

# **Governance for Decent Work in Agricultural Globalisation**

Dissertation for the acquisition of the academic degree

Doktor der Agrarwissenschaften (Dr. agr.)

Submitted to the Faculty of Organic Agricultural Sciences (FB11)

University of Kassel

By

Evans Appiah Kissi

**First supervisor:** Prof. Dr. Christian Herzig

**Second supervisor:** Dr. Emmanuel Y. Tenkorang

Witzenhausen, 2021

Date of submission: 26.02.2021

Date of disputation: 14.04.2021

## **Summary**

In the past decades, the agricultural world has become smaller as international food businesses have become organised around a global production network. One of the main factors for the introduction of a more decentralised and flexible food and agricultural system was the wage difference between Global North and Global South actors. In addition, Global South countries have facilitated the spread of Global Agricultural Value Chain/Global Agricultural Production Networks (GAVC/GAPNs) through promoting export processing zones and attracting foreign direct investments through non-existing or weak labour standards. The consequences are ‘decent work deficits’ within GAVC/GAPNs because of changing lead firm requirements and the fragmentation of labour through offshoring, outsourcing or contracting. To address labour rights violations within GAVC/GAPNs, different actors at various levels have responded through various hard laws and soft laws. Several studies have examined the effects of labour standards in addressing decent work deficits in GAVC/GAPNs. However, the issue of Global South, especially, smallholders and farmworkers’ capability to access decent work remains under-researched in the GAVC/GAPNs literature.

First, so far little is known about the conceptual tension in the determinants of the approaches that promote Global South actor’s participation in governance of decent work in GAVC/GAPNs. This tension may be a result of inadequate understanding of the different perspectives with regard to the response to governance gaps in addressing labour rights violations in various GAVC/GAPNs. Second, so far little is known about the role of rural institutional arrangements in promoting smallholder producers’ agency to access decent work. Focusing on rural institutions could help promote Global South inclusiveness and create an enabling environment for smallholders to actively embed themselves in managing working conditions within GAVC/GAPNs. Third, so far little is known about the growing role and the participation of Global South actors, in most cases smallholder farmers and farm workers, in lead firm governance processes. The exclusion of smallholders and farm workers in lead firm governance theorisation in labour research within GAVC/GAPNs—is because of inadequate public governance, lack of local knowledge expertise and power asymmetry between Global North buyers and Global South producers.

This thesis comprises three studies. In the first study, we attempt to highlight the different governance paths that are adopted by different stakeholders to improve labour-related practices in diverse GAPNs in the Global South based upon a comprehensive review. We also emphasise the methodologies employed in the analysis of labour-related issues in GAVC/GAPNs. In the second study, we analyse the role of rural labour arrangements on

smallholders' agency to access decent work, in particular avoiding child labour and improving safe working conditions using the case of Ghana's cocoa value chain. In the third study, we examine the factors that bring about the participation of smallholders in lead firm management of labour-related practices. It also clarifies the conditions leading to the provision of decent work through economic and social upgrading in Ghana's cocoa value chain. While the first paper is based on a systematic review analysis of peer-reviewed articles published before May 2017, the second and third studies utilise qualitative data from a wide range of actors within the cocoa production network of Ghana in 2018 and 2019 complemented by available recent sustainability-related reports of lead firms in the cocoa-chocolate value chain before December 2019.

Ghana and its cocoa sector are an interesting case for the empirical analysis because it provides a unique setting as regard to the 'partial liberalisation' of the sector. In addition, the potential evidence of decent work deficits amongst smallholders and their growing communities is obvious in Ghana due to a number of sustainability initiatives implemented by both private and public actors in the pursuit of higher productivity in the past decades.

In the first study, we find that the assessment of labour regulatory frameworks' impact on labour issues is more focused on private than public or social forms of governance and on vertical than horizontal frameworks. Wageworkers working on smallholder farms and agro-industries and women have received little consideration, in particular, if compared with wageworkers on plantations, as has the topic of occupational health and safety as a specific key labour issue. Overall, the existing body of empirical research can be characterised as being largely qualitative in nature, underexploiting the potential of quantitative or mixed methods research designs. This study contributes conceptually to recent debate on perspectives and methodologies in research on labour issues in global supply chains and provides a conceptual framework to analyse smallholder engagement for decent work within different agricultural value chains.

In the second study, we show how three labour arrangements – communal labour support systems, landowner-caretaker relations and rural service centres – grant opportunities or not for smallholder to access decent work, in particular to counter child labour and occupational health and safety risks in cocoa production in Ghana. We discuss several impediments of specific labour arrangements which can act as barriers to smallholders' agency and provide avenues for research into how challenges associated with labour arrangements can be addressed to improve working conditions of lower-tier suppliers in global agricultural production networks.

In the third study, our findings show that lead firms govern decent work through vertical and horizontal paths, and through a combination of both, and that factors including incentives, cooperation and multi-stakeholder collaboration, respectively, are key drivers for smallholders' participation in value chain governance. Our findings also reveal two drivers of economic upgrading—higher yields and premium payment—and clarify the conditions through which smallholder participation in lead firm governance can improve economic and social upgrading. Overall, our analysis shows that the economic upgrading of smallholder cocoa farmers does not fully translate into social upgrading for the smallholders and their farm workers. This is due to the cost of labour, weak labour monitoring, poor health training and education and the structural power of smallholder producers. We contribute to the debate on key drivers for smallholder participation in various lead firm governance approaches—as well as on how the global governance of value chains may simultaneously promote the economic and social upgrading of smallholder producers and their farm workers. The study findings provide avenues for research into global value chains to enhance decent work through economic and social upgrading, in the Global South.

We offer some general conclusions on the implications of the findings of the thesis and some suggestions for making smallholder capacity in decent work governance more effective. Overall, our study shows that the various governance approaches have not adequately addressed decent work deficits of smallholders and their farm workers. We conclude that Global South, especially smallholders and farm workers' capacity to access decent work is limited. Our recommendations relate to measures needed to improve smallholders and farm workers' capacity to access decent work in GAVC/GAPNs. We focus on ways to improve smallholder participation in existing governance mechanisms so that these approaches can deliver decent work more effectively. In terms of managerial implications, we highlight how key actors, in particular lead firms could enhance their governance mechanisms and in terms of policy implications we stress on labour governance through national government regulations.

### **Zusammenfassung**

In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten ist die Welt der Landwirtschaft kleiner geworden, da sich die internationalen Lebensmittelunternehmen um ein globales Produktionsnetzwerk herum organisiert haben. Einer der Hauptfaktoren für die Einführung eines dezentraleren und flexibleren Lebensmittel- und Agrarsystems war der Lohnunterschied zwischen den Ländern des Globalen Nordens und des Globalen Südens. Darüber hinaus haben die Länder des Globalen Südens die Ausbreitung globaler landwirtschaftlicher Wertschöpfungsketten/Global Agricultural Production Networks (GAVC/GAPNs) durch die Förderung von Freien Exportzonen und die Anziehung ausländischer Direktinvestitionen durch nicht vorhandene oder schwache Arbeitsstandards erleichtert. Die Folgen sind "Defizite bei menschenwürdiger Arbeit" innerhalb der GAVC/GAPNs aufgrund der sich ändernden Anforderungen der multinationalen Unternehmen und der Fragmentierung von Arbeitsschritten durch Offshoring, Outsourcing oder durch die Vergabe von Unteraufträgen. Um gegen Arbeitsrechtsverletzungen innerhalb der GAVC/GAPNs vorzugehen, haben verschiedene Akteur:innen auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen mit verschiedenen harten Gesetzen und weichen Gesetzen reagiert. Mehrere Studien haben die Auswirkungen verschiedener Arbeitsnormen bei der Bekämpfung von Defiziten bei menschenwürdiger Arbeit in GAVC/GAPNs untersucht. Die Frage, ob Kleinbauern und Kleinbäuerinnen und Landarbeiter:innen im Globalen Süden Zugang zu menschenwürdiger Arbeit erhalten können, ist in der GAVC/GAPN-Literatur jedoch noch wenig erforscht.

Erstens ist bisher wenig über das konzeptionelle Spannungsverhältnis bei den Determinanten der Ansätze bekannt, die die Beteiligung von Akteur:innen des Globalen Südens an der Governance menschenwürdiger Arbeit in GAVC/GAPNs fördern. Dieses Spannungsverhältnis kann auf ein unzureichendes Verständnis der unterschiedlichen Perspektiven in Bezug auf die Reaktion auf Lücken in der Unternehmensführung bei der Behandlung von Arbeitsrechtsverletzungen in verschiedenen GAVC/GAPNs zurückzuführen sein. Zweitens ist bisher wenig über die Rolle ländlicher institutioneller Arrangements bei der Förderung der Handlungsfähigkeit kleinbäuerlicher Produzent:innen beim Zugang zu menschenwürdiger Arbeit bekannt. Die Fokussierung auf ländliche Institutionen könnte dazu beitragen, die Inklusion im Globalen Süden zu fördern und ein günstiges Umfeld für Kleinbauern und Kleinbäuerinnen zu schaffen, damit sie sich aktiv in die Gestaltung der Arbeitsbedingungen innerhalb der GAVC/GAPNs einbringen können. Drittens ist bisher wenig über die wachsende Rolle und die Beteiligung von Akteur:innen des Globalen Südens,

in den meisten Fällen kleinbäuerliche Produzent:innen und Landarbeiter:innen, an den Governance-Prozessen der multinationalen Unternehmen bekannt. Der Ausschluss von kleinbäuerliche Produzent:innen und Landarbeiter:innen bei der theoretischen Gestaltung der Governance von multinationalen Unternehmen in der Arbeitsforschung innerhalb der GAVC/GAPNs ist auf die unzureichende öffentliche Kontrolle, das fehlende Fachwissen vor Ort und die Machtasymmetrie zwischen den Käufer:innen im Globalen Norden und den Produzent:innen im Globalen Süden zurückzuführen.

Diese Promotionsarbeit umfasst drei Studien. In der ersten Studie versuchen wir, auf der Grundlage eines umfassenden Überblicks die unterschiedlichen Governance-Pfade aufzuzeigen, die von verschiedenen Interessengruppen zur Verbesserung der arbeitsbezogenen Praktiken in diversen GAPNs im Globalen Süden eingeschlagen werden. Wir legen den Schwerpunkt auf Methoden, die bei der Analyse von arbeitsbezogenen Themen in GAVC/GAPNs vorrangig Anwendung finden. In der zweiten Studie analysieren wir die Rolle ländlicher Arbeitsverhältnisse für die Möglichkeiten der Kleinproduzent:innen, Zugang zu menschenwürdiger Arbeit zu erhalten, insbesondere zu Kinderarbeit und Arbeitsschutz in Ghanas Kakao-Wertschöpfungskette. In der dritten Studie untersuchen wir die Faktoren, die die Beteiligung von Kleinbauern und Kleinbäuerinnen am Management arbeitsbezogener Praktiken in Leitbetrieben bewirken. Außerdem werden die Bedingungen geklärt, die zu menschenwürdiger Arbeit durch wirtschaftliche und soziale Aufwertung in Ghanas Kakao-Wertschöpfungskette führen. Die erste Arbeit basiert auf einer systematischen Übersichtsanalyse von begutachteten Artikeln, die vor Mai 2017 veröffentlicht wurden. Die zweite und dritte Studie nutzen qualitative Daten von einer Vielzahl von Akteuren innerhalb des Kakaoproduktionsnetzwerks in Ghana aus den Jahren 2018 und 2019. Die Daten aus der empirischen Forschung werden durch verfügbare aktuelle nachhaltigkeitsbezogene Berichte von führenden Unternehmen der Kakao-Schokoladen-Wertschöpfungskette vor Dezember 2019 ergänzt.

Ghana und der dortige Kakaosektor sind ein interessanter Fall für die empirische Analyse, weil er ein einzigartiges Setting in Bezug auf die "Teilliberalisierung" des Sektors bietet. Darüber hinaus sind in Ghana aufgrund einer Reihe von Nachhaltigkeitsinitiativen, die sowohl von privaten als auch von öffentlichen Akteuren mit dem Ziel höherer Produktivität in den letzten Jahrzehnten umgesetzt wurden, potenzielle Anzeichen für Defizite bei der menschenwürdigen Arbeit unter Kleinbauern und ihren wachsenden Gemeinschaften offensichtlich.

In der ersten Studie stellen wir fest, dass sich die Bewertung der Auswirkungen von arbeitsrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen auf Arbeitsfragen mehr auf private als auf öffentliche oder soziale Formen der Governance und auf vertikale als auf horizontale Rahmenwerke konzentriert. Lohnarbeiter:innen in kleinbäuerlichen Betrieben und in der Agroindustrie sowie Frauen generell werden insbesondere im Vergleich zu Lohnarbeiter:innen auf Plantagen wenig berücksichtigt, ebenso wie das Thema Arbeitsschutz als spezifisches Kernthema der Arbeit. Insgesamt kann der vorhandene Korpus an empirischer Forschung als weitgehend qualitativ charakterisiert werden, wobei das Potenzial quantitativer oder gemischter Forschungsdesigns nicht ausgeschöpft wird. Diese Studie leistet einen konzeptionellen Beitrag zur aktuellen Debatte über Perspektiven und Methoden in der Forschung zu Arbeitsfragen in globalen Lieferketten und bietet einen konzeptionellen Rahmen zur Analyse des Engagements von Kleinbauern für menschenwürdige Arbeit innerhalb verschiedener landwirtschaftlicher Wertschöpfungsketten.

In der zweiten Studie zeigen wir, inwiefern drei Arbeitsverhältnisse - kommunale „labour support systems“, Beziehungen zwischen Landeigentümer:innen und Hausbesitzer:innen und ländliche Dienstleistungszentren - Kleinbauern die Möglichkeit bieten, Zugang zu menschenwürdiger Arbeit zu erhalten, insbesondere um Kinderarbeit und Arbeitsschutzrisiken in der Kakaoproduktion in Ghana zu bekämpfen. Wir diskutieren verschiedene Hindernisse spezifischer Arbeitsverhältnisse, die als Barrieren für die Handlungsfähigkeit von Kleinbauern und Kleinbäuerinnen wirken können, und zeigen Wege für die Forschung auf, wie Herausforderungen im Zusammenhang mit Arbeitsverhältnisse angegangen werden können, um die Arbeitsbedingungen von Zulieferern der unteren Ebene in globalen landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsnetzwerken zu verbessern.

In der dritten Studie zeigen unsere Ergebnisse, dass führende Unternehmen menschenwürdige Arbeit über vertikale und horizontale Pfade sowie über eine Kombination aus beidem regeln, und dass Faktoren wie Anreize, Kooperation und Multi-Stakeholder-Zusammenarbeit wichtige Antriebsfaktoren für die Beteiligung von Kleinbauern und Kleinbäuerinnen an der Governance von Wertschöpfungsketten sind. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen auch zwei Antriebsfaktoren der wirtschaftlichen Aufwertung - höhere Erträge und Prämienzahlungen - und zeigen die Bedingungen, durch die die Beteiligung von Kleinbauern und Kleinbäuerinnen an der Steuerung von multinationalen Unternehmen die wirtschaftliche und soziale Aufwertung verbessern kann. Insgesamt zeigt unsere Analyse, dass die wirtschaftliche Aufwertung der Kakao-Kleinbauern und -Kleinbäuerinnen nicht in vollem Umfang zu einer sozialen Aufwertung derselben und ihrer Landarbeiter:innen führt. Dies liegt

an den Arbeitskosten, der schwachen Überwachung der Arbeitskräfte, der unzureichenden gesundheitlichen und schulischen Ausbildung und der strukturellen Macht der Kleinbauern und Kleinbäuer:innen. Wir leisten einen Beitrag zur Debatte über die Schlüsselfaktoren für die Partizipation von Kleinbauern in verschiedenen Governance-Ansätzen von Leitbetrieben - sowie darüber, wie die globale Governance von Wertschöpfungsketten gleichzeitig die wirtschaftliche und soziale Aufwertung von Kleinbauern und Kleinbäuer:innen und ihren Arbeitskräften fördern kann. Die Ergebnisse der Studie bieten Anhaltspunkte für die Erforschung globaler Wertschöpfungsketten zur Förderung menschenwürdiger Arbeit durch wirtschaftliche und soziale Aufwertung im Globalen Süden.

Wir bieten einige allgemeine Schlussfolgerungen zu den Implikationen der Ergebnisse der Studie und einige Vorschläge, wie die Kapazitäten von Kleinbauern und Kleinbäuerinnen in der Governance für menschenwürdige Arbeit effektiver gestaltet werden können. Insgesamt zeigt unsere Studie, dass die verschiedenen Governance-Ansätze die Defizite der Kleinbauern und Kleinbäuerinnen und ihrer Landarbeiter:innen in Bezug auf menschenwürdige Arbeit nicht adäquat angegangen sind. Wir kommen zu dem Schluss, dass die Kapazitäten des Globalen Südens, insbesondere von Kleinproduzent:innen und Landarbeiter:innen, für den Zugang zu menschenwürdiger Arbeit begrenzt sind. Unsere Empfehlungen beziehen sich auf erforderliche Maßnahmen, um den Zugang von Kleinbauern, Kleinbäuerinnen und Landarbeiter:innen zu menschenwürdiger Arbeit in GAVC/GAPNs zu verbessern. Wir konzentrieren uns auf Möglichkeiten, die Beteiligung von Kleinbauern und Kleinbäuerinnen an bestehenden Governance-Mechanismen zu verbessern, damit diese menschenwürdige Arbeit effektiver in die Tat umsetzen können. In Bezug auf die Auswirkungen auf die Unternehmensführung heben wir hervor, wie die Hauptakteure und -akteurinnen, insbesondere die führenden Unternehmen, ihre Governance-Mechanismen verbessern könnten, und in Bezug auf die politischen Auswirkungen betonen wir die Arbeits-Governance durch nationale Regierungsvorschriften.



## **Acknowledgements**

This work was financially supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development through the “Exceed – Higher Education Excellence in Development Cooperation” programme of the German Academic Exchange Services. Furthermore, I would like to thank the International Centre for Development and Decent Work (ICDD) for their support in conducting the study, attending conferences and workshops throughout my PhD study. In addition, I am most grateful to the University of Kassel for their completion support through the DAAD STIBET Degree.

To accomplish this doctorate study, I have received enormous support from some people, whom I gratefully acknowledge. First and foremost, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Christian Herzig who is a friend and a mentor. I appreciate the faith he bestowed in me, the interest he showed in my work, as well as his continuous support and guidance throughout the entire period of my PhD. Without his encouragement, patience, positive energy and knowledge, it would have been very difficult to complete this thesis. I also thank my second supervisor Dr. Emmanuel Y. Tenkorang for his support, advice and insightful comments. Similarly, I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Christoph Scherrer and Prof. Dr. Detlev Möller for being members of my thesis committee and for insightful comments.

I would also like to thank all my colleagues including Janalisa, Johanna, Tanja, Mathias, Thuy, Jessica, Robin, Maren and Sophie at the section of Management in the International Food Industry for the pleasant and inspiring working environment, especially the many exciting non-academic activities and the words of encouragement we shared. Moreover, I thank Angela for her support with administration stuffs in the unit.

I am also very grateful to a number of cocoa license buying companies such as Produce Buying Company, Agro-Ecom, Olam and Kuapa Kokoo Limited as well as cocoa farmer cooperatives such as Kuapa Kokoo Cocoa Farmers Union Limited and ABOCFA who facilitated my data collection through allowing me to interview their officials and smallholder producers in Ghana. In addition, I am indebted to a number of organisations such as Touton, World Cocoa Foundation, Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance, Mondelēz International, International Cocoa Initiative and Solidaridad who willingly participated in the interviews during my data collection in Ghana.

Special thanks also go to my parents Mr. Charles Abrah Kissi and Madam Comfort Otiwaa, my aunty Mrs. Mary Owusuwaa Bentum and my siblings Phyllis Nana Owusu, Kingsley Osei-Bonsu Kissi, Dr. Edith Gyamfua Kissi, Bernard Nti Kissi and Emmanuel

## *Acknowledgements*

---

Frimpong Kissi for their prayers, love, support and encouragement throughout my entire academic life. They have always offered me the necessary support and believed in me to get to the top. I am also very grateful to my entire family members and friends for their love and prayers. Moreover, I thank my fiancée Afia Kyeraah Anim for her prayers, patience, love and understanding.

Finally, but not least, I am most grateful to the almighty God, for good health, peace, joy, happiness and knowledge in completing the thesis.

**Dedication**

I dedicate this work to my dear parents, my dear siblings and my dear fiancée.

## **Preface and Declaration**

This work was financially supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development through the “Exceed – Higher Education Excellence in Development Cooperation” programme of the German Academic Exchange Services. This PhD thesis is based on review and empirical research carried out within the thematic theme of the ICDD on “decent work along agricultural value chains”. The title of the dissertation is “governance for decent work in agricultural globalisation”. The study contains six chapters. Chapter one contextualises the background to the study, identifies research gaps and outlines stated research objectives in addressing the research problem. Chapters two, three and four contain scientific articles in different stages that have been submitted to peer-reviewed journals, all listed in Thomson Reuters Web of Science.

### *Chapter 2:*

Kissi, E. A., & Herzig, C. (2020). Methodologies and Perspectives in Research on Labour Relations in Global Agricultural Production Networks: A Review. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 56(9), 1615-1637. First published online: 12 Dec 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2019.1696956>

### *Chapter 3:*

Kissi, E. A., & Herzig, C. (submitted to journal). “The Role of Local Labour Arrangements on Decent Work: Evidence from Cocoa in Ghana”. *Journal of Rural Studies*, initial date submitted: 30 January 2021.

### *Chapter 4:*

Kissi, E. A., & Herzig, C. (under review: WD-19993). “Governance of Decent Work in Ghana’s Cocoa Industry: Implications for Economic and Social Upgrading”. *World Development*, initial date submitted: 16 February 2021.

*Chapter five* explains the contribution of the study to the existing theoretical knowledge on the concept of governance for decent work in agricultural globalisation. *Chapter six* summarises the key findings of the thesis, and derives some policy recommendations including limitations of the dissertation and relevant areas for future research.

I, Evans Appiah Kissi of the Management in the International Food Industry, University of Kassel, declares that in all three scientific articles at different stages listed above, Prof. Dr. Christian Herzig provided feedback and advice at all stages of the research process. The

## *Preface and Declaration*

---

research idea for all the three articles was developed by both of us. The following roles were performed by me: conceptualisation and designing of each study; conducting data collection and data analysis for each study; interpretation of research results in cooperation with the co-author for each study; and revision of each manuscript with the co-author. The co-author's address is shown below:

Prof. Dr. Christian Herzig.  
Faculty of Organic Agricultural Sciences, University of Kassel.  
Steinstr. 19  
37213 Witzenhausen.  
Tel: +49 5542 98 1208.  
Fax: +49 5542 98 1333.  
E-mail [herzig@uni-kassel.de](mailto:herzig@uni-kassel.de)

*Date:*

*Signature:* .....

I hereby confirm the statement made by *Mr. Evans Appiah Kissi* on the contributions to the three articles by both of us.

*Name: Prof. Dr. Christian Herzig    Signature:* .....

**Table of Contents**

Summary .....	i
Zusammenfassung .....	iv
Acknowledgements .....	viii
Dedication .....	x
Preface and Declaration .....	xi
Table of Contents .....	xiii
List of Tables.....	xv
List of Figures .....	xvi
List of Acronyms.....	xvii
<b>1 General Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background.....	1
1.2 Problem Statement.....	4
1.3 Research Objectives, Setting and Outline of the Thesis.....	6
<b>2 Methodologies and Perspectives in Research on Labour Relations in Global Agricultural Production Networks: A Review .....</b>	<b>8</b>
2.1 Introduction .....	8
2.2 Analytical Framework .....	10
2.2.1 Conceptual Perspectives.....	11
2.2.2 Units of Analysis.....	15
2.2.3 Research Methods .....	16
2.3 Methodology.....	17
2.3.1 Selection of Journals .....	17
2.3.2 Selection of Articles .....	18
2.4 Results and Discussion .....	19
2.4.1 Salience and Focus of Studies .....	20
2.4.2 Conceptual Perspectives.....	23
2.4.3 Unit of Analysis .....	29
2.5 Conclusions and Recommendations .....	35
<b>3 The Role of Local Labour Arrangements on Decent Work: Evidence from Cocoa in Ghana.....</b>	<b>38</b>
3.1 Introduction .....	38
3.2 Conceptual and Theoretical Background .....	40
3.2.1 Decent Work — child labour and occupational health and safety in GAPNs ...	40

## *Table of Contents*

---

3.2.2	Institutional Theory .....	42
3.3	Methodology.....	44
3.4	Results .....	47
3.4.1	Communal Labour Support.....	47
3.4.2	Landowner-Caretaker Relations.....	49
3.4.3	Rural Service Centres.....	50
3.5	Discussion.....	52
3.6	Conclusion.....	54
<b>4.</b>	<b>Governance of Decent Work in Ghana’s Cocoa Industry: Implications for Economic and Social Upgrading.....</b>	<b>57</b>
4.1	Introduction .....	57
4.2	Background.....	60
4.2.1	Decent work in agri-food value chains. ....	60
4.2.2	Value chain governance and Global South participation .....	61
4.2.3	Upgrading for decent work along value chains.....	62
4.3	Methodology.....	64
4.3.1	Research Context.....	64
4.3.2	Data Collection and Analysis .....	68
4.4	Findings .....	72
4.4.1	Smallholder Participation in Lead Firm Governance for Decent Work.....	75
4.4.2	Implications of Lead Firm Governance for Economic and Social Upgrading... ..	77
4.5	Discussion.....	81
4.6	Conclusion.....	84
<b>5</b>	<b>General Discussion.....</b>	<b>88</b>
5.1	Approaches to Improve and Maintain Decent Work in GAVC/GAPNs.....	88
5.2	Global South Capability for Decent Work in GAVC/GAPNs .....	92
<b>6</b>	<b>General Conclusions .....</b>	<b>96</b>
6.1	Main Findings.....	96
6.2	Policy and Managerial Recommendations .....	98
6.3	Limitations and Areas for Further Research.....	100
	Bibliography.....	103
	General Appendix .....	138
A1	Salience and Focus of Study One.....	138
A2	Interview Guide: Chapter Three (Study Two).....	151
A3	Interview Guide: Chapter Four (Study Three) .....	155

**List of Tables**

Table 2. 1 Salience and focus of studies, n=87 .....	21
Table 2. 2 Category of Journals of selected articles, n=87 .....	22
Table 2. 3 Labour regulatory frameworks examined in studies (actors), n=87 .....	25
Table 2. 4 Labour regulatory frameworks examined in studies (scope), n=87 .....	27
Table 2. 5 Labour issues examined in studies, n=87 .....	29
Table 2. 6 Unit of analysis examined in studies, n=87 .....	30
Table 2. 7 Research designs employed in the studies reviewed, n=87 .....	32
Table 3.1 Area selection.....	46
Table 4. 1 Overview of lead firms' involvement in and use of sustainability initiatives along GCVC.....	67
Table 4. 2 Interviews.....	69
Table 4.3 Sustainability reports of key actors of GCVC (traders, manufacturers, brands, NGOs).....	71
Table 4.4 Governance of smallholder cocoa producers in Ghana by lead firms (traders, manufacturers, and brands).....	74



**List of Figures**

Figure 2. 1 Selection of the articles for inclusion in the systematic review..... 19  
Figure 3.1 Two-stages data collection process.....45  
Figure 4.1 Ghana's cocoa value chain.....65

**List of Acronyms**

CLMRS	Child Labour Monitoring and Remediation System
COCOBOD	Ghana Cocoa Board
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GAPNs	Global Agricultural Production Networks
GAVC	Global Agricultural Value Chain
GPNs	Global Production Networks
GVC	Global Value Chain
ICI	International Cocoa Initiative
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LBCs	License Buying Companies
NGOs	Non-government Organisations
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PRISMA	Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
WCF	World Cocoa Foundation

## **1 General Introduction**

### **1.1 Background**

Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein coined the term ‘commodity chain’ to describe “a network of labour and production process whose end results is a finished product” (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1986:159). In the mid-1990s, the concept of global commodity chain was introduced to explain global industrialisation as a result of international trade (Gereffi, 1994). Beginning in the 2000s, emphasis of value creation along the supply chain was stressed which saw the name ‘global commodity chains’ being replaced with ‘global value chains’ (Gereffi et al., 2001) and a subsequent development of the global value chain framework (Gereffi et al., 2005). In the same period, early to mid-2000s, the focus of value chain was shifted to production networks as the latter was emphasised and argued to produce a better understanding of labour and production processes in the global economy (see for example, Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 2002; Sturgeon, 2001) because of emphasis on embeddedness, in addition to power and value found in the value chain concept (Coe et al., 2008).

Over the last two decades, globalisation has caused the rising emergence of Global Value Chain/Global Production Networks (GVC/GPNs). Today, GVC/GPNs have experienced a profound spread from the Global North to the Global South, mostly led by Transnational Corporations as a result of asset and market seeking (Dicken, 2015). Moreover, the fall of Fordism, increase in technology, communication and transport innovations and income and wage convergence are part of the reasons for the spread of GVC/GPNs (Baldwin, 2013). Furthermore, Global South countries have facilitated the spread of GVC/GPNs through promoting export processing zones and attracting foreign direct investments through weak or non-existing labour laws and standards (Horner, 2017; Levien, 2011; Papadopoulos et al., 2016).

The spread of GVC/GPNs has become the locus for which the world’s economy thrives (Cattaneo et al., 2010) with a major impact on employment as a result of rising expansion of outsourcing by multi-national companies from the Global North in the Global South because of trade liberalisation (Barrientos et al., 2016a). As a consequence, the expansion of outsourcing has led to a growing concern for the concept of decent work in the Global South, reflecting employment quality and satisfaction within GVC/GPNs (Barrientos et al., 2011a). For example, exploitative prices (Alamgir & Banerjee, 2019), price and sourcing squeeze practices of Global North buyers (Anner, 2020), weak governance institutions in the Global South (Reinecke &

Posthuma, 2019) and inadequate interaction and diffusion of public, private and social labour governance (Delautre, 2019) are major factors for poor working conditions in different GVC/GPNs. As a result, various Global North and Global South actors at different levels through diverse governance approaches are addressing poor working conditions within the global economy (Gilbert & Huber, 2017). Governance response to labour rights violations in GVC/GPNs can come at three main levels based on the type of actors involved (Gereffi & Lee, 2016).

First, at the public governance level, national governments can pass labour laws to regulate working conditions and hold companies responsible for labour rights violations in GPNs (Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Gilbert & Huber, 2017). Moreover, public actors can adopt international labour standards from the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The ILO has emphasised and developed many international labour standards in the form of conventions and protocols that are considered as ‘hard laws’ – legally binding after ratification by member states to regulate working conditions across the different GVC/GPNs (ILO, 2014). In addition, the ILO sometimes adopts ‘soft laws’ in the form of recommendations, declarations and resolutions as guidelines to promoting labour rights among nations.

Public governance may facilitate decent working conditions in GVC/GPNs because it is far reaching and covers all actors in a particular jurisdiction (Mayer & Gereffi, 2010), rests on democratic mechanisms with state power through legal requirements (Coslovsky, 2014) and is capable of reinforcing private forms of governance (Amengual, 2010; Toffel et al., 2015). For example, a growing body of research shows that state governance remains key in improving precarious working conditions in GVC/GPNs through facilitation, collaboration and regulation of labour laws and labour practice (Alford & Phillips, 2018; Knudsen et al., 2015, Kourula et al., 2019).

However, public governance may stimulate labour rights violations because it is often deliberately made weak, in particular in developing economies to attract or retain foreign direct investments, thus creating the problem of ‘race to the bottom’ (Davies & Vadlamannati, 2013; Wang, 2020). Studies such as LeBaron and Rühmkorf (2017) and Thomas and Turnbull (2018) have suggested that public governance is often ineffective in promoting and enforcing labour rights in global supply chains as state actors look for ways to partner with private actors who they believe have considerable knowledge of labour ‘governance-making’.

Second, at the company and industry level, multi-national companies have responded to accusations of labour rights violations of workers’ rights in their GVC/GPNs through private governance such as establishing company codes of conduct, adopting third party certification

standards or joining industry-wide initiatives which are all forms of ‘soft laws’ to promote decent work. Voluntary private initiatives have emerged widely because of increasing corporation search for legitimacy and reputation (Czinkota et al., 2014; Husted et al., 2016; Kauppi & Hannibal, 2017; Standing, 2008), to fill the gaps in the public governance system (Eberlein, 2019; Schrage & Gilbert, 2019) and to standardise firms’ commitment to sustainable labour practices in global supply chains (Ashwin et al., 2020; Kuruvilla et al., 2020).

Private governance may promote decent working conditions in GVC/GPNs because of their ability to empower local actors to comply with underlying rules of corporate social responsibility standards (Auld et al., 2015; Reynolds, 2017; Schuster & Maertens, 2017). For example, an increasing body of studies highlights that benefits of social premium, capacity building, job security and improved participation of local actors are contributory factors to the potential positive effect of private voluntary standards on labour (Dietz et al., 2019; Quaedvlieg et al., 2014; van Rijn et al., 2020). However, private governance may fail to empower Southern actors and thus encourage labour rights violations in GVC/GPNs. For instance, a growing body of research has stressed that a lower degree of compliance mechanisms (Koenig-Archibugi, 2017; Marx & Wouters, 2016), inefficient auditing and monitoring systems (Kim, 2013; Locke, 2013), increasing competition, contradictory ideas and diverse capacities among actors (Fransen & Conzelmann, 2015; Sippl, 2020), uneven participation of actors (Anner, 2017; Cramer et al., 2016; Oka, 2016; Reinecke & Donaghey, 2020) and lack of trade union access to rights (Salmivaara, 2018) can limit the effectiveness of private voluntary governance in promoting decent work.

Third, at the social level, different groups of stakeholders are involved in the processes of labour governance design and implementation through multi-stakeholder initiatives also referred to as ‘soft laws’ including codes of conduct, principle-based standards and reporting standards (Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Rasche & Waddock 2017). The difference between the social governance and private governance lies in the groups of actors involved in the design, development and implementation of the standards. Social governance typically includes a number of stakeholders including public actors, non-governmental organization (NGOs), trade unions, investors and multi-national companies (MNCs). Social governance has emerged rapidly because of lack of credibility and legitimacy in private governance schemes (Fuchs et al., 2011; Mena & Palazzo, 2012) and a call for more inclusiveness and cooperation in labour standard development and enforcement beyond compliance (Cheyns & Riisgaard, 2014; Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen 2014).

Social governance can promote good working conditions in GVC/GPNs because of improved legitimacy of underlying rules of labour standards and accountability through multiple stakeholder inclusion and capability building (de Bakker et al., 2019; Rasche, 2012). For example, an increasing body of research underlines the significance of a better democratic legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives in addressing labour rights violations in GVC/GPNs in comparison to private voluntary standards (Lee et al., 2020; Gereffi & Lee, 2016). However, there is an increasing challenge to the legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives (Whelan et al., 2019) that threatens its effectiveness on labour conditions because of varying degrees of interests and views among participating actors based on differences in formal and informal institutions (Boersma, 2018; Martens et al., 2018). For example, prior studies have argued that power imbalances (Brouwer et al., 2013) and resource imbalances (Moog et al., 2015) between MNCs in the Global North and suppliers and workers in the Global South, as well as potential ‘greenwashing’ (Riisgaard et al., 2020) in multi-stakeholder initiatives limits its impact on addressing labour related issues in GVC/GPNs.

Despite the efforts put in place by different stakeholders to address decent work deficits, the problem still persists across the globe. Overall, a fundamental challenge for different actors at various levels in governing decent work in the global economy is how to improve the position of businesses and workers simultaneously within different GVC/GPNs (Barrientos et al., 2011a). Therefore, the United Nations’ eighth of 17 Sustainable Development Goals, i.e. ‘Decent work and Economic Growth’, remains elusive, particularly for Global South actors.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

While a lot is known about the creation of governance instruments at different levels, ranging from soft laws to hard laws in addressing decent work deficits in GPNs—a number of conceptual and empirical challenges exists in literature with regard to issues about Global South capability—especially lower-tier suppliers in managing labour-related issues in GVC/GPNs. First, a key conceptual challenge is the tension in the determinants of what promotes and restrains Global South actor’s capacity to participate in global value chains governance (Ponte & Sturgeon, 2014). This tension may be a result of inadequate understanding of the different perspectives with regard to the response to governance gaps in addressing labour rights violations in various GVC/GPNs (Gereffi & Mayer, 2006).

Second, another empirical challenge in literature is the under-explored role of rural institutional arrangements in promoting the Global South, in particular smallholders’ capacity

to access decent work in GVC/GPNs (Barrientos et al., 2011b; Nielson & Pritchard, 2009). While previous studies have considered the effect of institutional environment (Bartley, 2012; Ponte et al., 2014), social embeddedness (Egels-Zandén, & Hansson, 2016; Kano, 2018) and resource allocation (Brown & Wright, 2018; Porteous et al., 2015) on encouragement of Global South actors to govern decent work, the role of governance structures, in particular rural institutions, remains an under-researched area in GPNs (Ponte et al., 2014). However, researchers have identified that the local conditions are key in promoting governance processes in GVC/GPNs (Mohan, 2016; Nielson & Pritchard, 2009).

Third, a major empirical challenge is the neglect of the growing role and the participation of Global South actors—in most cases lower-tier suppliers—in lead firm governance processes in various GVC/GPNs. Several theories and related empirical studies conclude that lower-tier suppliers in comparison to upper-tier suppliers are generally excluded in global value chain governance for sustainability practices (Alexander, 2020; Nadvi & Raj-Reichert, 2015; Kim & Davis, 2016; Strambach & Surmeier 2018; Tessmann, 2018). This is because of a weak role of the state (Gereffi, 2014; Nadvi, 2014; Neilson, 2014) and perceptions of inadequate local knowledge expertise (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). In addition, the power asymmetry between Global North buyers and Global South producers is an important determinant of the exclusion of Global South actors in the development of governance for decent work in GPNs (Lee & Gereffi, 2015).

In this thesis, we focus on the Global Agricultural Value Chain/Global Agricultural Production Networks (GAVC/GAPNs) to address the discussed research gaps. This thesis has three parts: the first study consists of a literature review of GAPNs, and the second and third present empirical findings from Ghana's cocoa value chain. In the first study, we attempt to highlight the different governance paths that are adopted by different stakeholders to improve labour-related practices in diverse GAPNs in the Global South based upon a comprehensive review. We also emphasise the methodologies employed in the analysis of labour-related issues in GAPNs. In the second study, we analyse the role of rural labour arrangements on smallholders' agency to access decent work, in particular avoiding child labour and promoting occupational safety and health in Ghana's cocoa value chain. In the third study, we examine the factors that bring about the participation of smallholders in lead firm management of labour-related practices. It also clarifies the conditions leading to the provision of decent work through economic and social upgrading in Ghana's cocoa value chain.

The GAPNs and Ghana's cocoa value chain specifically are interesting cases for such an analysis. This is because Global South actors who participate in GAVC/GAPNs are often

positioned at the level of production of raw materials with less status and governance capabilities that make them vulnerable to labour rights violations (Barrientos et al., 2011a). In addition, many smallholder decent work deficits are a result of differences in power dynamics between North and South actors (Grabs & Ponte, 2019). Moreover, issues of occupational gender segregation and cultural concerns (de Castro et al., 2020), combined with production and reproduction relations often in rural households make it increasingly difficult for Global South actors in particular, smallholders, to achieve decent work in GAPNs (LeBaron & Gore, 2020).

### **1.3 Research Objectives, Setting and Outline of the Thesis**

The overall aim of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the various approaches adopted in governing decent work in GAVC/GAPNs—and how the different approaches promote the capacity of Global South actors, in particular smallholder farmers and their farm workers to access decent work. Specifically, this thesis has the following objectives:

1. To review and examine the methodologies and perspectives in research on labour relations in GAPNs.
2. To examine the role of rural labour arrangements in promoting smallholders' agency to access decent work, with a particular focus on the topics of child labour and occupational safety and health risks in cocoa production networks in Ghana.
3. To examine factors that enable participation of smallholders in lead firms' management of labour-related practices in the Ghanaian cocoa-chocolate industry and the implications for economic and social upgrading.

While the analysis of objective one is based on a systematic review analysis of peer-reviewed articles published before May 2017, the analyses of objectives two and three are based on qualitative data collected from a wide a range of actors in the cocoa production network of Ghana in 2018 and 2019, complemented by available recent sustainability-related reports of lead firms in the cocoa-chocolate value chain before December 2019. The interview guide used for the data collection for objective 2 (A2) and the interview guide for objective 3 (A3), are both attached in the Appendix at the end of the thesis.

Ghana and its cocoa industry are an interesting case for empirical analysis because it provides a unique setting with regard to the 'partial liberalisation' that differs from the institutional arrangements in other African producing countries. In Ghana, the government



controls production and has a monopoly on export marketing through Ghana's Cocoa Marketing Board (COCOBOD) in what is often described as a partial market liberalisation structure (Kolavalli & Vigneri, 2017). Yet the state allows license buying companies (LBCs) to operate the domestic purchase of raw beans, at or above a fixed price that is announced annually (Kolavalli et al., 2012). In addition, Ghana alone accounts for about 20% of the world's cocoa production as the second largest producer after Côte d'Ivoire (ICCO, 2018). The production processes impact the livelihood of many key actors, including a large pool of about 800,000 smallholder farmers who produce raw cocoa beans on about 3-5 hectares on average (GSS, 2014). Moreover, the potential evidence of decent work deficits amongst smallholders, their farm workers and their growing communities is obvious in Ghana due to a number of sustainability initiatives implemented by both the private and public actors in the pursuit of social justice in the last decades (Fountain & Hütz-Adams, 2018).

The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents the first study, analysing the methodologies and perspectives in research on labour relations in GAPNs using descriptive qualitative and content analysis on selected peer reviewed articles. Chapter 3 presents the second study, analysing the role of rural labour arrangements in encouraging smallholders' agency in accessing decent work, in the cocoa value chain of Ghana. We employ qualitative content analysis by exploring key benefits and constraints of three major local labour arrangements on smallholders' agency to access decent work.

Chapter 4 presents the third study, analysing the factors that bring about the participation of smallholders— in processes of lead firm governance and clarifies the path to decent work through economic and social upgrading in the cocoa value chain of Ghana. We employ qualitative content analysis by building on Alexander's (2020) conceptualisation of how lead firms govern sustainability through vertical paths, horizontal paths and both vertical and horizontal linkages. We then expand the analysis, to investigate the key factors underlying smallholder participation. The analysis also examines how smallholder participation in the governance of value chains translates into economic and social upgrading and how these are interlinked.

In Chapter 5, we explain our contribution to the existing theoretical knowledge on the concept governance for decent within GAVC/GAPNs. In Chapter 6, we summarise the key findings of the thesis and derive some policy recommendations including limitations of the dissertation and relevant areas for future research.

## **2 Methodologies and Perspectives in Research on Labour Relations in Global Agricultural Production Networks: A Review<sup>1</sup>**

**Abstract:** The integration of Global South actors into the global agricultural economy has attracted research on labour effects. This is because Global South actors are often integrated at the level of production of raw materials with little power and less capture of gain. To better understand the conceptual perspectives and methodologies underpinning existing empirical studies and provide evidence for the labour-related practice, this paper conducts a systematic review of the methodologies and perspectives applied in the Global Agricultural Production Networks literature. Based on an analysis of 87 articles published in English-speaking journals, we show that the assessment of labour regulatory frameworks' impact on labour issues is more focused on private than public or social forms of governance and on vertical than horizontal frameworks. Wageworkers working on smallholder farms and agro-industries and women have received little consideration, in particular, if compared with wageworkers on plantations, as has the topic of occupational health and safety as a specific key labour issue. Overall, the existing body of empirical research can be characterised as being largely qualitative in nature, underexploiting the potential quantitative or mixed methods research designs. Our review generates methodological ideas and conceptual perspectives for future studies to consider.

### **2.1 Introduction**

The agricultural sector plays an important role for the development of the Global South. It provides employment for the vast majority of the labour force in Southern countries, in particular in low-income and lower-middle income countries where the sector accounts for 68.9% and 38.9% of labour force, respectively (ILOSTAT, 2018). With the emergence of global production networks – “the globally organised nexus of interconnected functions and operations by firms and non-firm institutions through which goods and services are produced and

---

<sup>1</sup> This chapter represents an article published by the author of this dissertation and Prof. Dr. Christian Herzig as a co-author. Any reference to this chapter should be cited as:

Kissi, E. A., & Herzig, C. (2020). Methodologies and Perspectives in Research on Labour Relations in Global Agricultural Production Networks: A Review. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 56(9), 1615-1637. First published online: 12 Dec 2019.

## ***Chapter 2. Methodologies and Perspectives in Research on Labour Relations in Global Agricultural Production Networks: A Review***

---

distributed” (Coe et al., 2004, p. 471) – agricultural workers have become integrated into the Global Agricultural Production Networks (GAPNs).

Criticism of GAPNs is often directed towards labour violations such as low wages, lack of job security and little or no social protection from which workers, in most cases self-employed smallholder farmers and waged workers on plantations and/or smallholder farms, suffer persistently (ILO, 2014). They often suffer such violations because of their position, status and type of work within production networks (Barrientos et al., 2011a). In response to this ethical misconduct, various governance mechanisms and codes have been developed and introduced by a number of institutions and organisations.

Perhaps most prominently, a number of conventions, protocols and recommendations have been enacted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to formulate standards as well as assess and guide working conditions specifically for the agricultural sector (for further details refer to the ILO NORMLEX). At international level, the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) has also provided a number of guidelines to address labour-related issues in the sector (see for example, FAO, 2016). Other mechanisms emerged to address labour issues in GAPNs include company codes of conduct, government regulations, multi-stakeholder initiatives and industry level initiatives (Gilbert & Huber, 2017; Locke et al., 2013).

In the academic world, the proliferation of these labour regulatory mechanisms in GAPNs has attracted considerable research. Studies have largely focused on the impact of regulatory frameworks on labour relations, concluding with somewhat mixed impacts for actors from the Global South. For example, some authors posit that GAPNs contribute to improvement in working conditions. This is due to increase of bargaining power, improvement in capacity building and training, and empowerment (Gibbon & Riisgaard, 2014; Lockie et al., 2015; Maertens & Swinnen, 2012; Raynolds, 2012; Schuster & Maertens, 2017). On the other hand, some studies show a negative impact because of factors such as a decline in respect for labour rights, coercive working conditions, discrimination and lack of understanding of regulatory mechanisms (Bacon, 2010; Cramer et al., 2016; Dolan, 2008; Potter & Hamilton, 2014; Stringer et al., 2016).

The recent increase in attention paid to empirical research on labour issues within GAPNs has attracted some reviews. Terstappen et al. (2013) qualitatively scope the effect of Fairtrade and alternative trade on social issues including gender, health, labour and inequities in the agricultural sector with mixed evidence. Oya et al. (2018) carry out a systematic

qualitative synthesis and meta-analysis on the socio-economic impacts of voluntary standards for agricultural production. This study shows that there are inadequate and diverse findings on the effects of certification standards for agricultural producers and waged workers in the Global South. While we share with these reviews our interest in the geographical focus, i.e. the Global South – because of the high focus on empirical research in that part of the region, the agricultural sector’s significant contribution to employment, and the workers’ vulnerability and marginalisation –, none of the other studies discusses the conceptual perspectives and choice of methodologies used in the studies reviewed.

Reviews of conceptual perspectives and methodologies, however, are fundamental to improving the scientific quality of research and providing guidance for future studies to make appropriate decisions about the choice of methodologies. They stimulate research that improves and expands on the limited range and strength of conceptual perspectives and methodology used to date. Failure to address the limitations of existing perspectives and methodologies biases the study findings of future studies and does not allow findings to be generalised or replicated by other researchers. Our study therefore adds to the existing knowledge by asking: What are the conceptual perspectives that various studies have discussed and their methodologies used in examining social concerns in global agricultural value chains?

The remainder of the review is organised in five sections. Section 2 presents the analytical framework guiding our systematic review. Section 3 provides methods used in selecting articles included in the final review and the analytical tools used for the synthesis. In section 4, we show the results and discuss the findings from the review. In section 5, we conclude on the final systematic review and provide recommendations for future research.

## **2.2 Analytical Framework**

A systematic review is inherently an important approach across different fields. It is a way of sieving large bodies of information to make sense, remove uncertainty and give high credence to research findings for the purpose of creating generalisations (Petticrew & Roberts, 2008; Cooper & Hedges, 2009). We apply an analytical framework based upon three themes: (a) conceptual perspectives: regulatory frameworks and labour issues; (b) units of analysis, and (c) research methods. These themes are identified in order to review the evolution and current status of conceptual perspectives and methodologies utilised for examining labour issues in empirical studies on GAPNs.

## **2.2.1 Conceptual Perspectives**

Research on GAPNs can conceptually be based upon broader labour regulatory frameworks or more narrowly designed to examine specific labour issues.

### **2.2.1.1 Labour Regulatory Frameworks**

Research on global value chains emphasises the role of governance in shaping the behaviour of actors along the supply chain, aiming to examine the labour outcome of different actors participating in GAPNs (Ponte & Sturgeon, 2014). The governance of value chains often involves many ways (incl. rules, standards, and codes of conduct) by which some actors regulate and coordinate activities of other actors through different institutional arrangements (Boström et al., 2015). In the recent past, production networks have experienced a profound spread from the Global North to the Global South, mostly led by Transnational Corporations as a result of asset and market seeking (Dicken, 2015). The spread of global production networks has become the locus for which the world's economy seems to thrive (Cattaneo et al., 2010).

However, the sourcing practices of global lead actors have raised questions on labour rights violations of actors further up the chain (Barrientos, 2013a). Therefore, the majority of global chain actors (incl. public and private) have responded to address working conditions in their value chains through various regulations. The labour regulation depends on specific country conditions despite guidelines provided at the international level by reputable international organisations. The regulations determine the power relationship between Transnational Corporations and workers hegemony, and, Transnational Corporations and the state inter-laced hegemony (Scherrer, 2017).

Labour regulatory frameworks take the form of public, private or social governance on either a vertical or a horizontal path (Gereffi & Lee, 2016). While horizontal governance implies that national and local actors play the lead role in formulating, implementing and enforcing labour regulatory frameworks, global firms and international organisations play the lead role in vertical governance (Tallontire et al., 2011).

Public governance are formal regulations and laws to reform and address labour rights. They may take the form of national, extraterritorial or inter-governmental laws enforced by public actors (Gilbert & Huber, 2017). Public governance plays a significant role in improving labour rights within GAPNs (Coslovsky, 2011). In addition, they complement private and social

governance in improving working and labour rights in supply chains (Amengual, 2010). However, there are gaps in the existence, implementation and effectiveness of public governance in the Global South (Gilbert & Huber, 2017). The challenges of public governance are part of the reasons for the proliferation of private governance within GAPNs.

Private governance is driven by lead firms and is essential in improving working conditions in agricultural globalisation (Henson & Humphrey, 2009; Nadvi, 2008). This form of governance has proliferated along GAPNs as a result of retail power, consumer demand for quality, liberalised international trade, foreign direct investment and improvement in technologies (Henson & Humphrey, 2009; Henson & Reardon, 2005). This form of governance has received wide attention in research and debates regarding its effect on working and general welfare for Global South actors (Mayer & Gereffi, 2010; Lee et al., 2012).

Social governance is the third form of governance that involves multiple actors such as non-government organisations (NGOs), civil society groups, governments, private organisations and trade unions to seek a common aim (Hughes et al., 2008; O'Rourke, 2006). Besides regulatory frameworks that have advanced in labour research in GAPNs, research has also taken a more narrowly designed approach to enhancing our understanding of individual labour issues, as described in the following.

#### **2.2.1.2 Labour Issues**

In the context of increased attention paid to the governance and economic upgrading of global value chains as well as the effectiveness of supplier strategies, the world of work in GAPNs has been changing rapidly. As a consequence, the concept of decent work, reflecting employment quality and satisfaction within global production networks – has gained considerable attention in the last two decades (see for example, ILO, 2014). This is not only evident in the development of ILO conventions, but also in the broader academic research on poverty and social improvement (see for example, Bell & Newitt, 2010). Accordingly, labour standards have become more relevant than before (Barrientos et al., 2011a) and a number of labour laws and standards have been issued, stemming from the ILO to address the numerous persistent labour issues in GAPNs and the attempt to prevent the “race to the bottom” effect (Bhagwati, 1995; Davies & Vadlamannati, 2013). Such labour issues include a number of subjects covered by

the ILO's International Labour Standards (ILS)<sup>2</sup>. Key persistent issues relevant to the agricultural and other sectors include fundamental principles and rights at work, employment issues, skills development and training, and occupational safety and health (ILO, 2014).

### ***Fundamental Principles of Rights at Work***

The fundamental principles of right at work represents four sub-dimensions that are core international labour standards of the ILO. These include freedom of association and collective bargaining, effective abolition of child labour, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

In the agricultural sector, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining (FACB) is largely absent. This is because formal organisation that may lead to the right to collective bargaining is mostly missing (Barrientos et al., 2003). Meanwhile, collective bargaining enables a common voice for smallholder farmers and wageworkers. With a common voice, they form a strong coalition that aids in a strong negotiation for decent work. For example, strengthening of union coordination and improvement in union strategies improves working conditions in the banana and cut flower value chains (Riisgaard & Hammer, 2011).

Child labour is another major problem in the agricultural sector. The sector accounts for much of the world's incidence of child labour. The concept is identified as any work that interferes with the educational, physical, moral, social and mental well-being of children between the ages of five and seventeen (ILO, 2017). Smallholder farmers and wageworkers in the Global South often engage their children in some farm activities. This is because of poverty, big supply of children in rural areas and lack of educational opportunities and prospects (Dammert, 2017).

Forced and compulsory labour is another major concern in GAPNs. This is usually due to a number of reasons. For example, Yea (2017) assesses unfree labour amongst labour migrants and concludes that employer tactics to manipulate labour management practices and the fear of migrants to contest abuse is valuable in predicting forced or compulsory labour in a global economy. In addition, increased deception and coercive labour recruitment practices,

---

<sup>2</sup> The International Labour Standards cover a wide range of labour concerns (such as forced labour, slave labour, child labour, employment promotion, employment security, wages, working time, etc.) in a globalised economy (for further details see: ILO,2014)

## ***Chapter 2. Methodologies and Perspectives in Research on Labour Relations in Global Agricultural Production Networks: A Review***

---

competition within global agricultural supply chains and omission of information forms a major contribution to forced labour (Phillips & Sakamoto, 2012; Potter & Hamilton, 2014; Stringer et al., 2016).

Although women play an important role in agricultural production, they are often at the receiving end of worst forms of labour mistreatment (Barrientos, 2014). There is evidence to suggest that employment opportunities and working conditions are not the same for men and women in agricultural globalisation (Patel-Campillo, 2012). Female workers are rarely concentrated in higher paid positions and secure employment (Greenberg, 2013; Dolan, 2004). There is also evidence of wage gaps between male and female workers in a globalised economy. The reasons for this is partly due to occupational segregation along social-economic roles, changes in prices, bargaining power and employment hierarchies (England, 2010; Gaddis & Pieters, 2017; Rao, 2011; Robertson et al., 2020).

### ***Employment Issues***

Agricultural globalisation is expected to influence employment parameters such as wages, working hours and employment security. An often-meaningful debate for globalisation is that it enhances improved technology adoption and encourages labour substitution from low productivity to high productivity industries (McMillan, et al., 2014; Minten, et al., 2009). However, there are also arguments against globalisation because of exclusion of smallholder farmers, limited opportunities for marginalised workers and poor farmers (Farina & Reardon, 2000; Gibbon, 2003). A number of studies provide convincing evidence that the production of quality agricultural products and adoption of certification standards do not improve wages, employment security and working hours in GAPNs (Bonanno & Cavalcanti, 2012; Cramer et al., 2016; Kritzinger et al., 2004; Trauger, 2014). On the other hand, compelling confirmation shows that adoption of certification standards and increase in export agricultural products is associated with employment security and higher daily wages for farm workers (Colen et al., 2012; Ortiz & Aparicio, 2007).

### ***Skills Development and Training***

The impact of globalisation on skills development and training of smallholder farmers and wagedworkers is contested. At one end of the spectrum is the argument that agricultural



globalisation empowers only elite farmers at the expense of smallholder farmers (Dolan, 2010; Getz & Shreck, 2006; Loconto & Simbua, 2012; Lyon, 2006; McEwan & Bek, 2006; Shreck, 2002; Staricco & Ponte, 2015). At the other end of the spectrum is the fact that actors benefit from social premiums, capacity building and increasing managerial expertise (Herman, 2010; Lyon, 2007b; Makita, 2012; Quaedvlieg et al., 2014; Schuster & Maertens, 2017).

### ***Occupational Safety and Health***

The agricultural sector is known to be one of the sectors with a high record of fatal occupational safety and health injuries (Alsamawi et al., 2017). The desire to increase agricultural export demand has resulted in the use of intensive fertilizer and chemical application that causes dire consequences to occupational health and safety in the sector (Raynolds, 2012). One of the ways to solve the occupational safety and health menace is through intensive education and training of farmers and workers on how to comply adequately and effectively with the respective regulations of various certification standards (Raynolds, 2014; Said-Allsopp & Tallontire, 2014). According to Asfaw et al. (2010), adoption of certification standards enhances lower use of pesticides, application of less harmful chemicals and effective pesticide management practices.

#### **2.2.2 Units of Analysis**

According to Barrientos et al. (2011a), the unit of analysis of global production networks is the value chain that links production to consumption. It mostly comprises different types of work force to produce a product until it gets to the final consumer. These include small-scale household and home-based work, low-skilled, labour intensive work, medium-skilled, mixed production technologies work, high skilled, technology intensive and knowledge-intensive work. The different types of workforce are linked to the global production networks because of trade liberalisation, wage convergence and technological innovation amongst others (Baldwin, 2013).

Distinguishing and clarifying between different categories of agricultural workers and farm owners in value chain research is necessary to identify challenges and opportunities for a specific group of people. For example, on the one hand, a gendered mapping of agricultural value chains may help to identify the niches and opportunities for women's participation in

agricultural globalisation (Masamha et al., 2018). On the other hand, according to the ILO (2018), out of the 1.1 billion people working in agriculture, there are about 300-500 million waged workers. Smallholder farmers and waged workers essentially occupy the lower tiers in GAPNs and the type of work they perform is mostly small-scale household, and low skilled labour intensive (Barrientos et al., 2011a). Hence, they are often prone to labour abuse because of their position within the GAPNs with minimal or no power. Hence, overly simplified perceptions of rural employment and producers' livelihoods fall short in addressing the heterogeneity of roles in agricultural employment and understanding the implications of different regulatory frameworks and upgrading strategies for work in agriculture (Matheis & Herzig, 2019).

### **2.2.3 Research Methods**

Conducting research with social impact has a history of methodological experiences that researchers can learn from (Høgsbro, 2015). Commonly used research designs for understanding the effect of labour regulatory frameworks on different labour actors include qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods. The two main designs, qualitative and quantitative differ in their research activities (or characteristics) such as approach, selection of unit of analysis, data collection and data analysis (Creswell, 2014). Available qualitative strategies or approaches include case study, ethnography, narrative, phenomenology, and grounded theory (Lewis, 2015). Strategies employed in quantitative designs are pre-experimental, true experiment, quasi-experimental design and single subject design (Creswell, 2014).

While quantitative methods employ probability-sampling methods aimed at sample representativeness, qualitative sampling methods often employ non-probability sampling methods aimed at theoretical saturation (Silverman, 2015). Concerning data collection, qualitative studies employ interviews, observations, conversation analysis, and discourse analysis while quantitative designs utilize mainly surveys and questionnaires (Bryman, 2016; Creswell, 2014). Quantitative data analytical methods include descriptive statistics and regression analysis to test for statistical significance while qualitative analytical methods include grounded theory, narrative analysis, discourse analysis, content analysis, thematic analysis and contextual analysis to generate codes, categories and themes (Creswell, 2014; Silverman, 2015).

## **2.3 Methodology**

In this outline of the methodology, we explain the selection of peer reviewed journals and articles. We did not impose any restriction on the date of publication of potential studies to be included in our final analysis to allow for wider search based on keywords. However, we restricted our search to studies written in only English. We analysed our data using descriptive qualitative analysis and content analysis.

### **2.3.1 Selection of Journals**

We focused on the selection of peer-reviewed journals containing studies related to our interest including labour, employment, work and decent work issues in supply chains, commodity chains, value chains and/or production networks in the agricultural industry.

We selected a number of journal categories defined in the ISI Web of Knowledge whose scope and focus relates to the focus of our review. These categories include *Agricultural Economics and Policy, Agriculture Diary Animal Science, Agriculture, Multidisciplinary, Agronomy, Business, Economics, Ethics, Fisheries, Food Science and Technology, Forestry, Horticulture, Geography, Green & Sustainable Science & Technology, Industrial Relations & Labour, Management, Operations Research Management Science, Planning and Development, Political Science, Sociology, Social Issues and Urban Studies.*

Some potentially relevant peer-reviewed journals are not listed in the ISI Web of knowledge because of a journal's own decision not to apply to be listed or failure to meet the inclusion criteria of Thomson Reuters. Hence, to complement our review, we checked for cross references of articles and added further journals. These include *The European Journal of Development Research, Journal of Corporate Citizenship, International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture & Food, Development in Practice, Food Chain, Competition & Change, Culture, Agriculture, Food and Environment, Journal of Consumer Policy, Development in Practice, The European Journal of Development Research and Social Anthropology.*

In general, we restricted our search to peer-reviewed journals although some reviews also include grey materials to enhance the scope of evidence (Rothstein & Hopewell, 2009). In comparison to peer-reviewed studies, grey materials often contribute little to methodology improvement, the focus of this study. Moreover, they do not receive rigorous review process and thus often lack the quality of a peer-reviewed article. For example, Egger et al., (2003)

suggest it is better to suffer criticisms of exclusion of grey materials than to introduce bias in a finding due to inclusion of all available publications that have low methodological quality. Lastly, replication of a research synthesis depends on transparency, thorough documentation and easy verification of the final studies included (Rothstein & Hopewell, 2009; Wilson, 2009). A complete coverage, access and verification of all grey literature, however, is usually not possible. To maintain validity and neutrality of our findings, we thus focus on articles published in peer-reviewed journals as described above.

### **2.3.2 Selection of Articles**

Articles were selected and presented following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) by Moher et al. (2015). The different phases of the systematic review and the results from this review are illustrated in Figure 2.1 (see for a similar approach, for example, Zürcher, 2017). We first identified articles which were published before May 2017, through key word searches in the selected journals by using an asterisk to indicate wildcard search and quotation marks for a whole term (phrases). We also used “AND”, “OR” and “NOT” for our search combinations.

The key words and combinations used include: Lab\* (e.g., labo(u)r, labo(u)rrers); Work\* (e.g., worker and workers); Employ\* (e.g., employment, employees, and employers); Agric\* (e.g., agriculture and agricultural); Food\*; “Supply Chain\*”; “Commodity Chain\*”; Value Chain\*; Production Network\*, Sustainab\* (e.g., sustainable, sustainability), Gender\*, Health\*, Empower\*, Social\*, Skill\*, Wage\*, Bargain\* and Safe\*. A total number of 3810 articles were identified through our key word searches and combinations from the ISI Web of Knowledge and additional journals from cross cutting references. Next, we screened the titles, abstracts and full texts. 2610 articles were excluded after screening the titles while 963 were excluded after screening the abstracts. The final study selection among the remaining 237 articles was based on an inclusion criterion developed by the authors and applied to all studies to avoid biases. The eligibility criteria for inclusion are as follows.

1. The study investigates labour related issues in agriculture from one or more of the following sub-sectors: crops; livestock; agro-forestry; fishing and aquaculture.
2. The study covers one or more of the labour related issues identified in International Labour Standards (ILO, 2014).
3. The study is an empirical paper.

4. The study reports primary (original) result or parts of a wider study project and not findings from a review of other studies or other studies as a joint project.

Based on these eligibility criteria, 87 articles were finally included in the systematic review.




Figure 2. 1 Selection of the articles for inclusion in the systematic review

## 2.4 Results and Discussion

This section first describes the salience and focus of studies (see Table A.1 in the Appendix for more information) and proceeds to discuss the three themes presented in section 2.2

### **2.4.1 Salience and Focus of Studies**

Since the year 2000, the number of research studies into labour issues in GAPNs has constantly risen indicating an evolving interest of research in this field (see Table 2.1). The first articles were published during the period between 2000 and 2005 (13 articles; 15%) whilst the total number of articles then increased from 35 (40%) in 2006-2011 to 40 publications (45%) in 2012-2017. The growing interest can be explained by widespread exposure of labour rights violations such as low wages, forced labour, gender discrimination and child labour mostly by civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations (Gibbon & Riisgaard, 2014; Jacobs et al., 2015; Nickow, 2015).

Regarding what product has been the focus of research, our data shows that articles focusing on horticultural commodities (such as fruits, vegetables, cut flowers, and ornamental flowers) make almost half of all studies (46%). 16% and 13% of the final articles concentrate on coffee and the wine industry, respectively. Other crops such as sugar, tea, cocoa, agave, berry, and acai account for 15% while multiple categories of products are assessed in 8% of the articles. Fish and livestock play a minor role in labour related studies of GAPNs (2%).

The higher focus on non-traditional exports compared to traditional agricultural commodities may not be surprising for two reasons.

First, government and donor policies in the past have focused attention on transnational value chains given their potential for poverty reduction amongst smallholder farmers and for national economic growth for the Global South (Humphrey, 2006). Second, the concern of food safety and risks (Hammoudi et al., 2009), and the growing recognition of transparency (Gardner et al., 2018) has resulted in the development of a wide range of policies (Knudsen et al., 2015) in addressing responsible and sustainable food production in a global context. This has created a spotlight on the assessment of policies and sourcing strategies of global private actors on working conditions of Global South actors.

In terms of regional focus across the Global South, Table 2.1 indicates a high number of studies carried out in countries from Africa and Latin America (46% each). The low number of studies concerning Asian countries (5%) is a puzzle. Potential explanations include; first, the African and Latin American bias of studies may relate to donor and public policies' foci as well as the scholarly tendency to investigate contemporary issues and developments in value chains and countries that are in the spotlight of scholarly debates. For example, there has been a heightened interest by researchers in examining labour-related issues in the garment sector in South and South East Asia (e.g., Ahmed & Peerlings, 2009;

***Chapter 2. Methodologies and Perspectives in Research on Labour Relations in Global Agricultural Production Networks: A Review***

---

Polaski, 2006; Tran & Jeppesen, 2016). Moreover, we might have missed relevant studies in that part of the South due to the English language bias of the review and the focus on peer reviewed articles. See for example an edited book chapter by Scherrer and Verma (2018). However, the relevance (and visibility) of labour related concerns in other sectors in Asia does not preclude the likelihood of persistent forms of labour concerns in the agricultural industry.

Table 2. 1 Saliency and focus of studies, n=87

<b>Year, product, region</b>	<b>Frequency [abs.]</b>	<b>Percent [%]</b>
<i>Year</i>		
2000-2005	13	15
2006-2011	35	40
2012-2017	39	45
<i>Product</i>		
Coffee	14	16
Fish and livestock	2	2
Horticulture	40	46
Multiple category	7	8
Other crops	13	15
Wine	11	13
<i>Region</i>		
Africa	40	46
Asia	40	5
Latin America	4	46
Mixed	3	3

Likewise, more cross-country evidence could provide a platform for a wider understanding and comparativeness of labour issues in GAPNs (Barrientos, 2014; Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Riisgaard & Hammer, 2011). Of all papers reviewed, only 3% were cross-country comparative studies (see Table 2.1). This presumably reflects the strong bias towards qualitative research in our sample as outlined further below (section 4.4). Qualitative studies tend to be more exploratory and in-depth in nature, making comparison across countries more difficult to design and execute.

***Chapter 2. Methodologies and Perspectives in Research on Labour Relations in Global Agricultural Production Networks: A Review***

---

Table 2.2 presents an overview of the type of journals in which the empirical studies have been published. Our findings show that, perhaps unsurprisingly, labour and agricultural globalisation studies have most frequently been published in development and economics journals – in particular, if one also takes into account journals addressing multiple disciplines (i.e. economics and development as well as geography and environment). Leading journals in this category are *Journal of Development Studies*, *World Development*, and *Journal of Agrarian Change*.

Table 2. 2 Category of Journals of selected articles, n=87

<b>Journal category</b>	<b>Frequency [abs.]</b>	<b>Percent [%]</b>
Economics and Development	21	24
Agriculture and Food	14	16
Sociology and Anthropology	12	14
Geography and Environment	12	14
Business and Management	8	9
International & Industrial Relations and Labour	7	8
Geography and Environment; Economics and Development	7	8
Others	6	7

A second group of journals contributing to this field of research is composed of the categories “agriculture and food” (in particular, *Agriculture and Human Values*), “sociology and anthropology”, and “geography and the environment” (in particular, *Geoforum*). It should be noted that a few journals in these three categories have also additional links or overlap with other areas and disciplines. 3 out of 14 articles in the category “agriculture and the environment” are published in agricultural economics journals while journals allocated to “sociology and anthropology” often reflect a diverse forum for multiple perspectives including geography, economics, development, industrial relations and political sciences (in 6 out of 12 cases).

Other disciplinary journals, in which empirical research on global agricultural production networks is presented and discussed, belong to management, business, international relations and industrial relations. The group of “other journals” represents a mix of disciplines including green and sustainability sciences and technology, consumer studies, and political sciences.



Overall, the findings show that a large spectrum of disciplines and perspectives contributes to our knowledge about labour-related issues in agricultural globalisation. Moreover, there is a notable number of journals dedicated to interdisciplinary research fostering the development of this field of research.

### **2.4.2 Conceptual Perspectives**

The conceptual perspectives analysed in our review comprise labour regulatory frameworks and labour issues.

#### **2.4.2.1 Labour Regulatory Framework**

The studies in our review consider the effect of a variety of labour regulatory frameworks. These frameworks vary mainly according to the actors involved (private, social, or public) or the scope of coverage (vertical or horizontal) (Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Tallontire et al., 2011).

Table 2.3 shows that studies which focus on one actor group primarily consider private labour regulatory frameworks (62%). Few studies (2%) solely assess public labour regulatory frameworks whilst an increasing number of studies have focused on social labour regulatory frameworks in recent years (in total 18%). In addition, some studies evaluate two forms of labour regulatory frameworks such as private and social (10%), private and public (5%) and social and public (1%) as well as all three forms of framework (1%).

These findings echo the shift from public policies to private regulations, for example in food safety and risk regulations as imposed by actors from the Global North in the last decade (Hammoudi et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2012). This has also amounted to a relatively speedy shift from public policies to private regulations among researchers' interests in order to study the impacts of the novel approaches on working conditions and general welfare of global South actors (Mayer & Philips, 2017; Lee et al., 2012). The growing interest of enquiry of social labour regulatory frameworks that can be noted in recent years might stem from the notion that they offer better democratic legitimacy compared to private governance (Mena & Palazzo, 2012). They are also usually regarded as an effective way of dealing with labour violations (Locke, 2013). The limited number of studies particularly focusing on public regulatory frameworks may be due to conceptualising labour regulatory frameworks as a coordination mechanism between private companies in the beginning of the global commodity chains and value chains literature (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). This has led to the role of public

***Chapter 2. Methodologies and Perspectives in Research on Labour Relations in Global Agricultural Production Networks: A Review***

---

labour regulatory frameworks being downplayed and understudied (Alford, 2016). Moreover, government labour regulatory frameworks for addressing labour issues within GAPNs are often considered to be either lacking, weak or exploitative (Gilbert & Huber, 2017).

The observation of considering two or all three forms of labour regulatory frameworks in some studies is encouraging. Private, social or public labour regulatory frameworks alone are not enough to provide a better understanding of how labour conditions within GAPNs can be improved.

Table 2. 3 Labour regulatory frameworks examined in studies (actors), n=87

<b>Actor focus of labour regulatory frameworks</b>	<b>Frequency [abs.]</b>	<b>Percent [%]</b>	<b>Examples for specific labour regulatory frameworks<sup>3</sup></b>
Public	2	2	National identity and culture (Bowen & Gaytan, 2012), national institutions (Rainbird & Ramirez, 2012)
Social	16	18	Institutional changes (Mohan, 2016), NGO pressure and social movement organisations' strategies (Jacobs et al., 2015; Nickow, 2015),
Private	54	62	Certification standards ((such as Fairtrade (Cramer et al., 2016; Phillips, 2014; Staricco & Ponte, 2015) and Global GAP ((Ehlert et al., 2014; Bonanno & Cavalcanti, 2012; Colen et al., 2012))), voluntary codes of conduct (Greenberg, 2013; Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Nelson et al., 2007).
Private and social	9	10	Combination of MSIs such as Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI) and certification standards such as Fairtrade (Schuster & Maertens, 2017; Schuster & Maertens, 2016; Nelson & Tallontire, 2014)
Private and public	4	5	Combination of codes of conduct and/or certification standards and national regulations (Coslovsky & Locke, 2013; Lockie et al., 2015; McGrath, 2013)
Social and public	1	1	Industry and grassroots initiatives, and public regulations (McEwan & Bek, 2006)
Private, social and public	1	1	Public and private regulations, and civil society organisations regulations (Alford, 2016)

<sup>3</sup> Examples of studies selected are restricted to only three articles where necessary and based on the recent year of publication.

We call on future studies to consider all three forms of labour regulatory frameworks. One way of looking at it will be to consider the interactions and dynamics of public-private-social labour regulatory frameworks from lead buyers, suppliers and workers (Alford, 2016; Alford et al., 2017). Such studies, for example, can contribute to a better understanding of how public governance has the potential to reinforce private and/or social governance resulting in improvement in working conditions and decent work within GAPNs (Amengual, 2010; Mayer & Gerreffi, 2010).

Regarding the scope of labour regulatory frameworks, the majority (66 articles; 76%) focused on the impact of vertical labour regulatory frameworks in improving labour conditions compared to horizontal forms (14 articles; 16%) while a limited number of studies (6 articles; 7%) considered both forms (see Table 2.4).

The huge difference in scope may be because horizontal forms of governance might not exist or be weak in most of the countries under study. Future studies should not only focus on horizontal governance as it is understudied and can bring marginalised voices to global economic governance (Bennett, 2017; Matheis & Herzig, 2019), but take into account both forms of governance in understanding how they improve labour conditions in GAPNs. In doing so, future studies should examine more the interactions and effects of lead firm strategies and national regulations (Barrientos & Kritzinger, 2004), lead firm and cooperative strategies (Barrientos et al., 2016b), or codes of conduct and national regulations (Coslovsky & Locke, 2013). As Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi (2010) as well as Matheis and Herzig (2019) argue, examining both horizontal and vertical forms of governance can provide a better understanding of the interplay between them and facilitates an effective way of improving labour conditions.

Table 2. 4 Labour regulatory frameworks examined in studies (scope), n=87

<b>Scope of labour regulatory frameworks</b>	<b>Frequency [abs.]</b>	<b>Percent [%]</b>	<b>Examples for specific labour regulatory frameworks<sup>4</sup></b>
Vertical	66	76	Public, private and/or social coordinated by lead firms (Cramer et al., 2016; Schuster & Maertens, 2017; Schuster & Maertens, 2016)
Horizontal	14	16	Public, private and/or social coordinated by local organisations (Jacobs et al., 2015; Mohan, 2016; Nickow, 2015)
Mixed	7	8	Public, private and/or social coordinated by both lead firms and local organisations (Alford, 2016; Barrientos et al., 2016b; Lockie et al., 2015, McEwan & Bek, 2006)

---

<sup>4</sup> Examples of studies selected are restricted to only three articles where necessary and based on the recent year of publication.

#### **2.4.2.2. Labour Issues**

The labour issues addressed in existing studies form part of the central aim of each research. Labour issues vary from a high focus on specific key issues (36%) to a high focus on broad labour issues and multiple key issues (32% each) (Table 2.5). The broad labour issues focused on in studies include general labour and working conditions of the various labour forces in agricultural globalisation while the multiple key issues concern a combination of at least two specific key labour issues. These labour issues are mainly the subjects covered by the International Labour Standards (ILO, 2014). The increasing focus on specific key labour issues as compared to broad labour issues is noteworthy. The empirical enquiries into context specific labour issues are relevant because they cover adequately and comprehensively specific labour issues in GAPNs. Such specific findings enable effective response to addressing labour issues in agricultural globalisation.

In terms of specific key labour issues, Table 5 indicates a high number of studies focused on fundamental principles of rights at work<sup>5</sup> (16 articles; 18%) and skills development and training<sup>6</sup> (9 articles; 10%) while few studies focused on employment issues<sup>7</sup> (5 articles; 6%) and occupational safety and health (1 article; 1%). The limited focus particularly on occupational safety and health is a worrying trend. It is important to point out that some of the studies that focused on multiple key specific issues regularly included occupational health and safety related issues (see for example; Arnould, 2009; Nelson et al., 2007; Reynolds, 2012, 2014; Said-Allsopp & Tallontire, 2014; Valkila & Nygren, 2010).

---

<sup>5</sup> Fundamental Principles of Rights at Work as addressed in the studies reviewed covers subjects under the International Labour Standards (ILO, 2014) such as freedom of association and collective bargaining (see for example; Barrientos et al., 2016b; Brown, 2013; Riisgaard, 2009), slave labour (see for example; McGrath, 2013; Phillips & Sakamoto, 2012) and equality of opportunity and treatment (see for example; Barrientos, 2014; Barrientos, 2013; Barrientos et al., 2003; Barrientos, McClenaghan, & Orton, 2000; Greenberg, 2013; Hale & Opondo, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2015; Lyon, 2008; Lyon et al., 2010; Maertens & Swinnen, 2011; Patel-Campillo, 2012)

<sup>6</sup> Skills development and training focus in various studies includes mainly empowerment (see for example; Bacon, 2010; Makita, 2012; McEwan & Bek, 2006; Quaedvlieg et al., 2014; Rainbird & Ramirez, 2012; Said-Allsopp & Tallontire, 2015; Said-Allsopp & Tallontire, 2014; Schuster & Maertens, 2017; Staricco & Ponte, 2015)

<sup>7</sup> Employment issues in various studies includes wages (see for example; Cramer et al., 2016), employment opportunities (see for example; Humphrey et al., 2004; Maertens et al., 2011), producer prices (see for example; Moberg, 2005) and labour management (see for example; Riisgaard & Gibbon, 2014).

Table 2. 5 Labour issues examined in studies, n=87

<b>Labour issue</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Frequency [abs.]</b>	<b>Percent [%]</b>
Broad labour issues	General labour and working conditions	28	32
Specific Key issues	A focus on one specific key issue (total)	31	36
	Fundamental principles of rights at work	16	18
	Skill development and training	9	11
	Employment issues	5	6
	Occupational safety and health	1	1
Multiple specific key issues	A combination of two or more specific key issues	28	32

Still, we notice a demand for more focus solely on occupational safety and health in future studies. The agricultural sector is amongst the occupations with high fatal and non-fatal cases (Alsamawi et al., 2017). Many agricultural producers and workers are exposed to harmful chemicals, and engage in a number of dangerous activities. Future studies should endeavour to evaluate the causal effect of regulatory frameworks (especially certification standards) on occupational safety and health for smallholder farmers and waged workers within GAPNs (see for example; Asfaw et al., 2010).

### **2.4.3 Unit of Analysis**

Table 2.6 demonstrates that most studies focus their analysis on waged workers (44%) while smallholder farmers and a mixture of both farmers and workers are addressed in a lower number of studies (30% and 26%, respectively). This finding might not be surprising as a substantial number of people in the Global South rely on agricultural wage labour activities (Mueller & Chan, 2015). There is an increase in agricultural wage employment in developing economies given the globalisation of the sector (Gindling & Newhouse, 2014). This has attracted a focus of research on

labour issues affecting wageworkers as compared to the traditional focus on smallholder producer's wellbeing.

Table 2. 6 Unit of analysis examined in studies, n=87

<b>Unit of analysis</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Frequency [abs.]</b>	<b>Percent [%]</b>
Smallholder farmers (in total: 26 articles; 30%)	Farmers	24	28
	Women	2	2
Wageworkers (in total: 38 articles; 44%)	Plantations	19	22
	Smallholder farms	2	2
	Agro-industry	4	5
	More than one type	3	3
	Women	10	11
Mixed (in total: 23 articles; 26%)	Smallholder farmers and wageworkers	23	26

Wageworkers on smallholder farms (2 articles; 2%) and wageworkers in agro-industries<sup>8</sup> (4 articles; 5%) have received considerably less attention in research than wageworkers on plantations (19 articles; 22%) (see Table 2.6). We argue that wageworkers particularly on smallholder farms, who are mostly the rural landless folk and migrants forming part of the bottom poor in a society, deserve equal attention. They are among the most vulnerable and frequently face discrimination, have got no employment security, and are often exploited and covered by little social protection (ILO, 2014). To bridge this disparity, we urge future studies to consider this group of workers. For example, Riisgaard and Okinda (2018) focus on wageworkers on smallholder tea farms in Kenya

---

<sup>8</sup> Agro-industries comprises agribusiness firms that engage in production, processing and exporting of agricultural products.



to advance the implications of certification standards on working conditions of rural informal workers. In addition, Cramer et al. (2016) focus smallholder producers of tea and coffee in Uganda and Ethiopia, respectively. Both examples improve our understanding of how casual and temporal labourers are affected in GAPNs and how policies can be formulated to improve their working conditions.

Table 2.6 also shows a minority focus on women producers (2 articles; 2%) and women wagedworkers (10 articles; 11%). This finding is not surprising as most of the communities in the study areas have the patriarchal system where women lack access to land for the cultivation of cash crops. Women make up a large proportion of the agricultural labour force and are mostly part of the unpaid family labour (ILOSTAT, 2018). They are also sometimes not recognised as part of the labour force with few options available for other job opportunities besides agriculture. Therefore, the use of gender lens in some of the studies is vital as it sheds light on the control over resources between men and women in different food systems.

Other studies also considered both wagedworkers and smallholder farmers in their analysis (23 articles; 26%) (see Table 2.6). This type of analysis is useful and insightful as it enhances triangulation of the information obtained and provides a wider and comprehensive assessment of the impacts on the different labour force in agricultural globalisation. However, the main challenge is data accessibility. Some studies report that while smallholder farmers and wagedworkers working on plantations or agro-industries may be easily accessed, the same cannot be ascribed to wagedworkers on smallholder farms (Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Cramer et al., 2016; Humphrey et al., 2004). Wagedworkers on smallholder farms are mostly migrant labourers who are often casual and temporal labourers, usually not covered by national census, with no address and who are unwilling to expose their identity.

#### **2.4.4 Methods Used**

Table 2.7 shows that the vast majority of researchers adopted qualitative methods (82%) while few studies adopted quantitative and mixed methods (9% each). This huge disparity in method use may partly be explained by the aims and objectives of the studies in our review. Most of the studies explored labour patterns and aimed at providing detailed description of labour relations in GAPNs.

Qualitative methods are best suited for understanding patterns of labour relations and why they are diverse for similar interest groups (Bryman, 2016).

For instance, a number of studies through qualitative methods, explored pathways, complexities, dynamics and interactions of private governance in improving working conditions (see for example, Dolan & Opondo, 2005; Herman, 2010; McEwan & Bek, 2009b; Moseley, 2008; Rainbird & Ramirez, 2012). Similarly, other studies through qualitative methods examined the impact of different governance forms on labour issues (see for example, Bonanno & Cavalcanti, 2012; Dolan, 2010; Jacobs et al., 2015; Lockie et al., 2015; Makita, 2012; McEwan & Bek, 2009a; Muller et al., 2012; Riisgaard & Hammer, 2011). The quantitative methods are used more favourably to establish statistical correlation and causation (see, for example, Arnould, 2009; Asfaw et al., 2010; Colen et al., 2012; Ehlert et al., 2014; Ruben & Zuniga, 2011; Ruben et al., 2009; Schuster & Maertens, 2017; Schuster & Maertens, 2016).

Table 2. 7 Research designs employed in the studies reviewed, n=87

<b>Research design</b>	<b>Frequency [abs.]</b>	<b>Percent [%]</b>
Qualitative	71	82
Quantitative	8	9
Mixed	8	9

Mixed methods may provide a more comprehensive understanding of labour concerns in GAPNs than either qualitative or quantitative methods alone (see, for example, Coslovsky & Locke, 2013; Cramer et al., 2014; Dolan, 2004; Gibbon & Riisgaard, 2014; Humphrey et al., 2004; Maertens et al., 2011). For instance, Cramer et al. (2016) shows that Fairtrade does not improve the working conditions of the rural poor. By using mixed methods, the authors provided quantitative evidence of wages using statistical regressions while complementing with qualitative methods by highlighting the working conditions of the rural poor in the local context. Likewise, Maertens et al. (2011) through quantitative evidence supported by in-depth expert interviews conclude that the gendered supply chains benefit women from large-scale plantation in contrast to small scale.

#### **2.4.4.1 Characteristics of Qualitative Methods**

The qualitative studies adopted different strategies, sampling methods, data collection methods and data analytical methods. Most publications in the review adopted a case study approach. These cases include individuals (see, for example, Jacobs et al., 2015; Makita, 2012; McGrath, 2013; Ortiz & Aparicio, 2007; Selwyn, 2007), groups or communities (see, for example, Barrientos, 2014; Herman, 2010), and organisations, events or programmes (see, for example, Alford, 2016; Barrientos et al., 2016b; Said-Allsopp & Tallontire, 2015). The case study approach here enhances examination of in-depth labour concerns of different types of cases.

Other studies employed the ethnography approach to explain how the socio-cultural features of a specific economy affect labour issues in GAPNs (see, for example, Lyon, 2008; Moberg, 2005; Smith, 2007). Lyon et al. (2010) adopt the approach to interpret the extent of quantitative changes of the effect of Fairtrade on gendered norms and participation of women coffee farmers in Guatemala and Mexico. According to Trauger (2014), the ethnographic approach reveals “unseen sociality” of the impact of certification standards.

Different sampling methods were employed in the studies reviewed. Purposive sampling was employed where authors had prior knowledge on the existence of labour violations for a specific group of people (see for example; Mather, 2004; Phillips, 2014; Riisgaard & Gibbon, 2014). Because it is impossible to obtain a sampling frame of potential respondents, some qualitative studies rely on snowball sampling (see for example; Lyon, 2008; McEwan & Bek, 2006; Medland, 2016; Nelson & Tallontire, 2014; Potter & Hamilton, 2014; Quaedvlieg et al., 2014). The snowball sampling method enhances access to key informants, vulnerable workers, migrant workers and part time workers who are difficult to reach.

A stratified sampling method was employed by some studies to capture labour experiences from diverse group of workers within the GAPNs to enhance comparability (see for example; Bacon, Ernesto Mendez, Gómez, Stuart, & Flores, 2010; Jacobs et al., 2015; Lyon, Bezaury, & Mutersbaugh, 2010; Said-Allsopp & Tallontire, 2014, 2015). On the contrary, a number of studies did not clearly state which sampling methods were used (see for example; Bek et al., 2007; Bonanno & Cavalcanti, 2012; Bowen & Gaytan, 2012; Lockie et al., 2015; Loconto & Simbua, 2012). As the clarity of the sampling methods enhances transparency, better interpretation and

generalisation of the results (Silverman, 2015), future studies should endeavour to describe explicitly the sampling methods used in their study.

The main data collection methods used in the qualitative studies include interviews, observation and documentary analysis. A substantial number of studies adopted interview techniques. This is because interviews are interactive, interrogative, reflective and iterative, and enable one to make connections with the interviewees (Silverman, 2015). There are different types of qualitative interviews applied to individual studies. For example, semi-structured and/or in-depth interviews (see for example; Getz & Shreck, 2006; Johannessen & Wilhite, 2010; Kritzinger et al., 2004; Makita, 2012; McGrath, 2013; Moseley, 2008; Pegler, 2015; Potter & Hamilton, 2014; Rainbird & Ramirez, 2012; Shreck, 2002; Staricco & Ponte, 2015) as well as focus group discussions (see, for example, Bacon et al., 2008; Nelson et al., 2010).

Interviews are relevant for eliciting responses and assessing perspectives on labour issues. Using interviews to understand the experiences of workers may be sometimes challenging. Some authors show the difficulty in interviewing workers in the South African wine industry. McEwan & Bek (2009b), for example, show that it is difficult to interview workers borne out of a number of reasons such as restrictions imposed by farmers (employers), extensive use of casual labourers and the refusal of accessed workers to express an objective voice due to job security. Another striking interview challenge stems from racial segregation. As a white American researcher, Mosley (2008) observes that the power imbalance between white farm owners and black workers made conversations difficult. Another interview challenge is the exclusion of some relevant actors due to resource and time constraints (see, for example, Barrientos, 2014; Barrientos & Kritzinger, 2004; Barrientos et al., 2016b; Greenberg, 2013; Jacobs et al., 2015; Robinson, 2010a; Shreck, 2002; Tallontire, Dolan, Smith, Barrientos, 2005).

Some of the studies combined different qualitative methods of data collection to ensure triangulation, reliability and validity of data. This often included a combination of interviews, observations, documentary analysis, attending workshops, and informal interviews (see, for example, Barrientos et al., 2016b; Bonanno & Cavalcanti, 2012; Bowen & Gaytan, 2012; Hale & Opondo, 2005; Moberg, 2005; Muller et al., 2012; Nelson & Tallontire, 2014; Nelson et al., 2007; Valkila, 2009).

A number of data analytical methods were used in the qualitative studies. These included for example, content analysis (McGrath, 2013; Quaadvlieg et al., 2014; Riisgaard, 2009; Trauger,

2014; Valkila, 2009; Valkila & Nygren, 2010), grounded theory (Bonanno & Cavalcanti, 2012; Mohan, 2016; Potter & Hamilton, 2014; Said-Allsopp & Tallontire, 2015), discourse analysis (Dolan, 2010; Herman, 2010; McEwan & Bek, 2006) and narrative analysis (Johannessen & Wilhite, 2010; Nelson & Tallontire, 2014). These methods are useful in generating categories and themes of labour patterns and understanding interactions of labour regulatory frameworks in GAPNs. Some studies applied more than one analytical method to ensure robustness of the analysis and improvement of triangulation (see for example; Bowen & Gaytan, 2012; Greenberg, 2013, Jacobs et al., 2015; Medland, 2016; Pegler, 2015; Riisgaard & Gibbon, 2014; Robinson, 2010b; Staricco & Ponte, 2015). Regrettably, some studies also did not mention or only insufficiently described the process of data analysis which hampers understanding and replication of such findings.

#### **2.4.4.2 Characteristics of Quantitative Methods**

Quantitative methods are important and complementary to qualitative methods. The quantitative publications employed ex-post-controlled observation strategy, statistical sampling procedures, survey techniques to collect data, and regression analysis. The quantitative approach aims at generalisation through ensuring representative sampling. Data obtained from workers and smallholder farmers were collected through surveys and questionnaires. This produces quantifiable information to determine the causal effect of different labour regulatory forms.

The quantitative studies identified methodological challenges such as selection bias and estimation bias (see for example; Arnould, 2009; Colen et al., 2012; Ruben & Zuniga, 2011; Schuster & Maertens, 2016). This is because the choice of workers employed in companies, who have adopted labour standards or not, affects the reliance on random assignment. Studies resolve these challenges using available analytical methods such as propensity score matching and instrumental variable approach and balanced sample structure.

## **2.5 Conclusions and Recommendations**

Research in GAPNs in the past decade has witnessed widespread interest in labour related issues. In order to better understand the methodologies underpinning existing empirical studies and to

provide evidence for labour-related practice, the paper presented here conducts a systematic review of the various methodologies applied for analysing labour relations in GAPNs in the literature. The intention of this paper is not to provide a homogeneous methodology in understanding labour relations but to produce a guide that will help researchers select appropriate objectives, concepts and methods for future research. The field of labour relations in GAPNs is not that old and open to conceptual and empirical investigations. The review identified a wide range of studies in peer-reviewed journals that examined labour concerns from Africa, Asia and Latin America on different transvalue chain products. Drawing on our review of these studies, we make a number of conclusions that have implications for future labour research in GAPNs.

First, the review confirms the existence of governance based on actors (private, social, and public) and scope (horizontal and vertical) in regulating labour issues within GAPNs. Focus on the impact of horizontal labour regulatory frameworks is limited compared to vertical forms. The majority of the review articles that focus on horizontal governance are found in the *Journal of Agrarian Change*. Likewise, consideration of private governance is higher than social and public governance. More recent studies consider both private and social governance effects. However, such evidence may lack a comprehensive view of how public governance interacts with social and private governance. We suggest that future studies should follow the comparative and interrelated impact of all three forms of governance. Such studies may help understand whether public governance supersedes, reinforces or works together with the other forms.

Second, the findings on labour issues analysed in the studies were diverse. We found that the majority of studies examined specific key labour issues, particularly the issues of fundamental principles and rights at work as well as skills development and training. Labour related studies into occupational safety and health for farmers and workers are limited. This is surprising given that many farmers and workers are exposed to harmful chemicals and engage in a number of dangerous activities. There appears to be a need for more research to assess occupational safety and health risks for farmers and workers within the GAPNs. Such evidence may help improve policies and strategies for health and safety practices in agriculture. One of the means to address the limited focus on occupational safety and health will be to undertake analytical research on the most effective programmes, policies and strategies on occupational safety and health along global agricultural value chains in various countries. This will offer the opportunity to identify gaps in research and practice regarding well-being of smallholder farmers and farm workers.

Third, the review shows a focus on smallholder farmers and wagedworkers. Units of analysis vary, especially by different category of wagedworkers. Wagedworkers working on plantations are more studied than those working in agro-industries and in smallholder farms while male farmers are mostly considered compared to female farmers. The less focus on women farmers and wagedworkers on smallholder farms may have significant implications for overall understanding of labour effects given their less control over resources yet the major role they play for the quality of labour provision in agricultural production. While we call for an increase in focus on wagedworkers and other underrepresented groups such as women in both agro-industries and on smallholder farms, future investigations should generally define more specifically the unit of analysis. This clarification helps to understand the different labour concerns for the different groups. It may also aid in designing effective strategies to address labour issues for specific group of workers.

Fourth, we found that the majority of available studies utilised qualitative research methods as compared to other research designs. Most of the qualitative studies relied on a case study approach, snowball sampling methods, interviews and content analysis. We noticed that the lower use of quantitative methods relates to the difficulty in establishing causal links. This is because of scarcity of labour focused data, irregularity of workers and fewer quantifiable labour indicators such as the right to collective bargaining, non-discrimination and empowerment. Despite the challenges in using quantitative methods, there is the need for studies to use such research designs to help quantify and measure labour effects in GAPNs. Even so, future studies should consider using more methods that are mixed. Such designs can help improve methodological challenges in using only quantitative or qualitative methods.

Finally, we suggest that future studies build upon our review to further enhance our understanding of methodologies and perspectives used in research on GAPNs. This could take the form of more direct engagement with researchers to learn from the experience made in designing appropriate research strategies and, for example, also better understand ethical issues associated – with getting access to and engaging with vulnerable protagonists of GAPNs.

**3 The Role of Local Labour Arrangements on Decent Work: Evidence from Cocoa in Ghana<sup>9</sup>**

*Abstract:* Global South actors are known to be the most vulnerable to labour rights violations such as low wages and incomes, health and safety risks, child labour and gender discrimination in agricultural globalisation. One way to ensure decent work in agriculture is by promoting the capability (or agency) of local actors to access labour rights. This paper examines the role of local labour arrangements on smallholders' agency to access decent work from an institutional theory perspective. It is based on interviews and focus groups with various actors in Ghana's cocoa production network. Our findings reveal how three labour arrangements – communal labour support systems, landowner-caretaker relations and rural service centres – grant opportunities or not for smallholder to access decent work, in particular to counter child labour and occupational health and safety risks in cocoa production in Ghana. We discuss several impediments of specific labour arrangements which can act as barriers to smallholders' agency and provide avenues for research into how challenges associated with labour arrangements can be addressed to improve working conditions of lower-tier suppliers in global agricultural production networks.

**3.1 Introduction**

A common reference for labour-related concerns in global production networks is the concept of *decent work – quality of employment for all* that was launched by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1999. It has over the years progressively provided insights into policies, standards and conventions for measuring and controlling labour-related issues in global production networks (see for example, ILO, 2014).

Decent work and economic growth are captured in goal number 8 of the recent 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations in September 2015. The SDGs are universal commitments aiming at ending hunger, poverty and inequality to achieve a sustainable planet. Because labour rights violations can be found in almost all global production

---

<sup>9</sup> This chapter represents an article by the author of this dissertation and Prof. Dr. Christian Herzig as a co-author. The article is submitted to a peer-reviewed journal since January 2021.



networks including agriculture, apparel and electronics (Gilbert & Huber, 2017), promoting decent work is a global struggle. The last two decades have seen a large number of global efforts to address ‘decent work deficits’ in global agricultural production networks (GAPNs) through various international labour instruments and standards (see for example, FAO, 2018; ILO, 2019). This is because smallholder producers in the Global South have very little upgrading opportunities in GAPNs, partly driven by their position and power in comparison to Global North actors (Barriento et al., 2011; Lee & Gereffi, 2015).

One of the main challenges identified in the literature on decent work is poor Global South participation in labour standards and compliance with underlying rules, often attributed to high illiteracy, weak local monitoring and enforcement systems, and the high cost of monitoring and evaluation (see for example, FAO, 2018; Lockie et al., 2015; Ponte & Cheyns 2013). Institutions can play a key role in promoting Global South compliance with labour standards and participation in governance of decent work in GAPNs (Mohan, 2016; Nielson, 2008; Nielson & Pritchard, 2009). Existing studies have long analysed the impact of institutions on employers’ capability of improving working conditions from a compliance perspective only (see for example, Raynolds, 2014; Riisgaard, 2009; Schuster & Maertens, 2017) to a consideration of a more cooperative perspective (see for example, Alford et al., 2017; Gansemans & D’Haese, 2019) or an integration of both in recent times (see for example, Louche et al., 2020). However, the impact of a cooperative approach in promoting labour rights for smallholder producers and their wage workers has received comparatively little attention, in contrast to workers in a plantation context (for key exceptions, see for example, Riisgaard & Okinda, 2018). Moreover, evidence is particularly limited on the role of labour institutions on smallholders’ agency to access decent work, a gap this paper addresses.

Based on the understanding that governance of decent work can be viewed as both processes and institutions for regulation and coordination of behaviour (Keohane & Nye, 2000), this study addresses the question of how to improve smallholders’ agency to access decent work from an institutional theory perspective. We use institutional theory to explain the potential that labour arrangements pose for smallholders’ governance of decent work. We draw upon insights from 91 individual qualitative interviews and 14 focus group discussions which we have carried out in the cocoa sector of Ghana to examine what local labour arrangements exist and what the

benefits and constraints on smallholders' agency to access decent work are. We focus on the cocoa sector of Ghana because, in recent years, Ghana has seen a substantial increase in production induced by factors such as area expansion, a strong promotion of productivity-enhancing interventions, national policy reforms and rising farm gate prices (Fountain & Hütz-Adams, 2018; ICCO, 2019; MoFA, 2018). The quest for higher productivity poses danger for decent work, in particular child labour and safety working conditions due to the increasing unavailability and high cost of adult labour, and the potential high use of pesticide and chemicals respectively (see for example, Vigneri et al., 2016). Overall, our study aims to shed some light on local labour arrangements in Ghana's cocoa production and how they grant opportunities or not for smallholder producers to access decent work concerns (e.g. abolition of child labour, and increased occupational health and safety). In so doing, our study contributes to the literature on how to promote decent work from the bottom of the global production network.

In the next section, we explore relevant literature on decent work in GAPNs with a particular focus on child labour and occupational health and safety concerns. Then we present the institutional theory as our theoretical framework underpinning the study. We explain the study's methodology, present our findings and proceed to discuss the results, before conclusions are drawn and areas for further research and policy recommendation are outlined.

## **3.2 Conceptual and Theoretical Background**

### **3.2.1 Decent Work — Child Labour and Occupational Health and Safety in GAPNs**

In the field of GAPNs, Kissi and Herzig (2020) identify four key persistent agricultural labour concerns in empirical research: fundamental principles of rights at work (e.g., freedom of association and collective bargaining, effective abolition of child labour, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour and the elimination of discrimination), employment issues (e.g., wages, working hours and employment security), skills development and training, and occupational health and safety issues. For the purpose of this study, we limit our analysis to two labour-related issues – child labour and occupational health and safety concerns.

Our focus on child labour in the sector is necessary and prompt, given the approaching 2025 deadline of the SDG target 8.7 to end all forms of child labour in various GPNs (ILO, 2017), and

fact that the agricultural sector accounts for the highest incidence of child labour. Furthermore, despite the fact that the agricultural sector has a high record of occupational health and safety injuries (Alsamawi et al., 2017; FAO, 2018), labour research on health and safety concerns in GAPNs in the Global South has received limited attention in literature (Kissi & Herzig, 2020).

According to the ILO, the term child labour is defined as “work that deprives children of their childhood, their potential and their dignity, and that is harmful to physical and mental development” (ILO, 2004, p.16). Worldwide 152 million suffer in child labour while 71% of the total child labour is found in agriculture (ILO, 2017). Extreme poverty, inadequate availability of schools or difficult access to them, market imperfections, inadequate availability of adult labour and cultural norms are the main causes that allow child labour to be pervasive and persistent in GAPNs (Dumas, 2013; Edmonds & Schady, 2012). For example, existing studies show that higher household income (Ali, 2019) and higher minimum wages (Menon & van der Meulen Rodgers, 2018) are likely to reduce child labour in employment outside the home in comparison to that in the family business.

The ILO has set out certain regulations that concern age limits, nature of work, hours performed and the conditions under which it is performed to verify its existence in various GPNs. The ILO’s fundamental standard on the effective abolition of child labour is declared in Convention No. 138 on ‘minimum age’ and No. 182 on ‘worst forms of child labour’ (ILO, 2014). In the GAPNs’ scholarly literature, a number of studies have highlighted different responses to reducing child labour. For instance, Dammert et al. (2018) show the effect of different government policies in addressing child labour issues. Besides the efforts of public actors, child labour issues in agriculture are also being addressed by private and social actors through certification standards, industry commitments and company sustainability initiatives (see for example, Schwarzbach & Richardson, 2014; van Rijn et al., 2020).

Moreover, all employees and employers have the right to a healthy and secure working environment. However, GAPNs have particularly high occupational health and safety risks. Agriculture in the Global South has a high number of fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries because of weak or no health and safety laws and regulations, and inadequate smallholder education and training on health and safety practices (Alsamawi et al., 2017; Moradhaseli et al., 2017; Sapbamrer, 2018). Also, there is evidence of lack of training, best practices information on

health and safety issues and poor health seeking behaviour amongst smallholder producers and plantation workers in the Global South (see for example, Mengistie et al., 2017; Scherrer & Radon, 2019). These facts raise concerns about the health and safety of smallholder producers in the Global South which has dire consequences for higher agricultural productivity and reduction of extreme poverty in rural areas due to an inactive, weak and irregular agricultural work force (ILO, 2014). Appropriate ILO standards in the form of conventions such as Convention No. 184 on ‘safety and health in agriculture’ and No. 129 on ‘labour inspection in agriculture’ can help to reduce the potential health and safety dangers in agricultural production (ILO, 2014). In addition, certification standards such as Organic, Fairtrade and Rainforest can help to reduce the negative effects of pesticide use on health and safety of smallholders and their growing communities in the Global South through proper education, regulation and enforcement on the use of the quality and quantity of agro-chemicals (Asfaw et al., 2010; Sellare et al., 2020).

Overall, previous efforts to address child labour and occupational safety and health risks in GAPNs have focused more on the enforcement and compliance of soft laws and the reduction of household poverty. Given that inadequate adult labour supply remains a main cause and drive of decent work deficits, particularly child labour (Dumas, 2020), we focus on how provision of adult labour through institutional arrangements grant smallholders’ agency to access decent work. To capture ways of improving smallholder governance of decent work, our study refers to the role of institutions, in particular labour arrangements on labour agency, as explained next.

### **3.2.2 Institutional Theory**

Institutions refer to “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p.3) and can provide relevant frameworks to explore stability and meaning in social life (North, 1994). According to Williamson (2000), there are four analytical levels of economics of institutions: 1) level one: social embeddedness; 2) level two: institutional environment; 3) level three: institutional arrangement; and 4) level four: resource allocation and use, that can be used to explain economic growth and development in the global economy. These levels provide an analytical framework for exploring the impact of labour arrangement on smallholders’ agency to access decent work.

This paper focuses on two interlinked scales: 1) the first and second levels concern the rules (informal or formal) that shape smallholders' ability to engage in a labour arrangement; and 2) the third and fourth levels concern contracts and coordination, and incentives that shape smallholders' ability to act in addressing child labour and occupational safety and health conditions. We contribute to literature on smallholders' labour agency, arguing that their strategies must be assessed in relation to a wider institutional context.

In academic discourse, researchers have examined the role of the different institutional levels in explaining Global South governance of labour in GAPNs. Studies into social embeddedness among stakeholders have examined the role of local actor engagement in global production networks and have, for example, suggested that social interaction and collective action (Ganseman & D'Haese, 2019; Jelsma et al., 2017; Karatepe & Scherrer, 2019; Orsi et al., 2017) are critical to promoting social change. These findings are complemented by others which have underscored that informal rules such as norms, customs, tradition, networks and religion play a key role in promoting Global South participation in socio-economic change (Koopmans et al., 2018; Mohan, 2016).

At the second level, improvements to the institutional environment such as the introduction of formal rules provide a framework through which to view the participation of local stakeholders in complying with labour-related initiatives. For example, the existence and strength of domestic regulation is crucial for value chain actors' participation, adoption and compliance with social responsibility standards (Ponte et al., 2014).

Studies into institutional arrangements also provide a framework through which to view the participation of local actors in governance for sustainability. For example, studies show that state and external institutions have a central role to play in standard diffusion and compliance through regulation and facilitation (Heron et al., 2018; Mishra & Dey, 2018). In addition, others have highlighted that certain evolutionary processes such as power and path dependency of governance structures as well as transaction costs play an important role in the diffusion and compliance with labour standards in GAPNs (see for example, Kashwan et al., 2019; Oduol et al., 2017).

Finally, at the fourth level, provision and use of resources is considered to be important for Global South actors' compliance with social standards in GAPNs. This is shown, for example, by

Swinnen and Kuijpers (2019) who reveal that financial institutions promote technological adoption among smallholder producers in agricultural value chains through reduction in transaction cost and sharing of risks. Also, a growing body of study shows that economic incentives in the form of improved wages and income (Brown & Wright, 2018; Rossi, 2015) influence Global South compliance with labour standards in GPNs.

Following on from Williamson and the above empirical examples, we focus on the role of labour arrangements on smallholders' agency to access decent work in cocoa production in Ghana. Labour agency can be defined as the ability of employees to take actions through resilience, reworking and resistance in order to improve their working conditions (Coe & Jordhus-Lier, 2011). Traditionally, the literature has mainly assessed labour agency from a worker perspective (Alford et al., 2017; Gansemans & D'Haese, 2019; Schuster & Maertens, 2017). Most of these studies examine strategies deployed by plantation workers to access decent work. However, self-employed smallholder producers face decent work deficits as much as workers on plantations despite potential differences (Barrientos et al., 2011), but still they have been neglected in literature. In our particular case of Ghana, we seek to fill this void by examining various local labour arrangements and what they provide in terms of smallholders' agency to access decent work. This is particularly important to improve our understanding of the role of the local context in which the global production network is embedded. In doing so, we theorise how local institutions are relevant for decent work governance and contribute to the growing body of literature that recognises the role of institutions in governance of decent work (Eckhardt & Poletti, 2018).

### **3.3 Methodology**

We analyse how labour arrangements may benefit or limit smallholders' agency to access decent work by adopting a qualitative research design. This offers the opportunity to explore and explain the key benefits and constraints under which various forms of labour arrangements enhance smallholder participation in governance for decent work. We conducted fieldwork between May and August 2019 in various cocoa growing areas of Ghana. We interviewed in total 91 different actors with smallholder producers being the majority and conducted 14 focus group discussions

with producers and permanent farm workers as a means to obtain diversity of views. The two-stage data collection process is illustrated in Figure 3.1.

In stage 1, we focused mostly on actors such as manufacturers, processors, the Cocoa Health and Extension Division of Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), NGOs, farmer cooperatives, and License buying companies (LBCs) in Accra (the capital) and Kumasi (the capital of the Ashanti region). Since about 40 LBCs exist in Ghana, we purposively selected the top three, including Produce Buying Company, Agro-Ecom limited and Olam Ghana that together account for more than 50% of the internal purchase of cocoa beans (COCOBOD, 2020).

### **Stage 1**

- 6 in-depth interviews with representatives of Cocoa Health and Extension Division of COCOBOD
- 5 in-depth interviews with representatives of Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Union
- 6 in-depth interviews with representatives of LBCs (incl. Produce Buying Company, Agro-Ecom and Olam)
- 8 in-depth interviews with representatives of traders, grinders and manufacturers (incl. Touton, Nestlé, Hershey and Mondelez)
- 10 in-depth interviews with representatives of NGOs (incl. World Cocoa Foundation, Solidaridad and World Vision International)
- 2 in-depth interviews with representatives of the General Agricultural Workers Union of Ghana

### **Stage 2**

- 40 semi-structured interviews with smallholder cocoa farmers
- 10 focus group discussion sessions with smallholder farmers
- 14 semi-structured interviews with permanent smallholder cocoa farm workers
- focus group discussion sessions with permanent smallholder cocoa farm workers

Figure 3.1: Two-stage data collection process

For the farmer cooperative, we purposively selected Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Union, the largest cocoa cooperative in Ghana with over 100,000 members. We elicited information from these

### ***Chapter 3. The Role of Local Labour Arrangements on Decent Work: Evidence from Cocoa in Ghana***

---

actors regarding how they manage decent work, in particular, absence of child labour and improved occupational health and safety concerns along the cocoa value chain. In addition, we sought their views on the opportunities and challenges of existing local labour arrangements they feel important in helping smallholders address decent work deficits.

In the second stage, we focused on smallholders and permanent cocoa farm workers in four cocoa growing regions: Western North, Ashanti, Ahafo, and Bono. These regions occupy the largest producing regions respectively and are known for their involvement in both informal and formal labour arrangements. For each region, we selected at least one district and subsequently a number of villages and towns (Table 3.1) most actively involved in various local labour arrangements, particularly, the formal ones based on findings at the first stage. Through purposive sampling, we selected smallholders through the top three LBCs and Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Union. Because no pre-existing information on availability and access to permanent cocoa farm workers existed, snowball sampling methods were used to select them in respective growing communities and towns visited.

Table 3.1: Area Selection

---

<b>Region</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Villages and towns</b>
Western North	Sefwi-waiso Municipality and Juabeso	Sui, Ahidam, Bramajato, New Somanya, Bunso, Nkwanta, Madina, South Sonka, Caiphas 2, Domeabra
Ashanti	Adansi-South	Ataase, New Edubiase, Asare Krom, Wuruyie, Kotwea, Nyame Bekeyere and Adansi Sweduru
Ahafo	Asunafo-North Municipal	Goaso, Mehame Nkwanta, Kukuom, Ahyiresu, Anwiam, Abetirenewom
Bono	Sunyani Municipality	Duayaw Nkwanta, Sunyani, Ansen and Yamfo

---

We elicited information from smallholders and farm workers regarding their views on the existing labour arrangements, their relevance to their activities and how these arrangements help



them to access decent work, especially, absence of child labour and improved occupational health and safety risks. While all interviews in stage 1 were conducted into English, Twi (a dialect widely spoken as a first language in all the cocoa growing areas selected for the study) was used for smallholders and permanent farm workers in stage 2. We recorded the interviews through seeking participant consent and noted additional ethical research issues including anonymity, confidentiality, and convenience.

Interviews included individual interviews and focus group discussions, lasting on average 45 minutes and 90 minutes, respectively. The recorded interviews in the local dialect were transcribed into English. Analysis was conducted using qualitative content analysis (Lewis, 2015; Silverman, 2015) to explore the consequences of labour arrangements on smallholders' agency to access decent work. Though, smallholder producers employ casual or permanent hired labour on their farm, we do not consider workers in the analysis as their labour agency differs significantly due to the lack of control over production decision. However, we interviewed permanent workers because they are engaged in one of the labour arrangements discussed in the ensuing section.

### **3.4 Results**

Based on a qualitative content analysis of individual interviews and focus group discussions, benefits and constraints of three major local labour arrangements on smallholders' agency to access decent work were identified: (1) communal labour support system; (2) landowner-caretaker relations; and (3) rural service centres. We highlight what these three labour arrangements in the cocoa sector of Ghana provide smallholders with in terms of choice (engagement) and actions in addressing decent work. First, we explore the rules governing access to each labour arrangement before moving on to discuss how they induce a process of absence of child labour and increased safety and working conditions of smallholder producers.

#### **3.4.1 Communal Labour Support**

Since Ghana's independence, communal labour support also known locally as "Nnoboa" has been practised among smallholder cocoa farmers. Traditionally, it involves verbal agreements to supply labour on member farms to carry out various value chain activities. As expressed during the individual interviews and focus group discussions with smallholders, Nnoboa is often formed between neighbouring farmers that are engendered to support farm activities such as weeding,

harvesting and pod breaking. During focus group discussions, farmers pointed out that agreed rules set out the movement of Nnobia from one farm to the other daily or every other working day in this informal labour arrangement (see also, Deppeler et al., 2014).

According to interviewees, Nnobia may facilitate the reduction or elimination of child labour. This was reflected in how several farmers spoke about Nnobia providing ‘cheap’ access to adult labour to take up key activities likely to interfere with the schooling of children or cause emotional, moral and physical harm. Several farmers confirmed that major activities including harvesting, pod breaking and weeding, likely to be carried out by children, are often taken over by Nnobia. With regard to occupational safety and health, analysis of our interview data proves that Nnobia is most unlikely to contribute to increased safe working conditions. Though the key activities performed by Nnobia as compared to spraying or pruning activities may not represent a significant source of health and safety risks except weeding, the lack of knowledge and training on general safety measures in cocoa production combined with inadequate use of personal protective equipment (PPE) explains their negative impact. As one farmer puts it, “when they [extension officers] come to educate us, they focus more on the health of our cocoa farm other than our own health and safety practices”. Also, the lack of availability and accessibility to PPE due to lack of finance was echoed by many other farmers who, in addition, elaborated on the comfortability of wearing PPE.

Despite the potential of Nnobia to provide smallholders’ agency to avoid child labour, the ageing of farmers compounded by the labourious nature of cocoa production and lack of reciprocity appears to constrain improvements in decent work. Some farmers stated they were not interested in Nnobia because they thought that they are too old to join a labour group for the increased intensity of work on cocoa farms. In addition, most interviewees were of the view that the lack of reciprocity acts as a barrier to participating in Nnobia. During a focus group discussion, most farmers gave insights that the potential rise to strategic behaviour among farmers not to return their support discourages them from engaging in Nnobia. For example, one farmer spoke critically of the ‘opportunists’ members in Nnobia, scolding farmers who sometimes deliberately give an excuse of attending social activities such as funerals and weddings or not feeling well in times of their needed labour support on a neighbour’s farm. More interestingly, many interviewees reported that a possible way of dealing with the opportunism in Nnobia would be to make use of ‘reciprocity

norms' to build and re-enforce trust over time in smallholder collective action. As one farmer said, "as for me, I will only join Nnoboia if those who deliberately fail to reciprocate their services are made to pay something in kind or cash".

### **3.4.2 Landowner-Caretaker Relations**

In Ghana, landowner-caretaker relations in the cocoa sector are through 'Abunu' and 'Abusa' by verbal agreement (see for example, Amanor, 2010; Barrientos, 2014; Deppeler et al., 2014; Takane, 2000). In Abunu, which means dividing into two, the farmer bears all the cost of production on a farmland and shares the income from the cocoa sales in a ratio of 1:1 with the landowner. Usually the land is used until the farmer ceases producing cocoa. Abusa, on the other hand, means dividing into three. In this instance, a fully-grown cocoa farm is given to a worker (caretaker) to perform all the necessary activities on the cocoa. The income is shared in a ratio of 1:2 with the owner who bears all cost of production, taking two-thirds. Unlike Nnoboia, almost all interviewees explained that Abusa is one of the most common labour arrangements adopted by farmers because of multiple farm ownership as well as ageing. This was attested in a focus group discussion by one farmer as, "in this community and other areas, most of us have multiple farms and are above 50 years old, thus, we are not able to manage more than one farm mainly due to high maintenance costs, so we prefer to arrange with caretakers that are easily available and accessible than to hire a casual labourer who may be difficult to find and costly".

Although Abusa is widely used and reduces total household labour use on cocoa production, most interviewees do not recognise it as an option to improve smallholders' agency to access decent work. For example, an LBC manager interviewed made clear, however, that "caretakers are often the category of farmers with migrant status, faced with limited access to training, capital and labour, and who hence rely mostly on family labour, a significant source of child labour for most farm activities". In addition, a focus group discussion with caretakers further revealed the lack of safe working conditions by referring to negligence of land-owners. For instance, one interviewee commented that "my landlord does not provide me with PPE despite several requests made, so for example, I spray the farm without access to any PPE and I am scared of asking again for fear of losing my job". Furthermore, other interviewees stated that job insecurity, underpayment and lack

of respect by farm owners exposes them to decent work deficits. As one interviewee said, “we know that farm owners sometimes receive bonuses and premium payment from the government and certification standards respectively at a later time of selling the beans to the government, yet we do not receive our share and we are scared to demand due to fear of job loss”. To address the constraints of Abusa, almost all interviewees suggest informal ways of addressing potential ‘contested terrain’ between land-owners and caretakers. As argued by one cooperative manager, “because of potential conflicts in Abusa as a result of differences in interests, I hold the view that the inclusion of a mediator in the informal arrangement may encourage access to social justice leading to decent work”. The call for a local dispute resolution mechanism was also echoed by several interviewees who called for community by-laws and a local adjudication system to address oppositional forces in the Abusa labour arrangement as and when they arise.

### **3.4.3 Rural Service Centres**

In reaction to sustainability shortcomings in the cocoa sector, multinational lead firms decided to run rural service centres (RSCs) since 2015. The RSC can be likened to a small to medium enterprise that provides a wide range of services to cocoa producers through a variety of approaches. The approaches can range from mobile to stationary provision of services such as entrepreneurial and agronomic training, input and agrochemical shops, and access to credit through private cocoa buying companies or an independent entrepreneur who manages an established farm and makes all production decisions. Like “Abusa”, the independent entrepreneurial model can be understood as a type of sharecropping arrangement with an entrepreneur and a farmer each receiving one-third of the sales of the harvested beans and the remaining one-third set aside for farm management in principle. For the purposes of our analysis, we focus on this form of formal sharecropping contract.

Many interviewees believe in the prospects of RSC to address decent work deficits on the basis of promises from the model that entrepreneurs will deliver professionalism leading to higher outputs, respect for human rights and the protection of the environment. A programme manager of an NGO gave insights that “the RSC is the way to avoid child labour and improve safe working conditions because entrepreneurs believe that providing access to adult quality

labour and adhering to safety health protocols could influence the overall sustainability of their business”. Other supply chain actor interviewees further attested that labourers working under RSC are young adults recruited at the community level, who have access to education and training on health and safety issues, are provided with PPE and are able to follow essential occupational safety measures through skills and development. Also, during the focus group sessions, smallholder producers made it clear that RSC provides access to available quality adult labour services that demotivate them from using household labour including children on the farm.

Although RSC may grant smallholders’ agency to avoid child labour and increased safe working conditions, financial constraints of entrepreneurs and smallholder’s interest in engaging RSCs emerge to restrain developments in decent work. Beginning with supply chain actors, the majority emphasised that although entrepreneurs are motivated to run RSCs across the cocoa growing areas, the lack of funds to accommodate more interested farms has resulted in a shortage of patronage. As one interviewee narrated, “the lack of funds to pre-finance input and labour costs is a major impediment to entrepreneurs providing their services to many farmers who are interested”.

In addition, however, during the interviews with smallholders, transparent process in the RSC and potential loss of smallholder farmers’ autonomy was mentioned by the majority and viewed as key barriers to their interest. For instance, one interviewee declared, “some of us are uninterested in engaging the RSC because we are doubtful about whether entrepreneurs would make quantity of produce and input cost more open to us or not”. In a related argument, another interviewee posits that “I am not interested in the RSC because I perceive loss of control over production decisions to the entrepreneur, and later I will not be treated as the farm owner and accorded the necessary respect”.

Given these barriers to RSC, our study paid attention to ways of addressing them. With regard to financial constraints, interviewees consistently highlighted the need to empower these entities to accommodate more interested farmers. It was stressed more generally by a sustainability officer that “we need to build these entities to be independent like any commercial business in order to attract loans from financial institutions to help accommodate interested clients in order to address decent work through creating employment for the youth”. Furthermore, almost all interviewees share the view that smallholder and community sensitisation to the

awareness, understanding, benefits and challenges of RSC appears to be necessary to boost transparency and confidence among smallholder producers.

### **3.5 Discussion**

The purpose of this study was to highlight the implications of local labour arrangements on decent work governance, in particular avoiding child labour and improving safe working conditions in cocoa production in Ghana. In line with the above two interlinked scales of institutions depicting the ability to choose and act in addressing decent work, the analysis reveals how labour arrangements offer smallholders' capability to access decent work. Overall, our analysis indicates that the consequences of local labour arrangement on smallholders' ability to access decent work in the cocoa sector of Ghana are limited. We find that lower search cost for labour is a common reason for local labour arrangements. However, major constraints such as lack of reciprocity of communal labour support, low agency and low bargaining of Abusa act as barriers to smallholders' capacity to access decent work. In addition, issues bothering on finance, transparency and autonomy constrain rural service centres' ability to enhance decent work.

In our analysis, we show that lower search costs for labour is key in encouraging smallholder cocoa producers in Ghana to avoid child labour and improve occupational health and safety risks. Progressively, scholars have argued that institutions facilitate worker agency to access decent work in agricultural plantations through creating a better institutional environment (Alford et al., 2017; Gansemans & D'Haese, 2019). Contrary to previous studies that focus on workers, the findings in this present paper provide new insights into how institutions are vital for smallholder self-regulation of decent work. Our results suggest that lower labour search cost, that resonates with all three labour arrangements, remain a main cause and drive of smallholders' ability to choose and act in addressing decent work. The reduction in labour transaction costs through institutional arrangement is critical because smallholders complain of scarcity and high cost of labour (a view shared by Vigneri et al., 2016). This implies that efforts to reduce increasing labour transaction cost, in order to increase smallholders' access to adult labour, is critical for their ability to access decent work. The finding echoes existing observation that access to labour market is more efficient in reducing child labour in comparison to access to credit market (Dumas, 2020).

In addition, our findings indicate that though communal labour support grants smallholders' agency to reduce or eliminate child labour other than improved health and safety working conditions, the lack of reciprocity is a major constraint. We note that most farmers are no longer interested in engaging in communal labour support as they are sceptical about receiving support in return. Reciprocity plays an important role in the context of trust and a reputation for keeping promises. This implies that services not reciprocated premised on the condition of self-interest seeking among farmers can lead to withdrawal of collective action due to loss of trust in others. As prior work suggests (Louche et al., 2020), lack of workers' trust for union representatives hinders their agency to address labour-related issues in GAPNs. Moreover, some authors argue that the absence of workers' trust in auditing services of a labour governance system has dire consequences for their quest for labour rights and practices in agricultural production (Swanepoel, 2017). Hence, our results confirm and contribute to the point that trust is important for agreements to be entered into among smallholders in a collective effort to promote decent work.

Our findings that Abusa does not provide smallholders' agency to address both child labour and occupational safety and health, can be explained in light of low agency and low bargaining power of caretakers. Our analysis shows that caretakers have no greater capacity to contest unfair labour treatment including underpayment and inadequate supply of inputs. For example, potential benefits in the form of bonuses and premiums that farm-owners receive with some delay are not passed on to care-takers. However, care-takers avoid confrontation due to fear of losing their jobs. This situation raises the question as to whether farm workers (incl. permanent and casual) on smallholder farms participate and benefit from labour governance schemes, particularly certification standards (see for example, Cramer et al., 2016; Meemken et al., 2019; van Rijn et al., 2020). Our finding that care-takers have low agency and low bargaining power implies rising inequality between them and farm-owners, potentially exacerbating decent work in the cocoa sector of Ghana. This finding mirrors existing evidence of labour exploitation experienced by actors with low agency and low bargaining power, including women cocoa farmers and, in particular, women cocoa workers in Ghana (LeBaron & Galore, 2020).

Moreover, our findings suggest that rural service centres provide smallholders' ability to access decent work through a form of share contract scheme. The share contract scheme is an indication of linking smallholder cocoa producers to high-quality labour supply to avoid decent

work deficits. The scheme also signifies risk sharing between the entrepreneur and the smallholder producer. Although the rural service centre arrangement seems to present a perfect way of ensuring smallholders' agency to avoid child labour and increase in safety and health conditions in the cocoa sector of Ghana, we identify two main sources of impediments to its rate of participation. The first relates to financial constraints of entrepreneurs. Our analysis revealed the importance of financial independence of entrepreneurs to retain more interested farmers in the rural service scheme. The second relates to smallholders' fear of transparency and autonomy. Our findings suggest that for smallholder farmers to participate and avoid exit from the rural service centre, they need to be regarded as the owners and made part of all production and marketing decision making at all times to ensure their autonomy and improve transparency. The perception of potential lack of transparency by entrepreneurs and loss of farmer control seem to lead each other to create an environment of disinterest among producers in the rural service centre. Hence, our results complement findings from previous studies on transparency and smallholders' decision to participate in contract schemes (Abebe et al., 2013; Ruml & Qaim, 2020) as well as the importance of their autonomy in decision-making (see for example, Adams et al., 2019).

### **3.6 Conclusion**

In this paper, we have examined the role of institutions in promoting Global South agency to access decent work in agricultural globalisation. Although institutions play a major important role for decent work along global value chains, it remains an under-researched area (Mohan, 2016; Nielson & Pritchard, 2009), particularly in the context of smallholders' agency. Specifically, we explore the role of local labour arrangements in providing smallholders' agency to access decent work (absence of child labour and increased safety and working conditions) in cocoa production in Ghana. Our empirical results show that labour arrangements provide smallholders' capacity to avoid child labour and improve their occupational health and safety concerns through availability and access to adult labour. However, we find that several impediments of specific labour arrangements act as a barrier to smallholders' agency. Addressing such impediments of labour arrangement should receive more attention in future research and policy-making.

First, given that trust is relevant for informal communal labour agreement to be entered into among smallholders, future studies should examine ways of including reciprocity norms to build



and reinforce trust among smallholder collective action (see for example, Gardner et al., 2019; Padmanabhan, 2008; Walsh-Dilley, 2017). Such studies may provide a better understanding of how to avoid the temptation of smallholders' self-drop-out in Nnoboa. In addition, local actors such as LBCs and extension officers who have direct contact with farmers should educate and train smallholders more on developing trust and reputation in their social interactions with each other. This can be done through lessons on trust building strategies and trust games activities (see for example, Ezezika et al., 2012). Such social development and training are necessary to drive a long-term self-interest in smallholder collective action.

Second, we show that low agency and low bargaining power of care-takers in landowner-caretaker relations constrain smallholder access to decent work. For instance, we noted that caretakers are not able to access redress when their rights are violated and they are exploited by farm owners, thereby increasing persistent decent work practices in the cocoa sector. From the situation of care-takers, we argue that future empirical enquiry should focus on what available power resources farm workers on smallholder farms can draw from to represent their interest in an informal labour arrangement (see for example, Riisgaard & Okinda, 2018). Such findings may provide further insights into smallholders' farm workers participation in GAPNs as well as how to reduce power asymmetries in landowner-caretaker relations to promote decent work practices. Also, local actors such as COCOBOD, LBCs, farmers, trade unions and community chiefs may come together to create an informal framework that defines how Abusa can be agreed on and enforced. This framework may include community by-laws and a mediator to address future arising conflicts. Such an existing framework may provide incentives for care-takers to contest their labour rights violations and exploitation within GAPNs.

Third, our study shows the potential of rural service centre to grant smallholders' agency access to decent work and suggests that issues including financial constraints, transparency and autonomy deserve more attention. We contend that financial challenges of the rural service centres may be addressed through private-public financial investment to support the sustainability of the service sector. This will drive decent work transformation in the coca sector through poverty reduction, build resilience, create employment and increase productivity. In addition, given that issues of autonomy and lack of transparency can contribute to low participation in the service scheme, future empirical enquiry should also focus more on how to promote inclusive and

### ***Chapter 3. The Role of Local Labour Arrangements on Decent Work: Evidence from Cocoa in Ghana***

---

transparent contractual farming arrangements between smallholders and service providers (see for example, Ruml & Qaim, 2020). Such studies may provide a better understanding of how to increase smallholders' legitimacy of labour contract schemes in promoting decent working conditions in GAPNs. From a managerial policy perspective, local actors should intensify the sensitisation of smallholders and their growing communities to the benefits and challenges of such service schemes. Such community sensitisation is necessary to boost transparency and confidence among different players

**4. Governance of Decent Work in Ghana’s Cocoa Industry: Implications for Economic and Social Upgrading<sup>10</sup>**

**Abstract:** Smallholder participation in global value chains may lead to decent work, that is fair income, respect for human rights and safety environment—both for themselves and for their farm workers. This paper examines the factors that bring about the participation of smallholders in lead firm management of labour-related practices. It also clarifies the conditions leading to the provision of decent work through economic and social upgrading. The study is based on qualitative primary data, collected from various key actors along Ghana’s cocoa value chains. Our findings show that lead firms govern decent work through vertical and horizontal paths, and through a combination of both, and that factors including incentives, cooperation and multi-stakeholder collaboration, respectively, are key drivers for smallholders’ participation in value chain governance. Our findings also reveal two drivers of economic upgrading—higher yields and premium payment—and clarify the conditions through which smallholder participation in lead firm governance can improve economic and social upgrading. Overall, our analysis shows that the economic upgrading of smallholder cocoa farmers does not fully translate into social upgrading for the smallholders and their farm workers. This is due to the cost of labour, weak labour monitoring, poor health training and education and the structural power of smallholder producers. We contribute to the debate on key drivers for smallholder participation in various lead firm governance approaches—as well as on how the global governance of value chains may simultaneously promote the economic and social upgrading of smallholder producers and their farm workers. The study findings provide avenues for research into global value chains to enhance decent work through economic and social upgrading, in the Global South.

**4.1 Introduction**

The past two decades have seen a rise in “decent work deficits” along different global value chains (GVCs). Decent work deficits range from violations of freedom of association and

---

<sup>10</sup> This chapter represents an article by the author of this dissertation and Prof. Dr. Christian Herzig as a co-author. The article is submitted to a peer-reviewed journal since February 2021.

collective bargaining (Kucera & Dora, 2019), to health and safety risks (Alsamawi et al., 2017), to insufficient social protection (Barrientos & Hulme, 2009) and gender discrimination (Barrientos et al., 2019; LeBaron & Gore, 2020), to wages below the minimum or below those needed to maintain decent living standards (Aguiar de Medeiros & Trebat, 2017). The sourcing practices used by lead firms—particularly production cycle squeeze and price squeeze, which lead to overtime with little or no pay, as well as to sub-contracting casual workers who are vulnerable and prone to exploitation (Posthuma, 2010)—are often referred to as key factors for decent work deficits in GVCs (Anner, 2018).

The agri-food sector is among various industries that have received heightened attention in research on labour related issues, in the last decade (Kissi & Herzig, 2020). Global agricultural value chains (GAVCs) are associated with a large pool of small-scale and low-skilled actors from the Global South. These actors have relatively little chance of upgrading opportunities (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011), since they are commonly integrated within GAVCs at the level of raw material production and wield little power compared to lead firms from the Global North (Grabs & Ponte, 2019; Lee & Gereffi, 2015; Stringer et al., 2016). Moreover, Global South actors who are excluded from GAVCs often end up in the informal sector, thus exacerbating decent work deficits (Scherrer, 2018).

Against this backdrop, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have put pressure on lead firms associated with GAVCs to address decent work deficits, while giving voice to local actors on labour-related issues (Nickow, 2015). Lead firms have responded by adopting a number of voluntary sustainability initiatives, the focus of which often overlaps with or contains key elements of the International Labour Organisation's (ILO's) core standards for workers' rights and good employment conditions (Kissi & Herzig, 2020). In this paper, we examine the factors that bring about the participation of smallholders in lead firms' management of labour-related issues and clarify the conditions required to promote decent work through economic and social upgrading, along Ghana's cocoa value chains (GCVCs).

Much of the literature on the governance of value chains and its implications for economic and social upgrading has paid little attention to the relationship between lead firms and lower-tier suppliers (for key exceptions see, for example: Alexander, 2020; Kim & Davis, 2016; Nadvi & Raj-Reichert, 2015). In particular, we have yet to understand more about the economic

and social opportunities smallholder producers may reap, once they participate in lead firm governance (Kissi & Herzig, 2020). While they may share similar workforce characteristics with waged workers on plantations, smallholders' inclusion or linkage to the GAVCs differs significantly (Barrientos et al., 2011). In this paper, we thus set out to explore the different governance paths adopted by lead firms in the global cocoa-chocolate value chain, to govern labour. Specifically, we examine factors that enable smallholders' participation in lead firms' management of labour-related practices and ask: Which mechanisms are adopted by lead firms in governing labour along GCVCs and what factors determine smallholder participation in value chain governance?

Moreover, we are interested in revealing how participation in the sustainable governance of value chains translates into economic and social upgrading, and how these are interlinked. From the literature around global value chain upgrading, we know that a firm's economic upgrading does not always lead to the social upgrading of its waged workers (Barrientos et al., 2016; Bernhardt & Pollak, 2016; Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Reinecke & Posthuma, 2019; Rossi, 2013). Similarly, smallholders' participation in GAVCs does not necessarily result in their social upgrading (see, for example: Coslovsky & Locke, 2013; Quaadvlieg et al., 2014). In light of this, there have been calls to better explain the effect of GAVC governance on the social outcomes for smallholder farmers and their workers and to clarify the conditions that may lead to economic and social upgrading (Barrientos et al., 2011). The second research question guiding our study is thus: How are the economic upgrading of the smallholder farmer—on the one hand—and the social upgrading of farmers and permanent hired labour, on the other hand, interlinked in GCVCs?

We make two primary contributions. First, we empirically identify how lead firms' strategies advance smallholder participation in the governance of decent work and show the key drivers for smallholder participation in various lead firm governance approaches (vertical, horizontal and both). Second, we contribute to the literature on how global governance of value chains might promote the economic and social upgrading of smallholder producers and their farm workers—providing valuable insights from an industry influenced by a strong role held by the state (partial market liberalisation).

We now present the intersecting literature on decent work, the governance of GVCs and economic and social upgrading, before explaining our methodology. We then present our empirical findings and proceed to discuss the results and implications of our study.

## **4.2 Background**

### **4.2.1 Decent work in Agri-food Value Chains.**

Since 1999, when the ILO launched the concept of decent work, research on labour-related issues in the global production networks of agriculture has been growing (Kissi & Herzig, 2020). This is due to the industry's concentration of global buyers (Gereffi & Lee, 2012), the outsourcing practices of lead firms (Anner, 2018) and the power imbalance along the supply chains (Grabs & Ponte, 2019). Following the failure of government institutions and public labour regulation in governing decent work (Reinecke & Posthuma, 2019), manufacturers and brand companies have responded to accusations of labour rights violations through various forms of “soft laws,” such as company codes of conduct, certification standards and multi-stakeholder initiatives to promote decent work (Standing, 2008).

In the global agricultural value chain (GAVC) literature, the effect of soft laws on social issues—such as gender empowerment, child and forced labour, workers' rights, wages and skills development—have been assessed in a number of case studies. The results have been mixed (see, for example: Barrientos et al., 2019; Cramer et al., 2016; Raynolds, 2020). These private initiatives may promote decent working conditions along GAVCs, due to their ability to empower various actors to comply with the underlying rules of labour standards (Schuster & Maertens, 2017). However, soft laws may fail to encourage decent work in GAVCs because of weak auditing and monitoring systems (Locke, 2013), the role of intermediaries in social sustainability implementation (Soundararajan & Brammer, 2018) and the lack of participation of workers and trade unions (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2020). While these studies provide insights into how value chain actors improve working conditions, the issue of how lead firms connect to the poorest rural workforce—namely, smallholders and waged workers on smallholder farms—is less explored. In this study, we consider the literature on the Global South, particularly that which explores the

participation of smallholders in decent work governance. We thus highlight two main aspects: the first involves value chain governance and Global South participation, while the second involves upgrading for decent work in value chains.

#### **4.2.2 Value chain governance and Global South participation**

The governance role of lead firms can be defined as the way in which they organise global supply chains through various instruments (Boström et al., 2015). Governance shows how the production and consumption processes are taking place, globally, and explicates—for example—the role of lead firm initiatives in filling the gaps left by public initiatives (Bush et al., 2015). Generally, lead firms in the Global North—such as processors, manufacturers, retailers and supermarkets—govern their global supply chains through vertical and horizontal paths. In the vertical path, “powerful” lead firms determine product type, quantity and price through “powerless” first-tier suppliers (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014). Dependent upon the technical and management capabilities of suppliers, the complexity of transactions and the ability to codify transactions, governance mechanisms can take various forms. Market-orientated and hierarchy-based mechanisms are characterised by an unequal power relationship between lead firms and first-tier suppliers. Other forms—which are more relational, modular and captive—depict a more equal relationship between supply chain actors (Gereffi, et al., 2005). Still, the vertical path is generally seen as under-emphasising the concept of embeddedness, which remains important for assessing how different governance mechanisms influence labour issues across organisational and geographical scales (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014).

Given the drawbacks of the vertical path, a horizontal path—one that considers public and local institutional contexts, aiming to alter unequal power relations in global supply chains—has emerged in the last decade (Tallontire et al., 2011). The horizontal form of lead firm governance is characterised by Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen (2014) as a more “cooperative paradigm” between multi-national companies, national governments, NGOs, local actors and trade unions to address labour challenges.

It is striking that—in the global value chain literature concerned with the development and enforcement of governance mechanisms—the role of Global South actors is notably

neglected (Bair, 2005). Moreover, the participation of national and local actors in the Global South is often described as passive, due to weak public regulatory frameworks or the lack of such frameworks altogether (Nadvi, 2014)—along with a lack of knowledge and expertise around private standard formulation (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). Yet others, such as Alford and Philips (2018) or Mayer and Phillips (2017), ascribe a high level of importance to Global South actors—particularly public stakeholders—due to their diverse roles in governance facilitation, regulation and distribution. Similarly, public actors in the Global South are viewed as having the potential to reinforce private governance and regulation (Amengual & Chirot, 2016).

The limited theorising role played by Global South actors in governance development and enforcement is concerning, since it can have strong effects on the diffusion of and compliance with labour standards. For instance, the inclusion of local actors in global governance settings can be vital to the consideration of locally specific context and knowledge, which is likely to enhance and increase the legitimacy of labour frameworks (e.g., Bair, 2017; Kano, 2018). In a similar vein, Reinecke and Donaghey's (2020) framework illustrates how buyer companies can enable the democratic participation of workers in their supply chains, to pursue the goals of the ILO's decent work agenda.

### **4.2.3 Upgrading for decent work along value chains**

Underlying the debate about the governance of decent work along value chains is the question of how the economic and social upgrading of supply chains can be fostered and how they are interlinked. Historically, upgrading has been primarily understood as an industrial process—by which actors participating in a global production network re-organise themselves to improve productivity, connect with markets and enter more economically promising relationships with global buyers (Gereffi, 1999). Due to the expansion of the global value chain framework to include other sectors beyond manufacturing, the term “upgrading” now usually refers to economic upgrading. Economic upgrading can be defined as “the process by which economic actors—nations, firms and workers—move from low-value to relatively high-value activities in GPNs” (Gereffi, 2005: 171). The literature distinguishes four different types of economic



upgrading: process upgrading (where economic actors transform inputs into outputs more efficiently); product upgrading (where economic actors move into more sophisticated product lines); functional upgrading (where economic actors acquire new functions to increase skill capacity); and chain upgrading (where economic actors move into new but related sectors) (see Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002; Ponte & Ewert, 2009 for details). In GAVCs, smallholder upgrading relates more to product and process upgrading (Kilelu et al., 2017; Neilson, 2014). Smallholders cannot be explicitly characterised as firms, as described by Pegler (2015). Thus, their economic upgrading is spurred by their inclusion in GVCs through skill development training and transfer from the Global North (Vicol et al., 2018) and the role of the local institutional environment (Pipkin & Fuentes, 2017; Ponte et al., 2014).

With regard to the management of working conditions in GVCs, the concept of upgrading has been extended to also reflect socioeconomic conditions for producers and workers (Barrientos et al., 2011). “Social upgrading” acknowledges their full participation in society with rights and entitlements (Rossi, 2013) and places much emphasis on employment quality, as it is aligned to the four pillars of the decent work agenda of the ILO (ILO, 2016). There is now a broad consensus that a combination of both forms of upgrading is a necessary condition for decent work (ILO, 2016). There is likewise a broader understanding that global partnerships and the collaboration of governments, the private sector and civil society in the implementation of value chain governance projects can contribute to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Matheis & Herzig, 2019). Yet—despite this consensus and the broader understanding of upgrading strategies in GVCs—we are only slowly beginning to understand the linkages between economic and social upgrading and how they work in different institutional and organisational contexts, to ensure decent work in supply chains.

Barrientos et al. (2011) propose that such factors as the type of economic upgrading (including product upgrading, process upgrading, functional upgrading and chain upgrading); status of work (regular or irregular); supplier strategy (low road, high road or mixed road); and the role of institutions all influence the link between economic upgrading and social upgrading/downgrading, along different global value chains. In our case, we elaborate on the impact of the type of economic upgrading on social upgrading or downgrading. As found in the Moroccan garment industry, both process and product upgrading led to the same outcome of

social upgrading for both regular and irregular workers (Rossi, 2013). Yet Barrientos et al. (2016) also highlight that, in the South and East African horticultural industry, product and process upgrading were likely to enhance social upgrading for skilled workers, permanent workers, women and organised producers with skill capabilities. Meanwhile, working conditions were found to be worse among low-skilled casual workers, migrant workers and unorganised producers with poor skills. Firms that successfully achieve process upgrading by reducing labour costs to remain competitive also aggravate poor working conditions, as found in the apparel industries of Cambodia and Pakistan (Bernhardt & Pollak, 2016). By contrast, Bernhardt and Pollak (2016) found—in the wood furniture industries of India, China and Vietnam—that firms who successfully undergo process upgrading by maintaining labour costs and maximising quality do improve the social upgrading of labour.

In sum, the decent work and upgrading literature has enhanced our understanding of the interlinkages between economic and social upgrading. However, while the concept of processes of governance appears to offer important insights into decent work through upgrading, previous studies have tended to overlook the implications of GVC governance on smallholder producers—simultaneously with the implications on their hired labour. Reinecke and Donaghey (2020) criticise the insufficient consideration of workers in supply chain governance structure and literature. There is also a lack of studies examining how different institutional environments can affect lead firms' governance of decent work in value chains and the interlinkages between economic and social upgrading. We believe that this limits our understanding of the complexity of the management of working conditions along GVCs.

### **4.3 Methodology**


#### **4.3.1 Research Context**

In this paper, we draw on the case of Ghana's cocoa sector to examine possible factors that stimulate smallholder participation in lead firm governance for decent work and its implications for economic and social upgrading. We employ a qualitative case study approach in Ghana's cocoa value chain (GCVC). The case is defined as a production system of interconnected key actors, who perform various value chain activities—including input supply by both public and

private actors, production, marketing, quality control, export, processing, retailing and consumption (Figure 4.1). Our research approach allows us to explore the processes of lead firm governance for sustainability on decent work, from the viewpoints of various key actors along the GCCV (Yin, 2018).

In Ghana, the cocoa production is numerically dominated by a large pool of about 800,000 smallholder farmers, who rely on family and hired labour (GSS, 2014). This GCVC accounts for about 20% of the world's cocoa production; Ghana is the world's second largest cocoa producer, after Côte d'Ivoire (ICCO, 2018). The state plays a strong role in price determination, production and marketing through Ghana's Cocoa Marketing Board, "COCOBOD," in what is often described as a partial market liberalisation structure (Kolavalli & Vigneri, 2017). In this structure, the government controls production and has a monopoly on export marketing through COCOBOD. Yet it allows license buying companies (LBCs) to operate the domestic purchase of raw beans, at or above a fixed price that is announced annually (Kolavalli et al., 2012). COCOBOD performs major functions—such as seed supply, extension service delivery, quality control and marketing—via five subsidiaries. COCOBOD also regulates the intermediary LBCs that are responsible for buying cocoa beans, on behalf of the state. Other actors contributing to the value chain activities include private input dealers—who provide fertilizers, seeds and pesticides—and haulers, who transport beans to the cocoa quality control division on behalf of the LBCs.

Despite the strong role of the state, two sets of actors—cocoa-chocolate manufacturers and trader-grinder processors—both coordinate the supply chain in distinctive ways. This is described by Fold (2002) as a "bi-polar" governance. This "twin-driven" governance is characterised by complex dynamics that connect local producers to global buyers (Islam, 2008). For example, substantial investments have been made to improve the sustainability management of suppliers' activities, by the world's six biggest chocolate manufacturers (Ferrero, Hershey, Lindt & Sprüngli, Mars, Mondelez International, Nestlé)—who accounted for 60% of the global chocolate market in 2017 (Statista, 2018)—and the four biggest cocoa processing companies (Barry Callebaut, Cargill, Ecom and Olam), who accounted for 72% of the global grinding market in 2017, according to Fountain and Hütz-Adams (2018). These lead firms have responded



Source: Authors construct. *Note: Dashed boxes represent the subsidiaries of COCOBOD*

Figure 4.1. Ghana's cocoa value chain (GCVC)

to sustainability challenges and accusations in the GCVC by adopting third party certification standards, “in-house” sustainability programmes and multi-stakeholder initiatives (Table 4.1). These initiatives often overlap with (or contain a section of) the ILO’s core workers’ rights and good employment conditions. They can help us to assess the ways in which lead firms interact with smallholder producers and farmworkers in their governance, promoting decent work through economic and social upgrading.

Table 4. 1: Overview of lead firms’ involvement in and use of sustainability initiatives along GCVC

<b>Type of initiative</b>	<b>Organisations and examples</b>
Certification standard	Lead firms using Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance (formerly Rainforest Alliance and UTZ) and Organic certification
Lead firm’s in-house sustainability initiative	Barry Callebaut - <i>Cocoa Horizons</i> Cargill - <i>Cocoa Promise</i> Ecom Trading - <i>Sustainability Programme</i> Olam - <i>Olam Livelihood Charter</i> Touton Ghana – <i>Rural Service Centres</i> Mars - <i>Sustainable Cocoa Initiative and Vision for Change</i> Nestlé - <i>Cocoa Plan</i> Hershey - <i>Cocoa Link</i> Mondelez - <i>Cocoa Life Sustainability Programme</i> Ferrero - <i>Sustainable Cocoa</i> Lindt & Sprüngli - <i>Farming Programme</i>
Multi-stakeholder initiatives	Solidaridad - <i>Cocoa Rehabilitation and Intensification Programme Phase II and Next Generation of Cocoa Farmers</i> World Cocoa Foundation - <i>Cocoa Livelihoods Programme; Cocoa Action; African Cocoa Initiative; Climate smart cocoa and Cocoa and Forest Initiative</i> International cocoa initiative - <i>Elimination of Child Labour</i>

### **4.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis**

Qualitative data was collected from a wide range of actors, concerning smallholder participation in lead firm governance for decent work and the key mechanisms in promoting economic and social upgrading. Using purposive and random sampling, we carried out a total of 117 individual interviews and 16 group interviews (with 6 participants on average) in Ghana in 2018 (Table 4. 2). Smallholder farmers were selected based on their involvement in lead firm sustainability initiatives and accessibility. We traced farmers through four LBCs and two farmer cooperatives. The LBCs included Produce Buying Company, Agro-Ecom Limited and Olam Ghana—with a coverage of more than 50% of the market share of the internal purchase of cocoa beans, amongst over 40 other LBCs (COCOBOD, 2020). We also considered the farmers of Yayra Glover, the only organic LBC in Ghana at the time of data collection. For the farmer cooperatives, we selected farmers belonging to the Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Union—the largest cocoa cooperative in Ghana, with over 100,000 registered farmers—and the ABOCFA Co-operative Cocoa Farmers and Marketing Society Limited, one of the two registered organic based farmers' cooperatives in Ghana at the time of data collection. We included the organic variant of LBCs and cooperatives, to cover all the types of certification standards in Ghana's cocoa sector.

In terms of regional spread, we focused on the top four growing regions<sup>11</sup>, out of six. For each region, we selected at least one district—the one most actively involved in one or more of the lead firms' sustainability initiatives, based on an initial interaction with representatives of the LBCs and farmer cooperatives. For each district, a number of farmers were interviewed in their villages and towns based on their availability and willingness. We identified permanent hired labourers through smallholder producers and using a snowball sampling method. Although we aimed to include as many hired labourers as possible, the difficulties in gaining access to workers

---

<sup>11</sup> Cocoa is grown in six of the ten regions (now 16 regions) of Ghana. These include the Western region, Ashanti region, Brong-Ahafo region, Eastern region, Central region and Volta region. The regions are shown in ascending order, according to their annual production (as of the time of data collection, from April to August 2018). Currently, these six regions translate into 10 regions. This is due to the creation of three regions from the Brong Ahafo region and two regions each from the Volta and Western regions, effective as of 2019.

Table 4. 2: Interviews

<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Length</b>	<b>Examples</b>
Farm workers	12 individual and 2 group interviews (6-8 participants)	20-60 min	
Smallholder farmers	60 individual and 14 group interviews (6-10 participants)	20-60 min	
Farmer cooperatives	8 individual interviews	30-60 min	Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Union and ABOCFA Co-operative Cocoa Farmers and Marketing Society Limited
License Buying Companies (LBCs)	15 individual interviews	30-60 min (40 min)	Produce Buying Company, Agro-Ecom, Olam and Yayra Glover
Lead firms	4 individual interviews	30-60 min	Touton, Nestlé, Hershey and Mondelez
COCOBOD	2 individual interviews	30-60 min	Cocoa Health and Extension Division
NGOs	8 individual interviews	30-60 min	World Cocoa Foundation, Solidaridad and World Vision International
Trade union	2 individual interviews	30-60 min	General Agricultural Workers Union of Ghana
Certification bodies	6 individual interviews	30-60 min	Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance and Afri Cert Limited

led to a higher proportion of smallholders, when compared with permanent hired labour. It should be noted, though, that not all smallholders employ permanent hired workers. We also included questions about the working conditions of permanent hired labour in our interviews with smallholder producers. Moreover, of the farmers interviewed, 44% held dual roles—i.e., in

addition to their own roles as smallholders, they were also working as permanent hired farm workers for other smallholders. We were unable to include casual hired labour in this study, due to difficulties in access and their relative scarcity in our research setting (they more commonly work on plantations, while Ghana's cocoa production is dominated by smallholder farmers and permanent hired workers). All interviews were conducted in English or Twi<sup>12</sup>. They were either recorded, with the participant's consent, or notes were taken. In all interviews, we observed ethical issues such as informed and implied consent, confidentiality and anonymity, and participant convenience. Each individual and group interview lasted an average of about 40 and 90 minutes, respectively (Table 4.2). The interviews recorded in Twi were transcribed using a pure verbatim protocol; a selected protocol was used for the English-language interviews. Our primary data was complemented by the available sustainability related reports of various lead firms who source cocoa from Ghana, as well as of NGOs (Table 4.3). The reports that we reviewed complemented the interview data we gathered regarding lead firms' governance of decent work along the GCVC. The data were analysed via a qualitative content analysis.

We build on Alexander's (2020) conceptualisation of how lead firms govern sustainability through vertical paths, horizontal paths and both vertical and horizontal linkages. We then expand the analysis, to investigate the key factors underlying smallholder participation. If we consider the main goal of sustainability initiatives to be enhancing productivity (Fountain & Hütz-Adams, 2018), and following Barrientos et al. (2011), then a smallholder cocoa farmer in Ghana is said to have experienced economic upgrading when their income increases. A decrease in income, on the other hand, represents economic downgrading. In this study, we assess the main conditions for

---

<sup>12</sup> A dialect widely spoken in Ghana, as a first or second language, in all the cocoa growing areas selected for the study.



Table 4.3: Sustainability reports of key actors of GCVC (traders, manufacturers, brands, NGOs)

<b>Name of company</b>	<b>Actor type</b>	<b>Title of sustainability-related report</b>	<b>Year</b>
Barry Callebaut	Trader	Cocoa horizons foundation 2017-18 progress report	2018
Cargill	Trader	Committed to more: The 2016/2017 Cargill Cocoa Promise global summary report	2018
Ecom Trading	Trader	Achieving the impossible to create prosperity in rural communities	NA
Hershey	Manufacturer	Introducing COCOA FOR GOOD our sustainable cocoa strategy	NA
International Cocoa Initiative	NGO	Annual report 2017	2018
Lindt & Sprungli	Manufacturer	Sustainability report 2017	2018
Mondelez	Brand	COCOA LIFE 2017 progress report: From cocoa farmers, connecting both ends of the supply chain	2018
Mars	Brand	Cocoa for Generations 2019 Report	2019
Nestlé	Brand	Tackling child labour 2017 report	2017
Olam	Trader	Olam cocoa sustainability	2018
Tony chocoloney	Manufacturer	Annual Fair Report 2017-2018	2018
Touton	Trader	Co-creating more sustainable supply-chains: Sustainable Sourcing Report 2015/2016	2017
World Cocoa Foundation	NGO	Cocoa Action 2017: What we have learned	2018

higher smallholder income as a result of their participation in lead firm governance for sustainability. Since—as stated above—economic upgrading may not necessarily lead to social upgrading, we assess the conditions that link both. Following Barrientos et al. (2011), a smallholder cocoa producer in Ghana is said to have experienced social upgrading when there is a

combination of: (a) the effective abolition of child labour; (b) elimination of gender discrimination; (c) promotion of occupational safety and health. Similarly, a permanent hired cocoa farm worker in Ghana is said to have experienced social upgrading when there is a combination of: (a) the effective abolition of child labour; (b) promotion of occupational safety and health; (c) increase in wages. A decline in the combination of these indicators, on the other hand, amounts to social downgrading for both smallholder producers and farmworkers. We do not include certain relevant social upgrading indicators, such as freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. This is because these issues do not currently constitute common labour rights violations amongst self-employed smallholder producers and wageworkers on smallholder farms along GCVCs, as they do for wageworkers on plantations.

More specific to farm workers, we do not include the elimination of gender discrimination in respect of employment. Although the lack of employment of women as caretakers in the cocoa sector could be seen as a sign of inherent gender discrimination itself, the dominant role of male caretakers, due to the labourious nature of the job, has led to this decision.

#### **4.4 Findings**

As shown in Table 4.4, the lead firms examined for this study govern decent work in the cocoa value chain of Ghana via a number of mechanisms; these can be vertical, horizontal or a combination of both (Alexander, 2020).

The sustainability reports, in particular, note that the majority of lead firms apply vertical methods in an attempt to promote decent work. These include *vertically defining process requirements* and *vertical integration*. In the former case, where there is no direct relationship between lead firms and smallholder producers, lead firms govern the chain through third party certification standards. These are complemented by their in-house sustainability initiatives. The latter mechanism includes vertical integration, including acquisitions (for example, Olam and Barry Callebaut) and the establishment of LBCs (for example, Cargill). This appears to be a more recent phenomenon. Horizontal strategies, where lead firms manage decent work through local players such as NGOs and local governance actors, take the form of *working relationships based upon partnerships*, *local community forums* and *online connections*. Only a very few lead firms use these non-sourcing approaches in the cocoa sector of Ghana, however. One of the few

examples we found in the available reports is the case of Mondelez, which partners with the NGO World Vision to implement “Cocoa Life” programme with farmer cooperatives from which Mondelez does not necessarily source cocoa. In this partnership-based working relationship, cocoa farmers and their communities improve the quality and quantity of the cocoa beans they produce. Another rare example is the community farmers’ annual forum of Mondelez’s Cocoa Life programme—in which actors such as producers, COCOBOD, NGOs, chiefs, opinion leaders, political leaders and other policymakers assemble to discuss the sector’s challenges around promoting decent work. Online connections are also provided. These involve free mobile apps that are used to help inspire and incentivise farmers, particularly amongst the youth, by providing them with information—especially on pests and disease infestation and control. Here, Hershey collaborates with COCOBOD to train key actors on the use of Hershey’s digital platform, which is called “Cocoa Link.”

Our analysis of interviews and corporate reports has identified four further types of governance mechanisms, in which lead firms combine the use of horizontal and vertical paths to govern decent work along the GCVC. Nearly all the lead firms were involved in the development of decent work-related standards, which they use to control for *compliance* through local governance actors. The Child Labour Monitoring and Remediation System (CLMRS) is one example. Developed in cooperation with the International Cocoa Initiative (ICI), the CLMRS relies on child labour liaison officers (mostly farmers) who are responsible for detecting and reporting child labour cases for prevention and remediation by the lead firms. The *partnership* model, mostly expressed by the Fairtrade certification scheme in Ghana, enables lead firms to promote sustainability through local actors—implementing codes of conduct that are developed by certifiers and enforced by third-party monitors, to address sustainability issues (Alexander, 2020). *Support services* to smallholders are generally a widely spread governance path followed by lead firms, irrespective of whether they source from them or not. They range from “training and coaching, agro-inputs distribution, community development and financial support,” as clarified by one of the LBC managers interviewed. The same manager went on to highlight that they would also include support for smallholders to set up saving accounts and encourage them to, for example, “participate in a ‘Village Savings and Loans Association’ run by smallholders through LBCs and NGOs”. Finally, and more generally, there is evidence for wider

cooperation—led by the World Cocoa Foundation on a voluntary basis—between lead firms and other governance actors of cocoa production in Ghana. This is done through industry wide initiatives, to enhance decent work by fostering new or modified practices of *voluntary change*.

Table 4.4: Governance of smallholder cocoa producers in Ghana by lead firms (traders, manufacturers, and brands).

<b>Types of governance</b>	<b>Forms of governance</b>	<b>Number of companies involved<sup>1</sup></b>
Vertical	Vertical defining process requirements	10
	Vertical integration	9
Horizontal	Working with partners	1
	Local forums / online connections	3
Vertical and horizontal	Compliance	11
	Partnership	5
	Support services	11
	Voluntary change	11

<sup>1</sup>11 lead firms involved in the development and/or implementation of governance approaches: Barry Callebaut; Cargill; Ecom Trading; Hershey; Lindt & Sprungli; Mondelez; Mars; Nestlé; Olam; Tony chocloloney; and Touton.

Source: Author’s construction using typology of Alexander (2020).

To this extent, there is support for the expectations born of our literature review (above). The data suggests that lead firms use and combine different approaches to govern GCVCs. The further condensation of codes of analysis, established after analysing the interview data, provided two key themes. These show how the governance approaches enabled or hampered smallholder participation in lead firms’ governance for decent work—along with their implications for economic and social upgrading.

#### **4.4.1 Smallholder Participation in Lead Firm Governance for Decent Work**

In those cases of vertical governance paths, many respondents said that the participation of smallholders is stimulated by perceived “non-price” incentives. This was reflected in how smallholder interviewees spoke of benefits—such as access to bonuses, farming inputs, training and credit—as reasons for their participation in sustainability initiatives. As one interviewee put it, “we are part of the certification programme because we believe in getting access to inputs to improve the quantity of our yield.” The attraction of non-price incentives was echoed by several other interviewees—who, in addition, elaborated on their access to training to improve farming practices as a motivation for farmer participation in sustainability initiatives.

In addition, according to the interviewees, what horizontal governance approaches have in common is the cooperation with local actors that foster smallholder participation in lead firm governance for decent work. During the focus group sessions, smallholder producers made it clear that their role in various committees such as child protection committee, community development committee, gender dialogue platform, women extension volunteers and youth committee in the cocoa life programme of Mondelez indicates a feeling of being part of the solution of sustainable change. Also, interviewees reported that the working together with stakeholders such as community chiefs, NGOs and government officials in this path helps to improve coverage amongst smallholders and their growing communities. Likewise, interviewees revealed that the use of the mobile app promotes smallholder participation in lead firm governance for decent work through working together. As expressed by one interviewee, “the cocoa link has been a very resourceful tool that allows extension officers and young educated farmers to work together to drive sustainable change among farmers”.

In those cases where both vertical and horizontal mechanisms are applied, the majority of the interviewees argue that the participation of smallholders is inspired by multi-stakeholder collaboration regarding the nature of the formulation and implementation of the initiatives. For instance, one lead firm manager commended the “collaboration between different actors in these initiatives, praising the engagement of NGOs, trade unions, COCOBOD, LBCs and other local

actors to take up roles such as educating of farmers as key in promoting diffusion and compliance of labour standards because of improved transparency and enforcement.” More specifically to CLMRS, many interviewees further confirmed the involvement of many actors in this initiative— noting the engagement of non-producer local actors such as NGOs, trade unions, teachers, political leaders and chiefs as essential to smallholder acceptance of labour standards through an increased culture of cooperation, transparency and enforcement.

However, respondents generally reported high levels of discrimination within the vertical governance mechanisms, because of the selling conditionality and the high cost—a view shared by Skalidou (2018). During the interviews, an LBC manager revealed that running certification programmes for smallholder farmers is very expensive due to the high cost of training, monitoring and auditing. The interviewee further attested to the importance of criteria—such as the ability to comply with stringent rules and access to road and supply capacity—as requirements for farmer participation in certification standards.

Many respondents also held the view that partnership-based working relationships suffer from generally weak local governance structures and the association of the governance process with philanthropy. The majority of the interviewees noted the challenge—when participating in online connections—due to poor internet connectivity, difficulties in smart phone usage and illiteracy amongst smallholder producers and their growing communities.

Nearly all respondents appeared frustrated by the lack of interest of key local actors in most of the multi-stakeholder collaborations, combined with the lack of government support. As described by an NGO manager, “despite the growing number of multi-stakeholder initiatives in the cocoa sector of Ghana, the lack of interest by the majority of locally owned LBCs and the lack of government policies to create an enabling environment may affect participation amongst smallholders and their growing communities”. More specific to partnership—and commonly reflected through the Fairtrade certification scheme, in the context of farmer cooperatives— interviewees complained of their narrow reach in Ghana, at least when compared with other cocoa producing countries like Ivory Coast (a view shared by Bymolt et al., 2018). One cooperative manager confirmed, for example, that “most cocoa farmers are not interested in a farmer cooperative due to weak collective bargaining, fixed prices, bad experience with past cooperatives and market availability through LBCs.”

#### **4.4.2 Implications of Lead Firm Governance for Economic and Social Upgrading**

In this section, we present the key drivers through which lead firm governance for decent work can improve the economic upgrading of smallholders. We simultaneously clarify the conditions for the social upgrading of smallholder producers themselves—as well as for permanent hired labourers.

##### **Key drivers of Smallholder Economic Upgrading.**

According to the majority of the interviewees, the major driving force for an increase in smallholder income—and thus for economic upgrading—is through an increased yield. Our interviews with a number of smallholder producers confirmed this. They explained that they had improved their harvest from 3–4 bags to 6–8 bags per acre, due to intensified education and training by the LBCs and NGOs through their participation in sustainability initiatives. This type of smallholder economic upgrading, through increased productivity, can be termed process upgrading (Barrientos et al., 2011).

Yet many respondents shared with us that efforts to increase yield, or to otherwise achieve process upgrading, are facilitated only by the condition of the prevailing cocoa farm-gate price in Ghana, which depends on the world market price. Most of our interviewees perceived the establishment of the price stabilisation fund and the price fixing by COCOBOD as reducing farmers' risk of facing volatile prices. As one interviewee said, “the price fixing mechanism in Ghana benefits cocoa farmers, because they are prevented from the shock stemming from the international market—as seen, for example, in the significant decline in world market price of the 2016 and 2017 crop season.” Opportunistic behaviour by intermediaries also impedes the success of smallholder process upgrading. Evidence gathered through a focus group discussion with farmers suggests that cheating on weights—which some LBCs do to maximise profit—is one of the major risks they face in terms of income (see also: Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018). One smallholder farmer spoke harshly of “the purported ‘scale adjustment’” of some purchasing clerks, lambasting the questionable difference between weights at home and at the depot, while the LBCs maintain the genuineness of their scale measurements.

Our interviewees also recognised that premium payments—received directly by farmer cooperatives or through LBCs, for producing certified beans depending on buyers' demands—are

a key driving force for smallholder economic upgrading. From our interviews with smallholder producers, it emerged that their ability to produce certified cocoa and the subsequent receiving of premium improves their income. As one farmer put it, “the premium we receive on top of the regular cocoa price brings about positive outcomes for our household income and farming practices.” This type of smallholder economic upgrading, through improved skills and the ability to produce high quality cocoa, can be termed as product upgrading (Barrientos et al., 2011).

Yet, during the individual interviews and focus group sessions with smallholder producers, they mentioned that the stability and amount of the premium is a condition for a successful smallholder product upgrading. As one Rainforest Alliance certified farmer mentioned, “though the premium is helpful, we do not often receive the expected amount because the LBCs tell us that they fail to get a final buyer for all certified beans.” The interviewed cooperative managers note that—although Fairtrade guarantees a minimum price and a fixed premium paid directly into the accounts of cocoa farmer cooperatives—smallholders receive a low premium share, since such cooperatives’ membership increases when there is a constant demand for certified beans from the lead firm. One cooperative manager explained this: “Because participation (including training and skill development) in the cooperative is open, more members implies less premium for each member—given a constant or marginal increase in demand for certified beans by our clients.”

### **Link between Smallholder Economic Upgrading and Social Upgrading/Downgrading of Smallholder Producers themselves and their Farm Workers.**

#### **Link between Higher Yield and Social Upgrading/Downgrading.**

The findings provide evidence that process upgrading through increased yield can lead to social upgrading and downgrading amongst smallholders and their farm workers.

According to most of our respondents, the need to increase yield aggravates the risk of child labour amongst both farmers’ and permanent workers’ families. This is due to conditions like the unavailability and rising cost of adult labour, along with weak local monitoring systems. In the focus group discussions, the majority of smallholder producers and permanent hired farm workers conceded that some of them rely on family labour—including that of children—for harvesting and pod breaking during the peak seasons from October to January, due to the high



cost and unavailability of adult labour. As one farmer acknowledged, “during [the] harvesting period of the main cocoa season, there is always pressure put on family labour because of difficulty in access to adult labour due to high cost.” The interviewees also indicated that child labour monitoring mechanisms incorporated in productivity enhancing interventions are generally weak, due to a lack of local capacity. Most of the stakeholders interviewed particularly expressed their concern about the capacity of local actors with regard to their engagement in the monitoring and enforcement of the popular CLMRS, as seen in numerous quotes below. As identified by one LBC manager, “the low literacy rate among local inspectors, in particular farmers, constrains their ability to record and report accurate events of child labour at the community level.” An NGO worker noted: “the commitment and dedication of local inspectors are usually restrained, due to the voluntary nature of their work coupled with a lack of incentives and rewards.” A farmer also indicated that “while [the] majority of smallholders own multiple farms, some locations of farms remain remote, making child labour monitoring difficult”. Another farmer also mentioned that “child labour inspectors who double as purchasing clerks or lead farmers usually have a business relationship with farm owners and workers—which limits their authority to report identified child labour cases, combined [with] the inability of local authorities such as chiefs to enforce reported cases.”

Most of our respondents also admitted that increased yield or process upgrading worsens occupational safety and presents greater health risks, for both smallholder producers and permanent hired farm workers. This is due to limited access to safety and health training and inadequate access to personal protective equipment (PPE). Interviews with a number of sustainability managers of private companies confirmed that both spraying and pruning—undertaken to boost cocoa yield—are significant health risks. Yet very few initiatives cover extensively health-related education and training programmes. As one interviewee said, “apart from certification standards, [which] also admit [only a] minority of farmers, [the] majority of the productivity-enhancing interventions are silent on safety and health issues.” In addition, smallholder producers and farm workers disclosed that they rarely receive education and training on safe working conditions—if compared to issues around child labour, for instance. In the focus group discussions, farmers and farm workers also made it clear that their inability to wear PPE stems from a lack of funds, from their discomfort in wearing them and from their claim of good

health without PPE. This was reflected by one farmer who said, “Beyond the lack of money to buy PPE, most of us do not wear them because without it, we have been healthy for decades and we feel uncomfortable wearing them under the scorching sun.”

With regard to smallholder producers only, most of our interviewees suggested that increased yield or process upgrading is likely to reduce gender discrimination through improved access to skill development and training, which are key to increasing women’s empowerment. One NGO manager interviewed said, for example, “Women farmers have increasingly been empowered and received profound attention in [the] majority of the sustainability programmes aimed at improving yields.” Women’s empowerment was also echoed by several other interviewees—who also mentioned the women extension volunteers in some communities, who attend only to women; a community gender platform to discuss the challenges of women in cocoa production; and women’s enterprise groups. Overall, these opportunities—which are offered to women to help them successfully achieve process upgrading—promote women’s empowerment, which is essential to reduce gender inequality.

Regarding wage increases, we focus only on permanent hired farmworkers. The majority of our respondents revealed that increased yield is most likely to improve the wages of permanent farm workers. This is because they receive their income through a sharecropping arrangement known as *Abusa* (which literally means “to divide into three”). Several interviewees acknowledged that farm workers receive their exact share, since they—together with the farm owner or a representative—observe the weighing and sale of the cocoa beans to a purchasing clerk. Process upgrading thus seems to bring with it the potential for increases in wages for permanent farm workers, even as they receive just one-third of the overall share.

#### **Link between Premium Payment and Social Upgrading/Downgrading.**

Most interviewees acknowledged that premium payments or product upgrading through certification programmes are likely to reduce child labour, to increase safety and healthy working conditions and to reduce gender discrimination among smallholder producers. This is because the premium serves as a reward for both quality and labour governance compliance. As one farmer said, “We comply with labour rules in order to pass audit assessment so we can receive premium.” The smallholder producers—in response to questions about their labour rights compliance in a focus group discussion—firmly claim that they avoid employing underage

children or using children for difficult tasks; that they pay male and female workers equally for the same kind of job; and that they avoid leaving empty chemical containers on the farm or near salt and sugar storage, to qualify for the premium.

Yet the interviewees also indicated that a premium payment is likely to worsen child labour, occupational safety and health risks and wages for permanent hired cocoa farm workers. This is based on the exercise of smallholder producers' structural power. Nearly all respondents reported that permanent farm workers do not participate in certification standards; a share of the delayed premium payment and an insistence on compliance with labour rights must thus be passed on to permanent farm workers. However, during a focus group discussion with permanent farm workers, they confirmed that they do not receive any share of the premium yet are unable to complain because of their low bargaining power. One permanent farm worker critically pointed out that "caretakers face hard times but prefer to remain mute because landlords can decide to sack us any time, any day." Nearly all permanent hired workers also disclosed that they often manage remote farms, which are likely to escape auditing around their compliance with labour rights, due to limited road access. As noted by one permanent farm worker, the "majority of smallholders who own multiple certified farms at different locations often decide to allocate the remote ones to us." He further divulged, "Because auditors rarely visit the farms we work on, farm owners do not insist on compliance with labour rights." Consequently, permanent farm workers often escape child labour monitoring and do not observe occupational safety and health protocols.

#### **4.5 Discussion**

The purpose of this study was to analyse the implications of lead firm governance for decent work, through the economic and social upgrading of smallholders and permanent hired farm workers in the cocoa sector of Ghana. By examining the key drivers of smallholder participation in lead firm governance and the conditions for decent work, this article contributes to the growing attention to Global Value Chains (GVCs)—focusing on how multi-stakeholder engagement and processes are shaping the outcomes of economic and social upgrading, in the Global South.

First, we found that lead firms govern decent work through both vertical and horizontal pathways, and through a combination of both. In our analysis, we show that incentives are key to

promoting smallholder participation in lead firm governance for decent work through vertical pathways. Our result suggests that input-based incentives—such as fertilizers, farming tools, training and credit—trigger farmers' participation in the vertical governance of labour. This finding is similar to those of existing studies, showing that economic-based incentives—including trade agreements and market access—are critical for country- and firm-level participation in labour governance (Rossi, 2015). In the context of horizontal governance, our findings also indicate that lead firm cooperation with local actors is crucial for smallholder participation in decent work governance. We note that the process of lead firms working together with local actors allows for the consideration of local expertise and the locally specific context, improving the participation of smallholders in decent work governance. This implies that expanding the active involvement of Global South actors in lead firm governance for decent work is vital for smallholder participation and may help promote the development of new, emerging governance in the sector (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2020). For both horizontal and vertical linkages, we found that multi-stakeholder collaboration is fundamental to promoting the participation of smallholders in decent work governance. We show that such collaborative efforts are essential to promoting smallholder participation through increased legitimacy, due to a more consultative and real stakeholder involvement that allows for information and knowledge sharing (a view shared by Lee et al., 2020). In particular, our evidence suggests that transparency and effective enforcement are successful ingredients for smallholders' participation in both vertical and horizontal governance of decent work.

Our findings also reveal that smallholders' participation in lead firm's management of working conditions can successfully result in process and product upgrading—through improved and higher yields and premium payments, respectively. Each of these two types of economic upgrading is driven by key conditions. For process upgrading, the data analysis highlights that the role of the state and the opportunism of intermediaries are critical conditions for smallholder economic upgrading. The opportunism of intermediaries implies that LBCs along the chain may cheat smallholders by adjusting the weighing scale. While we appreciate current findings—which show that the role of national government, through institutional environment and governance structures, is essential in the economic upgrading of smallholder producers in the Global South (see, for example: Karatepe & Scherrer, 2019; Kilelu et al., 2017; Lombardozi, 2020)—here we

explicitly identify what aspects of the state's responsibilities remain key in our case. We recognise that the crucial role played by the state through COCOBOD, in price fixing and stabilisation mechanisms, is imperative for the process upgrading of smallholders who participate in lead firm governance for decent work. Our findings contribute to the debate around the idea that commodity price development, in producing countries, is essential for the economic upgrading of smallholders—due to the increasing price volatility of export-oriented crops (see, for example: Tröster et al., 2019). On top of the role of COCOBOD, our analysis further suggests that the LBCs' opportunistic behaviour and outright cheating remain critical obstacles to successful process upgrading. For instance, our analysis shows that the adjustment of weighing scales by some LBCs acts as a barrier to the impact of increased yield on smallholder economic upgrading. Our results contribute to the growing attention toward the “market opportunism” that is exhibited by some LBCs in the cocoa sector of Ghana (see, for example: Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018) as a bane to smallholder economic upgrading. For product upgrading, our findings indicate that the amount of premium paid is an important condition for its accomplishment. Our analysis suggests that, despite the effort put into cultivating certified cocoa beans, a substantial amount of these are sold as conventional beans. This raises questions around the commitment and use of sustainable cocoa through certification standards, as claimed by lead firms. On the other hand, it also tends to affect the sustainability of certification schemes as LBCs struggle to find a final buyer for certified cocoa (Skalidou, 2018). In sum, the advancement of smallholder product upgrading could be hampered in future.

The data analysis also highlights that both the process and product upgrading of farmer producers result in mixed outcomes on social upgrading. They are also more likely to lead to the social downgrading of permanent hired farm workers, in comparison to the smallholder producers themselves. Contrary to previous evidence showing that both process and product upgrading leads to the same outcome—regardless of the status of the work—for garment industry workers (Rossi, 2013), or a different outcome based on the status of work for horticultural producers and workers (Barrientos et al., 2016), we present a mixed view. We have found that, while process upgrading leads to the same outcome of social downgrading for both smallholders and their farm workers, product upgrading leads to a different outcome. The different outcomes for smallholders and farm workers as a result of product upgrading can be described as a “double-edged sword” (Rossi, 2013),

as they are associated with improved labour issues for smallholder producers and decent work deficits for permanent farmworkers.

Our analysis describes how the link between process upgrading and social downgrading—occurring simultaneously for both producers and farm workers—is intrinsically linked to a number of conditions. For example, we show that process upgrading can lead to the use of child labour in the cocoa sector of Ghana, due both to the rising cost and unavailability of adult labour and to weak labour monitoring in the governance system. We emphasise that the weakness in the labour monitoring system stems from weak local enforcement mechanisms. Also, we show that process upgrading can lead to poor safety and health conditions for both producers and farm workers, owing to poor health training and education. In addition, we describe how the link between product upgrading and the social downgrading of permanent farm workers is inherently linked to the exercise of structural power by smallholder producers. Our study underscores that product upgrading can lead to the use of child labour, poor safety and health conditions and lower wages for permanent farm workers. This is owing to the structural power exercised by smallholders vis-à-vis the low bargaining power of farm workers, as shown elsewhere (see, for example: Riisgaard & Okinda, 2018).

Overall, our findings underscore that smallholder participation in lead firm governance does not automatically translate into economic upgrading—and that, even if it does, waged workers on smallholder farms do not socially benefit. While we share with Cramer et al. (2016) and Riisgaard and Okinda (2018) our interest in the poorest rural workforce focus—that is, waged workers on smallholder farms and smallholders—this research offers an important additional insight. Namely, we highlight the conditions under which the economic upgrading of smallholder producers can lead to specific social upgrading indicators for smallholders and their waged workers, mutually. We also show that smallholder producers do not solely rely on family labour, as perceived in the prior literature.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

This study has explored how lead firms' management of working conditions may promote decent work through economic and social upgrading, along the Ghana cocoa value chain. We contribute to the growing body of literature on the factors that promote the participation of smallholders in lead firms' governance of decent work, and how economic and social upgrading are interlinked.

Our results show that—while incentives encourage smallholder participation in vertical governance—the active engagement of local actors in lead firm governance processes spurs smallholder participation, in horizontal governance and in governance that is both vertical and horizontal. This is achieved through cooperation and collaboration, respectively. We have found that process and product upgrading occur for smallholders who participate in lead firms' governance of decent work through the role of key actors such as the state and the intermediary and lead firms. As it stands, the economic upgrading of smallholder cocoa farmers has not yet fully translated into social upgrading for themselves and their farm workers. This is due to the cost of labour, to weak labour monitoring, to poor health training and education, and to the structural power of smallholder producers. We have identified a number of issues that require attention, to promote smallholder participation in lead firm governance—while simultaneously fostering economic and social upgrading for both smallholder producers and their farm workers.

Given that input-based incentives drive the participation of smallholders in lead firm's vertical governance, future policy and research focusing on strengthening and identifying additional non-price incentives could positively influence and attract smallholders to participate in decent work governance in Ghana. Likewise, since cooperation drives the participation of smallholders in horizontal pathways of lead firm governance, future research into how to build and operate cooperation on the foundation of mutual benefit—rather than on competition among different actors in GCVCs—is key (see, for example: Ayala-Orozco et al., 2018). This may help to advance our understanding of how cooperation amongst key actors can have a more powerful impact in improving smallholder participation in lead firm governance for decent work. Since multi-stakeholder collaboration favours the participation of smallholders in both horizontal and vertical paths of lead firm governance, empirical enquiry into how to improve active multi-stakeholder engagement amongst diverse groups of stakeholders in the GCVCs also appears to be a promising path for future research (see for example, Van Tulder & Keen, 2018). This may help to maintain transparency and enforcement, leading to a successful economic and social upgrading for lower-tier suppliers. In addition, COCOBOD should empower the “lagging far behind” local LBCs and farmer cooperatives, to participate in increasing voluntary initiatives that take both vertical and horizontal paths. This can be done through increasing awareness by bringing together

the strengths and challenges of all LBCs and farmer cooperatives at the local level—for example, through a committee.

Our analysis also suggests that increased yield or process upgrading of smallholders can successfully be achieved under the conditions of a price stabilisation mechanism—and by overcoming the opportunistic behaviour of intermediaries. Future research could explore ways to make COCOBOD's management of price fixing and regulation of LBCs more effective and transparent. With regard to policy, transparency in price setting and fixing is also desirable. It appears to be of particular policy importance to ensure greater transparency in price transmission to smallholders. For example, as one acknowledges the collaboration between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in fixing a floor price of cocoa at USD 2,600 per ton for the crop season 2020/2021, there are calls for transparency in transmitting the increase down to smallholders. This can be done by fostering producers' representation and voice in the produce price review committee of COCOBOD, which determines the share to be given to various actors along the GCVCs. In addition, COCOBOD can adopt the use of digital weighing scales as a strategy to manage the purported adjustment of manual weighing scales by LBCs, helping to ensure smallholder process upgrading. This may help to improve transparency and reduce opportunism along the GCVCs. Our analysis also shows that the product upgrading of smallholders is successfully achieved, based on the condition of the amount of premiums. To add to the call from various civil society groups, Rainforest Alliance—for example—should guarantee a fixed minimum premium while Fairtrade should ensure that the existing living incomes for smallholders are appropriately elevated.

Finally, our analysis suggests that important conditions—such as the cost of labour; the labour monitoring system; health training and education; and the exercise of structural power for economic and social upgrading—are all interlinked. Future research could thus analyse the most effective ways to reduce labour costs among smallholder producers and their relation to economic and social upgrading. Likewise, future studies could explore policies and strategies related to improved local labour monitoring amongst cocoa farmers and cocoa growing communities in Ghana. Lead firms—along with COCOBOD and LBCs—should intensify safety and health education amongst producers and in their growing communities. Research into how the power and governance structures for smallholders and their farm workers can create positive or negative



upgrading outcomes also merits more attention (see for example, Riisgaard & Okinda, 2018). These studies could promote an improved understanding of how economic and social upgrading are linked, for both producers and farm workers in the Global South.

Our study is limited in a number of ways, which should be considered when drawing conclusions from the results. First, our analysis is limited to just one commodity. Given the uniqueness of the value chain structure of Ghana's cocoa—in comparison to other domestic export-oriented commodities such as palm oil, rubber and cashews—further studies considering these other crops could advance our understanding of how commodity chain structure affects smallholder participation in lead firm governance for sustainability in Ghana, along with its relation to upgrading. The study is also limited by its focus on just a few permanent hired workers. While data on casual workers on smallholder farms is hard to access, future studies should build on our findings—examining whether it is possible that the economic upgrading of farmer producers observed in this study may lead to the social upgrading or downgrading of casual hired labour. Such studies may help us to better understand whether what is good for smallholder cocoa producers in Ghana will be passed automatically down the supply chain to casual hired workers, or not.

## **5 General Discussion**

The purpose of this thesis was to analyse various actions used in governance for decent work in Global Agricultural Value Chain/Global Agricultural Production Networks (GAVC/GAPNs)—and how such approaches grant Global South actors, in particular smallholder producers and their farm workers, the capacity to achieve and maintain decent work. As global supply chains continue to operate on an international scale, mutual interdependencies increase and therefore, there is the need to involve all actors to achieve decent work. We argue that promoting the capacity of Global South actors, in particular smallholders and their farm workers, who have been neglected to some extent in theories and empirical research in GAVC/GAPNs governance, is key to achieving decent work. We first discuss what approaches have been adopted to improve and maintain decent work in GAVC/GAPNs, before proceeding to discuss how the different approaches grant agency to Global South actors to access decent work. This adds to the existing and rising knowledge regarding mutual governance for decent work within different Global Value Chain/Global Production Networks (GVC/GPNs).

### **5.1 Approaches to Improve and Maintain Decent Work in GAVC/GAPNs**

By examining the key approaches to improving and maintaining decent work in GAVC/GAPNs, this thesis contributes to the growing attention to managing working conditions in GVC/GPNs from a multi-stakeholder engagement perspective. First, in chapter two, we highlight a number of approaches that can be adopted to govern decent work in GAPNs from a conceptual perspective. Through the review, we identified that governance based on actor type and scope (see also Gereffi & Lee, 2016) are major means in promoting and maintaining decent work. The findings provide a conceptual framework to analyse different approaches to managing decent work within different GAVC/GAPNs.

Regarding actor type, we identified that despite the huge focus on the role of Global North actors in addressing decent work through private governance, there is an increasing focus on Global South engagement through social governance in GAPNs. Social governance is a form of collective-decision that requires engagement with both private and public actors as well as non-economic actors such as non-government organisations (NGOs) and labour unions through multi-stakeholder initiatives (de Bakker et al., 2019). The rising theories and related empirical research on social governance reflect the notion that Global South engagement and partnership are promoted in

practice and remain a main driver for addressing decent work deficits in GAPNs. The increase in focus on labour research on social governance is due to the complexity of agricultural supply chains (Lezoche et al., 2020), lack of transparency in private governance and the challenges associated with their monitoring and compliance (Gilbert & Huber, 2017).

In addition, we highlighted in chapter two that an increasing number of scholars consider the effect of two or more actor type of governance on labour related issues in their analysis. From the findings, a consideration of at least two types of regulatory frameworks (incl. private, social and public) reveals the growing importance of Global South participation in these empirical related researches on addressing labour rights within GAPNs. Such conceptualisation provides a better understanding of the interactions of private governance with social and public forms in addressing decent work deficits within GAPNs (Alford et al., 2017; Amengual, 2010; Mayer & Gereffi, 2010).

However, the declining role of focus on public actors in these empirical studies on decent work governance as shown in chapter two is a major constrain to Global South engagement in decent work governance. We show that the focus of public governance in literature is limited because of the conceptualisation of addressing labour issues in global commodity chains that focused on the role of private governance (Gereffi et al., 2005). Furthermore, public governance for addressing labour related issues in GAPNs are either lacking or exploitative (Gilbert & Huber, 2017) in order to attract foreign direct investments (Davies & Vadlamannati, 2013).

With regard to the scope, we observed that though the majority of studies focus on vertical governance in their analysis, there is an increasing focus on horizontal governance and a combination of both governances in addressing decent work deficits within different GAPNs. This reflects a growing engagement of Global South actors in managing decent work in GVC/GPNs. According to Alexander (2020), while vertical governance may involve lead firms and upper-tier suppliers only, horizontal governance may include non-economic actors, revealing a collective activity. The rising exploration of horizontal governance in labour research in GAPNs shows a shift in multi-stakeholder engagement through the inclusion of, for example, marginalised voices in addressing decent work deficits (Cheyins & Riisgaard, 2014; Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen 2014; Matheis & Herzig, 2019).

In chapter three, we highlight the influence of institutions on decent work in GAVC/GAPNs in the Global South. We focus on the role of rural labour arrangements in decent work governance, in particular avoiding child labour and improving safe working conditions in cocoa production in

Ghana. In line with the rural institutional focus, we contribute to the debate on understanding management of decent work from a horizontal governance perspective. The findings demonstrate that institutional arrangements can promote and maintain smallholder participation in decent work governance through a reduction in labour transaction costs. We identify that a reduction in labour transaction costs is driven by factors such as collective action and risk-sharing strategies through self-regulation and social relationships.

We contend that collective action is a primary driver of horizontal governance for decent work through reduction in labour search cost, monitoring cost and contracting cost. In addition, we argue that smallholder collective action in the form of communal labour support could help promote decent work—through breaking the rising power of the high cost of hired labourers. Similarly, existing studies show that collective action of smallholder producers is a necessary and to a larger extent a sufficient condition for Global South decent work through economic and social upgrading (Karatepe & Scherrer, 2019). Furthermore, collective action of smallholders improves their access to resources and markets through promoting their own interest and breaking away from constraints such as imperfect information and opportunistic behaviour likely to stem from intermediaries (Ochieng et al., 2018; Orsi et al., 2017).

However, collective action could hinder horizontal governance for decent work because of free ride problem and the labourious tasks of cocoa production. In this study and elsewhere (see for example, Vigneri et al., 2016), we found that communal labour support in Ghana is becoming less popular because of the ageing population of farmers in comparison to the labourious tasks in cocoa production. In the collective action literature, a number of authors highlight that a proper implementation arrangement is crucial in order to avoid defection, inspire trust, mutual understanding and transparency within smallholder collective action (Jelsma et al., 2018; Kruijssen et al., 2009; Uronu & Ndiege, 2018).

In chapter three, we also argue that risk-sharing strategies are a key driver of horizontal governance for promoting decent work through a reduction in labour transaction costs. In this study, we noticed that smallholder risk-sharing strategies including rural service centres and land-owner caretaker relations provide horizontal management of decent work through a reduction in the rising cost of labour in the cocoa sector of Ghana. Existing studies also show that risk management strategies that take a horizontal path such as insurance (Fisher et al., 2019; Jensen & Barrett, 2017) and contract farming (Al et al., 2020; Chamberlain et al., 2017) are essential to

promoting decent work through smallholder access to inputs, increased productivity and markets (Bellemare, 2018; Ros-Tonen et al., 2019). However, risk sharing strategies could hinder horizontal governance for decent work because of lack of assured transparency and trust. In the case of landowner-care taker relations for example, we found that the informality, uncertainty and lack of transparency give rise to landowner power over the caretaker. In addition, we noted that in the case of rural service centres, there is the smallholder farmer notion of mistrust and uncertainty that can hinder the performance of horizontal governance. In the risk sharing strategy literature, a number of studies show that lack of written contract (Meemken et al., 2019) and potential principal agent problems (Burchardi et al., 2019) may have dire consequences for smallholder engagement in governance of supply chains.

In chapter four, we emphasise a number of factors that encourage and discourage Global South, especially smallholder participation in lead firm governance, and clarify paths to decent work through economic and social upgrading. We found that lead firms govern decent work through both vertical and horizontal pathways, and through a combination of both.

In our analysis, we show that incentives are key to promoting smallholder participation in lead firm governance for decent work through vertical pathways. Our result suggests that input-based incentives—such as fertilizers, farming tools, training and credit—trigger farmers’ participation in the vertical governance of decent work. This implies that incentives are key measures to improve and maintain decent work in GAVC/GAPNs. However, we also noted that the selling conditionality attached to lead firm vertical governance restrain the participation of smallholders, in particular the marginalised ones. For example, we found in chapter four that license-buying companies select smallholders to incorporate into vertical governance structures based on their ability to meet the supply requirement, capability of following stringent labour laws and documentation, and location along easy-to-access roads in order to reduce costs. These findings complement results of other studies that show female farmers, farmers with small land holdings, and those with limited access to infrastructure, e.g. roads, face discrimination in the participation in vertical governance (see also, Chiputwa et al., 2015; Loconto & Simbua, 2012).

In the context of horizontal governance, our findings also indicate that lead firm cooperation with local actors is crucial for smallholder participation in decent work governance. We observed in our findings that lead firms that adopt non-sourcing approaches or horizontal paths in Ghana’s cocoa value chain reach a higher number of both economic and non-economic

actors, in particular marginalised actors, due to the lack of selling conditionality. We note that the process of lead firms working together with local actors allows for the consideration of local expertise and the locally specific context, improving the participation of smallholders in decent work governance. This implies that expanding the active involvement of Global South actors in lead firm governance for decent work is vital for smallholder participation and may help promote the development of new, emerging governance in the sector (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2020). Yet, the lack of direct control and verified compliance, and inadequate technological capability among smallholders hampers their participation in horizontal governance for decent work.

For both horizontal and vertical linkages, we found that multi-stakeholder collaboration is fundamental to promoting the participation of smallholders in decent work governance. We show that such collaborative efforts are essential to promoting smallholder participation through increased legitimacy, due to a more consultative and real stakeholder involvement that allows for information and knowledge sharing (a view shared by Lee et al., 2020). In this context, legitimacy may help to improve smallholder compliance with labour standards because of likely alteration of power differences, inclusion of marginalised actors, transparency, efficacy and enforcement (Hahn & Weidtmann, 2016; Mena & Palazzo, 2012). For example, existing studies show that involving social and public actors more actively in private governance of decent work may improve compliance with labour standards because of the consideration of institutional embeddedness and local context (Coe et al., 2008), improved monitoring systems (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014) and improved transparency (Gardner et al., 2019) in GVC/GPNs.

This thesis has recast our understanding of how governance of decent work is shaped by multi-stakeholder engagement. Within this context, the participation and role played by smallholder producers in governance of decent work continues to evolve. Therefore, research on decent work governance allows us to better understand smallholder capabilities for labour management.

## **5.2 Global South Capability for Decent Work in GAVC/GAPNs**

By examining how different approaches grant Global South actors, in particular smallholders and farm workers, the capability to access decent work in GAVC/GAPNs, this thesis contributes to the growing attention to the goal of decent work for all in GVC/GPNs, as stated in the United Nations's Sustainable Development Goal 8 'Decent work and Economic Growth'.

In chapter two, we provide evidence of the effectiveness of governance approaches on decent work of Global South actors. In discussing the mechanisms to stimulate Global South capability from a conceptual perspective—it is imperative to underscore that the focus is on the unit of analysis. The findings provide a conceptual framework to analyse the implications of governance for decent work based on a combination of the type of work and gender. With regard to the category of agricultural work, we show that theories and empirical related studies on decent work are limited to wage workers on plantations in comparison to self-employed smallholder farmers and their farm workers because of rising wage labour employment within GAPNs (Mueller & Chan, 2015) and lack of available quality national data on labour and working conditions in rural areas for smallholder producers (Oya, 2015). Regarding gender, we indicate that women have received far less focus because they are perhaps usually recognised as part of the unpaid family labour force and have limited access to land in the areas of study despite being considered as the majority in the agricultural labour force (ILOSTAT, 2018). Overall, the conceptual discussion on how governance approaches grant Global South actors' capacity to access decent work neglects the poorest rural workforce—namely, smallholders and wagedworkers on smallholder farms on one hand, and women smallholder producers on the other hand.

In chapter three, we highlight the implications of local labour arrangements on decent work governance, in particular avoiding child labour and improving safe working conditions in cocoa production in Ghana. The analysis reveals how labour arrangements offer smallholders' agency to access decent work. Overall, our analysis indicates that the consequences of local labour arrangement on smallholders' ability to access decent work in the cocoa sector of Ghana are limited. This is due to major constraints such as lack of reciprocity of communal labour support, low agency and low bargaining of Abusa—and issues bothering on finance, transparency and autonomy of rural service centres.

While our findings indicate that communal labour support grants smallholders' agency to reduce or eliminate child labour other than improved health and safety working conditions, yet the lack of reciprocity is a major constraint. We note that most farmers are no longer interested in engaging in communal labour support as they are sceptical about receiving support in return. This implies that services not reciprocated can lead to withdrawal of collective action among smallholder producers due to loss of trust in others. Also, our findings show that Abusa does not provide smallholders' agency to address both child labour and occupational safety and health.

This can be explained in light of low agency and low bargaining power of caretakers. Our analysis shows that caretakers have no greater capacity to contest unfair labour treatment including underpayment and inadequate supply of inputs.

Moreover, our findings suggest that rural service centres provide smallholders' ability to access decent work through a form of share contract scheme. Yet, we identify two main sources of impediments to its potential rate of success. The first relates to financial constraints of entrepreneurs. Our analysis revealed the importance of financial independence of entrepreneurs to retain more interested farmers in the rural service scheme. The second relates to smallholders' fear of transparency and autonomy. Our findings suggest that for smallholder farmers to participate and avoid exit from the rural service centre, they need to be regarded as the owners and made part of all production and marketing decision making at all times to ensure their autonomy and improve transparency.

In chapter four, we clarify the implications of lead firm governance on smallholders and farm workers' capability to achieve decent work through economic and social upgrading. Our findings reveal that smallholders' participation in lead firm's management of working conditions can successfully result in process and product upgrading—through improved and higher yields and premium payments, respectively. For process upgrading, the data analysis highlights that the role of the state and the opportunism of intermediaries are critical conditions for smallholder economic upgrading. The opportunism of intermediaries implies that LBCs along the chain may cheat smallholders by adjusting the weighing scale. For product upgrading, our findings indicate that the amount of premium paid is an important condition for its accomplishment. Our analysis suggests that, despite the effort put into cultivating certified cocoa beans, a substantial amount of these are sold as conventional beans. This raises questions around the commitment and use of sustainable cocoa through certification standards, as claimed by lead firms.

The data analysis in chapter four also highlights that both the process and product upgrading of farmer producers result in mixed outcomes on social upgrading. They are also more likely to lead to the social downgrading of permanent hired farm workers, in comparison to the smallholder producers themselves. Our analysis in chapter four describes how the link between process upgrading and social downgrading—occurring simultaneously for both producers and farm workers—is intrinsically linked to a number of conditions. For example, we show that process upgrading can lead to the use of child labour in the cocoa sector of Ghana, due both to



the rising cost and unavailability of adult labour and to weak labour monitoring in the governance system. We emphasise that the weakness in the labour monitoring system stems from weak local enforcement mechanisms. Also, we show that process upgrading can lead to poor safety and health conditions for both producers and farm workers, owing to poor health training and education. In addition, we describe how the link between product upgrading and the social downgrading of permanent farm workers is inherently linked to the exercise of structural power by smallholder producers. Our study underscores that product upgrading can lead to the use of child labour, poor safety and health conditions and lower wages for permanent farm workers. This is owing to the structural power exercised by smallholders vis-à-vis the low bargaining power of farm workers, as shown elsewhere (see, for example: Riisgaard & Okinda, 2018). Overall, our findings in chapter four also underscore that smallholder participation in lead firm governance does not automatically translate into economic upgrading—and that, even if it does, wageworkers on smallholder farms do not socially benefit.

## **6 General Conclusions**

In this final chapter of the thesis, we provide a summary of the main findings of each study in chapters two, three and four and highlight our contribution to the literature on decent work in Agricultural Value Chain/Global Agricultural Production Networks (GAVC/GAPNs). In addition, we offer some policy and managerial implications for improving smallholder and farm worker agency to access decent work. Finally, we outline some limitations of the thesis and areas for further research.

### **6.1 Main Findings**

The past two decades have witnessed an effective globalisation of food and agricultural supply chains because of the rise in food safety and quality concerns in the Global North, increased investment in the Global South agriculture and the rise in high-value food exports in the Global South (Swinnen, 2007). One of the striking criticisms associated with GAVC/GAPNs has been the persistent rise in labour rights violations of Global South actors (ILO, 2014) due to the sourcing practices of lead firms in the Global North (Anner, 2018) and the position, status and type of work of Global South actors within production networks (Barrientos et al., 2011a). Not surprisingly, different actors at various levels have responded to this ethical misconduct through various hard laws and soft laws (Gilbert & Huber, 2017; ILO, 2019). However, there is still a continued debate on the effects of these diverse arrangements on working conditions.

Some studies have argued that the diverse approaches to addressing decent work deficits within GAVC/GAPNs can be beneficial to Global South actors in terms of empowerment through improved education, income and productivity (Oya et al., 2018; Reynolds, 2014; Schuster & Maertens, 2017). Others suggest that these approaches may not benefit Global South actors, in most cases waged workers and self-employed smallholder farmers, because of their lack of participation in the development and implementation of these instruments, in particular the voluntary ones (Cramer et al., 2016; Jacobs et al., 2015; Oya et al., 2018; Staricco & Ponte, 2015). Therefore, in this dissertation, we contribute to the literature by analysing the different approaches that promote decent work in the Global South, especially, for smallholder producers and their farm workers within GAVC/GAPNs. We do so through three different but interlinked studies that have either not been sufficiently researched or paid attention to before.

In the first study, shown in chapter two, we have analysed the conceptual perspectives and methodologies underpinning existing empirical studies and provide evidence for the labour-related practice. Based on an analysis of 87 articles published in English-speaking journals, we show that the existence of governance based on actors (private, social, and public) in regulating labour rights is more dominated by private actors with a more recent focus on social actors and a consideration of at least two actors. In addition, we have found that the focus on scope (horizontal and vertical) in regulating labour issues is more dominated by vertical forms. Moreover, we find that labour issues addressed in literature were diverse with occupational safety and health risks under-researched. Also, we have shown that regarding category of workers focus, wagedworkers working on plantations are more studied than those working in agro-industries and in smallholder farms while studies on female farmers remains limited. Finally, we have found that the majority of available studies utilised qualitative research methods as compared to other research designs. This study generates methodological ideas and conceptual perspectives for future studies to consider.

In the second study found in chapter three, we have examined the role of institutions in promoting Global South agency to access decent work in agricultural globalisation. Although institutions play a major important role for decent work along global value chains, it remains an under-researched area (Mohan, 2016; Nielson & Pritchard, 2009), particularly in the context of smallholders' agency. Specifically, we explore the role of local labour arrangements in providing smallholders' agency to access decent work (absence of child labour and increased safety and working conditions) in cocoa production in Ghana. Our findings reveal how three labour arrangements – communal labour support systems, landowner-caretaker relations and rural service centres – grant opportunities or not for smallholder to access decent work, in particular to counter child labour and occupational health and safety risks in cocoa production in Ghana. Our empirical results show that labour arrangements provide smallholders' capacity to avoid child labour and improve their occupational health and safety concerns through availability and access to adult labour. However, we find that several impediments of specific labour arrangements act as a barrier to smallholders' agency. Addressing such impediments of labour arrangement should receive more attention in future research and policy-making.

In the third paper found in chapter four, we have analysed how lead firms' management of working conditions may promote decent work through economic and social upgrading, along the Ghana cocoa value chain. We contribute to the growing body of literature on the factors that

promote the participation of smallholders in lead firms' governance of decent work, and how economic and social upgrading are interlinked. Our results show that—while incentives encourage smallholder participation in vertical governance—the active engagement of local actors in lead firm governance processes spurs smallholder participation, in horizontal governance and in governance that is both vertical and horizontal. This is achieved through cooperation and collaboration, respectively. We have found that process and product upgrading occur for smallholders who participate in lead firms' governance of decent work through the role of key actors such as the state, the intermediary and lead firms. As it stands, the economic upgrading of smallholder cocoa farmers has not yet fully translated into social upgrading for themselves and their farm workers. This is due to the cost of labour, to weak labour monitoring, to poor health training and education, and to the structural power of smallholder producers. We have identified a number of issues that require attention, to promote smallholder participation in lead firm governance—while simultaneously fostering economic and social upgrading for both smallholder producers and their farm workers.

## **6.2 Policy and Managerial Recommendations**

Overall, our study shows that the various governance approaches have not adequately addressed decent work deficits of smallholders and their farm workers. Our recommendations relate to measures needed to improve smallholder and farm worker access to decent work in GAVC/GAPNs. We focus on ways to improve smallholder participation in existing governance mechanisms so that these approaches can deliver decent work more effectively. In terms of managerial implications, we highlight how key actors, in particular lead firms, could enhance their governance mechanisms. Regarding policy implications, we stress the importance of global governance through national government regulations. First, lead firms should support measures such as development and implementation of social governance, governance through both vertical and horizontal path, collective action capacity building, and building and reinforcing trust among smallholders to enhance the diffusion of and compliance with labour standards.

To begin with, lead firms should focus more on developing and implementing social governance in addressing decent work deficits in GAVC/GAPNs as a means to improve legitimacy. We have found in chapter two that social form of governance takes a multi-stakeholder approach that typically involves a wide range of economic and non-economic actors and has important implications for marginalised actors, in most cases smallholder farmers and farm workers. There

is the need for various actor support and participation in multi-stakeholder initiatives to help create a collective plan of action in addressing decent work deficits for all key actors.

In addition, lead firms should focus more on approaches that combine both horizontal and vertical governance mechanisms. We show in chapter four that such combination can improve labour standard compliance and is key for promoting Global South capacity to access decent work. As GAVC/GAPNs get smaller with improved engagement of smallholder producers, lead firm strategies that work on inclusion and empowerment of self-employed farmers and farm workers are important for multi-stakeholder engagement. Addressing vertical and horizontal governance challenges through a combination of both could increase smallholder and farm worker acceptance of social, economic and environmental responsibility.

Moreover, public and social actors should focus on collective action capacity building amongst smallholders and their growing communities. We find in chapter three that collective action is key in promoting smallholder participation in governance for decent work because of reduction in transaction costs. There is the need for policy support in collective action development approaches through training and awareness, empowerment and incentives. This could improve smallholder inclusion in decent work governance through knowledge sharing. Also, it may influence their capacity for a sustained short-term and long-term collective action.

Finally, policy makers and businesses should focus on building and reinforcing trust among smallholders within the production network. We have shown in chapters three and four that trust is essential in promoting sustained smallholder engagement in horizontal, vertical and both governances. Given that trust is key to smallholder participation in decent work governance, there is the need for policy support in building trust and reinforcing trust over time through social affiliations and networks for example. This strategy could help overcome the strong temptation of opportunistic behaviour in smallholder collective action while improving compliance with underlying rules of labour standards.

Second, policy makers should support measures such as improved monitoring of labour standards by local actors and development of institutional frameworks to regulate informal labour arrangements. Public actors and businesses should focus on improving labour monitoring structures implemented by local actors in the Global South. We have shown in chapter four that local enforcement mechanisms and monitoring systems of labour standards in the cocoa sector of Ghana remain weak or non-existent. Given that improved engagement of smallholder producers

increases compliance because of legitimacy, social actors should address constraints such as inadequate resources and lack of motivational mechanisms that impede local actor labour monitoring capacity. Improving labour monitoring by local actors could consequently lead to effective compliance with underlying rules of labour standards and help in the development of new emerging governance that consider local expertise and context. In addition, local actors such as COCOBOD, LBCs, farmers, trade unions and community chiefs may come together to create an informal regulatory framework that defines how informal labour arrangements can be agreed on and enforced. We have shown in chapter three that the lack of an enabling institutional environment hinders smallholders' access to decent work. The informal regulatory framework may include community by-laws and a mediator to address future arising conflicts. Such an existing framework may provide incentives for aggrieved parties to contest their labour rights violations and exploitation within GAVC/GAPNs. Such public regulatory roles could impact the way that smallholders govern their supply chains. Also, public regulation may raise awareness and pressure intermediaries to manage their supply chains in a transparent manner.

### **6.3 Limitations and Areas for Further Research**

Our study shows that smallholders' capability to access decent work can be improved and maintained through enhanced lead firm governance mechanisms and creation of public regulations. However, there are some aspects that limit the scope of our analysis.

First, we show that the conceptual study is based on English language articles selected from peer-reviewed journals, and are likely to have missed out on relevant studies in grey literature and non-English language studies. In addition, a systematic review approach is likely to omit relevant peer-reviewed articles based on the researchers' bias in the formulation of the eligibility criteria for inclusion. Future studies could build upon our findings through direct engagement with researchers to learn from the experience made in methodologies and governance perspectives in addressing decent work deficits in GAPNs. Such an additional research approach could provide expert evaluative opinions on opportunities and challenges of smallholder inclusion in decent work governance in labour research studies and in practice.

Second, the empirical studies are based on qualitative research designs which are likely to suffer from selection bias of participants. Despite the use of purposive and snowball sampling techniques to ensure wider variation of inclusion, the use of quantitative methods could balance

this limitation and further build on our findings to address questions that we are unable to answer through qualitative means. For example: What is the effect of incentives on governance participation among smallholders, smallholder collective action and effective labour monitoring by local actors? What influences the participation of LBCs in multi-stakeholder initiatives and its impact on smallholder engagement of governance? How can lead firms support Global South actor cooperation and collaboration at local level as seen at the international level by the World Cocoa Foundation?

Third, we find that the empirical research is limited by focusing on one country and one sector of the agricultural industry. For example, the governance structure of other cocoa producing countries in West Africa including Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria differs. Ghana has a non-liberalised domestic and export market, centralised marketing and maintenance of a high export quality system that differs from the other producing countries. This suggests that the level and flexibility of engagement of local actors in decent work governance may not be the same across producing countries in the same geographical region. Further studies considering other producing countries with a distinct value chain structure could better advance our understanding of opportunities and challenges of smallholder engagement for decent work in similar commodity chains in GAPNs across different countries.

Moreover, although cocoa in Ghana is very important due to its large share of GDP contribution, employment opportunities and decent work deficits, future studies could consider other commodity chains such as oil palm that differ from the cocoa sector in that a larger proportion of the value creation takes place within the country and is growing in importance for Ghana's economy. This could help to better understand smallholder engagement for decent work in diverse agricultural commodity chains within the same country.

Finally, the study is also limited by a focus on just a few permanent hired workers. Future empirical enquiry should focus on what available power resources farm workers on smallholder farms can draw from to represent their interest in informal labour arrangements. Also, although data on casual workers on smallholder farms is hard to access, future studies should build on our findings—examining whether it is possible that the economic upgrading of farmer producers observed in this study may lead to the social upgrading or downgrading of casual hired labour. Such studies may help us to better understand whether what is good for smallholder cocoa

## ***Chapter 6. General Conclusions***

---

producers in Ghana will be passed automatically down the supply chain to casual hired workers, or not.



**Bibliography**

- Abebe, G. K., Bijman, J., Kemp, R., Omta, O., & Tsegaye, A. (2013). Contract farming configuration: Smallholders' preferences for contract design attributes. *Food Policy*, 40, 14-24.
- Adams, T., Gerber, J. D., & Amacker, M. (2019). Constraints and opportunities in gender relations: Sugarcane outgrower schemes in Malawi. *World Development*, 122, 282-294.
- Aguiar de Medeiros, C., & Trebat, N. (2017). Inequality and income distribution in global value chains. *Journal of Economic Issues*, 51(2), 401-408.
- Ahmed, N., & Peerlings, J. H. (2009). Addressing workers' rights in the textile and apparel industries: Consequences for the Bangladesh economy. *World Development*, 37(3), 661-675.
- Al, B. H., Gibreel, T., Akaichi, F., Zaibet, L., & Zekri, S. (2020). Contractual agriculture: better partnerships between small farmers and the business sector in the sultanate of Oman. *Asian Journal of Agriculture and rural Development*, 10(1), 321-335.
- Alamgir, F., & Banerjee, S. B. (2019). Contested compliance regimes in global production networks: Insights from the Bangladesh garment industry. *Human Relations*, 72(2), 272-297.
- Alexander, R. (2020). Emerging roles of lead buyer governance for sustainability across global production networks. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 162(2), 269-290.
- Alford, M. (2016). Trans-scalar embeddedness and governance deficits in global production networks: Crisis in South African fruit. *Geoforum*, 75, 52-63.
- Alford, M., & Phillips, N. (2018). The political economy of state governance in global production networks: Change, crisis and contestation in the South African fruit sector. *Review of International Political Economy*, 25(1), 98-121.
- Alford, M., Barrientos, S., & Visser, M. (2017). Multi-scalar Labour Agency in Global Production Networks: Contestation and Crisis in the South African Fruit Sector. *Development and Change*, 48(4), 721-745.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Ali, F. R. M. (2019). In the same boat, but not equals: The heterogeneous effects of parental income on child labour. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 55(5), 845-858.
- Alsamawi, A., Murray, J., Lenzen, M., & Reyes, R. C. (2017). Trade in occupational safety and health: Tracing the embodied human and economic harm in labour along the global supply chain. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 147, 187-196.
- Amankwah-Amoah, J., Debrah, Y. A., & Nuerthey, D. (2018). Institutional legitimacy, cross-border trade and institutional voids: Insights from the cocoa industry in Ghana. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 58, 136-145.
- Amanor, K. S. (2010). Family values, land sales and agricultural commodification in South Eastern Ghana. *Africa*, 80(1), 104-125.
- Amengual, M. (2010). Complementary labor regulation: The uncoordinated combination of state and private regulators in the Dominican Republic. *World Development*, 38(3), 405-414.
- Amengual, M., & Chirot, L. (2016). Reinforcing the state: Transnational and state labor regulation in Indonesia. *International Labour Review*, 69(5), 1056-1080.
- Anner, M. (2017). Monitoring workers' rights: The limits of voluntary social compliance initiatives in labor repressive regimes. *Global Policy*, 8, 56-65.
- Anner, M. (2018). CSR Participation Committees, Wildcat Strikes and the Sourcing Squeeze in Global Supply Chains. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 56(1), 75-98.
- Anner, M. (2020). Squeezing workers' rights in global supply chains: purchasing practices in the Bangladesh garment export sector in comparative perspective. *Review of International Political Economy*, 27(2), 320-347.
- Arnould, E. J., Plastina, A., & Ball, D. (2009). Does fair trade deliver on its core value proposition? Effects on income, educational attainment, and health in three countries. *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing*, 28(2), 186-201.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Asfaw, S., Mithöfer, D., & Waibel, H. (2010). Agrifood supply chain, private-sector standards, and farmers' health: evidence from Kenya. *Agricultural Economics*, 41(3-4), 251-263.
- Ashwin, S., Kabeer, N., & Schüßler, E. (2020). Contested Understandings in the Global Garment Industry after Rana Plaza. *Development and Change*, 0(0), 1-10.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12573>
- Auld, G., Renckens, S., & Cashore, B. (2015). Transnational private governance between the logics of empowerment and control. *Regulation & Governance*, 9(2), 108-124.
- Ayala-Orozco, B., Rosell, J. A., Merçon, J., Bueno, I., Alatorre-Frenk, G., Langle-Flores, A., & Lobato, A. (2018). Challenges and strategies in place-based multi-stakeholder collaboration for sustainability: learning from experiences in the Global South. *Sustainability*, 10(9), 3217.
- Bacon, C. M. (2010). A spot of coffee in crisis: Nicaraguan smallholder cooperatives, fair trade networks, and gendered empowerment. *Latin American Perspectives*, 37(2), 50-71.
- Bacon, C. M., Ernesto Mendez, V., Gómez, M. E. F., Stuart, D., & Flores, S. R. D. (2008). Are sustainable coffee certifications enough to secure farmer livelihoods? The millennium development goals and Nicaragua's Fair-Trade cooperatives. *Globalisations*, 5(2), 259-274.
- Bair, J. (2005). Global capitalism and commodity chains: looking back, going forward. *Competition & Change*, 9(2), 153-180.
- Bair, J. (2017). Contextualising compliance: hybrid governance in global value chains. *New Political Economy*, 22(2), 169-185.
- Baldwin, R. (2013). Global supply chains: Why they emerged, why they matter, and where they are going. In D. K. Elms & P. Low (Eds.), *Global value chains in a changing world* (pp. 13–59). Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Barrientos, A., & Hulme, D. (2009). Social protection for the poor and poorest in developing countries: reflections on a quiet revolution: commentary. *Oxford Development Studies*, 37(4), 439-456.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Barrientos, S. (2013a). Corporate purchasing practices in global production networks: A socially contested terrain. *Geoforum*, 44, 44–51.
- Barrientos, S. (2014). Gendered global production networks: Analysis of cocoa–chocolate sourcing. *Regional Studies*, 48(5), 791-803.
- Barrientos, S. W. (2013b). ‘Labour chains’: analysing the role of labour contractors in global production networks. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 49(8), 1058-1071.
- Barrientos, S., & Kritzinger, A. (2004). Squaring the circle: Global production and the informalization of work in South African fruit exports. *Journal of International Development*, 16(1), 81-92.
- Barrientos, S., & Smith, S. (2007). Do workers benefit from ethical trade? Assessing codes of labour practice in global production systems. *Third World Quarterly*, 28(4), 713-729.
- Barrientos, S., Bianchi, L., & Berman, C. (2019). Gender and governance of global value chains: Promoting the rights of women workers. *International Labour Review*, 158(4), 729-752.
- Barrientos, S., Dolan, C., & Tallontire, A. (2003). A gendered value chain approach to codes of conduct in African horticulture. *World Development*, 31(9), 1511-1526.
- Barrientos, S., Gereffi, G., & Pickles, J. (2016a). New dynamics of upgrading in global value chains: Shifting terrain for suppliers and workers in the global south. *Environment and Planning A*, 48(7), 1214–1219.
- Barrientos, S., Gereffi, G., & Rossi, A. (2011a). Economic and social upgrading in global production networks: A new paradigm for a changing world. *International Labor Review*, 150(3-4), 319-340.
- Barrientos, S., Knorringa, P., Evers, B., Visser, M., & Opondo, M. (2016b). Shifting regional dynamics of global value chains: Implications for economic and social upgrading in African horticulture. *Environment and Planning A*, 48(7), 1266-1283.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Barrientos, S., Mayer, F., Pickles, J., & Posthuma, A. (2011b). Decent work in global production networks: Framing the policy debate. *International Labour Review*, 150(3-4), 297-317.
- Barrientos, S., McClenaghan, S., & Orton, L. (2000). Ethical trade and South African deciduous fruit exports addressing gender sensitivity. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 12(1), 140-158.
- Bartley, T. (2012). Certification as a mode of social regulation. In D. Levi-Faur (Eds.), *Handbook on the politics of regulation*, (pp. 441–452). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Bek, D., McEwan, C., & Bek, K. (2007). Ethical trading and socioeconomic transformation: critical reflections on the South African wine industry. *Environment and Planning A*, 39(2), 301-319.
- Bell, S., & Newitt, K. (2010). *Decent work and poverty eradication: Literature review and two-country study. A study for the decent work and labor standards forum*. London, UK: Ergon Associates Limited.
- Bellemare, M. F. (2018). Contract farming: opportunity cost and trade-offs. *Agricultural Economics*, 49(3), 279-288.
- Bennett, E. (2017). Who Governs Socially-Oriented Voluntary Sustainability Standards? Not the Producers of Certified Products. *World Development*, 91, 53-69.
- Bernhardt, T., & Pollak, R. (2016). Economic and social upgrading dynamics in global manufacturing value chains: A comparative analysis. *Environment and Planning A*, 48(7), 1220-1243.
- Bhagwati, J. (1995). Trade liberalisation and ‘fair trade’ demands: addressing the environmental and labour standards issues. *World Economy*, 18(6), 745-759.
- Boersma, M. (2018). Between norms and practice: Civil society perspectives on the legitimacy of multistakeholder initiatives to eliminate child labor. *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 27(5), 612-620.

## **Bibliography**

---

- Bonanno, A., & Cavalcanti, J. S. B. (2012). Globalisation, Food Quality and Labour: The Case of Grape Production in Northeastern Brazil. *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture & Food*, 19(1), 37-55
- Boström, M., Jönsson, A. M., Lockie, S., Mol, A. P., & Oosterveer, P. (2015). Sustainable and responsible supply chain governance: challenges and opportunities. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 107, 1-7.
- Bowen, S., & Gaytán, M. S. (2012). The paradox of protection: National identity, global commodity chains, and the tequila industry. *Social Problems*, 59(1), 70-93.
- Brouwer, H., Hiemstra, W., van Vugt, S., & Walters, H. (2013). Analysing stakeholder power dynamics in multi-stakeholder processes: insights of practice from Africa and Asia. *Knowledge Management for Development Journal*, 9(3), 11-31.
- Brown, S. (2013). One hundred years of labour control: violence, militancy, and the Fairtrade banana commodity chain in Colombia. *Environment and Planning A*, 45(11), 2572-2591.
- Brown, W., & Wright, C. F. (2018). Policies for decent labour standards in Britain. *The Political Quarterly*, 89(3), 482-489.
- Bryman, A. (2016). *Social research methods*. (5th ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burchardi, K. B., Gulesci, S., Lerva, B., & Sulaiman, M. (2019). Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(1), 281-347.
- Bush, S. R., Oosterveer, P., Bailey, M., & Mol, A. P. (2015). Sustainability governance of chains and networks: A review and future outlook. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 107, 8-19.
- Bymolt, R., Laven, A., & Tyzler, M. (2018). Demystifying the Cocoa Sector in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. The Royal Tropical Institute (KIT): Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
- Cattaneo, O., Gereffi, G., & Staritz, C. (2010). Global value chains in a postcrisis world: Resilience, consolidation, and shifting end markets. In O. Cattaneo, G. Gereffi, & C.

## **Bibliography**

---

- Staritz (Eds.), *Global value chains in a postcrisis world: A development perspective* (pp. 3–20). Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Chamberlain, W. O., & Anseeuw, W. (2017). Contract farming as part of a multi-instrument inclusive business structure: a theoretical analysis. *Agrekon*, 56(2), 158-172.
- Cheyens, E., & Riisgaard, L. (2014). The exercise of power through multi-stakeholder initiatives for sustainable agriculture and its inclusion and exclusion outcomes. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 31(3), 409-423.
- Chiputwa, B., Spielman, D. J., & Qaim, M. (2015). Food standards, certification, and poverty among coffee farmers in Uganda. *World Development*, 66, 400-412.
- COCOBOD (2020). 47 annual report and financial statement 2016. Retrieved February 08, 2020 from <https://www.cocobod.gh>.
- Coe, N. M., Dicken, P., & Hess, M. (2008). Global production networks: realizing the potential. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 8(3), 271-295.
- Coe, N. M., Hess, M., Yeung, H. W. C., Dicken, P., & Henderson, J. (2004). ‘Globalizing’ regional development: a global production networks perspective. *Transactions of the Institute of British geographers*, 29(4), 468-484.
- Colen, L., Maertens, M., & Swinnen, J. (2012). Private standards, trade and poverty: GlobalGAP and horticultural employment in Senegal. *The World Economy*, 35(8), 1073-1088.
- Cooper, H., & Hedges, L. V. (2009). Research synthesis as a scientific process. In H. Cooper, L. V. Hedges, & J. C. Valentine (Eds.), *The handbook of research synthesis and meta-analysis* (pp. 3-16). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Coslovsky, S. V. (2011). Relational regulation in the Brazilian Ministério Público: The organisational basis of regulatory responsiveness. *Regulation & Governance*, 5(1), 70-89.
- Coslovsky, S. V. (2014). Flying under the radar? The state and the enforcement of labour laws in Brazil. *Oxford Development Studies*, 42(2), 190-216.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Coslovsky, S. V., & Locke, R. (2013). Parallel paths to enforcement: Private compliance, public regulation, and labor standards in the Brazilian sugar sector. *Politics & Society*, 41(4), 497-526.
- Cramer, C., Johnston, D., Mueller, B., Oya, C., & Sender, J. (2016). Fairtrade and labour markets in Ethiopia and Uganda. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 53(6), 841-856.
- Cramer, C., Johnston, D., Oya, C., & Sender, J. (2014). Fairtrade cooperatives in Ethiopia and Uganda: uncensored. *Review of African Political Economy*, 41(sup1), S115-S127.
- Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (4th ed.). Los Angeles: Sage publications.
- Czinkota, M., Kaufmann, H. R., & Basile, G. (2014). The relationship between legitimacy, reputation, sustainability and branding for companies and their supply chains. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 43(1), 91-101.
- Dammert, A. C., De Hoop, J., Mvukiyehe, E., & Rosati, F. C. (2017). Effects of public policy on child labour: current knowledge, gaps, and implications for programme design. The World Bank.
- Davies, R. B., & Vadlamannati, K. C. (2013). A race to the bottom in labor standards? An empirical investigation. *Journal of Development Economics*, 103, 1-14.
- de Bakker, F. G., Rasche, A., & Ponte, S. (2019). Multi-stakeholder initiatives on sustainability: A cross-disciplinary review and research agenda for business ethics. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 29(3), 343-383.
- de Castro, C., Reigada, A., & Gadea, E. (2020). The devaluation of female labour in fruit and vegetable packaging plants in Spanish Mediterranean agriculture. *Organization*, 27(2), 232-250.
- Delautre, G. (2019). Decent work in global supply chains an internal research review. Research Department Working Paper No. 47 Geneva, ILO.
- Deppeler, A., Fromm, I., & Aidoo, R. (2014). The unmaking of the cocoa farmer: Analysis of



## **Bibliography**

---

- benefits and challenges of third-party audited certification schemes for cocoa producers and laborers in Ghana. In *International Food and Agribusiness Management Association 2014 Symposium*, Cape Town, South Africa, June (Vol. 16).
- Dicken, P. (2015). *Global shift. Mapping the changing contours of the world economy* (7th ed.). New York: Guilford Press.
- Dietz, T., Grabs, J., & Chong, A. E. (2019). Mainstreamed voluntary sustainability standards and their effectiveness: Evidence from the Honduran coffee sector. *Regulation & Governance*.
- Dolan, C. S. (2004). On farm and packhouse: employment at the bottom of a global value chain. *Rural sociology*, 69(1), 99-126.
- Dolan, C. S. (2008). In the mists of development: Fairtrade in Kenyan tea fields. *Globalisations*, 5(2), 305-318.
- Dolan, C. S. (2010). Virtual moralities: The mainstreaming of Fairtrade in Kenyan tea fields. *Geoforum*, 41(1), 33-43.
- Dolan, C. S., & Opondo, M. (2005). Seeking common ground: multi-stakeholder processes in Kenya's cut flower industry. *Journal of Corporate Citizenship*, 18, 87-98.
- Dumas, C. (2020). Productivity Shocks and Child Labor: The Role of Credit and Agricultural Labor Markets. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 68(3), 763-812.
- Eberlein, B. (2019). Who fills the global governance gap? Rethinking the roles of business and government in global governance. *Organization Studies*, 40(8), 1125-1145.
- Eckhardt, J., & Poletti, A. (2018). Introduction: bringing institutions back in the study of global value chains. *Global Policy*, 9, 5-11.
- Edmonds, E. V., & Schady, N. (2012). Poverty alleviation and child labor. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 4(4), 100-124.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Egels-Zandén, N., & Hansson, N. (2016). Supply chain transparency as a consumer or corporate tool: The case of Nudie Jeans Co. *Journal of Consumer Policy*, 39(4), 377-395.
- Egger, M., Juni, P., Bartlett, C., Holenstein, F., & Sterne, J. (2003). How important are comprehensive literature searches and the assessment of trial quality in systematic reviews? *Empirical study. Health Technol Assess*, 7(1), 1-76.
- Ehlert, C. R., Mithöfer, D., & Waibel, H. (2014). Worker welfare on Kenyan export vegetable farms. *Food Policy*, 46, 66-73.
- England, P. (2010). The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled. *Gender & society*, 24(2), 149-166.
- Ezezika, O. C., Lennox, R., & Daar, A. S. (2012). Strategies for building trust with farmers: the case of Bt maize in South Africa. *Agriculture & Food Security*, 1(S1), S3.
- FAO. (2016). *Assessment of international labour standards that apply to rural employment. An overview for the work of FAO relating to labour protection in agriculture, forestry and fisheries* (FAO Legal Papers No. 100). Rome: Food and Agricultural Organisation.
- FAO. (2018). *Regulating labour and safety standards in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors*. (FAO Legal Papers No. 112). Rome: Food and Agricultural Organisation.
- Farina, E. M. M. Q. & Reardon, T. (2000). Agrifood Grades and Standards in the Extended Mercosur: Their Role in the Changing Agrifood System. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 82(5), 1170-1176.
- Fisher, E., Hellin, J., Greatrex, H., & Jensen, N. (2019). Index insurance and climate risk management: Addressing social equity. *Development Policy Review*, 37(5), 581-602.
- Fold, N. (2002). Lead firms and competition in 'Bi-polar' commodity chains: Grinders and branders in the global cocoa-chocolate industry. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 2(2), 228-247.
- Fountain, A.C. & Hütz-Adams, F. (2018). Cocoa Barometer 2018 [pdf]. Retrieved December 17, 2018 from

## **Bibliography**

---

[http://www.cocoabarometer.org/Cocoa\\_Barometer/Download\\_files/2018%20Cocoa%20Barometer.pdf](http://www.cocoabarometer.org/Cocoa_Barometer/Download_files/2018%20Cocoa%20Barometer.pdf).

- Fransen, L., & Conzelmann, T. (2015). Fragmented or cohesive transnational private regulation of sustainability standards? A comparative study. *Regulation & Governance*, 9(3), 259-275.
- Fuchs, D., Kalfagianni, A., & Havinga, T. (2011). Actors in private food governance: the legitimacy of retail standards and multistakeholder initiatives with civil society participation. *Agriculture and human values*, 28(3), 353-367.
- Gaddis, I., & Pieters, J. (2017). The Gendered Labour Market Impacts of Trade Liberalization Evidence from Brazil. *Journal of Human Resources*, 52(2), 457-490.
- Gardner, T. A., Benzie, M., Börner, J., Dawkins, E., Fick, S., Garrett, R., ... & Mardas, N. (2019). Transparency and sustainability in global commodity supply chains. *World Development*, 121, 163-177.
- Gereffi, G. (1994). The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S. retailers shape overseas production networks. In G. Gereffi and M. Korzeniewicz (Eds.), *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, (pp. 95–122) Westport: Praeger.
- Gereffi, G. (1999). International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain. *Journal of International Economics*, 48(1), 37-70.
- Gereffi, G. (2005). The global economy: organization, governance, and development. *The Handbook of Economic Sociology*, 2, 160-182.
- Gereffi, G. (2014). Global value chains in a post-Washington Consensus world. *Review of international political economy*, 21(1), 9-37.
- Gereffi, G., & Lee, J. (2012). Why the world suddenly cares about global supply chains. *Journal of Supply Chain Management*, 48(3), 24-32.

## **Bibliography**

---

- Gereffi, G., & Lee, J. (2016). Economic and social upgrading in global value chains and industrial clusters: Why governance matters. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 133(1), 25-38.
- Gereffi, G., & Mayer, F. (2006). Globalization and the Demand for Governance. In G. Gereffi (Ed.), *The new offshoring of jobs and global development* (Lecture 3, pp. 39-65). Geneva: International Labour Office.
- Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., & Kaplinsky, R. (2001). Introduction: Globalisation, value chains and development. *IDS bulletin*, 32(3), 1-8.
- Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., & Sturgeon, T. (2005). The governance of global value chains. *Review of International Political Economy*, 12(1), 78-104.
- Getz, C., & Shreck, A. (2006). What organic and Fair-Trade labels do not tell us: towards a place-based understanding of certification. *International Journal of Consumer Studies*, 30(5), 490-501.
- Gibbon, P. (2003). Value-chain Governance, Public Regulation and Entry Barriers in the Global Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Chain into the EU. *Development Policy Review*, 21, 615-625.
- Gibbon, P., & Riisgaard, L. (2014). A New System of Labour Management in African Large-Scale Agriculture? *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 14(1), 94-128.
- Gilbert, D.U., & Huber, K. (2017). Labor Rights in Global Supply Chains. In: A. Rasche, M. Morsing, & J. Moon (Eds.), *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance* (pp. 451-478). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Gindling, T. H., & Newhouse, D. (2014). Self-employment in the developing world. *World Development*, 56, 313-331.
- Grabs, J., & Ponte, S. (2019). The evolution of power in the global coffee value chain and production network. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 19(4), 803-828.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Greenberg, S. (2013). A gendered analysis of wine export value chains from South Africa to Sweden. *Agrekon*, 52(3), 34-62.
- GSS (2014). Ghana Living Standard Survey Round 6 (GLSS 6): Poverty Trends in Ghana 2005–2013. Accra, Ghana. Retrieved January 24, 2019 from [http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/gssmain/fileUpload/Living%20conditions/GLSS6\\_Main%20Report.pdf](http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/gssmain/fileUpload/Living%20conditions/GLSS6_Main%20Report.pdf).
- Hahn, R., & Weidtmann, C. (2016). Transnational governance, deliberative democracy, and the legitimacy of ISO 26000: Analyzing the case of a global multistakeholder process. *Business & Society*, 55(1), 90-129.
- Hale, A., & Opondo, M. (2005). Humanising the cut flower chain: Confronting the realities of flower production for workers in Kenya. *Antipode*, 37(2), 301-323.
- Hammoudi, A., Hoffmann, R., & Surry, Y. (2009). Food safety standards and agri-food supply chains: an introductory overview. *European Review of Agricultural Economics*, 36(4), 469-478.
- Henderson, J., Dicken, P., Hess, M., Coe, N., & Yeung, H. W. C. (2002). Global production networks and the analysis of economic development. *Review of international political economy*, 9(3), 436-464.
- Henson, S., & Humphrey, J. (2009). *The impacts of private food safety standards on the food chain and on public standard-setting processes*. (Joint FAO/WHO food standards programme, Codex Alimentarius Commission, 32<sup>nd</sup> Session). Rome: FAO Headquarters. p. 29.
- Henson, S., & Reardon, T. (2005). Private agri-food standards: Implications for food policy and the agri-food system. *Food policy*, 30(3), 241-253.
- Herman, A. (2010). Connecting the complex lived worlds of Fairtrade. *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 12(4), 405-422.
- Heron, T., Prado, P., & West, C. (2018). Global value chains and the governance of ‘embedded’ food commodities: the case of soy. *Global Policy*, 9(2), 29-37.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Høgsbro, K. (2015). Evidence and research designs in applied sociology and social work research. *Nordic Social Work Research*, 5(sup1), 56-70.
- Hopkins, T. K., & Wallerstein, I. (1986). Commodity chains in the world-economy prior to 1800. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, 10(1), 157-170.
- Horner, R. (2017). Beyond facilitator? State roles in global value chains and global production networks. *Geography Compass*, 11(2), 1-3
- <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1737563>  
[https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/economic-and-social-development/rural-development/WCMS\\_437173/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/economic-and-social-development/rural-development/WCMS_437173/lang--en/index.htm)
- Hughes, A., Wrigley, N., & Buttle, M. (2008). Global production networks, ethical campaigning, and the embeddedness of responsible governance. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 8(3), 345-367.
- Humphrey, J. (2006). Policy implications of trends in agribusiness value chains. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 18(4), 572-592.
- Humphrey, J., & Schmitz, H. (2002). How does insertion in global value chains affect upgrading in industrial clusters? *Regional Studies*, 36(9), 1017-1027.
- Humphrey, J., McCulloch, N., & Ota, M. (2004). The impact of European market changes on employment in the Kenyan horticulture sector. *Journal of International Development*, 16(1), 63-80.
- Husted, B. W., Montiel, I., & Christmann, P. (2016). Effects of local legitimacy on certification decisions to global and national CSR standards by multinational subsidiaries and domestic firms. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 47(3), 382-397.
- Whit
- ICCO (2018): Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics Volume XLIV No. 1, Cocoa Year 2017/18, London.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- ICCO (2019). Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics, Vol. XLV, No. 3, Cocoa year 2018/19. Abidjan: International Cocoa Organisation.
- ILO. (2004). Child labour: a textbook for university students. Geneva. Retrieved from <http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/download.do?type=document&id=174>
- ILO. (2014). *Rules of the game: A brief introduction to international labour standards/ international labour office* (Third Revised edition). Geneva: Author. 2014. Retrieved from [https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/informationresources-and-publications/publications/WCMS\\_318141/lang-en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/informationresources-and-publications/publications/WCMS_318141/lang-en/index.htm)
- ILO. (2016). Decent work in global supply chains, Report IV, International Labor Conference, 105th Session, Geneva. Retrieved February 12, 2017 from [https://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/previous-sessions/105/reports/reports-to-the-conference/WCMS\\_468097/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/previous-sessions/105/reports/reports-to-the-conference/WCMS_468097/lang--en/index.htm).
- ILO. (2017). Global estimates of child labour: Results and trends, 2012–2016. Geneva. Retrieved from [https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS\\_575499/lang-en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_575499/lang-en/index.htm)
- ILO. (2018). World employment and social outlook: Trends 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.ilo.org/global/research/globalreports/weso/2018/lang-en/index.htm>
- ILO. (2019). Decent and Productive Work in Agriculture. Portfolio of Policy Guidance Notes on the Promotion of Decent Work in the Rural Economy. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. Retrieved August 20, 2020 from [https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/economic-and-social-development/rural-development/WCMS\\_437173/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/economic-and-social-development/rural-development/WCMS_437173/lang--en/index.htm)
- ILOSTAT. (2018, May). Employment by sector: ILO modelled estimates. Retrieved from [www.ilo.org/ilostat](http://www.ilo.org/ilostat)
- Islam, M. S. (2008). From pond to plate: towards a twin-driven commodity chain in Bangladesh shrimp aquaculture. *Food Policy*, 33(3), 209-223.
- Jacobs, S., Brahic, B., & Olaiya, M. M. (2015). Sexual harassment in an east African agribusiness supply chain. *The Economic and Labour Relations Review*, 26(3), 393-410.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Jelsma, I., Slingerland, M., Giller, K. E., & Bijman, J. (2017). Collective action in a smallholder oil palm production system in Indonesia: The key to sustainable and inclusive smallholder palm oil?. *Journal of rural studies*, 54, 198-210.
- Jensen, N., & Barrett, C. (2017). Agricultural index insurance for development. *Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy*, 39(2), 199-219.
- Johannessen, S., & Wilhite, H. (2010). Who really benefits from fairtrade? An analysis of value distribution in fairtrade coffee. *Globalisations*, 7(4), 525-544.
- Kano, L. (2018). Global value chain governance: A relational perspective. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 49(6), 684-705.
- Karatepe, I. D., & Scherrer, C. (2019). Collective Action as a Prerequisite for Economic and Social Upgrading in Agricultural Production Networks. *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy*, 8(1-2), 115-135.
- Kauppi, K., & Hannibal, C. (2017). Institutional pressures and sustainability assessment in supply chains. *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, 43(1), 91-101.
- Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S. (2000). Introduction. In J. S. Nye & J. D. Donahue. (Eds.), *Governance in a globalizing world* (pp. 1-44). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Kilelu, C., Klerkx, L., Omore, A., Baltenweck, I., Leeuwis, C., & Githinji, J. (2017). Value chain upgrading and the inclusion of smallholders in markets: reflections on contributions of multi-stakeholder processes in dairy development in Tanzania. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 29(5), 1102-1121.
- Kim, J. Y. (2013). The politics of code enforcement and implementation in Vietnam's apparel and footwear factories. *World Development*, 45, 286-295.
- Kim, Y. H., & Davis, G. F. (2016). Challenges for global supply chain sustainability: Evidence from conflict minerals reports. *Academy of Management Journal*, 59(6), 1896-1916.



## ***Bibliography***

---

- Kissi, E. A., & Herzig, C. (2020). Methodologies and Perspectives in Research on Labour Relations in Global Agricultural Production Networks: A Review. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 56(9), 1615-1637.
- Knudsen, J. S., Moon, J., & Slager, R. (2015). Government policies for corporate social responsibility in Europe: A comparative analysis of institutionalisation. *Policy & Politics*, 43(1), 81-99.
- Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2017). Does transnational private governance reduce or displace labor abuses? Addressing sorting dynamics across global supply chains. *Regulation & Governance*, 11(4), 343-352.
- Kolavalli, S., & Vigneri, M. (2017). *The cocoa coast: The board-managed cocoa sector in Ghana*. International Food Policy Research Institute.  
<https://doi.org/10.2499/9780896292680>.
- Kolavalli, S., Vigneri, M., Maamah, H., & Poku, J. (2012). The partially liberalized cocoa sector in Ghana: Producer price determination, quality control, and service provision. DSGD Discussion Paper 01213. Washington, DC: IFPRI.
- Kourula, A., Moon, J., Salles-Djelic, M. L., & Wickert, C. (2019). New roles of government in the governance of business conduct: Implications for management and organizational research. *Organization Studies*, 40, 1101–1123.
- Kritzinger, A., Barrientos, S., & Rossouw, H. (2004). Global production and flexible employment in South African horticulture: experiences of contract workers in fruit exports. *Sociologia Ruralis*, 44(1), 17-39.
- Kruijssen, F., Keizer, M., & Giuliani, A. (2009). Collective action for small-scale producers of agricultural biodiversity products. *Food policy*, 34(1), 46-52.
- Kucera, D., & Dora, S. A. R. I. (2019). New labour rights indicators: Method and trends for 2000–15. *International Labour Review*, 158(3), 419-446.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Kuruvilla, S., Liu, M., Li, C., & Chen, W. (2020). Field Opacity and Practice-Outcome Decoupling: Private Regulation of Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains. *International Labour Review*, 73(4), 841-872.
- LeBaron, G., & Gore, E. (2020). Gender and forced labour: Understanding the links in global cocoa supply chains. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 56(6), 1095-1117.
- LeBaron, G., & Rühmkorf, A. (2017). Steering CSR through home state regulation: A comparison of the impact of the UK bribery act and modern slavery act on global supply chain governance. *Global Policy*, 8, 15-28.
- Lee, J., & Gereffi, G. (2015). Global value chains, rising power firms and economic and social upgrading. *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, 11(3/4), 319-339.
- Lee, J., Gereffi, G., & Beauvais, J. (2012). Global value chains and agrifood standards: Challenges and possibilities for smallholders in developing countries. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 109(31), 12326-12331.
- Lee, S. H., Mellahi, K., Mol, M. J., & Pereira, V. (2020). No-size-fits-all: collaborative governance as an alternative for addressing labour issues in global supply chains. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 162(2), 291-305.
- Levien, M. (2011). Special economic zones and accumulation by dispossession in India. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 11(4), 454-483.
- Lewis, S. (2015). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches. *Health Promotion Practice*, 16(4), 473-475.
- Lezoche, M., Hernandez, J. E., Díaz, M. D. M. E. A., Panetto, H., & Kacprzyk, J. (2020). Agri-food 4.0: a survey of the supply chains and technologies for the future agriculture. *Computers in Industry*, 117(0), 0-0.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compind.2020.103187>
- Locke, R. M. (2013). *The promise and limits of private power: Promoting labour standards in a global economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Locke, R. M., Rissing, B. A., & Pal, T. (2013). Complements or substitutes? Private codes, state regulation and the enforcement of labour standards in global supply chains. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 51(3), 519-552.
- Lockie, S., Traverro, J., & Tennent, R. (2015). Private food standards, regulatory gaps and plantation agriculture: social and environmental (ir) responsibility in the Philippine export banana industry. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 107, 122-129.
- Loconto, A. M., & Simbua, E. F. (2012). Making room for smallholder cooperatives in Tanzanian tea production: Can Fairtrade do that? *Journal of Business Ethics*, 108(4), 451-465.
- Lombardozzi, L. (2020). Unpacking state-led upgrading: empirical evidence from Uzbek horticulture value chain governance. *Review of International Political Economy*, 1-27.
- Louche, C., Staelens, L., & D'haese, M. (2020). When workplace unionism in global value chains does not function well: exploring the impediments. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 162(2), 379-398.
- Lund-Thomsen, P., & Lindgreen, A. (2014). Corporate social responsibility in global value chains: Where are we now and where are we going? *Journal of Business Ethics*, 123(1), 11-22.
- Lund-Thomsen, P., & Nadvi, K. (2010). Clusters, chains and compliance: Corporate social responsibility and governance in football manufacturing in South Asia. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 93(2), 201-222.
- Lyon, S. (2006). Migratory imaginations: The commodification and contradictions of shade-grown coffee. *Social Anthropology*, 14(3), 377-390.
- Lyon, S. (2007a). Fair trade coffee and human rights in Guatemala. *Journal of Consumer Policy*, 30(3), 241-261.
- Lyon, S. (2007b). Maya coffee farmers and fair trade: Assessing the benefits and limitations of alternative markets. *Culture, Agriculture, Food and Environment*, 29(2), 100-112.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Lyon, S. (2008). We want to be equal to them: Fair-trade coffee certification and gender equity within organisations. *Human Organisation*, 67(3), 258-268.
- Lyon, S., Bezaury, J. A., & Mutersbaugh, T. (2010). Gender equity in fairtrade–organic coffee producer organizations: Cases from Mesoamerica. *Geoforum*, 41(1), 93-103.
- MacDonald, K. (2007). Globalising justice within coffee supply chains? Fair Trade, Starbucks and the transformation of supply chain governance. *Third World Quarterly*, 28(4), 793-812.
- Maertens, M., & Swinnen, J. F. (2012). Gender and modern supply chains in developing countries. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 48(10), 1412-1430.
- Maertens, M., Colen, L., & Swinnen, J. F. (2011). Globalisation and poverty in Senegal: a worst-case scenario? *European Review of Agricultural Economics*, 38(1), 31-54.
- Makita, R. (2012). Fair trade certification: The case of tea plantation workers in India. *Development Policy Review*, 30(1), 87-107.
- Martens, D., Gansemans, A., Orbie, J., & D'Haese, M. (2018). Trade Unions in Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives: What Shapes Their Participation?. *Sustainability*, 10(11), 4295.
- Marx, A., & Wouters, J. (2016). Redesigning enforcement in private labour regulation: Will it work? *International Labour Review*, 155(3), 435-459.
- Masamha, B., Thebe, V., & Uzokwe, V. N. (2018). Mapping cassava food value chains in Tanzania's smallholder farming sector: The implications of intra-household gender dynamics. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 58, 82-92.
- Matheis, T. V., & Herzig, C. (2019). Upgrading products, upgrading work? Interorganizational learning in global food value chains to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. *GAIA-Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society*, 28(2), 126-134.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Mather, C. (2004). Codes of conduct, retailer buying practices and farm labour in South Africa's wine and deciduous fruit export chains. *International Development Planning Review*, 26(4), 477-493.
- Mayer, F. W., & Phillips, N. (2017). Outsourcing governance: States and the politics of a 'global value chain world'. *New Political Economy*, 22(2), 134-152.
- Mayer, F., & Gereffi, G. (2010). Regulation and economic globalization: Prospects and limits of private governance. *Business and Politics*, 12(3), 1-25.
- McEwan, C., & Bek, D. (2006). (Re) politicizing empowerment: Lessons from the South African wine industry. *Geoforum*, 37(6), 1021-1034.
- McEwan, C., & Bek, D. (2009a). Placing ethical trade in context: WIETA and the South African wine industry. *Third World Quarterly*, 30(4), 723-742.
- McEwan, C., & Bek, D. (2009b). The political economy of alternative trade: Social and environmental certification in the South African wine industry. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 25(3), 255-266.
- McGrath, S. (2013). Fuelling global production networks with slave labour?: Migrant sugar cane workers in the Brazilian ethanol GPN. *Geoforum*, 44, 32-43.
- McMillan, M., Rodrik, D., & Verduzco-Gallo, Í. (2014). Globalisation, structural change, and productivity growth, with an update on Africa. *World Development*, 63, 11-32.
- Meemken, E. M., Sellare, J., Kouame, C. N., & Qaim, M. (2019). Effects of Fairtrade on the livelihoods of poor rural workers. *Nature Sustainability*, 2(7), 635-642.
- Mena, S., & Palazzo, G. (2012). Input and output legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 22(3), 527-556.
- Mengistie, B. T., Mol, A. P., & Oosterveer, P. (2017). Pesticide use practices among smallholder vegetable farmers in Ethiopian Central Rift Valley. *Environment, Development and Sustainability*, 19(1), 301-324.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Menon, N., & van der Meulen Rodgers, Y. (2018). Child labor and the minimum wage: Evidence from India. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 46(2), 480-494.
- Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) (2018). Agricultural Sector Progress Report, 2017. MoFA, Accra, Ghana
- Minten, B., Randrianarison, L., & Swinnen, J. F. (2009). Global retail chains and poor farmers: Evidence from Madagascar. *World Development*, 37(11), 1728-1741.
- Mishra, P. K., & Dey, K. (2018). Governance of agricultural value chains: Coordination, control and safeguarding. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 64, 135-147.
- Moberg, M. (2005). Fair trade and eastern Caribbean banana farmers: Rhetoric and reality in the anti-globalization movement. *Human Organization*, 64(1), 4-15.
- Mohan, S. (2016). Institutional change in value chains: Evidence from tea in Nepal. *World Development*, 78, 52-65.
- Moher, D., Shamseer, L., Clarke, M., Ghersi, D., Liberati, A., Petticrew, M., ... & Stewart, L. A. (2015). Preferred reporting items for systematic review and meta-analysis protocols (PRISMA-P) 2015 statement. *Systematic Reviews*, 4(1), 1.
- Moog, S., Spicer, A., & Böhm, S. (2015). The politics of multi-stakeholder initiatives: The crisis of the Forest Stewardship Council. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 128(3), 469-493.
- Moradhaseli, S., Farhadian, H., Abbasi, E., & Ghofranipour, F. (2017). Factors Affecting the Incidence of Occupational Accidents among Farmers. *Health Education & Health Promotion*, 5(1), 39-56.
- Moseley, W. G. (2008). Fair trade wine: South Africa's post-apartheid vineyards and the global economy. *Globalisations*, 5(2), 291-304.
- Mueller, B., & Chan, M. K. (2015). *Wage labour, agriculture-based economies, and pathways out of poverty: Taking stock of the evidence (Leveraging Economic Opportunities (LEO Report, No. 15))*. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Muller, C., Vermeulen, W. J., & Glasbergen, P. (2012). Pushing or sharing as value-driven strategies for societal change in global supply chains: two case studies in the British–South African fresh fruit supply chain. *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 21(2), 127-140.
- Nadvi, K. (2008). Global standards, global governance and the organisation of global value chains. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 8(3), 323-343.
- Nadvi, K. (2014). “Rising powers” and labour and environmental standards. *Oxford Development Studies*, 42(2), 137-150.
- Nadvi, K., & Raj-Reichert, G. (2015). Governing health and safety at lower tiers of the computer industry global value chain. *Regulation & Governance*, 9(3), 243-258.
- Neilson, J. (2008). Global private regulation and value-chain restructuring in Indonesian smallholder coffee systems. *World Development*, 36(9), 1607-1622.
- Neilson, J. (2014). Value chains, neoliberalism and development practice: The Indonesian experience. *Review of International Political Economy*, 21(1), 38-69.
- Neilson, J., & Pritchard, B. (2009). *Value chain struggles: Institutions and governance in the plantation districts of South India*. Malaysia: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Nelson, V., & Tallontire, A. (2014). Battlefields of ideas: Changing narratives and power dynamics in private standards in global agricultural value chains. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 31(3), 481-497.
- Nelson, V., Martin, A., & Ewert, J. (2007). The impacts of codes of practice on worker livelihoods: Empirical evidence from the South African wine and Kenyan cut flower industries. *Journal of Corporate Citizenship*, 28, 61-72.
- Nelson, V., Tallontire, A., & Collinson, C. (2002). Assessing the benefits of ethical trade schemes for forest dependent people: comparative experience from Peru and Ecuador. *International Forestry Review*, 4(2), 99-109.
- networks, territories and scales: towards an analytical framework for the global

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Nickow, A. (2015). Growing in value: NGOs, social movements and the cultivation of developmental value chains in Uttarakhand, India. *Global Networks*, 15(s1), S45-S64.
- North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- North, D. C. (1994). Economic performance through time. *The American Economic Review*, 84(3), 359-368.
- O'Rourke, D. (2006). Multi-stakeholder regulation: privatizing or socializing global labour standards? *World Development*, 34(5), 899-918.
- Ochieng, J., Knerr, B., Owuor, G., & Ouma, E. (2018). Strengthening collective action to improve marketing performance: Evidence from farmer groups in Central Africa. *The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension*, 24(2), 169-189.
- Oduol, J. B. A., Mithöfer, D., Place, F., Nang'ole, E., Olwande, J., Kirimi, L., & Mathenge, M. (2017). Women's participation in high value agricultural commodity chains in Kenya: Strategies for closing the gender gap. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 50, 228-239.
- Orsi, L., De Noni, I., Corsi, S., & Marchisio, L. V. (2017). The role of collective action in leveraging farmers' performances: Lessons from sesame seed farmers' collaboration in eastern Chad. *Journal of rural studies*, 51, 93-104.
- Ortiz, S., & Aparicio, S. (2007). How labourers fare in fresh fruit export industries: lemon production in Northern Argentina. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 7(3), 382-404.
- Oya, C. (2015). *Decent work indicators for agriculture and rural areas. Conceptual issues, data collection challenges and possible areas for improvement*. ESS Working Paper 1 5-10. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
- Oya, C., Schaefer, F., & Skolidou, D. (2018). The effectiveness of agricultural certification in developing countries: A systematic review. *World Development*, 112, 282-312.



## ***Bibliography***

---

- Padmanabhan, M. A. (2008). Collective action in agrobiodiversity management: gendered rules of reputation, trust and reciprocity in Kerala, India. *Journal of International Development*, 20(1), 83-97.
- Papadopoulos, N., Hamzaoui-Essoussi, L., & El Banna, A. (2016). Nation branding for foreign direct investment: an Integrative review and directions for research and strategy. *Journal of Product & Brand Management*, 25(7): 615-628.
- Patel-Campillo, A. (2012). The Gendered Production–Consumption Relation: Accounting for Employment and Socioeconomic Hierarchies in the Colombian Cut Flower Global Commodity Chain. *Sociologia ruralis*, 52(3), 272-293.
- Pegler, L. (2015). Peasant inclusion in global value chains: economic upgrading but social downgrading in labour processes? *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 42(5), 929-956.
- Petticrew, M., & Roberts, H. (2006). *Systematic reviews in the social sciences: A practical guide*. Malden, MA: Blackwell
- Phillips, D. P. (2014). Uneven and unequal people-centered development: the case of Fair Trade and Malawi sugar producers. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 31(4), 563-576.
- Phillips, N., & Sakamoto, L. (2012). Global production networks, chronic poverty and ‘slave labour’ in Brazil. Studies in *Comparative International Development*, 47(3), 287-315.
- Pipkin, S., & Fuentes, A. (2017). Spurred to upgrade: A review of triggers and consequences of industrial upgrading in the global value chain literature. *World Development*, 98, 536-554.
- Polaski, S. (2006). Combining global and local forces: The case of labour rights in Cambodia. *World Development*, 34(5), 919-932.
- Ponte, S., & Cheyns, E. (2013). Voluntary standards, expert knowledge and the governance of sustainability networks. *Global Networks*, 13(4), 459-477.
- Ponte, S., & Ewert, J. (2009). Which way is “up” in upgrading? Trajectories of change in the value chain for South African wine. *World Development*, 37(10), 1637-1650.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Ponte, S., & Sturgeon, T. (2014). Explaining governance in global value chains: A modular theory-building effort. *Review of International Political Economy*, 21(1), 195-223.
- Ponte, S., Kelling, I., Jespersen, K. S., & Kruijssen, F. (2014). The blue revolution in Asia: upgrading and governance in aquaculture value chains. *World Development*, 64, 52-64.
- Porteous, A. H., Rammohan, S. V., & Lee, H. L. (2015). Carrots or sticks? Improving social and environmental compliance at suppliers through incentives and penalties. *Production and Operations Management*, 24(9), 1402-1413
- Posthuma, A. (2010). Beyond 'regulatory enclaves': Challenges and opportunities to promote decent work in global production networks. *Labour in Global Production Networks in India*, 57-80.
- Potter, M., & Hamilton, J. (2014). Picking on vulnerable migrants: precarity and the mushroom industry in Northern Ireland. *Work, Employment and Society*, 28(3), 390-406.
- Quaedvlieg, J., Roca, M. G., & Ros-Tonen, M. A. (2014). Is Amazon nut certification a solution for increased smallholder empowerment in Peruvian Amazonia? *Journal of Rural Studies*, 33, 41-55.
- Rainbird, H., & Ramirez, P. (2012). Bringing social institutions into global value chain analysis: the case of salmon farming in Chile. *Work, Employment and Society*, 26(5), 789-805.
- RajNadvi, K. (2014). "Rising powers" and labour and environmental standards. *Oxford Development Studies*, 42(2), 137-150.
- Rao, S. (2011). Work and empowerment: Women and agriculture in South India. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 47(2), 294-315.
- Rasche, A. (2012). Global policies and local practice: Loose and tight couplings in multi-stakeholder initiatives. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 679-708.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Rasche, A., & Waddock, S. (2017). Standards for CSR: Legitimacy, impact and critique. In: A. Rasche, M. Morsing, & J. Moon (Eds.), *Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategy, Communication, Governance* (pp. 163-187). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Raynolds, L. T. (2012). Fair trade flowers: Global certification, environmental sustainability, and labour standards. *Rural Sociology*, 77(4), 493-519.
- Raynolds, L. T. (2014). Fairtrade, certification, and labor: global and local tensions in improving conditions for agricultural workers. *Agriculture and human values*, 31(3), 499-511.
- Raynolds, L. T. (2014). Fairtrade, certification, and labour: global and local tensions in improving conditions for agricultural workers. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 31(3), 499-511.
- Raynolds, L. T. (2017). Fairtrade labour certification: the contested incorporation of plantations and workers. *Third World Quarterly*, 38(7), 1473-1492.
- Raynolds, L. T. (2020). Gender equity, labor rights, and women's empowerment: lessons from Fairtrade certification in Ecuador flower plantations. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 00(0), 1-19.
- Reinecke, G., & Posthuma, A. (2019). The link between economic and social upgrading in global supply chains: Experiences from the Southern Cone. *International Labour Review*, 158(4), 677-703.
- Reinecke, J., & Donaghey, J. (2020). Towards worker-driven supply chain governance: developing decent work through democratic worker participation. *Journal of Supply Chain Management*, 00(00), 1-15.
- Riisgaard, L. (2009). Global value chains, labour organization and private social standards: Lessons from East African cut flower industries. *World Development*, 37(2), 326-340.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Riisgaard, L., & Gibbon, P. (2014). Labour Management on Contemporary Kenyan Cut Flower Farms: Foundations of an Industrial–Civic Compromise. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 14(2), 260-285.
- Riisgaard, L., & Hammer, N. (2011). Prospects for labour in global value chains: Labour standards in the cut flower and banana industries. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 49(1), 168-190.
- Riisgaard, L., & Okinda, O. (2018). Changing labour power on smallholder tea farms in Kenya. *Competition & Change*, 22(1), 41-62.
- Riisgaard, L., Lund-Thomsen, P., & Coe, N. M. (2020). Multistakeholder initiatives in global production networks: naturalizing specific understandings of sustainability through the Better Cotton Initiative. *Global Networks*, 20(2), 211-236.
- Robertson, R., Lopez-Acevedo, G., & Savchenko, Y. (2020). Globalisation and the gender earnings gap: Evidence from Sri Lanka and Cambodia. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 56(2), 295–313.
- Robinson, P. K. (2009). Responsible retailing: Regulating fair and ethical trade. *Journal of International Development*, 21(7), 1015-1026.
- Robinson, P. K. (2010a). Responsible retailing: The practice of CSR in banana plantations in Costa Rica. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 91(2), 279- 289.
- Robinson, P. K. (2010b). Do voluntary labour initiatives make a difference for the conditions of workers in global supply chains?. *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 52(5), 561-573.
- Rossi, A. (2013). Does economic upgrading lead to social upgrading in global production networks? Evidence from Morocco. *World Development*, 46, 223-233.
- Rossi, A. (2015). Better work: Harnessing incentives and influencing policy to strengthen labour standards compliance in global production networks. *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, 8(3), 505-520.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Ros-Tonen, M. A., Bitzer, V., Laven, A., de Leth, D. O., Van Leynseele, Y., & Vos, A. (2019). Conceptualizing inclusiveness of smallholder value chain integration. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, 41, 10-17.
- Rothstein, H.R., & Hopewell S (2009). Grey literature. In H. Cooper, L. V. Hedges, & J. C. Valentine (Eds.), *The handbook of research synthesis and meta-analysis* (pp. 103-125). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Ruben, R., & Zuniga, G. (2011). How standards compete: comparative impact of coffee certification schemes in Northern Nicaragua. *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, 16(2), 98-109.
- Ruben, R., Fort, R., & Zúñiga-Arias, G. (2009). Measuring the impact of fair trade on development. *Development in Practice*, 19(6), 777-788.
- Ruml, A., & Qaim, M. (2020). Smallholder farmers' dissatisfaction with contract schemes in spite of economic benefits: Issues of mistrust and lack of transparency. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 1-14.
- Said-Allsopp, M., & Tallontire, A. (2014). Enhancing Fairtrade for women workers on plantations: insights from Kenyan agriculture. *Food Chain*, 4(1), 66-77.
- Said-Allsopp, M., & Tallontire, A. (2015). Pathways to empowerment? dynamics of women's participation in Global Value Chains. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 107, 114-121.
- Salmivaara, A. (2018). New governance of labour rights: the perspective of Cambodian garment workers' struggles. *Globalizations*, 15(3), 329-346.
- Sapbamrer, R. (2018). Pesticide use, poisoning, and knowledge and unsafe occupational practices in Thailand. *New solutions: a Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy* 28(2), 283-302.
- Scherrer, C. (2017). How and by whom are the rules set? Retrieved from [https://iversity.org/en/my/courses/decent-work-inglobal-supply-chains/lesson\\_units/65187](https://iversity.org/en/my/courses/decent-work-inglobal-supply-chains/lesson_units/65187)

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Scherrer, C. (2018). Labor surplus is here to stay: why 'decent work for all' will remain elusive. *Journal of Social and Economic Development*, 20(2), 293-307.
- Scherrer, C., & Radon, K. (Eds.). (2019). *Occupational Safety and Health Challenges in Southern Agriculture*. Augsburg, München: Rainer Hampp Verlag.
- Scherrer, C., & Verma, S. (Eds.). (2018). Decent work deficits in southern agriculture: Measurements, drivers and strategies. Augsburg, München: Rainer Hampp Verlag.
- Schrage, S., & Gilbert, D. U. (2019). Addressing governance gaps in global value chains: introducing a systematic typology. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 1-16.
- Schuster, M., & Maertens, M. (2016). Do private standards benefit workers in horticultural export chains in Peru? *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 112, 2392-2406.
- Schuster, M., & Maertens, M. (2017). Worker Empowerment Through Private Standards. Evidence from the Peruvian Horticultural Export Sector. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 53(4), 618-637.
- Schwarzbach, N., & Richardson, B. (2014). A Bitter Harvest: Child Labour in Sugarcane Agriculture and the Role of Certification Systems. *UC Davis Journal of International Law & Policy*, 21(1), 99-130.
- Sellare, J., Meemken, E. M., & Qaim, M. (2020). Fairtrade, Agrochemical Input Use, and Effects on Human Health and the Environment. *Ecological Economics*, 176, 1-10, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106718> .
- Selwyn, B. (2007). Labour process and workers' bargaining power in export grape production, North East Brazil. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 7(4), 526-553.
- Shreck, A. (2002). Just bananas? Fair Trade banana production in the Dominican Republic. *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food*, 10(2), 13-23.
- Silverman, D. (2015). *Doing qualitative research: A practical handbook* (4th ed.) Los Angeles: Sage publications.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Sipl, K. (2020). Southern Responses to Fair Trade Gold: Cooperation, Complaint, Competition, Supplementation. *Ecological Economics*, 169, 0-0.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106377>
- Skalidou, D. (2018). In or out? Exploring selection processes of farmers in cocoa sustainability standards and certification programmes in Ghana (Doctoral dissertation, University of East Anglia). Retrieved from <https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/71170>.
- Smith, J. (2007). The search for sustainable markets: the promise and failures of fair trade. *Culture & Agriculture*, 29(2), 89-99.
- Soundararajan, V., & Brammer, S. (2018). Developing country sub-supplier responses to social sustainability requirements of intermediaries: Exploring the influence of framing on fairness perceptions and reciprocity. *Journal of Operations Management*, 58, 42-58.
- Standing, G. (2008). The ILO: An agency for globalization? *Development and Change*, 39(3), 355-384.
- Staricco, J. I., & Ponte, S. (2015). Quality regimes in agro-food industries: A regulation theory reading of Fair Trade wine in Argentina. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 38, 65-76.
- Statista. (2018). *Market share of leading chocolate companies worldwide in 2016*. Retrieved January 30, 2019 from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/629534/market-share-leadingchocolate-companies-worldwide>.
- Strambach, S., & Surmeier, A. (2018). From standard takers to standard makers? The role of knowledge-intensive intermediaries in setting global sustainability standards. *Global Networks*, 18(2), 352-373.
- Stringer, C., Hughes, S., Whittaker, D. H., Haworth, N., & Simmons, G. (2016). Labor standards and regulation in global value chains: The case of the New Zealand Fishing Industry. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 48(10), 1910-1927.
- Stringer, C., Whittaker, D., & Simmons, G. (2016). New Zealand's turbulent waters: the use of forced labour in the fishing industry. *Global Networks*, 16(1), 3-24.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Sturgeon, T. J. (2001). How do we define value chains and production networks? *IDS bulletin*, 32(3), 9-18.
- Swanepoel, J. (2017). Whose ethics? The international regulation of labour practices on South African export fruit farms. *Anthropology Southern Africa*, 40(4), 303-316.
- Swinnen, J. F. M. (2007). *Global supply chains, standards and the poor: How the globalization of food systems and standards affects rural development and poverty*. Wallingford, UK: CABI.
- Swinnen, J., & Kuijpers, R. (2019). Value chain innovations for technology transfer in developing and emerging economies: Conceptual issues, typology, and policy implications. *Food Policy*, 83, 298-309.
- Takane, T. (2000). Incentives embedded in institutions: the case of share contracts in Ghanaian cocoa production. *The Developing Economies*, 38(3), 374-397.
- Tallontire, A., Dolan, C., Smith, S., & Barrientos, S. (2005). Reaching the marginalised? Gender value chains and ethical trade in African horticulture. *Development in Practice*, 15(3-4), 559-571.
- Tallontire, A., Opondo, M., Nelson, V., & Martin, A. (2011). Beyond the vertical? Using value chains and governance as a framework to analyse private standards initiatives in agri-food chains. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 28(3), 427-441.
- Terstappen, V., Hanson, L., & McLaughlin, D. (2013). Gender, health, labour, and inequities: a review of the fair and alternative trade literature. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 30(1), 21-39.
- Tessmann, J. (2018). Governance and upgrading in South–South value chains: evidence from the cashew industries in India and Ivory Coast. *Global Networks*, 18(2), 264-284.
- Thomas, H., & Turnbull, P. (2018). From horizontal to vertical labour governance: The International Labour Organization (ILO) and decent work in global supply chains. *Human Relations*, 71(4), 536-559.



## ***Bibliography***

---

- Toffel, M. W., Short, J. L., & Ouellet, M. (2015). Codes in context: How states, markets, and civil society shape adherence to global labor standards. *Regulation & Governance*, 9(3), 205-223.
- Tran, A. N., & Jeppesen, S. (2016). SMEs in their own right: The views of managers and workers in Vietnamese textiles, garment, and footwear companies. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 137(3), 589-608.
- Trauger, A. (2014). Is bigger better? The small farm imaginary and fair trade banana production in the Dominican Republic. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 104(5), 1082-1100.
- Tröster, B., Staritz, C., Grumiller, J., & Maile, F. (2019). Commodity dependence, global commodity chains, price volatility and financialisation: Price-setting and stabilisation in the cocoa sectors in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. Working Paper Nr. 62. Wien: Austrian Foundation for Development Research.
- Uronu, A., & Ndiege, B. O. (2018). Rural Financial Inclusion: Prospects and Challenges of Collective Action in Extending Financial Services among Rural Smallholders Farmers in Tanzania. *International Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 3(2), 23.
- Valkila, J. (2009). Fair Trade organic coffee production in Nicaragua – Sustainable development or a poverty trap? *Ecological Economics*, 68(12), 3018-3025.
- Valkila, J., & Nygren, A. (2010). Impacts of Fair Trade certification on coffee farmers, cooperatives, and labourers in Nicaragua. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 27(3), 321-333.
- van Rijn, F., Fort, R., Ruben, R., Koster, T., & Beekman, G. (2020). Does certification improve hired labour conditions and wageworker conditions at banana plantations? *Agriculture and Human Values*, 37(2), 353-370.
- Van Tulder, R. & Keen, N. (2018). Capturing Collaborative Challenges: Designing Complexity-Sensitive Theories of Change for Cross-Sector Partnership. *Journal of Business Ethics* 150(2): 315-332.

## ***Bibliography***

---

- Vicol, M., Neilson, J., Hartatri, D. F. S., & Cooper, P. (2018). Upgrading for whom? Relationship coffee, value chain interventions and rural development in Indonesia. *World Development*, 110, 26-37.
- Vigneri, M., Serra, R., Cardenas, L.C. (2016). Researching the Impact of Increased Cocoa Yields on the Labor Market and Child Labor Risk in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire Retrieved May 20, 2019 from [https://cocoainitiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/market\\_research\\_full\\_web.pdf](https://cocoainitiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/market_research_full_web.pdf).
- Walsh-Dilley, M. (2017). Theorizing reciprocity: Andean cooperation and the reproduction of community in highland Bolivia. *The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology*, 22(3), 514-535.
- Wang, Z. (2020). Thinking outside the Box: Globalization, Labor Rights, and the Making of Preferential Trade Agreements. *International Studies Quarterly*, 64(2), 343-355.
- Whelan, G., de Bakker, F. G., den Hond, F., & Muthuri, J. N. (2019). Talking the walk: the deflation response to legitimacy challenges. *Management*, 22(4), 636-663.
- Whitfield, L., & Buur, L. (2014). The politics of industrial policy: ruling elites and their alliances. *Third World Quarterly*, 35(1), 126-144.
- Williams, T. (2009). *An African Success Story: The Case of Ghana's Cocoa Marketing Industry*. IDS Working Paper 318. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
- Williamson, O. E. (2000). The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 38(3), 595-613.
- Wilson D.B. (2009). Systematic Coding. In: H. Cooper, L.V. Hedges, & J.C. Valentine (Eds.), *Handbook of Research Synthesis and Meta-Analysis*, Second Edition (pp. 159–176). New York, N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Yea, S. (2017). The art of not being caught: Temporal strategies for disciplining unfree labour in Singapore's contract migration. *Geoforum*, 78, 179-188.

## ***Bibliography***

---

Yin, R. K. (2018). *Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods* (6th ed.). Los Angeles, LA: Sage Publications.

Zürcher, C. (2017). What do we (not) know about development aid and violence? A systematic review. *World Development*, 98, 506-522.

General Appendix

A1 Salience and Focus of Study One

Table A1: Salience and focus of studies in the review

Author(s)	Year	Country of study	Journal name	Product	Labour issue	Labour regulatory framework	Units of analysis	Study design	Conceptual and theoretical perspectives
Alford	2016	South Africa	Geoforum	Horticulture (fruits such as apples, pears, peaches, apricots, plums)	General employment issues including voice, wage levels, social protection	Public and private regulations and civil society organisations regulations	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	Strategic relational framework and GPN approach
Arnould	2009	Nicaragua, Peru and Guatemala	Journal of Public Policy & Marketing	Coffee	Income, education and health	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Quantitative	Self-developed concepts
Asfaw et al.	2010	Kenya	Agricultural Economics	Horticulture (vegetables)	Occupational safety and health	Global GAP	Smallholder farmers	Quantitative	Household production model
Bacon	2010	Nicaragua	Latin American Perspectives	Coffee	Gender empowerment	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers (women)	Qualitative	NA
Bacon et al.	2008	Nicaragua	Globalizations	Coffee	Training, education, investment and gender discrimination	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Qualitative	NA
Barrientos	2014	Ghana and India	Regional Studies	Cocoa	Gender discrimination	Gendered norms	Smallholder farmers (women) and wageworkers (women)	Qualitative	GVC, feminist political framework and GPN

## General Appendix

Barrientos	2013b	South Africa and UK	Journal of Development Studies	Horticulture	Gender discrimination	Local women NGOs campaigns	Wageworkers in companies (women)	Qualitative	Self-developed concepts
Barrientos & Kritzinger	2004	South Africa	Journal of International Development	Horticulture (fruits)	Forced labour, wages and working time	Global trade, supermarket buying strategies, national regulation	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	GVC
Barrientos & Smith	2007	South Africa, Costa Rica, Vietnam, India and UK	Third World Quarterly	Horticulture (fruits)	Wage, working hours and social protection	Codes of conduct	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	GVC
Barrientos et al.	2016	South Africa, Kenya and Uganda	Environment and Planning A	FFV	Collective bargaining	Lead firm and cooperative strategies	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	GVC, GPN and multi-polar governance
Barrientos et al.	2000	South Africa	The European Journal of Development Research	Horticulture (fruits such as grapes)	Gender discrimination	Codes of conduct	Wageworkers on plantations (women and black workers)	Qualitative	Paternalist practice
Barrientos et al.	2003	South Africa, Kenya and Zambia	World Development	Horticulture	Gender discrimination	Codes of conduct	Wageworkers on plantations (women)	Qualitative	GVC and gendered economy approach
Bek et al.	2007	South Africa	Environment and Planning A	Wine	General working conditions	Grassroots worker-focused schemes on individual estates and industry-wide initiatives, such as the Wine Industry	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	Commodity chains, networks and cultural approaches

## General Appendix

						Ethical Trade Association (WIETA).			
Bonanno & Cavalcanti	2012	Brazil	International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture & Food	Horticulture (fruits such as grapes)	Working hours, wages, job security	Global GAP	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	NA
Bowen & Gaytan	2012	Mexico	Social Problems	Agave	Livelihoods (working conditions)	Cultural norms and national heritage	Smallholder farmers, small-scale distillers and the community	Qualitative	Commodity chain approach
Brown	2013	Colombia	Environment and Planning A	Banana	Collective bargaining	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers and workers	Qualitative	Dis/articulation s approach
Colen et al.	2012	Senegal	World Economy	Horticulture (green bean and mango)	Wage levels and working hours	Global GAP	Wageworkers in export companies	Quantitative	Self-developed concepts
Coslovsky & Locke	2013	Brazil	Politics & Society	Sugar	General working conditions	Codes of conduct and national regulations	Producers and workers	Mixed	Self-developed concepts
Cramer et al.	2014	Ethiopia and Uganda	Review of African Political Economy	Coffee and tea	Wage levels and working conditions	Fairtrade	Wageworkers on smallholder farms	Mixed	NA
Cramer et al.	2016	Ethiopia and Uganda	Journal of Development Studies	Coffee, tea and flower	Wage levels	Fairtrade	Wageworkers on smallholder farms	Mixed	Self-developed concepts
Dolan	2004	Kenya	Rural sociology	Horticulture	General working conditions such as working hours, job security	Global competitive pressures	Wageworkers on plantations and exporter firms	Mixed	GCC

## General Appendix

					and gender discrimination				
Dolan	2010	Kenya	Geoforum	Tea	Empowerment , economic justice, autonomy, etc.	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Qualitative	Self-developed concepts
Dolan	2008	Kenya	Globalizations	Tea	Empowerment , transparency, fair distribution and democratic participation	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Qualitative	NA
Dolan & Opondo	2005	Kenya	Journal of Corporate Citizenship	Horticulture (cut flowers)	General working condition such as workers' rights	Codes of conduct and Horticultural Ethical Business Initiative (HEBI)	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	Stake holder management theory
Ehlert et al.	2014	Kenya	Food Policy	Horticulture	Physical and mental health, income (wage levels) and life satisfaction	Global CAP	Wageworkers on plantations and smallholder farms	Quantitative	Self-developed concepts
Getz & Shreck	2006	Mexico and Dominican Republic	International journal of consumer studies	Horticulture (herbs, tomatoes and banana)	Socio-economic impacts	Organic and Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Qualitative	NA
Gibbon & Riisgaard	2014	Kenya	Journal of Agrarian Change	Horticulture (rose flowers)	Labour recruitment, wage levels, training, etc.	NGO criticisms	Wageworkers on plantations	Mixed	Conventional theory
Greenberg	2013	South Africa	Agrekon	Wine	Gender discrimination	Codes of conduct	Wageworkers (women)	Qualitative	GVC approach
Hale & Opondo	2005	Kenya	Antipode	Horticulture (cut flowers)	Gender discrimination	Codes of conduct	Wageworkers (women)	Qualitative	Supply chain approach

## General Appendix

Herman	2010	South Africa and UK	Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning	Wine	General working conditions	Fairtrade	Wageworkers working on plantations	Qualitative	NA
Humphrey et al.	2004	Kenya	Journal of International Development	Horticulture (vegetables)	Employment opportunities	Codes of conduct	Smallholder farmers	Mixed	NA
Jacobs et al.	2015	Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda	Economic and Labour Relations Review	Horticulture (cut flowers)	Sexual harassment	NGO pressure and cultural setting (not clear)	Wageworkers (women)	Qualitative	Self-developed concepts
Johannessen & Wilhite	2010	Nicaragua and Guatemala/ Norway	Globalizations	Coffee	Collective bargaining and income	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Qualitative	GVC
Kritzinger et al.	2004	South Africa and UK	Sociologia Ruralis	Horticulture	Working conditions including employment security, social protection, etc.	Institutional arrangements (contract employment)	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	NA
Lockie et al.	2015	Philippine	Journal of Cleaner Production	Banana	General labour conditions	Global Gap, ISO9000, ISO 22000 and national regulations	Plantation farms, workers and the community	Qualitative	Self-developed concepts
Loconto & Simbua	2012	Tanzania	Journal of Business Ethics	Tea	General labour conditions such as credit and market access, income benefits and empowerment	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Qualitative	Actor network theory
Lyon	2007b	Guatemala	Culture, Agriculture, Food and Environment	Coffee	General labour conditions such as rights control,	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Qualitative	NA



## General Appendix

					income benefits and empowerment				
Lyon	2008	Guatemala	Human Organization	Coffee	Gender discrimination	Fairtrade	Wageworkers (women)	Qualitative	NA
Lyon	2007a	Guatemala	Journal of Consumer Policy	Coffee	Human rights	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Qualitative	NA
Lyon	2006	Guatemala	Social Anthropology	Coffee	Skill training and empowerment	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Qualitative	NA
Lyon et al.	2010	Guatemala and Mexico)	Geoforum	Coffee	Gender discrimination	Fairtrade and organic	Smallholder farmers (women)	Qualitative	GVC
Macdonald	2007	Nicaragua	Third World Quarterly	Coffee	Trade justice and empowerment of marginalized workers	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers and wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	Self-developed concepts
Maertens & Swinnen	2012	Senegal	Journal of Development Studies	Horticulture (mango, beans and tomato)	Gender discrimination	Organisational arrangements ((adopting standards such as Global Gap, BRC (British Retail Consortium) and Tesco's Nature Choice)).	Wageworkers (women) on both smallholder farms and companies	Mixed	Self-developed concepts
Maertens et al.	2011	Senegal	European Review of Agricultural Economics	Tomato	Employment creation	Standards from EU (common marketing	Smallholder farmer	Mixed	Self-developed concepts

**General Appendix**

						standards, labelling requirements and health control, including HACCP-based hygiene rules and traceability requirements)			
Makita	2012	India	Development Policy Review	Tea	Empowerment	Fairtrade, organic and CHAI project	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	Patron–client relations
Mather	2004	South Africa	International Development Planning Review	deciduous fruit and wine	General working conditions	Codes of conduct	Producers (large) and wageworkers	Qualitative	Commodity chain approach
McEwan & Bek	2006	South Africa	Geoforum	Wine	Empowerment	Industry wide initiatives (e.g. WIETA), grassroots initiatives and governments legislations	Producers and workers	Qualitative	Self-developed concepts
McEwan & Bek	2009b	South Africa	Journal of Rural Studies	Wine	Working conditions and empowerment	Technical codes and standards (such as ISO9000, ISO14000, and HACCP), social codes (e.g. Wine and Agricultural Ethical Trade	Producers and workers	Qualitative	Self-developed concepts

**General Appendix**

						Association (WIETA) and Fairtrade			
McEwan & Bek	2009a	South Africa	Third World Quarterly	Wine	Working conditions	Wine and Agricultural Ethical Trade Association (WIETA)	Producers and workers	Qualitative	NA
McGrath	2013	Brazil	Geoforum	Sugar cane (ethanol)	Slave labour	Dynamics between private and public governance in contributing to slave labour	Smallholder producers (migrant workers)	Qualitative	Global production network framework
Moberg	2005	St Lucia	Human Organization	Banana	Producer prices	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Qualitative	NA
Mohan	2016	Nepal	World Development	Tea	General upgrading and livelihood improvement	Institutional changes	Small-holder farmers	Qualitative	Institutions theory and sustainable livelihood approach
Moseley	2008	South Africa	Globalizations	Wine	Labour conditions	Fairtrade	Producers and workers	Qualitative	NA
Muller et al	2012	South Africa	Business Strategy and the Environment	Horticulture (fresh fruits such as table grapes)	Working conditions	Pushing approach (private) and sharing approach (social)	Producers and workers	Qualitative	Self-developed concepts
Nelson & Tallontire	2014	Kenya	Agric Hum Values (Agriculture and Human Values)	Horticulture	Labour rights	MSI and standards (such as, HEBI, ETI, FLO, GSC, FLP)	Smallholder farmers and workers	Qualitative	Standard governance framework

## General Appendix

Nelson et al.	2002	Peru and Ecuador	International Forestry Review	Brazil nuts and cocoa	Labour conditions	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers and workers (collectors)	Qualitative	NA
Nelson et al.	2007	South Africa	Journal of Corporate Citizenship	Wine and cut flowers	Labour conditions	Codes of conduct	Smallholder farmers and workers	Qualitative	NA
Nickow	2015	India	Global Networks-A Journal of Transnational Affairs	Agro-food	Working conditions	NGOs and SMOs strategies	Smallholder producers	Qualitative	Self-developed concepts
Ortiz & Aparicio	2007	Argentina	Journal of Agrarian Change	Horticulture (citrus)	Wage and poverty	Government and union pressures	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	Actor-oriented socio-political economy perspective
Patel-Campillo	2012	Colombia	Sociologia Ruralis	Horticulture (cut flowers)	Gender discrimination	Advocacy networks on how norms and practices that are gendered contests production and consumption relation	Wageworkers (women) on both smallholder and large farms	Qualitative	GCC approach and hegemonic masculinities
Pegler	2015	Brazil	Journal of Peasant Studies	Acai	Labour conditions	How inclusion in GVC affects labour practice	Smallholder producers and workers (collectors)	Qualitative	Labour process and human security approach
Phillips	2014	Malawi	Agric Hum Values (Agriculture and Human Values)	Sugar	Empowerment	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers and wage workers	Qualitative	GPN

## General Appendix

Phillips & Sakamoto	2012	Brazil	Studies in Comparative International Development	Cattle	Slave labour	How inclusion in GPN affects slave labour	Wageworkers on large scale cattle farm (plantations)	Qualitative	Concept of adverse incorporation
Quaedvlieg et al.	2014	Peru	Journal of Rural Studies	NTFP	Empowerment	Forest Stewardship Council, organic and Fairtrade	Smallholder producers	Qualitative	Empowerment framework
Rainbird & Ramirez	2012	Chilea	Work Employment and Society	Salmon	Skill development	National institutions	Smallholder producers (small firm suppliers)	Qualitative	Self-developed concepts
Raynolds	2014	Ecuador	Agric Hum Values (Agriculture and Human Values)	Horticulture (flower)	Working conditions	Fairtrade	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	NA
Raynolds	2012	Ecuador	Rural Sociology	Horticulture (flower)	Working conditions	Fairtrade	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	Social regulatory approach
Riisgaard	2009	Kenya and Tanzania	World Development	Horticulture (cut flowers)	Labour organisation	Social standards and trade union and NGOs impact on labour	Small and large farms, and workers	Qualitative	Concept of labour agency
Riisgaard & Gibbon	2014	Kenya	Journal of Agrarian Change	Horticulture (cut flowers)	Labour management	Civic and industrial conventions of the local people	Small and large farms, and workers	Qualitative	Conventional theory
Riisgaard & Hammer	2011	Latin America (Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica)	British Journal of Industrial Relations	Banana and cut flowers	Labour rights strategies	International framework agreements and private	Small and large farms, and workers	Qualitative	GVC

## General Appendix

		and Nicaragua) and Africa (Kenya and Tanzania)				social standards			
Robinson	2010	Costa Rica	Journal of Business Ethics	Banana	Labour conditions	CSR initiatives	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	GCC/GVC approach
Robinson	2010a	Costa Rica	Journal of Industrial Relations	Banana	Labour conditions	ETI, SA 8000, FLO, Codes of conduct, etc.	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	GCC/GVC approach
Robinson	2009	Costa Rica	Journal of International Development	Banana	Labour conditions	ETI, SA 8000, FLO, Codes of conduct, etc.	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	GCC/GVC approach
Ruben & Zuniga	2011	Nicaragua	Supply Chain Management- An International Journal	Coffee	Welfare of farmers (prices, yield, upgrading, etc.)	Fairtrade, rainforest, café practices programme etc.	Smallholder farmers	Quantitative	GVC
Ruben et al.	2009	Peru and Costa Rica	Development in Practice	Coffee and banana	Labour conditions (bargaining power, health, wages, equality of opportunity)	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Quantitative	NA
Said-Allsopp & Tallontire	2014	Kenya	Food Chain	Horticulture	GDL (women empowerment)	Fairtrade	Women (workers on plantations)	Qualitative	NA
Said-Allsopp & Tallontire	2015	Kenya	Journal of Cleaner Production	Tea and cut flowers	Women empowerment	CSR, Fairtrade, etc.	Wageworkers (women) in companies	Qualitative	GVC
Schuster & Maertens	2016	Peru	Journal of Cleaner Production	Horticulture (asparagus, artichoke,	Employment conditions (wage, job	ETI, Fairtrade, UTZ, etc.	Wageworkers on plantations (agro-	Quantitative	Self-developed concepts

## General Appendix

				mango, avocado and pepper)	contract, training, etc)		industrial companies such as production, exporting and processing companies)		
Schuster & Maertens	2017	Peru	Journal of Development Studies	Horticulture (asparagus, artichoke, mango, avocado and pepper)	Empowerment	ETI, Fairtrade, UTZ, etc.	Wageworkers on plantations (agro-industrial sector)	Quantitative	Self-developed concepts
Selwyn	2007	Brazil	Journal of Agrarian Change	Horticulture (fruits such as grapes)	Labour conditions	Rural trade union organization	Wageworkers on plantations	Qualitative	GCC
Shreck	2002	Dominican Republic	International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture & Food	Banana	Empowerment and training	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers	Qualitative	NA
Smith	2007	Costa Rica	Culture, Agriculture, Food and Environment	Coffee	Labour conditions	Fairtrade	Smallholder producers	Qualitative	NA
Staricco & Ponte	2015	Argentina	Journal of Rural Studies	Wine	Empowerment	Fairtrade	Wageworkers on small and large wineries	Qualitative	Regulatory theory
Tallontire et al.	2005	Ken, SA, Zambia	Development in Practice	Horticulture (flowers, fruits and vegetables)	Employment conditions (wage, legislation and representation, working hours, and employment status)	Codes of conduct	Wageworkers in companies (women and informal)	Qualitative	Gendered value chain approach

## General Appendix

---

Trauger	2014	Dominican Republic	Annals of The Association of American	Banana	Labour conditions	Organic and Fairtrade	Wageworkers (both plantations and smallholder farms)	Qualitative	New economic geography
Valkila	2009	Nicaragua	Ecological Economics	Coffee	Welfare effect (wages, working conditions)	Fairtrade (organic)	Smallholder producers	Qualitative	NA
Valkila & Nygren	2010	Nicaragua	Agric Hum Values (Agriculture and Human Values)	Coffee	Welfare effects (prices, wages, working conditions)	Fairtrade	Smallholder farmers and wageworkers (on smallholder farms)	Qualitative	GVC, Fair Trade and civic conventions theory

---



**A2 Interview Guide: Chapter Three (Study Two)**

I am from the University of Kassel, Germany and am studying how to promote decent work along the cocoa value chains of Ghana. I am especially interested in the role of labour arrangements in promoting smallholder participation in decent work governance in the cocoa value chain of Ghana and its implication on child labour and occupational safety and health amongst producers and their growing communities. I appreciate your participation in answering these questions. I would like to assure you that your responses will be treated completely confidentially and will only be used for research purposes. If you indicate your voluntary consent and you are comfortable for me to record, we will begin this interview now. Please may we begin?

**Section 1: In-depth Interview with Key Actors (incl. LBCs, COCOBOD and lead firms) along Ghana’s Cocoa Value Chain Except Smallholders and Farm Workers**

*Section 1.1: Respondents General Information*

1. Respondent’s name .....
2. Organisation .....
3. Current position .....

*Section 2.2: Lead Firm Governance of Decent Work in Particular, Child Labour and Occupational Health and Safety*

- What is the company’s overall vision to govern decent work, in particular, child labour and occupational health and safety amongst cocoa farmers and their cocoa growing communities?
- How does the company engage smallholders in her decent work governance?
- Did smallholders who participate/participated change their labour practices? How?
- Has child labour and occupational health and safety risks reduced among smallholders?
- What are the main factors that have led to the reduction of child labour and occupational health and safety risks?
- What labour arrangements (both formal and informal) exist in the cocoa sector of Ghana?
- Under what conditions do these arrangements promote smallholder capacity in decent work governance?

- Which labour arrangements (mentioned above) have led to the reduction of child labour and occupational health and safety risks amongst cocoa farmers and cocoa growing communities? For whom? How?
- What steps has the company taken to ensure that smallholders and their growing communities benefit from these labour arrangements?

**Section 2: Semi-Structured Interview amongst Smallholders and Wageworkers along Ghana’s Cocoa Value Chain**

*Section 2.1: Smallholders and Wageworkers General Information*

1. Respondent’s name .....
2. Sex .....
3. Age .....
4. Farmer or wageworker.....
5. Land size.....
6. Land ownership .....
7. Education .....
8. Location (incl. town, district and region) .....

*Section 2.2: Smallholder and Wageworker Participation Governance of Decent Work in Particular, Child Labour and Occupational Health and Safety*

- Besides agriculture, are you engaged in any other activity that brings income to the household?
- Is labour available and accessible? Why?
- What are your sources of labour in your farming activities? Why?
- Are you aware of child labour and occupational health and safety risks?
- What are your sources of information about child labour and occupational health and safety risks? Can you tell us the last time that you received education on child labour and occupational health and safety risks? By whom? How?
- How often are children involve in family farming (cocoa)? What type of tasks do they carry out?
- Should children be allowed to work on the farms? Why or why not?

- What type of tasks are appropriate for children? Which tasks may be inappropriate?
- Why do some farmers practice child labour?
- How do you address child labour problems amongst members of the community?
- What type of activities are source of risks to your health and wellbeing?
- Do you wear personal protective equipment when carrying out these activities?
- Is PPE available and accessible in this community?
- What labour arrangements (both formal and informal) are available in this community?
- Are these labour arrangements accessible?
- What do you like about the labour arrangements that are available and accessible? Why?
- Do the available and accessible labour arrangement change your farming activities? How?
- Which labour arrangements have led to the reduction of child labour and occupational health and safety risks? For whom? How?

*Section 2.3: Focus group discussions for smallholders and wagedworkers.*

Introductory session

- Respondent's name .....
- Sex .....
- Age .....
- Farmer or wagedworker.....
- Land size.....
- Land ownership .....
- Education .....
- Location (incl. town, district and region) .....

Main session

- Is labour available and accessible? Why?
- What are the sources of labour in this farming community? Why?
- Is the community aware of child labour and occupational health and safety risks?
- What are your sources of information about child labour and occupational health and safety risks? Can you tell us the last time that you received education on child labour and occupational health and safety risks? By whom? How?

- How often are children involve in family farming (cocoa)? What type of tasks do they carry out?
- Should children be allowed to work on the farms? Why or why not?
- What type of tasks are appropriate for children? Which tasks may be inappropriate?
- Why do some farmers practise child labour?
- How do you address child labour problems amongst members of the community?
- What type of activities are source of risks to your health and wellbeing?
- Do you wear personal protective equipment when carrying out these activities? Why?
- Is PPE available and accessible in this community?
- What labour arrangements (both formal and informal) are available in this community?
- Are these labour arrangements accessible? Why?
- What did you like about the labour arrangements that are available and accessible?
- Did the labour arrangements change your farming activities? How?
- Which labour arrangements have led to the reduction of child labour and occupational health and safety risks? For whom? How?

**A3 Interview Guide: Chapter Four (Study Three)**

I am from the University of Kassel, Germany and am studying how to promote decent work along the cocoa value chains of Ghana. I am especially interested in smallholder participation in lead firm governance of decent work in the cocoa value chain of Ghana and its implication on economic and social upgrading for producers and their farm workers. I appreciate your participation in answering these questions. I would like to assure you that your responses will be treated completely confidentially and will only be used for research purposes. If you indicate your voluntary consent and you are comfortable for me to record, we will begin this interview now. Please may we begin?

***Section 1: In-depth Interview with Key Actors (incl. LBCs, COCOBOD and lead firms) along Ghana's Cocoa Value Chain, Except Smallholders and Farm Workers***

*Section 1.1: Respondent's General Information*

4. Respondent's name .....
5. Organisation .....
6. Current position .....

*Section 1.2: Lead Firm Governance of Decent Work and Smallholder Engagement*

- What is the company's overall vision to govern decent work amongst cocoa farmers and their cocoa growing communities in Ghana?
- What category of cocoa farmers exist in Ghana?
- Which groups of farmers have had greater access to the company's decent work initiatives and why?
- How does the company engage smallholders in its decent work governance?
- What are the main conditions that have led to the participation of smallholders in the company's decent work governance?
- What steps has the company taken to ensure that cocoa farmers and workers are encouraged and empowered to adopt and comply with labour standards?

*Section 1.3: Economic and Social Upgrading of Smallholders and their Growing Communities*

- Has economic upgrading (incl. participation in the global cocoa-chocolate production network, access to niche markets, improvement in labour skills and high value capture)

been achieved among cocoa farmers who participate/participated in the company's decent work initiatives?

- What are the main factors/conditions that have led to the attainment of economic upgrading (incl. participation in the global cocoa-chocolate production network, access to niche markets, improvement in labour skills and high value capture) among these cocoa farmers?
- How have the different groups of farmers experienced economic upgrading differently?
- Amongst the groups that have experienced economic upgrading, has this led to social upgrading (incl. higher wages for farm workers, elimination of child and forced labour, improved well-being, reduced gender inequality)?
- What are the main factors that have led to social upgrading (incl. higher wages for farm workers, elimination of child and forced labour, improved well-being, reduced gender inequality) among these farmers?
- Is price setting an economic and social upgrading strategy? For whom? How?
- Is compliance with decent work standards an economic and social upgrading strategy? For whom? How?
- Is collective labour standard setting and implementation an economic and social upgrading strategy? For whom? How?
- Is capacity building and cooperation among actors an economic and social upgrading strategy? For whom? How?

***Section 2: Semi-Structured Interview amongst Smallholders and Wageworkers along Ghana's Cocoa Value Chain***

*Section 2.1: Smallholders and Wageworkers General Information*

9. Respondent's name .....
10. Sex .....
11. Age .....
12. Farmer or wageworker.....
13. Land size.....
14. Land ownership .....
15. Education .....
16. Location (incl. town, district and region) .....

*Section 2.2: Smallholder and Wageworker Engagement in Lead Firm Governance of Decent Work*

- Do you grow other crops besides cocoa? Name them.....
- Besides agriculture, are you engaged in any other activity that brings income to the household?
- What different License Buying Companies (LBCs) do you know?
- Which of the LBCs do you usually sell your beans to?
- Have you participated in any learning activity/programme/project/intervention? Please describe (by who, what you did, etc.)
- How did you come to participate in these interventions?
- What are your sources of information about labour conditions (incl. child labour, forced labour, occupational safety and health, etc)?
- Can you tell us the last time that you received education on labour conditions? By whom?
- How did you come to participate in the labour education?
- What did you like about your participation in the labour education and what could have been better?
- Which groups of farmers often have greater access to education on labour conditions and why?
- What are the things that you do in order to comply with the labour standards you are taught as a farmer?

*Section 2.3: Economic and social upgrading of smallholders and their growing communities*

- Did you change your farming practices when you participated in the labour education?
- Did your yield increase? By how much? What factors/conditions accounted for that?
- Did your labour skills improve? What factors/conditions accounted for that?
- Did you get access to a niche market? What factors/conditions accounted for that?
- Did your health and wellbeing improve? What factors/conditions accounted for that?
- Did you avoid using children and forced labour? What factors/conditions accounted for that?
- Did you pay your workers higher wages as well as equal wages for both male and female workers? What factors/conditions accounted for that?
- Is price setting an economic and social upgrading strategy? For whom? How?

- Is compliance to decent work standards an economic and social upgrading strategy? For whom? How?
- Is collective labour standard setting and implementation an economic and social upgrading strategy? For whom? How?
- Is capacity building and cooperation among actors an economic and social upgrading strategy? For whom? How?

*Section 2.4: Focus group discussions for smallholders and wagedworkers.*

Introductory session

- Respondent's name .....
- Sex .....
- Age .....
- Farmer or wagedworker.....
- Land size.....
- Land ownership .....
- Education .....
- Location (incl. town, district and region) .....

Main session

- What are your sources of information about labour conditions (incl. child labour, forced labour, occupational safety and health, etc)?
- Can you tell us the last time that you received education on labour conditions? By whom?
- How did you come to participate in the labour education?
- What did you like about your participation in the labour education and what could have been better?
- What changed for you in terms of your farming activities after the participation in the labour education?
- Did your labour skills improve? What factors/conditions accounted for that?
- Did you get access to a niche market? What factors/conditions accounted for that?
- Did your health and wellbeing improve? What factors/conditions accounted for that?



## ***General Appendix***

---

- Did you avoid using children and forced labour? What factors/conditions accounted for that?
- Did you pay your workers higher wages as well as equal wages for both male and female workers? What factors/conditions accounted for that?