

# **Dongi-dongi - Culmination of a Multi-dimensional Ecological Crisis: A Political Ecology Perspective**

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## Preface

When I set foot in the city of Palu, Central Sulawesi in February 2002, I had no idea that in just a short time I would encounter an interesting arena for the doctorate research program I was undertaking. Although I had made visits to Palu several times previously, specifically to Tadulako University, I had never gone very far outside of the city limits of Palu. Therefore it is not surprising to note that I had not quite mastered the ins and outs of working in the field during the first month I spent researching the countryside around the Lore Lindu National Park.

The Lore Lindu National Park is one of the largest biosphere reserves in the world with an area of approximately 230,000 hectares, with the vast majority of this area still in good condition. However, in the 1990s this national park began to be assailed by a variety of problems in relation to the 63 village communities on its outskirts. One of those problems came to focus on the residents of the Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia, and Rahmat villages of Palolo subdistrict, Donggala district. The residents of these four resettlement villages, in June 2001, occupied the Dongi-dongi area of Lore Lindu National Park, which had been declared an integral zone by the Park Authority. This problem expanded into a highly complex dilemma when Indonesia's largest environmental non-governmental organization (NGO) – The Indonesian Environmental Forum (*Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia*, WALHI) lent support to the villagers. At the time this thesis was completed in 2005, the villages continued to occupy Dongi-dongi.

Motivated to describe this case comprehensively and analytically, I undertook this research with a political ecology approach as the cutting edge for analysis. Through this approach, I attempted to step outside of the restrictions of conventional frameworks of thought concerning the causes of damage to tropical forests, particularly in protected areas. The Dongi-dongi case indicated that the damage of the protected areas was not solely the result of the scarcity of land pressuring the people living in the area, nor because of the diametric problems existing between the local farmers and the government, but was also due to problem of the interests and power of international actors far from Indonesia's national borders. In relation to this, it becomes vitally important to examine critically the conservation narratives, discourses

and policies produced primarily by global actors in the 1990s. The Dongi-dongi case also teaches the lesson that the politics of state that regulate access to and control of natural resources, and governance constitute two factors that play a major role in the sustainability of protected areas in Indonesia and the welfare of the people living around them.

This interesting research could not have been accomplished without the helping hand and full support of Prof. Dr. Michael Fremerey of Kassel University. He provided me with a golden opportunity that would prove to be highly definitive for my future – he opened the door to the doctorate program and became my advisor at the University of Kassel. Even my deepest appreciation and heartfelt respect for him could never even come close to equaling the significance of all that he has done for me. I am eternally indebted to this fine man.

I also wish to convey my heartfelt thanks to Prof. Dr. Werner Trossbach, University of Kassel, and Prof. Dr. Sediono M.P. Tjondronegoro, Bogor Agriculture Institute, who so patiently followed my progress throughout the development of my research; provided me with critical input, and encouraged me consistently to complete this doctoral program. I also wish to convey much deserved appreciation to Dr. M.F.T Sitorus, Chairman of the Rural Sociology Post Graduate Studies Program of the Bogor Agriculture Institute, who also provide a great deal of valuable support to my efforts to finish my doctoral program.

Another factor in the successful completion of this research was its implementation as a research agenda under the auspices of the Multidisciplinary Collaborative Research Program “Stability of Rainforest Margin Areas in Indonesia” (SFB 552 -STORMA), which was undertaken by the University of Göttingen, the University of Kassel, the Bogor Agriculture Institute (IPB), and the University of Tadulako (UNTAD), and based in the area of the Lore Lindu National Park. Due to the support of the Bogor STORMA office (Prof. Dr. Edi Guhardja and Dr. Surya Darma Tarigan), and the Palu STORMA office (Dr. Sylvia Werner, Dr. Elim Somba, Dr. Adam Malik, and Wolfram Lorenz, MA), I was able to benefit from more than adequate leeway and mobility in the implementation of my research efforts. Throughout my writing and study of literature in Germany, I was provided with significant assistance by Sylvia Ebersberg of the Institute of Social Studies,

University of Kassel, and Dr. Regina Birner, University of Göttingen. I offer immense thanks to both of them.

The completion of this dissertation was also supported by a number of colleagues and friends. I feel especially deeply indebted for the assistance provided by M. Shohibuddin, an intelligent and gifted young researcher, who not only acted as my field assistant and data analyst, but also as a critical discussion partner. I am also deeply indebted to Margaret G. Agusta, who assisted in editing and revising the English language text I wrote, and who even translated segments of my thesis when I encountered difficulty in expressing my ideas in clear and concise English. Because of her hard work, the results of my research could be presented with clarity in this document.

Of no less import was the invaluable support I received from my colleagues in a number of NGOs and the government. These people became new friends as well as colleagues for me during my research efforts. Among the NGOs I received a great deal of assistance from Agus Salim Feisal (YBHR), Hedar Laujeng (LBH Bantaya), Alimuddin Paada (YAKIS), Arianto Sangaji (YTM), Shadiq (FKTNLL), Harley (WALHI Central Sulawesi), Nassir Abas (FKKM), Rivai (YEI), Indra Mirza (NRM USAID Palu), Ikhsan Mentong (JKTI), and Erson Tungka (TNC), as well as from my colleagues at Awam Green. Within government circles, I received a lot of assistance from Banjar Y. Laban, Amir Hamzah and Helmi from the Lore Lindu National Park Authority. In order to not miss mentioning anyone without meaning to, it is important to note here that there just isn't enough space available to adequately list and thank individually the many other colleagues and friends of mine who joined in providing immense amounts of encouragement and support throughout my doctoral endeavors. For all of their kind assistance, I extend my deepest respect and appreciation.

I would also like to express my thanks and respect to the people of Dongidongi (among others, Papa Gola, Kuasa Ratalemba and Frans) who provided me with invaluable assistance throughout my time in the field. All during the period in which this research project took place, I was distinctly aware of the prayers and support of a number of people in Palu as well. To Pak Sunardi and Pak Gino, and all of the elders of the Sidera and Laswani areas, who never tired of helping me, I convey my respectful greetings and my deepest thanks. Many deep thanks also convey to Dian Achmad Kosasih and the Martalogawa clan, who deeply support my thesis writing

activity with the luxury facility of the beauty Marta Merian Villa in Sukabumi. May God bless each and every one of my friends and colleagues in Bogor and Palu, as well as the elders of Palu, for all of their kind attention, consideration and support.

I dedicate this dissertation to my beloved wife and children – Harmini, Wini Lestari and Maulana Agung Wibowo – who waited so long for this moment to arrive. I express my deepest and heartfelt thanks and devotion for their uncountable sacrifices, support and understanding throughout these last three years. Without their support and encouragement this dissertation could never have been accomplished.

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. Background

In 1950, the Indonesian Forest Service concluded that nearly 84 percent of Indonesia's land area or 162 million hectares was covered by primary forest, protected forest, swamp and wilderness forest, tidal forest, secondary forest and plantations of such estate crops as tea, coffee, and rubber.<sup>1</sup> Forty percent of the forest cover in 1950 was cleared in the following 50 years. Forest cover fell from 162 million to 98 million ha (Forest Watch Indonesia/Global Forest Watch 2002). During 1985–1997, Holmes (2001) estimates that the annual rate of deforestation in Indonesia was around 1.7 million hectares, higher than the previous estimates of 0.6 – 1.2 millions hectares per year predicted by Sunderlin and Resosudarmo (1996). In sum, Indonesia appears to have lost more than 20 million hectares of forest cover between 1985 and 1997, or about 17 percent of the forest area existing in 1985. Furthermore, Forest Watch Indonesia/Global Forest Watch (2002) concluded that deforestation levels are increasing over time, with annual clearing of about 1 million ha per year in the 1980s, rising to about 1.7 million ha in the first part of the 1990s, and increasing to an average of 2 million ha since 1996.

This continuous massive deforestation and forest degradation not only resulted in a decrease in land cover and standing stock, it also resulted in habitat loss, forest fragmentation and habitat degradation, which have a vast impact on biodiversity loss and species extinction in Indonesia. Of the various types of tropical forest in Indonesia, the lowland tropical forests – the richest in timber resource and biodiversity – are most at risk. They have been almost entirely cleared in Sulawesi and are predicted to disappear in Sumatra by 2005 and Kalimantan by 2010 if current trends continue (Forest Watch Indonesia/Global Forest Watch 2002).

For years, the high rate of illegal logging has been spreading into protection forest as well as into protected areas, i.e. nature reserves, wildlife sanctuaries, national parks, nature recreation parks, grand forest parks and hunting parks.<sup>2</sup> World Bank (2001:34) and Soekmadi (2002:3) reported that forest loss due to rampant illegal encroachment and logging occurred in many protected areas, even in well known and

major protected areas with important donor programs, such as Gunung Leuser, Bukit Barisan Selatan, Bukit Tigapuluh, Tanjung Puting, Gunung Palung, Meru Betiri and Lore Lindu National Park. Furthermore, World Bank (2001), Soekmadi (2002), and EIA and Telapak (2002) revealed that illegal logging is often sponsored by military and political figures, national park rangers and private business.

In consideration of the various incidences of deforestation and forest degradation previously discussed, the question remains as to the underlying causes of forest decline. Is it due to government policy failure and the corrupt political economic system that regard natural resources, particularly forests, as a source of revenue to be exploited for political ends and individual gain, as was affirmed by FWI/GFW (2002)? Or, as indicated by Peluso (1992:19-20), is it because forest degradation and rural poverty are symptoms of resource scarcity, outcomes of agrarian changes, and indicators of complex social conflict? Conflict over territory, redefinition of rights and constraints in resource access, surplus appropriation from forest extraction, and the distribution of the surplus extracted, according to Peluso, are factors that cause forest degradation and poverty. Contreras-Hermosilla (2000) describes forest decline as a complex socio-economic, cultural and political event. He argues that the underlying causes of forest decline originate in the distribution of economic and political power, attitudes towards corruption, population growth, imperfect market systems and in seemingly unrelated government policies. Thus, it is mistaken to attribute forest decline to a simple cause-effect relationship or assume that a relationship will remain unaltered over time.


This study is another effort aimed at exploring the underlying factors, conditions and processes of forest decline, with a particular focus on contestation of power and interests in resources among the various actors involved. It is hoped that this study can deepen our understanding of the complex socio-economic, cultural and political settings and events that generate different powers and interests and struggles over the use, access, and control of forest resources, with the ensuing consequences on the stabilization or destabilization of the forest ecosystem, as well as forest margins.

This study has been conducted at Lore Lindu National Park, particularly at the Dongi-dongi site, the place where various actors struggle for resources, exercise power and negotiate different interests. This study is also part of the long-term collaboration research on Stability of Rainforest Margins (STORMA) conducted since 2000 at Lore Lindu National Park, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. STORMA's research is interdisciplinary research dedicated to analyzing and assessing the processes of destabilization and factors that contribute to the stability of rainforest margins both in their temporal and spatial dimensions. This study, therefore, is expected contribute to the overall research objective of STORMA.

Another important factor motivating this study is the need to determine how extensively protected areas, such as Lore Lindu National Park (LLNP), which is located in the heart of the island of Sulawesi, are capable of resisting the rapid increase in deforestation and forest degradation. Sulawesi Island is well known for its significant levels of biodiversity within "the mega-diverse" country of Indonesia. The majority of Sulawesi's unique fauna (over 50% of the mammals and 68% of the birds) are present within LLNP in Central Sulawesi. Therefore, LLNP is one of the most biologically important areas in the world. This Park has been appointed as a Man and Biosphere Reserve by UNESCO (1977). For these reasons, it is important to observe and study the diverse points of view of the concerned parties, the government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and local peoples, in relation to their various efforts to maintain the integrity of the national park in the face of deforestation and forest degradation.

## **B. Research Questions**

Around 8 p.m. on December 13, 2003, after an hour of torrential rainfall, thousands of cubic meters of soil slid down from the steep mountainsides of the Dongi-dongi region. Dongi-dongi is one of the areas located in the core zone of the Lore Lindu National Park (LLNP), on the slopes of Mount Nokilalaki, in Palolo Subdistrict, Donggala District, Central Sulawesi Province (see Figure 1). The soil washed down with the heavy onslaught of rainwater in the landslide and rushed into tributaries, overflowing and flowing rapidly over and through stands of forest



vegetation, felled trees, orchards, cropland, roads and the homes of the people living in Dongi-dongi. These floodwaters carrying the debris of the landslide flowed into the channel of the Sopo River, which divided the Dongi-dongi region. In a short time, the channel of the Sopo River could no longer contain the massive load of mud, stones, trees and felled logs washed into it. The huge flood swept downstream through the villages of Tongoa, Berdikari and Rahmat in Palolo Subdistrict, Donggala District, Central Sulawesi.

The massive flood of December 13, 2003 was, in fact, the peak of the ecological changes in the Dongi-dongi area initiated on June 19, 2001, when residents of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat villages in Donggala District, Central Sulawesi Province, opened the Dongi-dongi forest area. (see Figure 1). These villages, along with others in Palolo Valley, had been established under the resettlement program, with the majority of the people relocated being members of the Kaili Da'a ethnic group. Within the next two years the villagers dramatically changed the landscape and biodiversity of the Lore Lindu National Park. The farmers still remain in Dongi-dongi. Leaders of Independent Farmers' Forum (*Forum Petani Merdeka: FPM*) claim that around 1,030 households from Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat village have already occupied the Dongi-dongi area and are involved in farming activities there. One year after the Dongi-dongi declaration, around 3,400 ha of Dongi-dongi forest cover had been opened (*Kompas* August 7, 2002). The overall deforestation rate was quite high as in the first two months after the declaration only around 63.5 ha of forest had been cleared (Setyo and Neville 2001).

The resistance of local peoples to state forest control has a long history and is found in many third world countries, including Indonesia (Peluso 1992; Bryant and Bailey 1997). The history of state forestry control and actual forest use by peasants indicates conflict over access, use and control of land between the state and the peasantry. Where the interests of the states and the peasants clash, environmental deterioration, poverty and ambivalent power relations often emerge (Peluso 1992). The turbulence of the Dongi-dongi affair, however, shows that competition over access to land and trees and over the control of that access is not simply a diametrical

conflict between the state and the peasantry. The involvement of local and international NGOs, along with their ideological narratives, advocacies, and political support, plus the fact that security officers are engaged in the illegal logging business, make the claims and counter-claims, threats and counter-threats, and struggles over Dongi-dongi's resource not fully diametrical.

It is therefore, the intention of this study to explore the following questions: **Why residents of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat were strongly eager to reside in the Dongi-dongi forest even though they recognized it was a protected area? Why are the Dongi-dongi peasants, as weaker actors, able to resist their more powerful counterparts and even continue their activities in the core part of the national park? What are the various ways and forms in which one or more actors seek to exert power for access and control over Dongi-dongi resources, as well as the Lore Lindu National Park at large?**

The above questions brought this research to deeply analyze the political bases and processes within which the diverse aims, interests and power resources of the involved actors, are framed and leveraged in the contesting over resources, meanings, institutional legacies and control of the environmental changes in Dongi-dongi, and which subsequently ramify the political process.

It is not the intention of this research to accuse certain actors of having taken mistaken directions or wrong positions with respect to the others. Rather, the intention is to explore, map and analyze the contour of the struggle over resources and its significance to the various actors involved, its impact on the Dongi-dongi environment, and, in turn, its affect on the political process. Thus, the contestation of political forces and interests behind the changes in Dongi-dongi ecology, as a representation of biophysical reality, is the focus of this study. An empirical study to answer the above questions is expected to enrich and contribute a better understanding of the course to take toward the stabilization of protected areas.

### C. Theoretical Framework

Researchers have investigated the Third World's environmental problems extensively in recent years. A rapidly growing literature examines in particular the ways in which those problems are related to human activities. It soon became clear that environmental change i.e. global warming, forest degradation, soil erosion, biological simplification and growing land, water and air pollution were not simply originating from a Malthusian phenomenon, and/or market and policy failure as frequently suggested in the mainstream literature (Hempel, 1996; Panayotou 1993; World Bank, 2001). Similarly, reversing such degradation has been found to be not merely a matter of technical policy solutions and managerial approaches. It is now acknowledged that a critical understanding of socio-economic, political and cultural processes and structures is central to understanding environmental problems (Doyle and McEachern 2001).

Growing amounts of literature and discourses on deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia also show us that the root causes are complex, inter-related, multi-dimensional, linking various local, provincial, national and international actors (Forest Watch Indonesia/Global Forest Watch 2002, Kartodihardjo and Supriono 2000, Sunderlin and Resosudarmo 1996 and World Bank 2001). Another important finding was revealed by Brown (1998 *in* Blaikie 1999:141), and Abel and Blaikie (*in* Blaikie 1999:141) in their studies done, respectively, in national parks in Zambia and Nepal. They identified the fact that most local farmers, hunters and pastoralists who use and have access to the same resources become politically marginalized and criminalized as a result of losing the battle of representation. Meanwhile, trophy hunters, tourist organizations, and a variety of international wildlife consultants and celebrities conceive of and draw incomes or reputations from the resources in the parks. They do so in line with their access to powerful networks and the theories (or narratives) they promote.

From the various literature mentioned above it is inevitable to tend to observe the Dongi-dongi affair as being the result of complex inter-woven causal relations and cross-border problems, rather than viewing it through an isolated, place-based analysis imbued with political meaning. Yet, it is the approach of political ecology

that could answer the research questions mentioned in Chapter 1.B. through its rigorous and comprehensive research framework.

There are three main reasons to apply political ecology as an appropriate framework for analyzing and explaining the Dongi-dongi affair. First, the Dongi-dongi affair is an outcome of the interaction of actors operating within a context of unequal power relations. Second, the Dongi-dongi affair is not simply a reflection of political and market failures, but rather a manifestation of broader political and economic forces. Third, the Dongi-dongi affair is also a struggle over the discursive meaning of biodiversity conservation, which is deeply rooted in scientific knowledge and power that are politically constructed and inscribed on the imaginations and material lives of the objects of development.

### **1. Political Ecology**

Perhaps the most important line of recent social scientific thinking about the environment and development is “political ecology”. The first usage of the term “political ecology” in academic publications appeared in the late 1960s and 1970s, while Third World political ecology began to enter into the subject matter of several researchers in the early 1970s (Forsyth 2003; Bryant and Bailey 1997). The term emerged as a response to the theoretical need to integrate land-use practices with the local-global political economy, as well as being a reaction to the growing politicization of the environment (Peet and Watts 1996:4). Broadly speaking, political ecology is a type of field research that assesses the political economy linkage between the community or society at large and environmental changes, as Blaikie and Brookfield (1987:17) have noted:

“... The phrase ‘political ecology’ combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resource and also within classes and groups within society itself ...”

Bryant (1997) defined political ecology as “an inquiry into the political sources, conditions and ramifications of environmental changes that impinge on existing socio-economic inequalities and political processes. By taking political questions seriously, political ecology explores how change in the environment is

incorporated into concrete political and economic relationships, and the ways that change may affect those relationships”. Further, by examining the politics of environmental change, political ecology acknowledges that environment and development, wealth and poverty, are inextricably linked (Bryant 1991). Consequently, at the heart of political ecology, research politics should be “put first” in the attempt to understand how human-environment interaction may be linked to the spread of environmental degradation (Bryant 1998:80).

The underlying assumption of political ecology is that politics and the environment are everywhere thoroughly interconnected (Harvey 1993:25). Many political ecologists tend to view political ecology and environmental politics as two separate disciplines as the main difference between the two resides in the theoretical and empirical concerns that arise from their different disciplinary homes. Environmental politics is a research field within political science that applies traditional political questions to environmental matters. In contrast, political ecology resides primarily within geography and explores the political dimensions of human-environmental interaction. Therefore, political ecology could encompass a wider understanding of “politics” than is traditionally found in environmental politics (Bryant and Bailey 1997:17). Forsyth (2003) argues that “science” cannot be separated from “politics”. He introduces “critical” political ecology as a term to point out that science and politics should be seen as mutually reinforcing at every stage, or as “co-produced”. Political ecology, then, to Forsyth’s point of view, is a politics of environmental science.

The next section will depict the development discourse of political ecology developed by scholars from the late 1970s to the 2000s (Escobar 1996; Peet and Watts 1996; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Blaikie 1999).

## **2. Structural-Radical Political Ecology<sup>3</sup>**

During the late 1970s and into the mid 1980s, political ecology was dominated by a powerful Marxist influenced analysis, or the Neo-Marxism of resource use and environmental conservation (Peet and Watts 1996:2; Bryant and Bailey 1997:3). Structural Neo-Marxism tends to explain local conflict/change as the outcome of the

global production process. One outstanding political ecology research study done in this period was Blaikie's *The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries* (1985).

Blaikie (1985) found that most soil conservation programs in developing countries do not succeed due to the origins and ideological assumptions behind the conservation policies that date back to the colonial period. The "colonial" or classic model of soil conservation, views soil erosion as primarily a "techno-environmental problem", rather than as a complex "socio-environmental" problem. Therefore, the colonial rulers applying coercion and force upon the populaces they ruled could afford to ignore the social problems that led to soil erosion in the first place. As a solution, Blaikie offers a new approach that takes the stance that the causes of soil erosion do not exist only in the actual place in which the physical symptoms are observed, but also derived from wider non-location-specific political-economic relations in places that may be far from the affected area. A hierarchy of geographical scales was constructed through what was called "the chain of explanation in land degradation" for elucidating the causal link of land degradation from the local level (physical changes in soil and vegetation) to the nature of the state, and then to the matter of international economic forces. However, there are undoubtedly formidable problems encountered -- associated with the availability and accessibility of data, and epistemological issues connected to acceptable standards of proof -- when attempting to make causal connections between social and environmental problems (Blaikie 1999:140).

The structural and radical political ecology approach continued to be in use through the 1990s, however, with a different theoretical base than previously developed. Scholars have drawn on the Neo-Weberian and social movement theories on political sociology to explore the implications of the potentially autonomous state for environmental conflicts (Bryant and Bailey 1997:14). This approach is a kind of new strand in structural-radical political ecology as it focuses on the explaining of conflict/change of all scales as an outcome of the interaction of various actors possessing unequal power capabilities, rather than as an outcome of the global production process. Peluso's *Rich Forest, Poor People: Resource Control and*

*Resistance in Java* (1992) is one of the most stunning research studies of political ecology of the late 1990s that adopted this type of approach simultaneously with the Neo-Marxist approach of Blaikie. Peluso reveals that over time, state imposed changes in forest access rights have affected not only the subsequent implementation of policy formation, but also the forms of peasant resistance to state control.

In 1997, a more comprehensive framework for political ecology appeared from the work of Bryant and Bailey in their book of *Third World Political Ecology* (1997). The political ecology research that generally aims to relate the political-economic and ecological processes in developing countries -- albeit through a plurality approach -- has developed rapidly since the 1980s (Bryant and Bailey 1997).

Third World political ecology has become of growing interest because the colonial legacies of integration in the global capitalist economy, natural resource dependency, environmental degradation and centralized political control have conditioned environmental use and conflict in postcolonial times (Bryant and Bailey 1997:8). A growing amount of literature on this issue encouraged Bryant and Bailey to introduce the term “Third World political ecology”, which describes a research field distinct from other environmental research fields in that it takes a more radical perspective than that upon which work in this field is typically based (1997:2-4).<sup>4</sup>

This radical perspective is drawn from two basic points, notwithstanding differing research approaches. First, the Third World’s environmental problems are not simply a reflection of policy failure, but rather are a manifestation of broader political and economic forces associated notably with the global spread of capitalism, particularly since the nineteenth century (Bryant and Bailey 1997:3). Second, since the sources of the Third World’s environmental problems are sufficiently complex and deep rooted, political ecologists argue that the only way to resolve the Third World environmental problems is through radical changes to the local and global political economy (Bryant 1997:8; Bryant and Bailey 1997:3).

One central concept originating in Bryant and Bailey book’s *Third World Political Ecology* is that of the “politicized environment”. The politicized environment concept provides a road map, or a way to understand environmental

issues in terms of the different dimensions of environmental change, to the political and economic contexts within which the environmental problems are created (Bryant and Bailey 1997).<sup>5</sup> These environmental change dimensions (everyday, episodic, systemic) correspond to the type of physical changes, the nature of human impact, the political response and key concepts (see Table 1). The first “everyday” dimension involves physical changes (e.g. soil erosion, deforestation) that simultaneously derive from day-to-day human practices and unequally affect those same practices on a daily basis. While, the second “episodic” dimension includes physical changes (e.g. flooding, high winds/storms) that often have a massive, immediate and highly unequal human impact, but occur sporadically over time and are frequently, described as “natural” disasters (Bryant and Bailey 1997:30; Bryant 1998:84).

Table 1. Dimensions of a Politicized Environment

Dimensions	Physical Changes	Nature of human impact	Political response	Key concept
Everyday	Soil erosion, deforestation, salinization	Cumulative and typically highly unequal; the poor are the main losers	Livelihood protests/ resistance	Marginality
Episodic	Flooding, high winds/storms, drought	May have general impact but unequal exposure means that the poor are the main losers	“Disaster” relief	Vulnerability
Systemic	Nuclear fallout, pesticide concentration, biologically modified species	Tend to have general impact	Popular distrust of official “experts”	Risk

Source: Bryant and Bailey (1997:84)

A more detailed understanding of the Third World’s politicized environment is to be found in the analysis of how unequal power relations are often linked to conflicts over access to and the use of diverse environmental resources (Bryant 1998:85). This type of analysis has long been a central theme in political ecology with scholars working in African, Asian, and Latin American contexts seeking to explain questions of environmental control and contestation (1998:85).

Further, Bryant developed a framework for political ecology research that fit into the Third World context, which embraces three critical areas of inquiry: the contextual sources of environmental change; conflict over access, and the political

ramifications of environmental change (1992:13). The framework explores the complexities of political and environmental interaction; as a consequence, its approach aims to unify, but through an appreciation of plurality of purpose and flexibility in explanation (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987).

### **3. Post-Structural Political Ecology**

The post-structural political ecology stems from the belief that nature is “socially constructed” because what we notice, interpret and give meaning to comes from our direct experience and cultural repertoire (value system, traditions, religions, educational contents etc), economics, technology, science and myths of all kinds as part of the “traffic between nature and culture” (Escobar 1996:46; Blaikie 1995:212). Post-structural political ecology questions the powerful environmental knowledge (usually “scientific”, formal, and state sponsored), which has controlled, immiserated and impoverished (both materially and culturally) so many people in the North and South (Blaikie 1999:141).

The study of Brown (1998 in Blaikie 1999:141), and Abel and Blaikie (*in* Blaikie 1999:141) demonstrate that the powerful environmental narrative on biodiversity conservation applied in the management of the national parks in Nepal and Zambia strongly impoverished and politically marginalized diverse local peoples who accessed and used the same resources. The power of environmental knowledge tends to accelerate and impinge on the powerless actors when materialized as development narrative by more powerful actors. Peluso (1992) in research on the state’s resource control and the peasants resistance to state forests in Java found that the confrontation between state and peasant interests stems from two different constructed ideologies that intended to justify the respective rights of the two parties to control forest access. On the one side, the nature of the ideology or “culture” of state authority and legitimacy (in managing forests) is an outgrowth of the political-economic strategy and structures originating in Europe. Meanwhile, on the other side, the nature of the rural people’s responses to state policies derives from local socio-cultural and political-economic circumstances, including local interpretations of the cultures and mechanisms of resource control (Peluso 1992:6).

Post-structural political ecology focuses its attention on how, by whom and why environmental knowledge, discourses and narratives are produced, represented, contested and, hereby, entered into politics (Blaikie 1995:143; Peet and Watts 1996). This concept reiterates an important point made by political ecologists Schminck and Wood (1987:51 in Bryant 1998:87) that ideas are never innocent but “either reinforce or challenge existing social and economic arrangements”. Post-structural political ecology certainly reflects wider trends in the social sciences of the 1990s (Gandy 1996 in Bryant 1998:87). Nevertheless, one of the weaknesses of post-structural ecology is found in its difficulty to follow through with a distinctive style of writing in a consistent post-structuralist epistemology and methodology (Blaikie 1995:143).

Three factors always become central discourses in political ecology, i.e. knowledge, power and actors. These three factors are inter-related and it is important to explore them in relation to the struggle over resources taking place in the Dongi-dongi affair. The next chapter explores the latest developments in the previously mentioned theories and approaches, much of the discussion of which is derived from Long’s *Development Sociology: Actor Perspective* (2001).

#### **4. Knowledge, Power and Actors**

The sociology of knowledge has become a central concern in the fields of development and social change only relatively recently (Long 2001:169). The sociology of knowledge is now more concerned with how “expert” and everyday forms of knowledge relate to the development process, because both open the way to determining how knowledge is created, internalized, externalized, and reconstructed by different actors, and also how it is used by all sort of actors in their attempts to cope with livelihood issues and planned intervention by outsiders (2001:170).

The creation and transformation of knowledge is deep-rooted in everyday social life, involving actor strategies, maneuvers, discourses and struggle over meanings and identity. Furthermore, knowledge processes are embedded in social processes that imply aspects of power, authority and legitimization, and thus they are just as likely to reflect and contribute to the conflict between social groups as they are to lead to the establishment of common perceptions, interests and intentions (2001:17,

183). Knowledge is not generated and transformed in the abstract, but in relation to the everyday contingencies and struggles that constitute social life (2001: 170). It involves the struggle between actors whereby some of them attempt to enroll others in their “projects”, getting them to accept particular frames of meaning and winning them over to their point of view (2001:184) as the product of some self-contained cultural or institutional orders or systems of social thought (2001:170-182).

Hence knowledge emerges as a product of interaction, dialogue, reflexivity and contest of meaning, and involves aspects of control, authority and power. Thus, knowledge is not simply something that is possessed, accumulated and unproblematically imposed upon others (Foucault *in* Long 2001:184). It must, therefore, like power, be looked at relationally and not treated as if it could be depleted or used up (2001:184).

The conception, dimension, epistemology and framework of power have been dramatically changed since being introduced by Hobbes in the early 1960s. Under the influence of the post-modernism paradigm world of research, Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe, and Clegg have developed meanings of power that differ markedly from those of Lukes’ (1974) radical view of power, which originated in classical political theory and Marxist analysis (Clegg 1989: 182). Clegg points out that the focal point of power is not agency, but lies in social relations, which constitute effective agency, and power itself is reproduced and “reified” in form. The greatest achievement of power is its reification (Clegg 1989:207). Power represents in its most pervasive and concrete mode when it become solid, real and materialized. However, reified power will rarely occur entirely without resistance. Power and resistance stand in a relationship to each other: in the absence of overt conflict there will be no resistance to power (Clegg 1989:207-208). Thus, in other words, power inevitably generates resistance, accommodation and strategic compliance as regular components of the politics of everyday life (Long 2001:71).

Power implies much more than how hierarchies and hegemonic control demarcate social positions and opportunities, and restrict access to resources. It is the outcome of complex struggles and negotiations over authority, status, reputation and resources, and necessitates the enrolment of networks of actors and constituencies

(Ibid). Like knowledge, power is not simply possessed, accumulated and unproblematically exercised (Gordon 1980). The analysis of the power process should not, therefore, be restricted to an understanding of how social constraints and access to resources shape social action as found in many structural-radical political ecology research studies. Nor should it lead to the description of rigid hierarchical categories and hegemonic ideologies that “oppress passive victims” as described in the writings of Blaikie (1985), Peluso (1992) and Bryant and Bailey (1997).

From the foregoing discussion, it will soon be clear that both power and knowledge are intertwined and may become reified in social life. This process of reification is, of course, an essential part of the ongoing struggles over meanings and the control of strategic relationships and resources (Long 2001:184).

To answer the research questions of this study, hence, it is necessary to seek a theoretical and methodological foundation that could explore how certain individuals or agencies (both “local” and “external” to particular arenas) are locked into a series of intertwined battles over resources, meanings and institutional legitimacy and control. An actor-oriented theory, concept and methodology is an appropriate approach to use as it could offer valuable insights to conceptualize how small-scale interactional settings or locales interlock within a wider framework, resource fields and networks of relations in which actions, expectations and values are framed and contested (Long 2001: 2,49).

There are several cornerstones of an actor-oriented approach some of which are as follows (Long 2001:49):

- 1) Social life is heterogeneous. It comprises a wide diversity of social forms and cultural repertoires, even under seemingly homogeneous circumstances.
- 2) It is necessary to study how such differences are produced, reproduced, consolidated and transformed, and to identify the social processes involved, not merely the structural outcomes.
- 3) Social action is never an individual ego-centered pursuit. It takes place within networks of relations (involving human and non-human components), is shaped by

both routine and explorative organizing practices and is bounded by certain social conventions, values and power relations.

- 4) Social action and interpretation are context-specific and contextually generated. Boundary markers are specific to particular domains, arenas and fields of social action and should not be prejudged analytically.
- 5) Meanings, values and interpretations are culturally constructed but they are differentially applied and reinterpreted in accordance with existing behavioral possibilities or changed circumstances, sometimes generating “new cultural standards”.
- 6) The perspective of the actors aims to elucidate the precise sets of interlocking relationships, actor “projects” and social practices interpenetrate various social, symbolic and geographical spaces. “Local” is not shaped by the “global” or the “global” is not an aggregation of the “local”. Rather, “micro-scale” interactional settings and localized arenas are connected to wider “macro-scale” phenomena and vice versa.

Hence, we come to the important point for this study: the actor approach is the most salient theory and perspective appropriate for this political ecology study. However, the actor-based political ecology developed in this study still takes into consideration the role of the “unequal power” concept as developed in the Third World political ecology of Bryant. It is important to underline the unequal power relations in this particular study of Dongi-dongi because it could specifically explain why resistance emerged in the struggle over resources and meanings, rather than simply bring us to a general assertion that power inevitably generates resistance as stated by Long.

An actor-oriented approach was adopted for this political ecology study due to its potentiality to facilitate complete understanding of how actors with diverse aims, interests, and characteristics, which are inter-linked either socially, politically or economically at local, regional, national and international scales, or in connection with resource fields, networks of relations, actions, expectations and values, are framed and locked into a series of battles over resources, meanings, institutional legitimacy and control.

One of the advantages of using the actor-oriented approach is that we could focus the study on the central importance of politics in political ecology that is (1) an appreciation that politics is about the interaction of actors over resources and meanings; (2) a recognition that even weak actors possess some power to act in the pursuit of their interests (Bryant and Bailey 1997:25; Bryant 1998). However, Forsyth has set forth some strong criticism of the actor-oriented approach because in utilizing this method, it is easy to make the mistake of assuming that the voices, opinions or actions of certain actors are somehow independent of the structure of society. Attributing political agency to these actors, without understanding how they replicate discourses, may overstate the power of the actors, and overlook the disciplining power of discourses or structure (Forsyth 2003:141). This weakness must be kept in mind.

## **5. Research Framework**

After reviewing the theoretical basis that will be used in this study, it is now necessary to set out the research framework that will be used in this research study. In order to critically answer the research questions concerning the Dongi-dongi affair, this study uses the research framework developed by Bryant (1992). Bryant has developed three critical areas of inquiry for political ecology studies in the Third World: the contextual source of environmental change; conflict over access of resources and meanings; and political ramification of environmental change (Bryant 1992:13). These three areas of inquiry have been adopted for use within the context of Dongi-dongi, and in relation to the most recent discourses developing within political ecology research (Peet and Watts 1996; Bryant 1998; Blaikie 1999). The main topics to be examined for each of the key aspects of inquiry are set out below.

### ***Contextual Sources of Environmental Change***

One contextual source of the environmental change in Dongi-dongi is the state policies with respect to forest management, in particular the management of the protected areas. State policies become a major point of interest because there is inherent, continuing potential for conflict between the state's roles as developer and as protector and steward of the natural environment on which its existence ultimately depends (Walker 1989:32 *in* Bryant 1992:15). Another contextual source of change

that is important to observe is the political atmosphere in relation to the conditions in Indonesia prior to the occupation of Dongi-dongi in June 2001.

Most political ecology research views social and environmental conditions as constituted in, or as the product of, unequal power relations. At one level, power is reflected in the ability of one actor or several actors to control the environment of another. Such control from the state could become “inscribed” in the environment through alterations in land, air or water -- such as felled forests, timber plantations or even the establishment of new protected areas -- as the state endorses and enforces policies, regulations, and the issuance of permits or licenses. At another level, the environmental knowledge, discourse and narratives that are “inscribed” in policy and regulations should be taken into consideration as they may cause or exacerbate the contestation between actors.

State policies are not developed in a political and economic vacuum. Rather, they result from a struggle between competing actors seeking to influence policy formulations (Bryant 1992:18). It is, therefore, also important to examine the role of international NGOs and international agencies in framing and producing global biodiversity narrative and discourse which, then, influence the conservation and management of the Lore Lindu National Park. Appointed as a world biosphere reserve, Lore Lindu National Park drew much attention from global actors such as USAID, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), and Asian Development Bank (ADB). The USAID and TNC grants devoted to the conservation of the Lore Lindu National Park and strengthening Park Authority (*Balai Taman Nasional Lore Lindu*). Whereas the Asian Development Bank disbursed loan that aims to increase the livelihood of local peoples and the socio-economic activities of all villages surrounding the Park. The loan was disbursed through the Central Sulawesi Integrated Area Development and Conservation Project (CSIADCP). Those two international projects initiated by international actors became strategic to this examination as they were linked to the emergence of conflict over access – the second framework of inquiry of this study.

The result of this first inquiry is presented in Chapter II - Global Biodiversity Politics, Chapter III - State, and in Chapter IV - Environmental Non Governmental Organizations.

### *Conflict over Access and Meanings of Resources*

The research into questions of conflict over access and meanings examines the relationship between environmental knowledge, access rights, local struggles and ecological transformation (Escobar 1998; Peluso 1992, and Hirsch 1990 *in* Bryant 1992:21). Thus, the second aspect of the framework is concerned with the constraints and opportunities facing farmers in the four resettlement villages in their struggles for livelihood. The complexity of conflicts over access related to tenurial systems and social institutions regulating access, control and use of forest resource, as well as conflicts over meanings derived from modern environmental knowledge and narratives (mostly developed by academicians) that impinge on local narratives; become points of interest for examination in this study.

In seeking to understand conflicts over access and meanings, both the historical and contemporary dynamics of conflict will be examined. In order to wholly understand the contemporary dynamics of the Dongi-dongi conflict, a spatial distinction has been drawn between actors at and near the Dongi-dongi site, and those at regional, national and international levels. In part F of this Chapter (Research Location and Actors Studied) the various actors studied in relation to the contestation of Dongi-dongi are presented. Further, the environmental knowledge and narratives, aims, interests and power resources used by and in relation to each actor are explored.

The power relations among those actors, thus becomes a central theme to examine. The questions are: How might this pattern influence the nature and outcome of struggle? How is this reflected in coalitions amongst actors? How are coalitions constructed? What impact does the spatial fragmentation of “contextual” actors, the state, NGOs and local peoples have on the Dongi-dongi conflict? These questions provide guidelines for exploring the second field of inquiry that is derived from Bryant (1992:23) and applied in this study.

The historical dimension of conflict over access and meanings is an essential element in understanding the Dongi-dongi affair as it could exemplify the course of the conflict and the changes in the positions of the actors over time due to diverse narratives, aims, interests and unequal power relations amongst the actors. In order to

describe the dynamics of the Dongi-dongi affair in accordance with the course of that conflict, the stages of conflict introduced by Kriesberg (1998), i.e. prologue, emergence, escalation, de-escalation, and settlement of conflict, have been adopted in this study<sup>6</sup>. Based on Kriesberg's concept, the conflict over access and meanings in the Dongi-dongi affair are appropriately categorized as prologue and emergence to conflict. The result of this second inquiry will then be placed in Chapter V - The Villages and The Farmers, particularly sub-chapter V.B - Dongi-dongi: A Contested Terrain that depicts the prologue of the conflict. The other stage of conflict is presented in Chapter VI, The Conflicts.

### *Political Ramifications of Environmental Changes*

The framework's third area of inquiry explores the ways that environmental changes influence socio-economic inequalities and, and by extension, the political process (Bryant 1992:24). Just as political forces contribute to environmental change, the modification of land, water and forests has important political ramifications; therefore, particular attention is directed toward socio-economic impact and political processes (1992:24).

Thus two basic questions are relevant for guiding the third area of inquiry for Dongi-dongi. First: with the Dongi-dongi forest being cut and cleared by the farmers from four resettlement villages for dry-land agriculture, settlement and timber logs, to what extent are the costs of the environmental changes borne by groups of people living nearby, or by actors living in areas more distant from Dongi-dongi? And secondly: under what circumstances does the change in the Dongi-dongi environment modify the political process?

The analysis of the socio-economic impact of the environmental changes at Dongi-dongi in this study will focus on the groups of people resident off-site the Dongi-dongi area, which are vulnerable to everyday and episodic forms of change (deforestation, floods). To yield a clearer picture of how environmental change at Dongi-dongi affects and is absorbed into the political process, the network of power relations and the everyday resistance of Dongi-dongi's farmers in contesting their plight will be examined. This effort is made in seeking to understand whether such

power relationships are reinforced in the face of the environmental change in Dongi-dongi. If so, how are they reinforced? What opportunities do the Dongi-dongi settlers, as well as their rivals, have for protest and resistance?

In the third inquiry this study will also seek to understand how Dongi-dongi farmers increasingly turning to overt strategies of collective resistance and manifested in environmental movement, such strategies that represent a potentially potent challenge to local, national and even international political process. How successful is such resistance in overcoming political and economics, or is it likely that the *status quo* will be maintained?

By critically focusing on the relationship between environmental change, socio-economic impact and political process, this study explores how such change is incorporated into concrete political and economic relationships, and the ways it may then be used to reinforce or challenge those relationships (Bryant 1992:27). The result of this third inquiry is presented in Chapter VI – The Conflicts.

#### **D. Hypotheses**

Based on research problems, research goals and the theoretical background aforementioned, two following hypotheses for guiding this research are constructed:

- 1) The Dongi-dongi occupation could continue only if the actors in the conflict were functioning on equal power levels within a framework of inter-locked interests in relation to the perceived discourse of ‘forbidden and allowed’ and ‘right and wrong’ in connection to access, use and control of the protected area
- 2) Under authoritarian regimes, the stability or instability of protected areas are much determined by the interests, power and governance of the state, as well as international actors, rather than local actors. Whereas, under democratic regimes, this is much determined by the interests, power and governance of local actors rather than those of the state and international actors.

## **E. Research Methods**

### **1. Research Location and Actors Studied**

The Dongi-dongi affair has been chosen as the main topic of this study because it is a good case example of a complex socio-economic, cultural and political event of environmental change in a particular deforestation area. Since many groups of people and organizations with diverse interests and political motives from the local, provincial and national levels became involved in the Dongi-dongi controversy over a relatively long period of time, it is necessary to describe the underlying factors, conditions and processes influencing the affair that originated further off-site the disputed land area in Dongi-dongi.


The Dongi-dongi area constitutes the research location for observing and collecting data regarding the decisions, actions and practices of a group of people struggling over resources and initiating changes in the daily ecological landscape for the sake of their livelihoods. This area, located inside of the Lore Lindu National Park, encompasses two villages in two districts: (1) Sedoa Village, Palolo Subdistrict, Donggala District; and (2) Tongoa Village, Lore Utara Subdistrict, Poso District. The Dongi-dongi area is concentrated in the section of the park between Kilometer 66 and Kilometer 79 of the Palolo–Napu provincial road (see Figure 1). Even though the majority of Dongi-dongi is located within the Lore Utara Subdistrict, Poso District, geographically it is closer to Palolo Subdistrict, Donggala District. Covering 3,500 ha of forestland, Dongi-dongi is located 1,100 m above sea level in the upper watershed of the Sopus-Gumbasa River. The topography of the area is plain to undulating (land slope less than 20 percent).

In addition, two other nearby sites, which have been strongly affected or influenced by the daily or episodic changes in the Dongi-dongi environment, have also been included in the overall research location. Those are: (1) the resettlement villages of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat, and (2) the village of Sedoa. The four resettlement villages, located in Donggala District, are the places origin of the settlers who moved into the Dongi-dongi area. Whereas, Sedoa village, located around 15 km south of Dongi-dongi under the administrative authority of

Poso District, has become a point of interest for this study as settlers from Sedoa claim the Dongi-dongi area as their customary land. All of the involved actors who are examined in this study are depicted in Figure 2.

Another off-site Dongi-dongi research location covered in this study is Palu city, the capital of Central Sulawesi. Palu is a point of interest for this study as it is the home base of various NGOs and state institutions where political decisions and actions related to Dongi-dongi are undertaken. Palu became the battleground for their efforts at exertion of power when tension among individuals, groups and organizations with pro and contra stances in the Dongi-dongi controversy reached its peak. Another location where deliberation related to the Dongi-dongi controversy has been taking place is Jakarta, the nation's capital. It is in Jakarta that policies and actions with nationwide impact and influence originate, are issued and set into place, particularly in the institutions of central government, i.e. the Department of Forestry and the Department of Home Affairs, as well as in the country's wide network of environmental NGOs.

Figure 2. Actors Studied in Dongi-dongi Controversy



## 2. Data Collections

Data were collected according to the framework of inquiry being developed, i.e. the contextual source of the environmental changes in Dongi-dongi, the conflicts over access and meanings, and the political ramifications of conflict. Table 2 shows various types of data and information collected in this study, whereas Table 3 depicts regional, national and international level of actors examined in this study.

Data were collected in two years period of time, February 2002 to February 2004. Field data collection in Central Sulawesi were conducted intensively in 10 months (February-March 2002; August–October 2002; April–July 2003, and February 2004), whereas data collections in Jakarta were carry out between trips to the field. With this relatively long period of observation, researcher been able to observe the political processes and its ramifications as a result of environmental changes in Dongi-dongi.

Data were collected through in-depth interviews, group discussions, direct observations, documentations and records collections, as well as secondary data collections. Table 4 provides types of data collected through various methods mentioned.

In depth interviews were conducted to representative figures of main actors involved in Dongi-dongi affair, such as Head and staff of the National Park, leader and members of the FPM, Governor of Central Sulawesi Province, Regent of Donggala District, NGO activists and member of provincial parliament. Except in the cases of the Governor of Central Sulawesi and the Regent of Donggala District, most of the interviews were conducted several times in order to enrich and verify facts.

Most of the primary data were collected effectively through group discussion either by attending group meeting/discussion held by local institutions or organizations (mostly NGOs) or unintentional discussions. Most of the group discussions were not organized purposely in order to have good reliability of data. There were two reasons why this approach was widely used. First, at the time the research was carried out in February 2002, Dongi-dongi affair had already entered the phase of conflict escalation. At that time various conflicting parties in particular

NGOs pro and contra to Dongi-dongi affair, were frequently holding meetings and discussions to determine collective actions taken. Second, through group discussions the researcher has the opportunity to understand more comprehensively the picture of positions, aims, power, interest and actions taken by each actor in relation to others.

Unfortunately data collections in Dongi-dongi site were not conducted intensively as in Palu city. This was due to the fact that at that time Dongi-dongi was sensitive to outsiders. However, the researcher was able to collect a lot of secondary data and information regarding chronological process of Dongi-dongi as well as actions taken by actors involved i.e. government reports and official letters, correspondence, E-mail archives, actor's statement and papers, NGO magazines, reports and publications, radio talk show records, clippings of news and articles on local and nation wide newspaper, photos and video films. These various documents – along with in-depth interviews – enabled the researcher to examine the aims, interest, power resources and relations of the various disputing actors.

### **3. Data Analysis**

The first step toward analysis of data was to transcribe all of data collected through in-depth interviews, group discussions, radio talk shows, and meetings. The transcripts were labeled with details of the pertinent event, including the time, place, names of participants and the topics discussed. Other data derived from various reports, statements, official letters, papers, email archives, magazines, clippings of newspapers, radio talk show records, photos and video films, were classified and marked with labels prepared for further analysis.

The next phase was the analysis of the different types of data through steps of reduction, categorization, validation and interpretation (Riesmann 2002: 217-270). Data reduction and categorization - either by descriptive analysis or cross-tabulation - was carried out under the framework of inquiry developed. The next step was validating data through interpretative approach (Maxwell 2002:37-64). This type of validation is considered the most appropriate for this study since the comprehension of the Dongi-dongi phenomena is not within the researcher's perspective and category, but is rather, within the scope of the participants in the situations studied -

that is, from an “emic” rather than from an “etic” perspective (Maxwell 2002:48-50). To ensure the collected data were set within an “emic” perspective, the data were validated by similar data collected from other sources, such as articles from newspapers and official reports. The next phase involved the process of comprehensively interpreting all of the validated data under the given framework of inquiry.

Table 2. Data and Information Collected with regards to Framework of Inquiry

Component	Research Framework		
	Contextual Source of Environmental Change	Conflict over Access & Meanings	Political Ramification (Emergence and Escalation, of Conflict)
Dongi-dongi site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Change of the forest function in the Dongi-dongi area</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Struggle over access and meanings of Dongi-dongi resource between land hunger farmers and Park Authority</li> <li>• Struggle over access and meanings of Dongi-dongi resource between Dongi-dongi settler's and Sedoa people</li> <li>• Conflict between biodiversity conservation discourse and agrarian discourse among NGOs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Everyday and episodic changes of Dongi-dongi's environment (settlements, crops cultivation, illegal logging, land slide, floods)</li> <li>• Exert of power between actors (dialogue, lobby, protest, coercion, intimidation, repress &amp; defeat opponent, coalition)</li> <li>• Associations/dissociations among NGOs</li> <li>• Victim of conflict</li> </ul>
Local Communities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Four resettlement villages</li> <li>• Sedoa Village</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agrarian structure in 4 resettlement villages</li> <li>• Changes of the border of the Lore Lindu National Park</li> </ul>		
State Actors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Central government (incl. Park Authority)</li> <li>• Provincial government</li> <li>• District government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decentralization</li> <li>• State control and power over land</li> <li>• State politics over access and control of protected areas</li> </ul>		
NGOs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local NGOs</li> <li>• National NGOs</li> <li>• International NGOs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Biodiversity conservation discourse</li> <li>• Agrarian discourse</li> </ul>		

Table 3. Actors Studied with respect to Level of Activities

Type of Actor	Level of Activities			
	Village to District	Regional	National	International
Local community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dongi-dongi farmers (FPM)</li> <li>• Sedoa villagers (<i>Pekurehua</i> customary community)</li> </ul>	--	--	--
State/Government/ International Agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• District Government of Donggala</li> <li>• Subdistrict Government of Palolo</li> <li>• Lore Lindu National Park Authority</li> <li>• Central Sulawesi Integrated Area &amp; Development Project (CSIADCP)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial Government of Central Sulawesi</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Forestry</li> <li>• Ministry of Home Affair</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NRM USAID</li> </ul>
NGOs	--	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGOs &amp; Alliances Support Dongi-dongi</li> <li>• NGOs &amp; Alliances Opposed Dongi-dongi</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGOs network for the environment (WALHI)</li> <li>• Umbrella organizations for customary community (AMAN)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Nature Conservancy</li> <li>• Care International</li> <li>• World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)</li> <li>• International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)</li> </ul>
Business	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Illegal loggers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sawmill industry</li> <li>• Wood kiosk</li> </ul>	--	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asian Development Bank (ADB)</li> </ul>

Table 4. Method of Data Collection according to Actors Studied

Method of Data Collection	Local Community	State	NGOs <sup>1</sup>	Business
1. In-depth interview and/or group discussion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leader and member of FPM</li> <li>• Head of Sedoa Village</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Director General for Forest Protection &amp; Nature Conservation</li> <li>• Governor of Central Sulawesi,</li> <li>• Head of Donggala District</li> <li>• Head &amp; Staff National Park Authority</li> <li>• Member of Provincial Parliaments</li> <li>• Head of Palolo Subdistrict</li> </ul>	Interview with leader and members of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WALHI Central Sulawesi</li> <li>• YBHR</li> <li>• LBH Bantaya</li> <li>• Awam Green</li> <li>• YEI</li> <li>• YTM</li> <li>• YAKIS</li> <li>• TNC</li> <li>• Care International Palu</li> </ul>	--
2. Direct observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Observation to Dongi-dongi area</li> <li>• Observation to 4 resettlement villages</li> <li>• Observation to Sedoa village</li> </ul>	--	--	--
3. Secondary data collection	statistical data	statistical data, national park reports, government reports, research reports, official documents	NGO's position paper, reports, publications, bulletin/magazines, & official documents, website	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Literatures/references/publications regarding illegal logging</li> <li>• CSIADCP reports</li> </ul>
4. Documents and records	Various documentations and records issued/published from June 2001 to December 2003: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Article and news in local and national newspapers (<i>Radar Sulteng, Surya, Nuansa Pos, Kompas, Jakarta Pos, Suara Pembaruan, and Tempo</i>), international newsletter (Down To Earth), and NGOs magazine/ newsletter (<i>Bergerak, Bantaya</i>)</li> <li>• Official letters from and for Park Authority, April 2 1997 – June 18, 2002</li> <li>• Press release, video films, and emails communication between NGOs</li> <li>• Record of radio talk-show, seminar, meeting and discussions between involved actors</li> </ul>			

<sup>1</sup>See glossary for abbreviations.

## II. THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY POLITICS

### A. Biodiversity Conservation: Global Political Discourse and Power

Biodiversity conservation, ozone depletion, global warming, and international waters are international ecological problems that have attracted the attention of various inter-linked global, national and local actors since the middle of the 1980s. Except for the conservation of biodiversity, scientists have brought all of the other global environmental problems to light predominantly. Unlike the other issues, the discourse on biodiversity is much more significantly shaped by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). This section examines how the issues within the biodiversity discourse are accumulated and framed in the existing channels of the environmental movement within which NGOs have played a significant role.

The term “biodiversity” is a relatively new word in the circles of modern scientific knowledge. In the 1970s, when the richness of species came to be called “natural diversity” for the first time by The Nature Conservancy, while others used terms such as “genetic resources” or “genetic diversity”, no one could have imagined that the newborn discussion would become a powerful discourse within the next two decades.<sup>7</sup> In 1980, the annual report of U.S. Council on Environmental Quality used a definition of biological diversity that included the concept of genetic diversity and species richness. Even though the definition, methods of observation, techniques, and procedures for investigation and research of biodiversity were under formation, the biodiversity concept attracted the U.S. State Department/Agency for International Development (US AID), which made it the focus of a “Strategy Conference on Biological Diversity”. Further, biodiversity became the explicit goal of legislation when the U.S. Congress issued the International Environmental Protection Act in 1983, which required federal agencies to help conserve the biological diversity in developing countries (Sanderson and Redford 1997: 117). The reason behind this was that the world’s tropical rainforests – the richest ecosystem in the world and the habitat of more than half of all species on earth; mostly located in developing countries – should be protected from ongoing massive depletion.

In 1980, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN),<sup>8</sup> World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)<sup>9</sup> and United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) published *World Conservation Strategy: living resource conservation for sustainable development* that marked the future direction of biodiversity conservation. In the *World Conservation Strategy*, the idea of sustainable use – making protected areas (e.g. national parks) relevant to local communities – was introduced for the first time and has major drive (Brandon 1997: 98). In 1987, the World Conference on Environment and Development (WCED) officially initiated the term sustainable development for a new development paradigm for the future. Soon, the idea of sustainable development began to strengthen the discourse for sustainable use of biodiversity resources previously developed in 1980.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s the biodiversity conservation discourse was further fostered by three important events. First, the National Forum on Biodiversity held in 1986 under the auspices of US National Academy of Sciences. This Forum produced a *Biodiversity*, which became a most influential textbook on that matter (Sanderson and Redford 1997; Horta 2000).

Second, the creation of a biodiversity network that aims to create a stable network for the movement of objects, resources, knowledge, and materials related to biodiversity. The network has been pivotal in accelerating global concern and galvanizes the interests of various global, national and local actors in relation to the loss of biodiversity. Further, it has also articulated a master narrative on biological crisis and launched it globally (Escobar 1998).

Third, in response to mounting conservation concerns and as a continuation of ideas initiated previously, the IUCN, UNEP, and WWF, in 1991, strongly endorsed the term sustainable development through *Caring for the Earth: a Strategy for Sustainable Living* that soon became the focus of many interested parties and subsequent bilateral and multilateral projects (Brandon 1997; Kramer and van Schaik 1997).<sup>10</sup> All of those events and actions have included the production of biodiversity knowledge, discourse and defined types of power - linking one to the other through concrete strategies and programs – which in turn, then, paved the road to the

“transnation state” meeting: in 1992; the Rio Summit that resulted in the Convention on Biological Diversity.

The attempts to link biodiversity with sustainable development have led to a noticeable expansion of the meaning of the phrase “biodiversity conservation”. In this context, the biodiversity discourse shifts away from the perspective of species protection toward sustainable use. The World Resource Institute, a leading international NGO, which emphasizes research funded almost entirely by corporate sponsorship and donations,<sup>11</sup> in their major international policy document of 1992, affirmed this shift as follows:

“Biodiversity conservation entails a shift from a defensive posture – protecting nature from the impact of development – to an offensive effort seeking to meet peoples’ needs from biological resources while ensuring the long term sustainability of Earth’s biotic wealth” (Kramer and van Schaik 1997: 4).

The appropriation of the biodiversity discourse for the purposes of sustainable use has shifted the ground rules governing biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity is no longer a matter of the natural preservation efforts that had characterized conservation circles, which had traditionally been the domain of natural scientists and conservation activists since the late nineteenth century. Rather, biodiversity has now become the object for sustainable use of natural resources upon which the livelihood of society depends.

Since the shift from the species perspective, a dynamic discourse on biodiversity conservation has been compiled -- the ideas formulated and produced, circulated and legitimized -- as the result of the interests of and the power relations between actors, i.e. international institutions, northern NGOs, funding institutions, botanical gardens, universities and research institutes, as well as private companies.

This all occurred in response to the vast depletion of biological diversity and the need to sustain and use natural resources for future development. Hence, biodiversity conservation is far from just being considered as a purely scientific discourse (Escobar 1998; Brandon 1997; Sanderson and Redford 1997). Rather, it has become part of a global political discourse within which markets, property regimes,

states, international institutions, as well as local communities, continuously struggle over biological resources within a given period of time and space (Adger et al 2001; Sanderson and Redford 1997; UNCED 1992).

The first paragraphs of the Convention on Biodiversity 1992 reflected clearly that conservation of biodiversity is a global political issue and that nations have sovereign rights over their biological resources (UNCED, 1992). Yet, biodiversity is not merely a contestation over meanings and narratives; it has become a struggle over access to and control of strategic relationship and resources. Biodiversity has become “a politicized environment”.

The assumptions of the global biodiversity conservation discourse were based on the premise that the solution for combating loss and for achieving sustainable use of the world’s biota should be defined at the global level. As a consequence, international actions coordinated by multilateral agencies, as well as relevant treaties, policy and regulatory frameworks, had to be established. Soon after the Rio Summit of 1992, biodiversity conservation became a powerful discourse. It governs and control ideas, thoughts and narratives around the globe, transforming them into institutional arrangements.

The Convention of Biodiversity has been eagerly adopted by countless governments and multilateral organizations and become one of their principal bases for action. Thousands of documents have been crafted, numerous international treaties have been signed, and plentiful strategies for global, regional, and national actions on conserving biodiversity have been published. Millions of dollars have also been rushed into biodiversity conservation. From 1990 through 2001, USAID provided a total of roughly \$270 million to NGOs, universities, and private institutions for conservation activities.<sup>12</sup> The Global Environmental Fund (GEF), established in 1991 by the World Bank was restructured and refinancing with US\$ 2 billion in 1994 (Young 2002).<sup>13</sup> Aside from that, the World Bank endorsed the development of internal National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs)<sup>14</sup> or National Biodiversity Action Plans by developing nations. Indonesia, for example, set up the Indonesian Biodiversity Action Plan (IBAP) in 1993, which was then revised in 2003, under grant

support from GEF and facilitated by the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS 2003).

The shift in the biodiversity discourse is not an independent one. It has been strongly influenced by the ecological modernization discourse that started to dominate environmental politics from about 1984 onwards. Ecological modernization starts from the conviction that ecological crisis can be overcome by technical and procedural innovation (Hajer 1996). In ecological modernization discourse environmental degradation is not impediment for growth; quite the contrary, it is the new impetus for economic growth since environmental pollution and degradation is framed as a matter of inefficiency. Soon, ecological modernization recognized as a promising policy alternative, and with the global endorsement of the Brundtland report *Our Common Future* and the general acceptance of Agenda 21 at the UN Conference of Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, the ecological modernization becomes dominant discourse in political debates on ecological affairs (Hajer 1996: 249). Up to the present, the domination of the concept of ecological modernization is quite strong. The recent global environmental initiatives promoted by the United Nations, in 2000, in The Millennium Project, whose tasks included setting up a task force for environmental sustainability, are fully a reflection of the tenets of ecological modernization.<sup>15</sup> To Hajer, the nature of ecological modernization is viewed as that of a technocratic project with a bias toward hierarchy and centralization. Ecological modernization has thus become a powerful structuring principle among multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank and state administrations, as well as a basis for industrial decision-making from the global down to local levels (Hajer 1996). Adger et al (2001), in *Advancing a Political Ecology of Global Environmental Discourse*, came to a similar conclusion: the global environmental discourse, of which the biodiversity discourse is part, is top-down, interventionist and techno-centric in nature, and any solution to the alleged global environmental problems must be devised with this in mind.

The situation and conditions discussed above give rise to twofold issues. First, since power can only be established, consolidated and applied (Foucault perspective of power) through the compilation, formulation, circulation, and production of a

functioning of discourse, we may consider the multilateral agencies, particularly the World Bank, the United Nations, USAID, as well as international environmental NGOs, as manifold global power actors that permeate, characterized and constitute “the social body” or global biodiversity conservation. Yet, as stated by Andrew Gorz – ecological issues have been, “taken up by the apparatuses of power”. This means that biodiversity conservation has also become a pretext and a means for the apparatuses of power to tighten the grip on the daily life of mankind and the social environment’ (Gorz 1993 *in* Hajer 1996: 254).

Second, international environmental NGOs have long been engaged in the biodiversity discourse. Most of them are from northern developed countries. WWF, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), and Conservation International (CI)<sup>16</sup>, as well as IUCN/World Conservation Union, and World Resource Institute (WRI) - to name a few – are big international environmental NGOs that have strongly shaped the discourse, knowledge, as well as the field of biodiversity conservation. Their discourses and power are inscribed in international treaties, policies and regulation frameworks, as well as materialized in the biodiversity landscape of the world; among the many ways in which environmental NGOs exert their political influence.

## **B. Global Politics over Access and Control of Biodiversity Resources**

The birth of the modern conservation movement began with the establishment of national parks in the United States. The first was the Yosemite park in 1864 and Yellowstone in 1872 (Kramer and van Schaik 1997; Colchester 2004). In the part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century both parks were managed under the Organic Act of 1916 that charged the National Park Service with the following goals: “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife herein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same by such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations” (Kramer and van Schaik 1997:5). This conservation narrative of setting aside undisturbed areas established a precedent of preserving habitats and ecosystems in their natural state by excluding resident people and allowing no exploitation of resources. In this model of conservation the protection of

physiographic regions, biotic communities, genetic resources and species in a natural state posed the highest priorities over other interests. As loss of species, particularly of large birds and mammals continued to increase tremendously, naturalists and conservationists viewed the parks as the “*Last Stand*” for biological diversity that has to be preserved.<sup>17</sup>

One of the commonly used management tools of the exclusionary mode is zoning or “zonation”. The park - based on biological and ecological scientific knowledge – is divided into zones in terms of their biological functions and management criteria, e.g. core zone, wilderness zone, activity/use zone, as well as tourist zone. The core zone is the heart of and the unique feature of the park dedicated entirely for biodiversity preservation. Therefore, this approach strictly prohibits any individual people or group of peoples from accessing, controlling and using the resources. Other zones allow limited access and use only for the purposes of research, tourism, and limited traditional resource extraction of locally occurring species.

Zoning, hence, reflects the philosophy and management parks by defining who can access, use and control the resources and by controlling the types of activities permitted to take places, as well as their locations and extent. Through this spatial arrangement, a park management can preserve pristine habitats with no exploitation of resources. However, newly declared national parks often create conflicts with local communities – who resided within or outside the park long before the nation-state was established – because the state ignores the traditional customary rights over natural resources, imposes limitations and exclusions on traditional users, and even moves them out entirely of the protected areas (Peluso 1993b, 1995; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Kramer and Schaik 1997; Colchester and Erni 1999; Lynch and Harwell 2002; Colchester 2004).

The power of state control over protected areas has become even stronger as a response to the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). The first paragraphs of the convention stipulate that “the conservation of biodiversity is a global political issue and that nations have sovereign rights over biological resources” (UNCED, 1992). The underlying assumption inscribed in the CBD is that the nation-state should control the present and future rights over the potential economic value of all the

biodiversity resources falling within nation-state's territorial boundaries. The implication of this assumption is that the nation-state should be able to control the present and future rights and behavior of all users of all resources located within the state's declared jurisdiction, "whatever the origin of the state's claim, whatever the nature of competition for those resources, and whatever the nature or origins of resistance to state's resources control" (Peluso 1993b; Sanderson and Redford 1997).

### **1. Indigenous People in Protected Areas**

Currently there are some 44,000 officially recognized protected areas worldwide, much of which is customarily owned or claimed by indigenous peoples (Colchester 2004). Colchester and Erni (1999) found that the "old protected area model" which ignores "the associated cultural resources" of the protected areas, has impinged on the rights of indigenous peoples inhabiting the areas to their land and livelihoods, often displacing them from their traditional homelands, and further leading to their impoverishment and "cultural collapse".<sup>18</sup> Rajaji National Park in Northwest India, for example, has adversely affected the forest peoples, while the Crocker Range National Park, Sabah, has had a dramatic impact on the Kadazandusun communities living near the Park. The USAID funded Royal Chitwan National Park, Nepal, has led to the indigenous minorities' loss of access to their sacred sites, traditional trade routes, and marketplaces (Colchester and Erni 1999). Further, Sangaji (2000a) reported that in Lore Lindu National Park, the park authority failed to resettle the *Katu* people who had resided deep in the forest long before the park was established to places outside of the area. Later the park authority acknowledged the traditional way of life of the *Katu* people living in the forest.

In Kenya, the alliance between the international conservation community and state agencies that established wildlife reserves and parks have excluded the Maasai, Kamba, Orma and pastoralists of other ethnic groups from access to resources to various degrees over the past century (Peluso 1993b). Furthermore, Peluso found the Kenyan government and its allying international environmental NGOs implement coercive conservation measures to enforce wildlife protection (elephants and rhinoceros). In the early 1990s, more than a hundred poachers were killed, many of

them with no chance for discussion or trial. The rangers are licensed to shoot-to-kill the poachers. The indigenous people with claims to resources and ivory poachers are treated in the same manner by the park rangers: with threats and violence (Peluso 1993b:209). Having once been independent nations within their own territories, indigenous peoples have been pushed out of their lands that have been expropriated by government agencies in the name of conservation (Colchester 2004). Hence, the history of indigenous peoples in relation to protected areas can be seen not only as the result of social exclusion and marginalization, but also violence.

The recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples and the need to accommodate these rights in protected areas, in fact, had been addressed in the 1975 Kinshasa Resolution – Protection of Traditional Ways of Life organized by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and World Park Congress (Colchester 2004). A similar position toward indigenous peoples was taken in 1982 at the World National Park Congress in Bali, which affirmed the rights of traditional communities to “social, economic, cultural and spiritual self determination” and “to participation in decisions affecting the land and natural resources on which they depend” (Ibid). During the Congress, the phrase “protected areas in developing countries will survive only insofar they address human concerns” reverberated and brought a sense of exuberance in relation to future park management. Appropriate to this vernacular and as an effort to create an effective international image, at the closing ceremony of the Bali World Park Congress, the Government of Indonesia declared the establishment of 10 new national parks, one of which was the Lore Lindu National Park.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, various initiatives and programs by conservation groups to work with communities began to flourish and develop in programs which were variously called “community-based natural resource management”, “community-based conservation”, “sustainable development and use”, “grassroots conservation”, “devolution of resource rights to local communities”, and “integrated conservation and development project” (ICDPs). All of these discourses, efforts and programs were generated by the conservation organizations (Chapin 2004:20).

In 1992, the role of indigenous peoples in protected areas again became a major discourse at the IUCN-sponsored World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas, held in Caracas. During this period of time, the same year as the 1992 Rio Summit was held, the IUCN and WWF began producing “a stream of declarations, statements of principles, and policy documents discussing the value of traditional knowledge, the need to respect indigenous traditions, and the importance of forging partnership” (Chapin 2004: 20). By 1993, when the United Nations proclaimed the International Year of the World's Indigenous People, the international political movement to protect the rights of indigenous people had clearly entered the mainstream (Myer 1998).

In 1994, the IUCN issued a new definition of protected area, much convinced that it represented a “new model” in conservation policy, which recognized the rights and roles of indigenous peoples in the decision-making processes involved in the zoning of protected areas and in the management of these areas.<sup>19</sup> In the next two years, by 1996, IUCN-WWF issued “Principles and Guidelines on Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas” that recognized the indigenous and traditional people as “rightful, equal partners in the development and implementation of conservation strategies that affect their lands, territories, water, coastal seas, and other resources, and in particular in the establishment and management of protected areas” (Chapin 2004: 20). In 1999, the World Commission on Protected Areas adopted the guidelines for putting these principles into practice. These guidelines put emphasis on co-management of protected areas, on agreements between indigenous peoples and conservation bodies, on indigenous participation and on recognition of indigenous people’s rights to sustainable use of their lands and territories (Beltran 2000 *in* Colchester 2004).

Even though for the last three decades numerous resolutions, principles and policies regarding the role of indigenous peoples in protected areas have been widely issued, however, exclusionary policies, violence and abuse of human rights of the indigenous peoples continue at present. The most recent evidence is the exclusion of local peoples living in territories the biggest three NGOs – WWF, CI, and TNC – have been trying to protect (Chapin 2004). The Ford Foundation, which, in 2003,

initiated two studies – one to assess what was really happening between the indigenous communities and conservationists, and the other to look into the financial situation of each of these three big NGOs<sup>20</sup> - collected a great deal of information, data and evidence. Unfortunately those studies were never made public as the president of the IUCN and president of WWF recommended that the studies should be embargoed, and should not even be officially turned in to the Ford Foundation (Chapin 2004:28).<sup>21</sup>

Uneasy with the conditions that had precipitated the two Ford Foundation investigations, Chapin, as an anthropologist working many long years with indigenous people, wrote in *A Challenge to Conservationists*, unearthing indications that the three big NGOs did not seem to be fully committed, or that they had only half-heartedly implemented alliances between conservationists and indigenous peoples, and had not worked closely or concertedly enough with local communities. There appeared to be two reasons for this. First, the biggest conservation NGOs seemed to have changed their priorities in determining their conservation agendas, with a new focus on large-scale conservation strategies and the importance of science rather than social realities. Starting in the mid- to late 1990s, WWF, CI, and TNC all reformulated their mission statements to the “large-scale conservation approach”. CI used the term “hotspots” for marketing the large-scale conservation projects, while WWF used “ecoregions” and “Global 200”, whereas TNC used the term “ecosystem” (Chapin 2004).

Under the umbrella of “large-scale conservation projects”, the biggest three NGOs successfully gained strong financial support from various foundations, individual members and funding agencies, as well as private companies. For example, the Gordon & Betty Moore Foundation donated \$261.2 million to CI for conservation activities with a focus on science, in “hotspots and tropical wilderness areas” around the world (Ibid). Another example is USAID, which from 1990 through 2001 provided a total of roughly \$270 million to NGOs, universities, and private institutions for conservation activities.<sup>22</sup> The biggest portion of this amount destined for NGOs was harvested by WWF, which received approximately 45 percent of the available money. Another small portion of the total budget for conservation went to five other NGOs –CI, TNC, World Conservation Strategy (WCS), and the African

Wildlife Foundation (AWF), and Enterprise Works- through the Agency's Global Conservation Program (Chapin 2004: 24).

Second, the majority of the biodiversity conservation efforts are in fact large and complicated social programs, while most of the conservation NGOs lack experience in working with community and grassroots organizations. The mounting problems arising out of socio-economic conditions that must be solved both within and outside of the protected areas have become worrisome to the conservation NGOs as these matters could draw them into rural development concerns that would distract them from the focus of their biodiversity conservation mission. At the same time an undercurrent of talk has arisen among the conservation NGOs about "how "difficult" indigenous peoples can be, how hard they are to work with, and, in places such as Ecuador, Bolivia, and the Chiapas region of Mexico, how some have moved in the direction of civil disruption and even violence" (Ibid).

Aside from all of this, the conservationists have also found in numerous locations that the indigenous peoples do not make – contrary to what many of them have been advertising – suitable allies as their populations increased and they gained easier access to technology and markets. Even where indigenous peoples have been given custody over their traditional lands, not all of them are treating their forests in a sustainable manner. One example of this is the behavior of the Kayapo Indians of eastern Amazon that were estimated to have earned \$33 million from felling mahogany in their indigenous reserve in 1988. Another is the Mayans, whose slashing and burning of the forests in Petén in Guatemala has often figured as examples of the destructive tendencies of indigenous peoples (van Schaik et al 1997; MacKinnon 1997; Chapin 2004).

Hence, it is not surprising that conservationists, such as Katrina Brandon, depict the efforts that link the livelihood of indigenous peoples and biodiversity conservation as "no longer" a conservation project (Brandon 1997: 107). Or, as the director of the WWF Latin America program stated to Chapin in reference to Amazon Basin: "We don't work with indigenous people. We don't have the capacity to work with indigenous people". Or the response of a CI biologist who works in the region of

Brazil: “Quite frankly, I don’t care what the Indians want. We have to work to conserve biodiversity” (Chapin 2004: 21).

The relations between indigenous peoples and conservationists became more complicated when the multinational corporations, which are directly involved in pillaging and destroying forested areas owned by indigenous peoples, began to enter into collaboration with or started providing funding to conservation NGOs as mentioned in the previous section. Chapin comments on this situation as follows.

“Conservationist agendas often begin with the need to establish protected areas that are off limits to people, and to develop management plans. If they include indigenous peoples in their plans, they tend to see those people more as a possible means to an end rather than as ends in themselves. They are seldom willing to support legal battles over land tenure and the strengthening of indigenous organizations, for they consider these actions ‘too political’ and outside their conservationist mandate. Also notable has been the reluctance of the large NGOs to support indigenous peoples in their struggles against oil, mining, and logging companies that are destroying vast swaths of rainforest throughout the world. Again, the excuse is that such interventions would be ‘too political’, and the conservationists often defer to national governments to handle those matters.” (Chapin 2004: 21-22).

## **2. Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDP)**

The notion of making protected areas relevant to local communities has been addressed since 1980 by IUCN, UNEP and WWF in the *World Conservation Strategy* (see previous sub-chapter). Under this idea, and as an attempt to address some of the shortcomings and problems associated with the “fines and fences” approach to conservation in protected areas, in 1985, WWF introduced the Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDP). At that time, WWF incorporated a portfolio of approximately twenty ICDP projects under the “Wildlands and Human Needs Program”. By 1994, the WWF was supporting more than fifty ICDPs. Roughly fifteen of these projects were continuations of the first-generation ICDPs developed in the mid-1980s. The remainder of the projects dated from 1990 or later. Today there are estimated to be over three hundred ICDPs worldwide. These projects absorb a major proportion of international conservation funding (Hughes & Flintan 2001: 4).

In the beginning, the ICDPs were viewed as biodiversity conservation projects with rural development components (first generation ICDP). Gradually, this shifted to “an approach that aims to meet social development priorities and conservation goals” that seems indistinguishable from broader sustainable (rural) development approaches except that the spaces the ICDPs encompass are located near protected areas (Hughes and Flintan 2001). The second generation of ICDPs is as varied as its components are numerous. They exist under a variety of names, such as “People-Centered Conservation and Development” and “Eco-development”.<sup>23</sup> This second generation of ICDPs tends to move away from ICDP projects based on inflexible and rigid management plans, towards approaches that place more emphasis on “learning while doing” and “adaptive management” (Ibid).

Despite the diversity of terminology and variation in the scope of activities encompassed by the ICDPs, they have a number of common features (Asian Development Bank 1997; Brandon 1997; MacKinnon 1997; Hughes and Flintan 2001: 5)

- Biodiversity conservation is the primary goal, whereas improved relationships between state-managed protected areas and their village’s neighbors are the core objective. Hence, enhancing park management and creating buffer zones around protected areas have become pivotal points.
- A need to address the social and economic requirements of communities who might otherwise threaten biodiversity, and the natural resource base in general if there is no compensation or substitution provided for local people for lost access to resources;
- ICDPs do not necessarily seek to devolve control or ownership of protected area resources to local communities nor to address this issue on the periphery of the parks;
- ICDPs usually receive funding from external sources, i.e. from bilateral or multilateral donors, and international conservation organizations. Without some form of external financial assistance government wildlife (or other conservation-related) department budgets can rarely afford to implement these projects;

- The majority of ICDPs is externally motivated and is initiated by conservation organizations and/or development agencies (even if implemented by governmental bodies).

The common features of ICDPs mentioned above are based on two underlying assumptions (Brandon 1997; Hughes and Flintan 2001: 5). The first assumption is that the diversified local livelihood options introduced or implemented through such projects will reduce human pressure on biodiversity, leading to its improved conservation. Second, local people and their livelihood practices, rather than being “external factors”, comprise the most important threat in relation to the degradation of biodiversity.

After nearly two decades of promotion, the ICDPs in many countries have failed to lead to improved conservation or resource use in either parks or adjacent areas. For example, out of thirty-six case studies only five examples were found in which the projects had contributed, demonstrably, to biodiversity conservation (Kremen et al 1994 in Hughes and Flintan 2001). Likewise, a review of the performance of ICDPs in Indonesia concluded as follows,

“...very few ICDPs in Indonesia can realistically claim that biodiversity conservation has been or is likely to be significantly enhanced as a result of current or planned activities ...” (Wells et al 1998 *in* Hughes and Flintan 2001).

In Indonesia, the national protected areas network is supported by donor funds allocated through various ICDP programs. Indonesia’s ICDP network has been supplemented by US\$ 130 million in international donor funds. Bilateral support of US\$ 20 million has also been made available to the Biodiversity Conservation Network (BCN) for twenty ICDPs, several of which are being implemented in Indonesia (Hughes and Flintan 2001: 5).

The larger scale ICDPs in Indonesia have been implemented in the Kerinci-Seblat National Park (KSNP) in Sumatra and the Lore Lindu National Park (LLNP) in Central Sulawesi. The KSNP ICDP started in 1991, funded partly through a grant from GEF and partly through a World Bank loan. In the LLNP the ICDP project started at 1997 under the Central Sulawesi Integrated Area Development and

Conservation Project (CSIADCP), funded partly by the Asian Development Bank loan and partly through grants from USAID and TNC (Chapter III particularly sub-Chapter F depicts further information regarding the CSIADCP). Other protected areas that implemented community empowerment and conservation on a smaller scale are the Dumoga-Bone National Park in Northern Sulawesi, funded by the World Bank; the USAID-funded Bunaken Marine Park Project in Northern Sulawesi; and the ADB-funded Biodiversity Conservation Project in Flores and Siberut (ADB 1997).

### III. THE STATE

#### A. Indonesia in Multi-Dimensional Transition

##### 1. A Democratic Transition Underway

Indonesia has been struggling for decades to develop democracy. Dhakidae (2001:67) noted that “Indonesia already failed three times to deal with democracy”. First, the parliamentary democracy developed in 1950-1957. Second, the “Guided Democracy” under Sukarno, 1959-1965. Third, the “Pancasila Democracy” developed under Suharto, 1967-1997. When an old regime was replaced by a new regime a political transition always emerged. The ongoing political transition in Indonesia is far more challenging than that occurring in 1965-1967, when the administration under President Sukarno was replaced by the Suharto government. President Sukarno’s resignation in 1967 was brought about by political disintegration. In contrast, the resignation of President Suharto was caused by economic collapse, which was deeply rooted in politics.

Under the Suharto regime, development programs, which focused on economic growth and political stability, were used as the foundation for all of the New Order policies. This approach resulted in pseudo security and political stability, as well as vanishing economic growth. What the end result would be became increasingly apparent as a repressive centralized political system, top-down policies, a lack of political freedom, as well as an absence of institutional checks and balances, and runaway rent seeking, crony capitalism, nepotism and blatant corruption, emerged and expanded over the period of the three long decades of the New Order. Consequently, Indonesia faced problems of inequality between individuals and between groups in the society, as well as between the provinces and regions. Dhakidae depicts this situation as follows:

“One of the easiest ways of looking at the New Order is to conceive it as the alliance of bureaucrats, the middle class, or the bourgeoisie in general, and the military of all ranks, especially its hundreds of generals. All are united in doing business of some sort. It comes to such a degree that only two hundred conglomerates are responsible

for 58 percent of the GDP. Since 24 percent of GDP goes to the tens of state companies, then the people are responsible for only 8 percent of the GDP” (Dhakidae 2001:70-71).

When the economic crisis hit Asian countries in mid-1997, Indonesia faced a severe financial crisis. The exchange rate of the rupiah against the US dollar declined from Rp. 2,400 in July 1997 to an average of Rp. 8,300 in the period of September 1997 through September 1999 and reached its lowest point in January and July 1998, Rp. 16,000–17,000 to the dollar (Sunderlin et al 2000:1-2). During 1967-1997, Indonesia had experienced average annual economic growth of 6.5 percent; in contrast to 1998 when the economy contracted 13.6 percent (Sunderlin 2002:246). The economic crisis not only substantially increased the number of people living below the poverty line, but also increased the extent of extreme poverty<sup>24</sup>, as well as increasing unemployment, triggering rampant inflation and causing the loss of consumer purchasing power, all of which led to grave social instability.<sup>25</sup> World Bank (1998 *in* Sunderlin 2002:246) described this severe situation as “No country in recent history, let alone one the size of Indonesia, has ever suffered such a dramatic reversal of fortune”.

As a result, dissatisfaction among the public became unavoidable, and this eventually led to social unrest, demands for stronger regional autonomy and even demands for complete independence from Indonesia. The people, youths, students, and scholars all demand total political, economic and legal reform, with this pressure forcing the collapse of the 32-year rule of Suharto as president of the country in May 1998. Assessments conducted by many scholars came to the conclusion that a high degree of corruption during Suharto’s administration was, in fact, the prime factor why the crisis was so severe in Indonesia (Sunderlin 2002:247).

Two years following 1997, many South-East Asian countries had begun recovering from economic crisis. Unfortunately, conversely, Indonesia remained enmeshed in crisis. The conventional economic measures taken did not work effectively enough to force Indonesia out of its economic and monetary crises. Tornquist (2001) and Dhakidae (2001) concluded that the basic problem was political rather than economic. Only through fundamental political change would the economic

crisis in Indonesia be resolved, because any monetary crisis is just a symptom of overall economic, political and social disease. Hence, the transformation and change from a political regime, particularly the transformation from a non-democratic regime to a democratic regime, became inevitable.

Shortly after Suharto stepped down in May 1998, several structural factors that had blocked the path toward constructing a consolidated democratic regime<sup>26</sup> began to dissipate. A number of significant measures to remove these structural factors had been taken under the administration of President Habibie (1998-1999). Among others was the lifting of the decades-long restrictions on press freedom and on the right of Indonesians to form political parties. A general election was conducted, the first since 1955, and the most democratic in decades, while Law 22/1999 was promulgated, with the result of substantially decentralizing authority, and shifting power to local administrations. Then, under President Abdurrahman Wahid and Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri (1999-2001), and President Megawati Sukarnoputri and Vice-President Hamzah Haz (2001-2004), several structural changes favoring democratization were also introduced; i.e. changes in the design of the electoral system, changes in the system for the election of President and Vice President, and shifts in the relations between the central government and regional administrations in accordance with decentralization.

Even though several political steps to consolidated democracy were taking place in the post-Suharto era, the democratic transition has been challenged by several major obstacles (BAPPENAS 2003, Tornquist 2001). First, the weak legal system and poor law enforcement; second, the weakness of the state bureaucracy and institutional arrangements; third, the fragile democratic culture and weak civil society caused by a lack of organized institutions and established rules of the game, and, four, the deep roots of corruption, nepotism and collusion.

## **2. Big Bang Decentralization**

Perhaps no other laws ever introduced in the Republic of Indonesia imposed so many fundamental changes and effects as the two decentralization laws set forth in May 1999. Law No 22/1999 on Regional Governance replaced both Law 5/1974 on

the Basics of Governance for the Regions and Law 5/1979 on Village Governance, and Law No. 25/1999, which replaced Law 32/1956 on the Fiscal Balance between the State and the Regions.<sup>27</sup>

Law No. 22/1999 even went so far as to completely reverse Law No. 5/1979 to make village governments uniform throughout Indonesia and enabling each province to develop its own model of village administration, bringing back old village institutions and leadership, and resolving local problems in accordance with local custom. The law also gave Aceh and Irian Jaya (Papua) Special Autonomous Region status. Under Law No. 22/1999, the local administrations are much more independent in holding elections in which the local populaces can truly elect their own leaders, in promoting their own interests, developing their own institutions, initiating their own policies, managing their own financial resources, and in mobilizing support from their own communities (Rasyid, 2002).

Both laws devolve economic and political power from central government to the 33 provinces and more than 400 regencies (*kabupaten*). Hofman and Kaiser (2002) described Indonesia's decentralization policy as a "*Big Bang*", as it is rapidly shifting the country from one of the most centralized systems in the world to one of the most decentralized in a short time. Within one year, after January 1, 2001, the Big Bang had decentralized a lot of responsibilities for public services to the local level, reassigned two-thirds of the central civil service to the regions, handed over more than 16,000 service facilities to the regions, and put into place a completely new intergovernmental fiscal system (World Bank 2003:i). Eighteen months after decentralization, the program had started up much better than expected as there were no major disruptions of service, and civil servants were paid normally, with little of the feared unrest substantiated among transferred civil servants (World Bank 2003:5; Hofman and Kaiser 2002:6).

Although Law No. 22/1999 did pave the way for an extensive devolution of powers and functions to local governments, notable exceptions were in the areas of security and defense, foreign policy, financial and fiscal matters, justice and religious affairs (Article 7.1). The central government also retained "other authority" with respect to national planning and development policies, allocation of financial

subsidies to the regions, strengthening the national systems of economic institutions and public administration, promoting human resource development, controlling the exploitation of natural resources, conservation, and the management of high technology and national standardization (Article 7.2). The power of districts and municipalities, therefore, covers all sectors of administrative authority, including public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, transportation, industry and trade, investment, environment, land affairs, cooperatives, and manpower.

Another important feature of Law No. 22/1999 pertains to the field of politics. Under Law No. 22/1999 the local legislature has full authority in electing governors, mayors and regents. This is quite different from the previous Law No. 5/1974 in which the provincial and local legislatures could only endorse candidates. It had previously been the central government, which decided both who was going to be elected (normally three of five candidates endorsed by the provincial and local legislatures), and who among those three would be inaugurated eventually. The central government's decision, therefore, was not affected by the votes received by candidates in the provincial or local legislature. The central government had discretionary power to apply its own conditions to justify any of its decisions, because under the previous system, the governor, the regent, and the mayor functioned both as representatives of the central government and the heads of regions and/or localities.

Two years into decentralization, after hasty preparation, some critical issues and weaknesses arose as follows. First, the process of decentralization was half-heartedly implemented (World Bank 2003; Hofman and Kaiser 2002; Rasyid 2002; Suwondo 2002). The failure of earlier attempts to decentralize,<sup>28</sup> the call for democracy, the need to disregard the centralistic approach of the New Order, clamor for independence in several regions, particularly Aceh and East Timor, and extraordinary political turbulence in 1998, were factors that inevitably led President Habibie to actively seek the support of the regions and to hastily commence regional autonomy. Thus, the "big bang" decentralization, in fact, was much more driven by political pressure rather than as a result of long-term, rational and gradual development choices. Therefore, not surprisingly, some ministers were reluctant to share and decentralize their authority, and were slow to move in preparing regulations

and technical guidelines. This made the central government look unsupportive, inconsistent, and halfhearted in implementing its own policy of decentralization.

Second, there was no clarity as to what, exactly, had been decentralized with respect to the assignment of functions of local government (World Bank 2003; Hofman and Kaiser 2002; Suwondo 2002). Except for the five functions retained by the central government, the assignment of functions stated in Law No. 22/1999 was considered vague and confusing, with some overlapping evident. In particular, Article 7 paragraph 2, which stated that the central government “holds other authority”, received the most criticism. It could, indeed, be used as an argument to keep some strategic powers at the central level, particularly the powers related to natural resource exploitation, e.g.; forests, estates and fisheries. Another controversial clause was in Article 11, which only specified the obligatory sectors of local government without specifying what the functions of local government in those sectors would be. This clause gave many local governments the impression that they were responsible for all tasks in those sectors, from legislation to planning, to implementation (World Bank 2003:10). Thus, the assignment of functions stated in the Regional Governance Law did not guarantee significant devolution of authority to the regions.

Third, was the weak legal and regulatory framework of decentralization. A little over one year into decentralization, its legal and regulatory framework exhibited weaknesses, such as the unclear functions of local government, an incomplete regulatory framework, the lack of adjustment of sectoral laws in relation to regional autonomy, and the unclear standards for service delivery. Many local governments are largely ignoring the provinces, which were supposed to have an important coordinating and supervisory role. Some central ministries retrieve their authorities that according to the law are the responsibility of the regions (World Bank 2003:5).

Fourth, the marginal role and function of provincial government. Law No. 22 assigned the most responsibility to the local government level and explicitly stated that there was no hierarchical relationship between the provincial and the local administrations. The provincial governments became residual service providers, responsible only for cross-district matters and whatever services were de-concentrated by the center or uploaded by the districts. This role as residual service provider made

it difficult for the provinces to facilitate cooperation among local administrations for the joint implementation of functions and facilities. It also made it difficult for the provincial administrations to effectively establish their authority in relation to cross-regional functions, in particular with regards to the cross-border type of natural resources.

Fifth, the lack of qualified human resources in regional and local government. The decentralization policy was only tenuously supported by qualified human resources and a professional attitude on the part of individual government officials or members of the local legislatures. Moreover, many newly empowered and autonomous units of government with limited technical capacity tend to aggravate the existing natural resource degradation because local governments use natural resources in their areas solely as sources of regional government revenues.

Under decentralization, the management of natural resource utilization and conservation has changed fundamentally. Law No. 22 explicitly allocated responsibility for natural resource utilization, conservation and environment across all levels of government. However, under this law, the district became the default level to which regional authority was assigned. While the authority for natural resource utilization was assigned to the center (Article 7.2), the “regions” (apparently both districts and provinces) were also authorized to manage the natural resources located in their area (Article 10.1). Similarly, conservation was reserved for the center (Article 7.2), however “environmental conservation” was designated a mandatory function of the districts (Article 10.1 and 10.2), and the maintenance of environmental conservation was assigned to the “regions” (presumably both district and province) (Article 10.1). Another important feature of Law No. 22 that affected natural resource utilization, conservation and environment was the “marginalization” role of the provincial government in managing the cross-border type of natural resources.

Under this new regional governance for natural resources and the environment, two critical issues arose. First, the larger scale and wide ranging areas of natural resource management, such as watershed management, marine and coastal management, forest management and the management of other cross-border resources, were likely to be underprovided so that managerial performance was

minimal. The problem was centered in the weak authority of the provincial governments in relation to facilitating cooperation among local administrations in connection with joint functions and facilities, and in establishing its authority in cross-regional functions (World Bank 2003:18; Hofman and Kaiser 2002:9).

Second, a multitude of conflicts over access and control of natural resources arose between regions, between local and provincial governments, and between the regions and the center, due to the high interest of each region in increasing Regional Revenue (*Pendapatan Asli Daerah*) in the midst of the weak legal and regulatory framework of decentralization. Suwondo (2002) argues that, under decentralization, conflicts over natural resources spread even more widely i.e. among villages, between villages and districts, or between villages and the provincial and/or central governments. Thus, the devolution in natural resource management had in fact created new vertical and horizontal conflicts, instead of resolving existing conflicts. Decentralization had not been able to improve efficiency in resource management; instead, it had increased economic costs due to increasing transactional costs in the form of various new charges and retributions (Forestry Department, Bogor Agricultural University 2002).

Another factor that strongly affected environmental change was the weak legal institutions that have never been strong in post-independence Indonesia. In the case of the massive forest fires of 1997/1998, for example, it was identified that permits – issued with the intention to foster, control, and direct activities in particular fields, including activities that potentially cause fires – have not functioned as a means to evaluate compliance to existing regulations (State Ministry for Environment and United Nations Development Program 1998:88). Achieving sustainable forest management, hence, is difficult because of the poor legal system and instruments. Further, law enforcement institutions often lack an understanding of legal matters related to forests, as reflected, for instance, in the illegal trade of flora and fauna. In addition, limited funding and inadequate human resources to support the enforcement of the law have aggravated this situation (BAPPENAS, 2003). The World Bank (2001:92) describes this situation of legal paralysis as follows:

“Legal rights are repeatedly abrogated and courts have seldom been decisive. Informal exchanges of favors among government officials, business persons and local communities often have greater force than law in a particular matter. What happens to the environment will probably be determined mainly by businesspersons, administrators, police and community representatives acting informally, rather than by lawyers arguing in court”.

All of the above mentioned factors show that the major source of environmental degradation or change in Indonesia is in the political condition and nature of the state. With Indonesia having entered onto a multi-dimensional path of transition, involving political shifts from the autocratic to democratic; economic shifts from a patron-client and crony capitalist economic system to a rules-based market economy, as well as shifts in governmental structures from a centralized to a decentralized system; significant environmental changes have also occurred. This transition is still ongoing and seems to have veered onto along a long, rough and winding road, with no one certain just how long it will take to reach “a new sociopolitical equilibrium” (Tornquist 2001:64; Tadjoeuddin 2002:12). Even though several important steps and measures were already taken during transition, nobody is sure whether Indonesia can pass through this multi-dimensional transition with its myriad problems smoothly and successfully. Any scholar interested in observing the natural resource or environmental changes in Indonesia should consider this critical transition in his or her studies. The preceding analysis also shows that the vast environmental change in Indonesia is the result of the power relations of actors, past and present; within these relations, the state – as a powerful actor – and the business sector imprint their significant role. The next chapter examines the state’s politics with regard to access and control over land and biodiversity resources.

## **B. Control and Power over Land in Indonesia**

Throughout the history of the Indonesian republic land policy and law have been an extremely sensitive issue as control and power over land has been a political as well as an economic issue. As has been stated by Wiradi (2004a), “the problem of agriculture, throughout the ages, has, at the core, been a problem of politics – whoever

controls agricultural resources, controls the marrow of individual life, society, and even the life of the people as a whole”. The Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) promulgated in 1960 reflected nationalist sentiment, as well as the cultural significance and social security functions of land (Lucas and Warren 2000). The BAL tried to resolve two different concepts of land administration, i.e. *adat* law (traditional or customary law) and Western law in order to ensure greater justice for the small farmer and the landless in regards to access to land. However, agrarian scholars found at least three weaknesses in the BAL as follows.

First, the abolition of “domain statement” and introduction of “Tanah Negara (state land)”. The BAL invalidated the 1870 *Agrarisch Wet* (Agrarian Act), and all of the regulations establishing state land rights usually referred to as the *Domeinverklaring* (“domain statement”).<sup>29</sup> *Domeinverklaring* stated that all land for which no evidence of private ownership under Dutch civil law could be given, was considered to be owned by the state (“state domain”). In its stead, the BAL amplified the Constitution by putting land under the control of the state. The 1945 Constitution, Article 33(3), stated that land, water and airspace including the natural resources therein, under the “control” of the state, to be used for the people’s prosperity. The phrase of Article 2(1) is similar to the stipulation of the Constitution: “land, water and airspace, including the natural resources contained therein, are at the highest level controlled by the state in its capacity as all of the people’s organization of powers”.

The term “control” implies no domain or ownership. However, under the term “control” the BAL provides the Government power to define and regulate all tenurial relations between persons and agrarian resources, and between people and other people or the state with regards to agrarian resources. Furthermore, by using “control” and not “ownership” to describe the state power, the state viewed that the nature of state relations with the people in regard to land were less invasive and dominant than under the Dutch. However, this is not the case. Wallace et al. (2000:3-6) revealed that “state control offers a far larger sphere for government action and influence than the ownership or domain in countries which recognize extensive private ownership rights and define, with precision, opportunities for the state to interfere”. The state, resting upon the legal power of the BAL, controls a gigantic

area of state land (*tanah negara*) and could determine everything concerning land and natural resources contained within, regardless of whether it is customary land/forest, or under the right of use of a group of people. Hence, it can be concluded that the “domain statement” has been adopted and evolved into the Indonesian concept of “land control by the state”, although on ideological grounds it is held to be fundamentally different.

Second, a further implication of “land control by the state” is that the *adat* law becomes subjugated to the national interests of the state. The BAL states that the Indonesian land law is *adat* law, if it is not in conflict with the spirit and the provisions of the BAL and other laws (Article 5). Further, the BAL also explicitly recognizes the *adat* community’s right of disposal (*hak ulayat*), but stipulates that the right must be adjusted to conform to the national interests of the state based on national unity (Article 3). As a consequence of those two articles of the BAL, an *adat* community may not prevent the government from granting the right to use the land for development plans. In other words, the *adat* community may continue to exercise its right of disposal so long as the government does not dispose of the land itself. Once the government plans to dispose of the land, for example, to undertake extensive forest exploitation in order to boost economic growth, increase food production and encourage transmigration, then the *adat* right of disposal must yield to the national interests of the state. Hence, the BAL not only not recognized the *adat* community’s land, it overrode the pre-existing traditional tenurial arrangement based on *adat* law which then, further, paved the way for the modification and abolition of the *adat* rights.

Third, the Indonesian land tenures are complex, use-related and not at all secure. The Indonesian tenures are insecure due to the extensive and pervasive ways in which the state is able to control and intervene in land tenures so that these tenures become continually liable to forfeiture to the state, often without just compensation (Wright 1999). This insecurity is deeply rooted in two major aspects; i.e. legal uncertainty in the law land system introduced by the BAL, and failure to enact implementing regulations of the BAL. Wright (1999: 12) reported, “the legal uncertainty has been taking place for more than four decades despite the fact that this

uncertainty, which was brought by the BAL, could have been addressed or at least substantially reduced if governments had taken the opportunity to enact implementing regulations for the BAL”.

One of the main criticisms addressed to the BAL is that for more than 40 years the government has failed to establish the implementing regulations for the BAL. The underlying problems are not technical matters. Tjondronegoro (1991) reveals that the political and economic reasons and interests of the rulers have been constraints in the implementation of the BAL. Furthermore, Tjondronegoro reported that with the land reform pending, land disputes that began to appear after the mid-1970s escalated to unprecedented levels in the 1990s. Aside from land disputes or multiple claims to the same land, two other closely related issues have also emerged, those being environmental degradation and social justice in the use of land.

Most the land disputes occur between local people and private companies or the administrators of central/local government projects in the cases of the development of hydroelectric dams, estate crops, timber plantations, industrial estates, urban infrastructure, residential estates, resort complexes and golf courses. The Consortium for Agrarian Reform (*Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria*, KPA), an umbrella NGO dedicated to the movement and agrarian reform, reported that by 2001, 813 land dispute cases had been recorded, spread out over 1,460 villages and 1.9 million hectares of land. The KPA also recorded the involvement of security personnel in several land dispute cases. Lucas and Warren (2000) reported that land disputes had covered the largest number of cases dealt with by the National Human Rights Commission (*KOMNASHAM*) and Administrative Courts by the 1990s. Approximately 30 percent of the complaints submitted were unresolved and carried over to the following year’s caseload.

In fact, the inability to handle the growing demand for land titles, land use, and land management in particular, in relation to resolving land disputes had been felt by the government since the end of 1970s (Tjondronegoro 1991), however, no major fundamental actions or breakthroughs have been made to overcome the ever increasing number of land problems. Indonesia now faces 40 years of backlog in problem solving in land affairs.

## C. The Politics over Access and Control of Protected Areas

### 1. The Politics of Preservation

#### *The Dutch Colonial – Post Independence Era*

The history of the preservation of nature in Indonesia began in the 1880s under the Dutch colonial regime. At the beginning, the initiative for preservation was taken predominantly into the hands of Dutch NGOs and individual members of the elite rather than the *Dienst van het Boschwezen* (Colonial Forestry Service) (Departemen Kehutanan 1986a; Peluso 1992). For example, in 1889, the Director of the Bogor Botanical Garden, Melchior Treub, appointed the *Cibodas* forest in West Java as a nature reserve to be managed as part of the Botanical Garden. Another significant contribution came from an NGO, the Dutch Organization for Nature Protection (*Nederlandsch Indische Vereeniging tot Natuurbescherming*), founded in 1912 at Bogor. In 1913, that organization proposed to the Colonial Forestry Service that it be allowed to manage 12 forested areas in Java, such as *Ujung Kulon* (Banten), Krakatau Island (Banten) and *Alas Purwo* (East Java), under the nature reserves type of management. The Colonial Forestry Service was reluctant to devolve power to the organization and responded by issuing the 1916 *Staatsblad* No. 278 concerning the enactment of nature reserves. This *Staatsblad* 278/1916 mentioned that all nature reserves were under the control and management of the Dutch colonial regime.<sup>30</sup> Later, in 1919, the governor-general of the Dutch East Indies appointed 55 state forestlands as nature reserves, including those proposed by the Dutch NGO (Ibid).

Perhaps, the best known preservation regulations issued under the Dutch colonial regime were those in the 1941 Ordinance for Nature Protection (*Natuurbeschermings Ordonnantie* 1941) that invalidated the 1932 Ordinance for Nature Reserve and Wildlife Sanctuary (*Natuurmonumenten en Wildreservaten Ordonnantie* 1932). Under the Article 2(3) of the 1941 Ordinance, the rights of indigenous people are recognized and had to be taken into account when establishing nature reserves, as follows (Danusaputro 1985:57).

*“... Designation as a nature reserve can be done in relation to areas that are held in the name of a third party, but only upon the agreement of those concerned ...”*

Further, Article 13(3) stated that (Ibid):

*“As long as this ordinance is in effect, in relation to the third party(ies) who have exerted their rights within the existing Nature Reserve, there shall be no changes, except with the agreement of those concerned.”*

In 1925, the Dutch established the *Nederlandsche Commissie voor Internationale Natuurbescherming* (Dutch Committee for International Protection of Nature). This Committee, despite its international scope of work, placed high interest in the East Indies. Instead of just urging the Dutch colonial administration to improve the management of nature reserves, the organization also recommended the establishment of large-scale nature reserves in outer Java (Departemen Kehutanan 1986a). Shortly before the Second World War, the Dutch established numerous nature reserves in Sumatra, Kalimantan and West Nusa Tenggara. At present, most of those reserves have been transformed into national parks (Ibid).<sup>31</sup>

Two important features are worth noting here regarding the preservation efforts under the Dutch. First, under the Dutch colonial regime, the initiatives for preserving pristine nature flourished after the Dutch secured access and control over forest areas through the *domeinverklaring*. Second, all protected areas established under the Dutch were managed under a nature preservation narrative, either in the form of a nature reserve or a wildlife sanctuary. Although the Dutch colonial administration ended in 1949, the preservation narrative has remained in the minds of Indonesian foresters, university lecturers and policy makers until the present time. In Section C.2 there is a more detailed discussion of this matter.

After independence, all nature reserves established by the Dutch were managed by the Indonesian government. During two decades, through the 1950s to end of 1960s, preservation efforts were very minor and not well documented. Three political events possibly burdened what efforts there were; e.g. the political and governmental transformation from the Dutch colonial regime to the Indonesian

leadership; political unrest and demands for the devolution of power from central to provincial governments, and the political upheaval that followed Soekarno's decline. However, in 1954, the government did begin to develop cooperation with the IUCN for improving the management of protected areas. A decade later, in 1964, IUCN and WWF initiated a conservation project for rhinoceros at the *Ujung Kulon* wildlife sanctuary (Departemen Kehutanan 1986b).

### ***The New Order Era***

The politics of protected areas, which occurred throughout the period of 1967 to 1997, were basically determined, or at least cannot be considered separately from, the political policies in relation to forestry, which were set out by the New Order regime. When Suharto became the president of Indonesia for the first time in 1967, three regulations were immediately issued that were the keys to opening up the nation to foreign investment and linking Indonesia's economy to global capitalism; these were Basic Forestry Law No. 5/1967 (BFL), the Oil and Gas Law, and the Foreign Investment Law. These laws defined the natural resources in Indonesia as economic resources designated to fulfill two political needs simultaneously: to trigger the development of the economy, and to get political support from the international community, in particular, the West. Then as time passed, especially from the middle of the 1980s up to 1997, Suharto began to use the forests as infrastructure to facilitate the strengthening of his political support and the prosperity of his family (Forest Watch Indonesia/Global Forest Watch 2002; McCarthy 2000).

During the reign of the New Order regime, preservation remained the dominant narrative for the management of protected areas, at least until up to the beginning of the 1990s. There are several indications of this. First, Basic Forestry Law No. 5/1967 (BFL), specifically the articles relating to the protection of forests, which continued to strongly reflect the preservation narrative contained in the 1941 Ordinance for Nature Protection (*Natuurbeschermings Ordonnantie* 1941). This is evidenced in the government's formation in 1971 of a new organization within the Directorate General of Forestry of the Department of Agriculture, which was specifically assigned to handle nature preservation. This organization was given the

name Directorate for Nature Protection and Preservation (*Direktorat Perlindungan dan Pengawetan Alam*).

Second, the preservation narrative carried with it the assumption that only the state (in this case, the government), which had the right to access and control, was capable of protecting the uniqueness of nature or wildlife species. Therefore, on the basis of this assumption, only the government could determine which forested regions could be designated as protected areas. This policy had actually already been in place since the Dutch colonial period with the issuance of the 1916 *Staatsblad* No. 278. Entering the New Order era, this preservation narrative got new support in the form of the Basic Forestry Law (BFL). The BFL provides the state with the legal authority to plan and regulate all forest tenures and to use the stipulations set out in the law in its jurisdictions. This law “centered authority on the minister, who was given the power to designate land as forest, determine the purpose and use of all forests, regulate the forest management, stipulate and regulate juridical conduct about forests” (Wrangham 2002: 22). Under this power, over 70% of Indonesia’s land mass, or more than 140 million ha, including over 90% of the Outer Islands, could be classified as State Forest and placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Forestry (Skephi and Kidell-Monroe 1993; Fay and Sirait 2002). Of this entire area, 13 percent or some 18.2 million ha have been allocated for protected areas (sanctuary reserves and nature conservation areas), whereas 21 percent or around 29.6 millions ha have been allocated for protected forests.

Among the further implications of this state-led control over forestry resources as set forth in the BFL was the fact that it granted negligible recognition to customary rights. This is particularly apparent in Section 17 of the BFL, which stipulates that customary communities may have the right to obtain benefit from the forests as long as there is not conflict with the goals of development as interpreted by the Minister (Thiesenhusen et al. 1997 *in* Wrangham 2002:22). From this, it is apparent that in exercising power and control over the more than 140 million ha of forestlands, including protected areas, the Department of Forestry (DoF) not only determined the sustainability of the wealth of resources within Indonesia’s tropical rainforests, but also the rights to livelihood of the millions of people living in and around the forested

regions in relation to its acknowledgement or neglect of the people's traditional/customary rights in forested areas. Moreover, the Indonesian foresters and policymakers have constructed and framed the narrative in such a way that forest dwellers, shifting cultivators and local forest users have come to be defined as destroyers and trespassers in relation to state or concession forests.

This typical aspect of state-led control over forestry resources and the neglect of customary rights are further reflected in various implementing regulations – the Government Regulations (*Peraturan Pemerintah*, PP). For example, as reported by Wrangham (2002: 23), PP 33/1970 (Government Regulations on Forestry Planning) did not allow for a participatory process of boundary setting, nor did it guarantee compensation for lost land. Under this Decree, the DoF established the boundaries for all production forests, protected forests, and other protected areas throughout Indonesia, of which the Lore Lindu National Park is a part. Further, PP 28/1985 (on Forest Protection) minimized the role of traditional communities by centralizing forest protection, which, then, reduced local involvement or responsibility.

As traditional forest dwellers, customary communities and local forest users have different perceptions regarding the rights to access and the use and control of resources, the number of conflicts over forest resources began to rise. Another cause of conflicts concerning forest borders and tenurial matters was the change in forest function. On behalf of state interests, the DoF often decides one-sidedly to change the function of a forested area; e.g. a protected forest being used as production forest or a former production forest being converted into a protected area. Wulan et al. (2004) in their study of forest-related conflicts in six provinces in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Java during the period of 1997-2003, found that of the 359 cases of recorded forest conflicts, 36 percent were aggravated by boundary problems and restricted access to forestry resources, whereas, forest conflicts due to changes in forest functions accounted for 3 percent. Furthermore, the study also revealed that the number of forest conflicts increased rapidly in 2000 during the transition to decentralization and stayed at levels higher than during the New Order period (Wulan et al. 2004). These conflicts often worsened as the government applied coercive power to enforce the rights of the state. Local peoples residing in the forests or living adjacent to the

forested areas often faced violence and human rights abuse from security or military officers.<sup>32</sup>

## **2. The Politics of Conservation**

In this thesis, 1980 is used as the marker for the beginning of the era of the politics of conservation. In this year, for the first time, the Indonesian government declared the establishment of 5 national parks; those being the Ujung Kulon (West Java), Gunung Gede Pangrango (West Java), Gunung Leuser (Aceh and North Sumatra), Komodo (East Nusa Tenggara), and Baluran (East Java) national parks. The politics of conservation that has continued over the past two decades was implemented primarily within the period from 1980 to 1997. So that it could be said that the politics of conservation in Indonesia was heavily influenced by the politics of the New Order. However, the New Order government was only one of the actors that shaped the politics of conservation in Indonesia. The other actors, which, as it turned out, heavily influenced the face taken on by the politics of conservation in Indonesia, were global actors (international conservation NGOs and multi-lateral agencies). What follows is a description of the politics of conservation that has developed over the period of the last two decades.

First, in the past two decades or so, two important narratives have been utilized by international conservation NGOs and multi-lateral agencies to manage protected areas; those being the nature conservation narrative (1980s) and biodiversity conservation narrative (1990s). The preservation narrative, which initially dominated texts, government reports, and regulatory rulings, was slowly replaced first with the conservation narrative and then the biodiversity narrative.

These new narratives were first introduced by the WWF in 1970, when cooperation was established with the Indonesian government to strengthen the management of protected areas in Indonesia. This cooperation was continued into a second period from 1977 to 1981. During this second period, the WWF handled 36 conservation projects. Toward the end of this cooperation period, the WWF formulated input for the compilation of the National Conservation Plan (NCP). A year after the cooperation ended, in 1982, with the support of the FAO and UNDP, the

National Conservation Plan (NCP) for Indonesia was published (Soekmadi 2002). One of the most important things in the NCP document was an evaluation of existing protected areas, as well as suggestions for new protected areas. Although the survey method used for the formulation of the NCP was viewed as an important innovation by the conservationists (ibid), this document was not well understood by the Department of Forestry staff because it was in the English language. The result was that the main thing that stuck in their minds was the preservation narrative.

Entering the 1990s, in particular after the Earth Conference, which produced the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) in 1992, the 1982 NCP for Indonesia came to be viewed as out of date and in need of revision. In 1993, the NCP for Indonesia was replaced by the Biodiversity Action Plan for Indonesia (BAPI). The BAPI document was published with funding support from the World Bank, IUCN and WWF. The publication of BAPI was at once a sign of the replacement of the nature conservation narrative with the biodiversity narrative in a formal government document. One of the factors facilitating the emergence of this biodiversity narrative was that from the 1990s, besides the WWF, other international conservation NGOs, such as TNC and CI were also making their presence felt. In the meantime, the global biodiversity discourse borne by these international conservation NGOs and multi-lateral agencies reached its climax in 1994, with the ratification of the CBD through Law No. 5/1994. A decade later, in 2003, the BAPI came to be perceived as no longer appropriate, leading to its replacement by the Indonesia Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (IBSAP). The IBSAP document was compiled with support from the Global Environmental Facilities (GEF) – the World Bank (BAPPENAS 2003).<sup>33</sup>

Second, as an implication of what has been clarified above, the protected areas in Indonesia are now not only controlled by the government on the basis of legal power, but also by international NGOs and multi-lateral agencies, which have their basis in the power of knowledge/discourse. So, before 1990, the government had gained its power/authority for managing protected areas from the Basic Forestry Law (UU No. 5/1967). Going into the 1990s, the government was more greatly empowered by the issuance of the Law on the Conservation of Biological Resources and its Ecosystem (CBR) in 1990 (UU No. 5/1990), which contained stipulations about

nature conservation areas, which included national parks, grand forest parks, and nature recreation parks.<sup>34</sup> When the BFL (UU No. 5/1967) was replaced by the Forestry Law (UU No. 41/1999), the new regulations became another power base from which the government could manage protected areas, including those within national parks.

In the meantime, with the issuance of the NCP for Indonesia (1982) and the BAPI (1993), which was then replaced by the IBSAP (2003), as well as the establishment of the 1990 CBR Law (UU No. 5/1990) and the ratification of the CBD in 1994 (UU No. 5/1994), it appeared that the new narratives and discourses that were being formulated, circulated and implemented by the international NGOs and multi-lateral agencies had consolidated themselves into power that greatly influenced the management of protected areas in Indonesia, including the formation of new protected areas. For example, it was not long after the establishment of the CBR in 1990, that the government established 5 new national parks, and, then, after the CBD in 1992 and its ratification in 1994, that the government established 23 new national parks (see Table 5).

Therefore, it could be said that at this time there are two powers that exert a strong influence on the protected areas in Indonesia, those being the legal power and the knowledge/discourse power. Under the juridical power, the government can effectively arrange and establish rights to access and control over the so-called state forestland. This kind of power/authority has been categorized by Foucault as contract-oppression power or the first scheme of power, in which local forest users and customary communities residing in the forest are perceived as illegitimate and opposed to the state as the legitimate party.

The character of the knowledge/discourse power is different. In this case global actors using scientific discourse compete with other actors to gain access and control over the diversity of genes, species, populations, and communities, as well as ecosystems. Biodiversity conservation discourses are accumulated, circulated and implemented by global actors in such a way that dominates the narratives and discourses of the management of protected areas. The character of this kind of power has been categorized by Foucault as domination-repression power, or the second

schema of power; “the pertinent opposition of this second schema of power is not between the legitimate and illegitimate, as in the first schema, but between struggle and submissions”.

In the last decade or so, the contract-oppression power (or juridical power) and the domination-repression power (or knowledge/discourse power) have been reinforcing each other and have formed a united force: “juridical-domination power”. This combining of forms of power effectively controls the diversity of species, communities, and ecosystems, as well as the forestlands, that need to be preserved and protected. Frequently, this power is imposed – often with coercion – on existing tenurial relations and changes those relations fundamentally. Further, as the power itself is the result of the production, accumulation and circulation of a discourse, it also dominates the narratives and discourses existing among the bureaucrats, academicians and NGOs, as well as among local peoples. As a consequence, there is absolutely no opportunity for the local forest users and customary communities to gain access, use and control over protected areas other than that, which has been set out legally by the state, and which is viewed as correct according to scientific discourse. The juridical power dictates that the public’s access be defined by “forbidden” or “allowed”. While the knowledge/discourse power carried the public into the space of the “right-wrong” discourse. Hence, the contemporary politics of protected areas involves not only changes to or modification of property regimes, but has much wider implications; it also seeks to control acts, narratives, discourses, attitudes, and everyday behaviors, as well as the modes of production of the local peoples living inside and adjacent to the protected areas.

Third, in the new order protected areas were basically leveraged in order to get political support from the international community. This was due to the fact that during the New Order, natural resources were positioned as economic resources in order to fulfill two political purposes simultaneously: triggering economic growth, and winning political support from the international community, in particular the West. From this point of view, the 43 national parks established over the past 20 years or more were, in actuality, established primarily to improve Indonesia’s image in the international world.

Among the main characteristics that differentiate conservation politics from preservation politics is the level of interest of international conservation NGOs and multi-lateral agencies in protected areas. The New Order government exploited this situation advantageously. This was because, in their collaboration with the government of Indonesia, international conservation NGOs not only conveyed new narratives, but also set targets for expanding protected areas and strengthened the management of existing protected areas. These interests of global conservation converged with Suharto's interests in gaining support from the international community in order to further solidify and extend the power of the New Order. Set out below are a number of facts related to the situation described above.

In 1982, near the end of the third IUCN World Park Congress in Bali, the government of Indonesia declared the establishment of 10 national parks (among them the Lore Lindu National Park).<sup>35</sup> This decision was a strategic political step meant, among other things, to improve Indonesia's image in international circles, and to smooth Suharto's path to a fourth term as president (1983–1987). This turned out to be an apt political decision because not long after the end of the World Park Congress in Bali, the WWF/IUCN allocated funds of \$1.5 million for the "Conservation for Development Program" over a five year period (1982–1986). In the meantime, the World Bank, for the same period of time (1982–1986), poured in \$850,000 to strengthen the conservation activities in Dumoga Bone National Park (Departemen Kehutanan 1986b).

A similar thing occurred in the period between 1990 and 1992. In that period, the government of Indonesia established 9 new national parks (see Table 5)<sup>36</sup> and issued new regulations in the form of the Law on the Conservation of Biological Resources and Its Ecosystem (CBR Law, UU No. 5/1990). This political decision was not without reason. From November 1988 until May 1992 the biodiversity conservation discourse had been transformed and formulated into a convention that bound all nations worldwide. Also within that period of time, three technical meetings of experts and seven working group meetings had occurred – in which Indonesia actively participated – to consider what came to be called "the Nairobi Final Act of the Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological

Table 5. The Evolution of Politics over Access, Use and Control of Protected Areas in Indonesia

	The Politics of Nature Preservation		The Politics of (Nature) Conservation	The Politics of (Biodiversity) Conservation
Period	Late 1880s – end of 1970s		1980 – early 1990s	June 1992 – 2002
Governing rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1916 Dutch <i>Staatsblad</i> No. 278</li> <li>• 1941 Dutch Ordinance for Nature Protection</li> <li>• 1967 Basic Forestry Law (UU No. 5/1967)</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1967 Basic Forestry Law (UU No. 5/1967)</li> <li>• 1990 Conservation of Biological Resources (UU No. 5/1990)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1990 Conservation of Biological Resources (UU No. 5/1990)</li> <li>• 1994 Ratification of the UN Convention on Biodiversity (UU No. 5/1994)</li> <li>• 1999 Forestry Law (UU No. 41/1999)</li> </ul>
Narrative/discourse	Nature Preservation		Nature Conservation	Sustainable use of biodiversity resources
Type of Power	Juridical power		Juridical power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Juridical power</li> <li>• Knowledge/discourse power</li> </ul>
Governance regime	Dutch colonial regime	Soekarno regime (1949 – 1967)	Suharto regime (1967 – 1997)	
				Reformation regimes (1998 – present)
Dominant Actor/s	State		State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State</li> <li>• International Conservation NGOs</li> <li>• Multi-lateral Agencies</li> </ul>
Number of New National Parks Created	None		1980 – 1989 : 16 national parks	June 1992 – 2002: 16 national parks
			1990 – May 1992 : 13 national parks	2003 – 2005: 4 national parks

Diversity” (an explanation of Law No 5. of 1994 concerning the Ratification of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity).<sup>37</sup> So it is not very surprising that the CBR Law established on August 10, 1990 only dealt with *in situ* biological resource conservation (protected areas), because this Law actually emerged as a response to the global biodiversity conservation discourse, which was in the process of becoming an international convention.

As the culmination of all of this, at the Rio Conference in 1992, the New Order regime could show the world that Indonesia had a strong commitment to conservation with the establishment of 29 national parks,<sup>38</sup> the existence of laws on biological conservation (UU No. 5/1990), besides being one of the first nations to sign the convention.<sup>39</sup> However, Suharto has targeted much more than that; this conference, which was held toward the end of Suharto’s fifth term in office, was expected to facilitate his intention to stay in power for a sixth term.

Fourth, even though biodiversity conservation had become a dominant narrative, in actuality the paradigm and framework of thought of Indonesian foresters, particularly the forestry bureaucrats, continued primarily to focus on the preservation narrative. In the CBR Law (UU No. 5/1990), biological conservation activities were stipulated as covering: the protection of life support systems, the preservation of biological diversity and related ecosystems, and the sustainable use of biological resources and related ecosystems (Article 5, UU No. 5/1990). The conservation activities listed in Article 5 encompassed issues very familiar to the foresters, academicians and NGOs active in the field of conservation. The land and marine areas, which were defined as having the three above mentioned functions under the CBR Law, were categorized as nature conservation areas, a term that covered national parks, grand forest parks, and nature recreation parks (Article 1, 29 and 30, UU No. 5/1990). It was these areas that were designated for the sustainable utilization of biological resources and their related ecosystems.

There were also land and marine areas, whose primary functions were the preservation of biodiversity and related ecosystems and the protection of life support systems, which were categorized as areas. Included in this category were nature reserves and wildlife sanctuaries. The sustainable use of biological resources was not

allowed in these areas, as it was in nature conservation areas (see Table 6). The only activities allowed in these areas were preservation activities undertaken to ensure the integrity of the region and maintain it in a pristine condition (Article 1, 12 and 15 UU No. 5/1990).

When the CBR Law was issued in 1990, the 1967 Basic Forestry Law (BFL) was still in effect. In the BFL of 1967, protected areas were still categorized as nature sanctuary areas, which covered wildlife sanctuaries and nature reserves.<sup>40</sup> So, although the conservation narrative has expanded since the decade of the 1980s, and as many as 16 national parks had been established since 1989 (see Table 5), actually the 1967 BFL, and its implementing regulations, never legally acknowledged the existence of nature conservation areas, which covered national parks, grand forest parks and nature recreation parks. Therefore, before 1990, it could be said that most forestry managers and bureaucrats at the Department of Forestry, continued to work and adhere to the point of view of the preservation narrative.

When the biodiversity conservation narrative began to displace the nature conservation narrative, foresters and government officials, in a fairly brief length of time, began using the new narrative in speeches, reports, and formal government documents. However, the core meaning of biodiversity conservation was never adequately articulated or deeply established. This is apparent in the Forestry Law (UU No. 41/1999), which replaced the BFL (UU No. 5/1967). In the Forestry Law of 1999 conservation forests only functioned to preserve the biodiversity and related ecosystems. Even, though – in line with the name and definition of a conservation forest – these forests should have also functioned to protect life support systems, and ensured the sustainable use of biological resources and related ecosystems. What had happened was that the three conservation functions stipulated for nature conservation forest areas had actually become part of conservation forests (see Table 6).

The confusion and the reduction of the meaning of conservation in the 1999 Forestry Law occurred not so much because of impropriety or carelessness on the part of the framers, but more because of the existing situation in which Indonesian foresters and forestry bureaucrats had actually not yet internalized the meaning of the biodiversity conservation, which was being advocated by global actors. Since then

biodiversity conservation has certainly been successfully articulated and transformed into guidelines, guidelines, action plans and even regulations, although, in actuality, this happened because of the provision of financial support and pressure exerted by global actors.

The basic meanings contained in the nature preservation, nature conservation, and biodiversity conservation narratives – as well as the background behind the shifts in narratives – were never really widely understood in the bureaucratic circles at the Department of Forestry, or the academicians, or even among the local NGOs. The result has been that the majority of Indonesian conservationists actually continue to think and act primarily as preservationists.

#### **D. Lore Lindu National Park: History of Change**

The present area covered by the Lore Lindu National Park resulted from the integration of two natural sanctuaries and a natural preservation area, which were formerly separated. Those two natural reserves include the Lore Kalamanta Wildlife Reserve (131,000 ha) located in Poso District and the Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve (67,000 ha) located in the Donggala and Poso Districts. The nature preserve areas included The Danau Lindu Tourism/Protected Forest (31,000 ha) located in Donggala District (Helmi, 2001; The Nature Conservancy, et al, 2001a: 181 – 191).

The Lore Kalamanta Wildlife Reserve was established on October 20, 1973, by the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture N0.522/Kpts/Um/10/1973. The Reserve formerly was consists of forest of Biru, Kalamanta and Lore in Poso District. Five years later, on January 25, 1978, 31,000 ha of forest in Danau Lindu and its surroundings adjacent to the Lore Kalamanta Wildlife Reserve in Donggala District were designated as the Danau Lindu Tourism/Protected Area the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No.46/Kpts/Um/1978. Three year later, on December 10, 1981, 67,000 ha of forest in Sungai Sopu – Sungai Gumbasa (located in Donggala District and Poso District) were designated as part of the Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve under the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 1012/Kpts/Um/12/1981.<sup>41</sup> In 1977, UNESCO declared Lore Kalamanta and Danau Lindu forests as Biosphere Reserved areas.

Table 6. Dispute on Conservation Narrative in the Forestry Law as Compared to the Conservation of Biological Resource Law

Descriptions	Conservation Functions & Related Articles		
	Preservation of biodiversity & related ecosystems	Protection of life support systems	Sustainable use of biological resources & related ecosystems
<b>The Conservation of Biological Resources and Related Ecosystems (UU No. 5/1990)</b>			
Nature sanctuary area ( <i>Kawasan Suaka Alam</i> ) <sup>1</sup>	Article 1, 29, 30	Article 1, 29, 30	--
Nature conservation area ( <i>Kawasan Pelestarian Alam</i> ) <sup>2</sup>	Article 1,12, 15	Article 1,12, 15	Article 1,12, 15
<b>The Forestry Law (UU No. 41/1999)</b>			
Conservation Forest (nature sanctuary forest, nature conservation forest & hunting forest)	Article 1, 6, 7	--	--
• Nature sanctuary forest area ( <i>Kawasan Hutan Suaka Alam</i> ) <sup>1</sup>	Article 1, 6, 7	Article 1, 6, 7	--
• Nature conservation forest area ( <i>Kawasan Hutan Pelestarian Alam</i> ) <sup>2</sup>	Article 1, 6, 7	Article 1, 6, 7	Article 1, 6, 7
• Hunting forest ( <i>Taman Buru</i> )	--	--	Article 1, 6, 7

<sup>1</sup> Consists of nature reserves (*cagar alam*) and wildlife sanctuaries (*suaka margasatwa*)

<sup>2</sup> Consists of national parks (*taman nasional*), grand forest parks (*taman hutan raya*), and nature recreation parks (*taman wisata alam*)

The process of altering those three conservation areas into the Lore Lindu National Park was carried out in three preparatory stages, which took more than 20 years to implement. First of all, on October 14, 1982, the Minister of Agriculture declared the establishment of the Lore Lindu National Park, including 231,000 ha of conservation area, through the issuance of the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 736/Menteri/X/1982. This declaration was issued during the Third World National Park Congress held in Bali.

Secondly, eleven years later –October 5, 1993– the government issued the Decree of the Minister of Forestry No. 593/Kpts-II/1993 for altering the function of the Danau Lindu Tourism/Protected Forest (31,000 ha), the Lore Kalamanta Wildlife Reserve (131,000 ha), and the Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve (67,000 ha) to that of a national park called the Lore Lindu National Park. This decree also states that the boundary of the Lore Lindu National Park thus established was to be a temporary boundary. The permanent boundary for the Lore Lindu National Park (229,000 ha) was to be determined after surveys for determining the structure of the border at the location of the park.

Thirdly, in 1999, the central government completed all survey activities on the structure of forest borders and the mapping of the boundaries at the Lore Lindu National Park. On June 23, 1999, the Minister of Forestry and Estate Crops issued Decree No. 464/Kpts-II/1999 determining that the preservation forest in the Donggala and Poso districts (217,991.18 ha) would function as national park land. Under this decree, the area of the National Park was 11,000 ha fewer than stated in the Decree of Minister of Forestry No. 593/Kpts-II/1993, due to the exclusion of the Lindu and Besoa enclaves.

Since the government carried out the boundary measurements and border establishment in the three conservation areas, which then became a national park, various conflicts over the land and other resources have arisen between the government and local people. Sangaji (2001b: 7–9) stated that land belonging to the local peoples of Besoa, *Pekurehua*, Bada, Lindu, Kulawi, Gimpu, and others was determined as being parts of the Lore Lindu National Park without their

acknowledgement and agreement. In addition, the local people whose lives were very much dependent on the forest and other natural resources were no longer allowed to hunt, collect wood, rattan, bamboo, and medicinal herbs, or to cultivate coffee, which had long been their habit. This was the situation also experienced by the local people of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Rahmat, and Kadidia villages where the people entering the Dongi-dongi forested areas lived.

Furthermore, the government also resettled local communities who had lived in the depths of the forest a long time ago upon the pronouncement of the forest as conservation areas. This was experienced by the people of the Dodolo and Katu villages. In 1998, the Dodolo villagers were resettled to Toe Jaya, an area close to the park located between Wanga and Kaduwaa Villages, in Lore Utara Subdistrict, Poso District. Another village located in the park called Katu Village was supposed to be resettled, but the villagers refused it, and they remained living in Lore Lindu NP. In 1999, for a second time the Katu people were to be resettled outside the park by using Central Sulawesi Integrated Area Development and Conservation Project's (CSIADCP) fund supported by an ADB loan (Project Coordination Unit CSIADCP, 2002). However, this effort failed due to the sturdy refusal of the Katu people supported by the Free Land Foundation (*Yayasan Tanah Merdeka*) (Sangaji, 2000a, 2001b:8).

#### **E. Central Sulawesi Integrated Area and Development Project**

Perhaps the greatest efforts particularly devoted for the development of the village and community living along the border of the Park as well as for the conservation of the LLNP, was the CSIADCP, which started in 1998 and was stipulated to end at March 2005. The goal of the Project is to promote economic development and resource management that are environmentally sound and beneficial for the local people and the Park. The Project investments emphasize activities that would improve natural resource management both for economic and conservation gain. It has two interrelated objectives: "(a) to improve the socio economic welfare of villagers surrounding the Park so that their economic sustenance will be independent

from the Park's resources, and (b) to protect the Park's biodiversity resources through the strengthening Park management" (ADB 1997). The provincial and local administrations viewed this project as an important one since they have limited fund for developing all villages surrounding the Park (60 villages) simultaneously. Beside that, the local government now has more authority for planning, implementing and controlling the project than before due to the regional autonomy policy.

CSIADCP supports four components of activities as follows (ADB 1997: iii). First, the community development component. Under this component, the Project support activities aimed at generating income, health, and social benefit for 60 villages most affected by the establishment of the Park; and supports for the resettlement of Katu village inside the Park to another location outside the Park. Second, the component of Park and buffer zone management, that include (a) improving Park management, training of Park rangers, and construction of trails and Park facilities; (b) formulating conservation agreements with villagers to reconcile their economic interests with Park protection measures; and (c) developing and implementing a community-based ecotourism promotion program. Third, improve rural support and infrastructure services. Under this component, the Project supported health improvement (including the *schistosomiasis* control), agriculture production and marketing, and rural infrastructure improvement. The last component is Project management and institutional strengthening (see Annex 2 for detailed information).

The total cost of the Project is estimated at \$47.7 million of which a loan of 32.0 million provides from the Asian Development Bank's ordinary capital resources (see Table 7). The USAID provides parallel financing in grants funds amounting to \$2.2 million to match a \$1.0 million contribution from The Nature Conservancy (TNC) (ADB 1997). The total amount of \$3.2 million will finance consulting service and training activities for the Park and buffer zone management component. Part of the USAID grant (a sum of US\$ 1,370,987) channeled through the USAID Natural Resources Management (NRM) II to TNC for "Building Conservation Capacity and Partnerships at Lore Lindu National Park". The grant was allocated for upgrading the management capability of the Park Authority, revising and developing 5-year and 25-year management plans for the Lore Lindu National Park, developing strategies for

community involvement in park management, increasing the capabilities of local institutions, creating greater awareness of the importance of conservation, and addressing the economic plight of communities around the park (Juliani, S., and Damayanti B., 2001: 3; The Nature Conservancy, 2002a: 3-5) (see also Annex 1). This grant covered activities from December 24, 1998, to June 30, 2001.

Table 7. Project Components of CSIADCP by Financiers, \$'000 (ADB 1997)

Component	Bank	Government	Beneficiaries	USAID & TNC <sup>a</sup>	Total
1. Community Development	5,509	3,256	2,662	-	11,427
2. Park & Buffer Zone Management	1,516	2,155	32	3,200	6,903
3. Rural Support & Infrastructure Services	15,442	7,481	1,560	-	24,463
4. Project Management	3,668	1,325	-	-	4,884
Total Base Costs & Contingencies	26,026	14,196	4,254	3,200	47,676
- Interest	5,597				
- Commitment charges	378				
Total Project Cost	32,000				

- magnitude zero

Note: Total may not sum due to rounding

<sup>a</sup> Parallel financing from USAID and TNC. The grant will be administered by USAID and TNC

According to the Project Administration Memorandum of the CSIADCP (ADB, 1998: 3), USAID/TNC and CSIADCP will collaborate on matters pertaining to several areas of concern. Those are: (1) Developing and implementing a Five Year Park Management Working Plan; (2) Training Park guards in relation to establishing Park boundaries and an inventory monitoring system; (3) Developing visitor programs and recruiting and training staff and villagers to implement such programs; (4) Conducting inventories and ecological studies as a guide for park zoning for the protection and sustainable use of the forest; (5) Constructing guard posts, staff housing and a visitors' center, rehabilitating existing structures and providing field equipment and vehicles for Park resource monitoring purposes; (6) Constructing new

and rehabilitating existing Park trails to improve access to tourist attractions in the Park, as well as to the roads outside the Park. The first three components were funded by USAID/TNC, whereas the last three components were funded by the CSIADCP.

However, this project raised many criticisms and protests from the local community, NGOs and also government officials (particularly the head of the subdistrict) due to the misuse of funds, the failure to identify the basic needs of the local community, and the poor performance of project implementation, particularly for community development and establishing a community conservation agreement and buffer zone program. The last point of criticism was a result of the group discussion initiated during the seminar and workshop for evaluation performance of CSIADCP in March 2002 at Kulawi Subdistrict, Donggala District.

#### **F. Park Zonation: The Process and Excess**

At the end of 2001, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), an NGO under the support of the NRM II-USAID grant, had completed a draft Management Plan for the Lore Lindu National Park. In this draft management plan, the park was designed to comprise 8 zones (The Nature Conservancy, et al. 2001b:99 – 102)<sup>42</sup> :

- 1) Core zone
- 2) Wilderness zone
- 3) Activity or utilization zone
- 4) Intensive utilization zone
- 5) Traditional utilization zone
- 6) Rehabilitation zone
- 7) Social and Historical Zone
- 8) Tourist Zone

The core zone according to the basic principles of national park management is the heart of and the unique feature of the park. Therefore, according to the existing forestry regulations, activities leading to the alteration of the function of the core zone, such as destroying the unique features of the ecosystem and its natural aesthetic

and physical phenomena, decreasing the area of core zone, or conducting economic activities, which are not in line with the Management Plan, are prohibited.<sup>43</sup> However, the zoning process of Lore Lindu National Park, which was designed by TNC, resulted in the following problems and weaknesses.

First, the Management Plan of Lore Lindu National Park – including zoning – was initially designed to utilize the information gathered during the biological study in and around the park carried out by TNC and the Central Sulawesi Integrated Area Development and Conservation Project (CSIADCP).<sup>44</sup> In fact, however, the management plan was based only on the ecological and biodiversity study carried out by TNC. This is due to the two following factors:

- 1) The ecological and biodiversity study funded by CSIADCP was delayed far behind the completion of TNC's biodiversity study. TNC started the surveys in March 2000 and finished in June 2001. Meanwhile, the CSIADCP did not issue the contract for the biodiversity study until November 2001, a delay of about two years from the initial plan (The Nature Conservancy, 2002a: 12).
- 2) TNC, due to restricted to the trust fund of NRM II/USAID, was to have completed the management plan before December 30, 2001, which was the deadline for the extended contract between TNC and NRM II/USAID (Juliani and Buchori 2001: 16).

As a result, the CSIADCP surveys could not be incorporated into the draft management plan that was finished by TNC on December 28, 2002. In the ADB loan review, the way TNC carried out its own services independently was criticized (The Nature Conservancy, 2002a: 12).

Second, the draft management plan was produced mainly based on biological and ecological data and information. The draft is rich in data and information on biodiversity and ecosystem characteristics, but has a weakness in understanding the social, economic, and cultural aspects of the community, particularly the agrarian relations between the local community and the surrounding forest, land and water sources. The draft management plan provides a detailed description of the biological character of the park, including the distribution and abundance of species there.

However, the social, economic and cultural aspects were not elucidated properly. Volume 1 of the draft comprises 203 pages, but only 15 of those pages elucidate the cultural aspects of the community, and the coverage of socio-economic patterns and livelihoods amounted to only one page. From this perspective, it is obvious that TNC was more interested in exploring and analyzing biological and ecological features of the park rather than the socio-economic and cultural aspects of the communities that inhabited the surrounding areas.

Third, the draft management plan was produced in a relatively short time. According to the agreement between TNC and NRM II/USAID, TNC should have completed the management plan before June 30, 2001. However, by March 1, 2001 the progress of management plan had reached only 10% (Juliani, S. and Damayanti B., 2001: 9). Therefore, TNC requested an extension from NRM II/USAID to finish the management plan (and other work) by December 2001.

When the Dongi-dongi affair emerged on June 19, 2001 the management plan—including park zoning—was an ongoing process. The emergence of the Dongi-dongi case motivated TNC to accelerate the accomplishment of the management plan immediately. The sooner the management plan documents were completed, particularly in relation to defining the status of the Dongi-dongi area, the better positioned the Park Authority (and its associates) would be to respond to Dongi-dongi affair. Furthermore, if the draft management plan was able to get approval from the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation, of the Ministry of Forestry, the National Park Authority would have a stronger juridical power to manage and control the national park in line with the designated zoning, including that for the Dongi-dongi area.

Two months after the FPM declared that it had occupied the Dongi-dongi area for the purpose of settlement, on August 29-30, 2001, TNC held its first public consultation for the management plan and zoning of Lore Lindu National Park. In this draft management plan, Dongi-dongi was categorized as a core zone due to its position for the protection of the Sopu and Gumbasa watersheds as a water supply for the downstream area of the Palolo valley (600 m above sea level) and Palu valley (0 – 200 m above sea level).

Fourth, even though the draft management plan states that the zoning of the Lore Lindu National Park was prepared through public consultation involving local NGOs, government officials, and village communities (The Nature Conservancy, et al. 2001b: 107), the zoning was criticized by various parties, including local government, environmental activists and local NGOs in Palu. They pointed out that the process of the zoning did not involve the local community residing in the margins of the forest within a transparent public consultation process.<sup>45</sup> In a public consultation forum held on August 29-30, 2001 by TNC, and attended by the Regent (*Bupati*) of Donggala and other government officials, the Regent elaborated his disappointment over the absence of all community leaders that should be involved in the zoning process in the forum. This fact was stated by two environmental activists from Palu who attended the meeting without TNC's invitation, but who were curious to find out about the zoning plan for the Lore Lindu National Park as presented by TNC (Pers. Comm.). On September 12, 2001, Forum Petani Merdeka (FPM) – the farmers' union from Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat villages who occupied Dongi-dongi – issued a declaration rejecting the draft zoning for the Lore Lindu National Park, because they were not involved in the process of developing the zoning plan. They stated that the establishment of Dongi-dongi as a core zone by the TNC was simply an effort to dislodge them from Dongi-dongi.

The above four points indicate that the existing draft of the Management Plan (including zoning) was not prepared comprehensively through intensive public consultation with the stakeholders of the park, particularly the community groups living in 60 surrounding villages. It can be concluded that in addition to the government, TNC and CSIADCP played an important role in determining the access to and control of the local community over the area's natural resources through the preparation of a management plan and the financing of related studies. Up to the preparation of this thesis, the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation, of the Ministry of Forestry, has not approved the management plan for Lore Lindu National Park – including its zoning – legally.

## IV. ENVIRONMENTAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

### A. International Environmental NGOs

During the mid 1970s and early 1980s a new social movement emerged in developed countries as a radical response to heavy industrial pollution, endangered wildlife and nuclear energy inspired by the writing of influential natural scientists, such as Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*. The movement was characterized by "unconventional actions at the local level, active participation of many concerned people, and the over-presentation of the new middle class" (van der Heijden 2002). As more and more support, as well as challenges, for better environmental conditions emerged from various communities and institutions in the early to mid 1980s, Green Peace and WWF "shifted their environmental activism out of the hands of amateurs and placed funding, management, and the articulation of the environmental message into the hands of professional advertising men, media and management consultants, and policy experts" (Jamison 1996). The process resulted in less radical stances, and a more oligarchic, institutionalized and professional approach: the environmental movement largely transformed into a transnational NGO.

Other environmental NGOs in developed countries soon followed the Green Peace and WWF's management and strategy model. Green Peace, WWF, TNC and Friends of the Earth (FoE) became multi-million-member organizations controlling multi-million-dollar budgets with extensive representation in such developing countries as Brazil, India, Malaysia and Indonesia (Jamison 1996; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Chapin 2004). These big NGOs, according to Jamison, were handled in much the same manner as multinational corporations, with "sophisticated communications and information networks, effective and professionally managed media strategies, and well-organized fund raising and research activities". Chapin, in his investigation, found that, over the last two decades, three environmental NGOs – WWF, TNC and CI – have rapidly grown in size. One recent estimates notes that the combined revenues of WWF, TNC, and CI in 2002, for work in the developing countries, amounted to more than half of the approximately \$1.5 billion available for conservation in 2002; and that the Big Three's investments in conservation in the

developing world grew from roughly \$240 million in 1998 to close to \$490 million in 2002 (Khare and Bray 2004 in Chapin 2004).

The next paragraph examines the character and size of international environmental NGOs with particular emphasis on WWF, TNC, and Friends of the Earth (FoE). The first two are taken into account as they have become the largest environmental NGOs in the world and dominate the matter of biodiversity conservation as has been described in Chapter II.A.<sup>46</sup> The last two – TNC and FoE – have been emphasized and analyzed more in depth as both of them have either had direct or indirect influence in the Dongi-dongi affair.

WWF International, founded in 1961 with a small office in Switzerland, was formerly a fundraising subsidiary of IUCN. Within the next three decades or so WWF had become one of the three biggest environmental NGOs. WWF, as it is quick to point out, has a global reputation for its science-based, comprehensive and rational approach, and for working through dialogue rather than confrontation. Born historically as a subsidiary of IUCN and formerly dedicated to wildlife protection, WWF and IUCN often working together to formulate numerous policies, principles, declarations, guidelines, and funding activities with regards to biodiversity conservation, and protected area management, as well as issues related to indigenous peoples. The role of WWF in formulating policies regarding indigenous peoples and initiating the Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDP), for example, has been elaborated in Chapter II section B, “The Global Politics over Access and Control of Biodiversity Resources”. Its pivotal roles enable the WWF to have “access and close relations to world’s highest decision levels for conservation” (Young 2002).

WWF’s mission is “to stop the degradation of the planet’s natural environment and to build a future in which humans live in harmony with nature by conserving the world’s biological diversity, ensuring that the use of renewable natural resources is sustainable, and promoting the reduction of pollution and wasteful consumption” (WWF 2004b). Six priority programs have been addressed to fulfill this mission: forests, seas, fresh water, climate change, toxins, and endangered species.

During the first two decades, the WWF family remained small, and then grew rapidly in the following decades. Chapin (2004) noted that in the late 1970s, for example, the U.S. branch of WWF was staffed by 25 people and occupied one floor of a relatively small building on Dupont Circle in Washington, D.C. Further Chapin reported that in the early 1980s, it began to grow rapidly, and today it fills up four floors of a luxurious building nearby, and has satellite offices posted around the world. In 1981, WWF's staff worldwide consisted of just over 300 people. At present, WWF currently employs close to 4,000 people, and has almost five million supporters and a global network active in 90 countries (WWF 2004b).

At present, WWF obtains its funds from individual members, bilateral and multilateral agencies, private foundations, corporations and the U.S. government. Two decades ago, nearly all of their funding came from private foundations and individuals (Chapin 2004). In 2003, WWF's income was \$380 million, of which around 46 percent was contributed by individual members. Contributions from government and aid agencies account for more than 20 percent, whereas trusts and foundations account for 10 percent. Corporate donations, sponsorships, legacies and royalties from licensing the Panda logo provide more than 22 percent (WWF 2004b). With this strong financial support, WWF was able to provide funding for nearly 2,000 projects spread over more than 100 countries. One of the most ambitious programs of the WWF is the multilateral agency, the World Bank-WWF Global Forest Alliance, that was created in 1998 and works in 30 countries. The Alliance targets for 2005 are 50 million hectares of new protected areas in forests (25 percent increase); 50 million hectares of existing "paper parks" - or parks with no effective management - coming under effective protection, and 200 million ha of the world's production forest to come under independently certified forest management (20-fold increase) (World Bank and WWF 2003).

Founded in 1951, TNC began its activities as a small organization. Funded by its members, consisting mainly of botanists and zoologists, TNC used their donations to purchase small tracts of land for preservation and collecting scientific specimens. From its inception in 1951, until the 1970's, TNC was "as American as motherhood and apple pie" (Keller 2002). In 1965, for example, TNC used a grant from the Ford

Foundation to pay the salary of its first full-time president. In the 1970s, it grew to cover all 50 states and expanded into Latin America (Chapin 2004).

The Nature Conservancy began to grow rapidly in the early 1980s and this was followed by vertiginous growth through the 1990s due to bilateral and multilateral funding, as well as corporate support. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 2000, the Conservancy reported total revenue and other support of \$786.8 million. The Conservancy has 1,029,012 members who pay a minimum annual membership fee of \$25. In addition to the membership dues and contributions that generated \$357.4 million in fiscal year 2000, TNC earned \$60 million from government awards, \$14 million from private contracts and \$161 million from investment income (Cohen 2001). The organization also reports that it received "gifts of land" in 2000 worth \$90 million. Today, it has become the "world's richest conservation organization" with assets in excess of \$3 billion for saving precious places (Ottaway and Stephens 2003; Chapin 2004).

The mission of TNC is to preserve the plants, animals and natural communities that represent the diversity of life on earth by protecting the land and water they need to survive (The Nature Conservancy 2003). Driven by this mission, TNC, which describes itself as being science-based, non-confrontational, collaborative, and focused, with an emphasis on creative business strategies, grew to become an aggressive collector of land for conservation. Two approaches have been widely used in the "land acquisition" approach of the TNC green business (Cohen 2001; Cook 2003; Ottaway and Stephens 2003). First, by working closely with the federal government, TNC buys large tracts of private land, frequently at the expense of private property owners' rights, then, sells the land to the government at a profit. Second, it promotes government purchases of private land in the guise of "protection" (often by bringing suit either against the government or against the property owner with the goal of forcing the landowner to sell his property). The land is then donated to the TNC, and after the TNC rehabilitates and enriches the land in the manner of conservationists, TNC sells the property to the Forest Service.

As a result, for example, on June 30, 1990 TNC reported that it held \$53.5 million in land for resale to the government, and by 1992, TNC's ledgers showed that

the organization had received \$90,693,000 for sale of land to government agencies (Keller 2002). Further, in 1996, TNC received \$37,853,205 - or 11 percent of its total income - from the sale of private land to federal, state and local governments for use as parks, recreational areas, and nature preserves (Cohen 2001). To sum up, Arnold and Gottlieb (*in* Cohen 2001) report that TNC sells about two-thirds of the private land it purchases to the federal government.<sup>47</sup> Around the world, the Conservancy now protects 7 million preserved acres through a variety of means and owns 2 million acres outright. Much of that land is held in 1,400 nature preserves, which Conservancy describes as the world's largest private sanctuary system (Ottaway and Stephens 2003; Petterson 2003<sup>48</sup>). Hence, TNC calls itself “Nature Real Estate” and claims “a unique niche: preserving nature, endangered habitats and species by buying the land and water they need to survive, and protecting land through gifts, exchange and debt-for-nature-swap” (Young 2002; TNC 2003; Ottaway and Stephens 2003).

At present, the Conservancy oversees 3,200 employees in 528 offices scattered across every state of the U.S. and 30 countries, with its "worldwide" headquarters sited in a \$28 million eight-story building in Arlington. Its governing board and advisory council now include executives and directors from one or more oil companies, chemical producers, auto manufacturers, mining concerns, logging operations and coal-burning electric utilities. Some of those corporations have paid millions in environmental fines, whereas in 2002, those companies and some 1,900 other corporate entities donated \$225 million to the Conservancy - an amount approaching that given by individuals (Ottaway and Stephens 2003). Since 1994, General Motors Corporation has donated more than \$4.7 million and more than 100 trucks to the organization. Likewise, Canon U.S. has contributed \$10.3 million and equipment since 1990, while the Southern Company has given \$2.6 million since 1996 (Cohen 2001).

In 2003, the management of TNC was alleged, in a series of articles in the *Washington Post*, to have been involved in questionable practices particularly concerning the organization's relations to corporate entities and the resale of land. In an effort to counter the allegations in the *Post's* articles, McCormick – The President and Chief Executive Officer of TNC – argued that on average, corporations account

for less than 10 percent of cash donations to the Conservancy. Further, he mentioned, “the Conservancy occupies a unique niche in the conservation movement - what some have called the radical center, and only TNC could and does enjoy the support of both the chairman of General Motors and a founder of Earth First!”<sup>49</sup> (McCormick 2003). Due to *Post’s* article, the group was being probed by the US Congress and audited by the IRS (Chapin 2004: 29). In Indonesia, TNC began its activities in 1991 at two major national parks in Indonesia, i.e. the Lore Lindu National Park and the Komodo National Park, as well as becoming involved in a number of projects aimed at coastal and marine conservation.

Friends of the Earth (FoE) International was founded in 1971 by four organizations from France, Sweden, England and the USA. FoE International is the world’s largest grassroots environmental network: uniting 68 diverse national member groups, 15 affiliated organizations, around 5,000 local activist groups on every continent, and approximately one million members and supporters around the world (FoE International 2004). FoE describes itself as a global federation of national environmental organizations. One of the members is FoE Indonesia - *Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* (WALHI). WALHI joined FoE International in 1989.<sup>50</sup>

FoE works on wide array of urgent environmental and social issues. Its mission is directed toward protecting the earth against further deterioration, preserving the earth’s ecological, cultural and ethnic diversity; increasing public participation and decision-making vital to the protection of the environment and the sound management of natural resources; achieving social, economic and political justice and equal access to resources, and promoting environmentally sustainable development on the local, national, regional and global levels (FoE International 2004).

In the course of carrying out its mission, the FoE strongly believes that only by promoting transparency, accountability, participation and equity in decision-making at all levels, including at the governmental and various institutional levels, will sustainability, world peace, environmental and social justice, and the well-being of people be achieved (FoE 2004:3). Albeit FoE works at the level of states, FoE is not fully confident of the states’ ability to address environmental problems. Furthermore,

in non-democratic regimes environmental activists usually do not have access to state officials. Therefore, according to FoE, “states must be forced, from the outside, to undertake environmental protection rather than through directly lobbying them” (Wapner 1996).

Because states and international agencies are entangled in numerous interdependencies i.e. economic, cultural, social and governmental activities that are interstate, trans-governmental, or transnational in character,<sup>51</sup> FoE locates its activities at intersections in such a way that it can influence and position states and/or international agencies in positions more responsive to environmental protection (Wapner 1996). By doing this, the FoE challenges the unjust current model of economic and corporate globalization, patents of life, and the abuse of human rights and indigenous peoples, as well as attempting to stop development projects that deteriorate the environment and marginalize local people. In FoE’s perspective, victories over those situations can be achieved effectively through strong grassroots activism and effective national and global campaigning. By working closely with local communities, as well as alliances with indigenous peoples, farmers’ movements, trade unions, human rights groups and others, power can be created and directed.

This neo-Marxist approach, combined with effective global, national and local campaigning, has become a powerful vehicle for FoE to challenge the domination of global economic actors over small farmers and indigenous peoples, male over female, industrial practices over the environment, as well as unequal access to resources. In 2003, FoE claimed it had achieved both small and large victories, i.e. demands that the World Bank get out of oil and mining projects,<sup>52</sup> overturning the 2003 World Trade Organization meeting in Cancún, impeding the efforts of the European Investment Bank (EIB) to finance Iceland’s Kárahnjúkar Dam, pressuring the WTO to not impose the acceptance of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and farming on the European Union and other countries. Other victories were achieved by various FoE members in the UK, Spain, Korea, Canada, Uruguay and other countries, highlighting its robust ability and power to get handfuls of people to work together, its networking and its alliances with other social and environmental movements (FoE International 2004).<sup>53</sup> This type of character colors all FoE activities in line with Diani

and Donati's (2002) typology of non-partisan political organization, which are classified as "professional protest groups".

These characteristics of FoE that challenge the unjust global, environmental and social conditions, have inspired many grassroots actors and activists, particularly from developing countries. For example, FoE International publication "*Clashes with Corporate Giants*" was downloaded approximately 30,000 times throughout 2003. "*Water Justice for All*" was downloaded more than 40,000 times, and "*Business Rules: Who Pays the Price?*" published for the WTO Summit in Cancun, was downloaded nearly 25,000 times in the last few months of 2003 alone (FoE International 2004).

Most FoE International revenues are gained from membership fees, FoE country members, and grants from organizations in line with FoE's mission. FoE does not accept grants from corporations of their affiliates, nor does it seek affiliation with them. In 2003, for example, FoE's assets reached approximately 300,000 euros (around \$270,000), whereas the organization's revenues reached some 1.7 million euros (around \$1.6 millions) (FoE International 2004). Around 70 percent of the revenues went to membership support funds (particularly for low-income FoE groups, e.g. in Indonesia), specific campaigns and projects, and campaign coordinators. The nature of the NGOs' missions and activities determines the level of financial support provided.

The three publicly acknowledged international NGOs - WWF, TNC and FoE – with their different circles of influence and activity have become involved with the issues of biodiversity conservation and environmental problems in Indonesia. As has been clarified, WWF first became involved in conservation activities in Indonesia in 1970. TNC became active in Indonesia in 1991. Both of these NGOs established bases for their activities by opening representational offices in Indonesia and sending in personnel for a period of several years in order to develop the desired managerial and working systems.

Unlike WWF and TNC, FoE did not send personnel into countries to establish representational offices and organizational management systems for the first few

years. FoE waited for various parties in the different parts of the world to express interest in joining the FoE International network (Wapner 1996). Once such a request was granted, the FoE would explain its working methods and the requirements and responsibilities to be fulfilled by the country joining the network. In this way, FoE developed a confederation-like organizational structure in which members could carry out their activities autonomously, while the organizational structure of FoE International remained light and flexible. This made the FoE an organization with a “quasi-anarchic character” (Wapner 1996: 124). Table 8, which follows, details the differences in the characters of TNC and FoE, which indirectly colored the Dongi-dongi controversy.

Table 8. The Nature Conservancy and Friends of the Earth: A Comparison of the Characters of Two Different International Environmental NGOs

Attributes	The Nature Conservancy (TNC)	Friends of the Earth (FoE)
Discourse/narrative	Biodiversity conservation	Social justice and equity through environmental protection
Main policy	“Biodiversity conservation first” policy	“Social justice and equity first” policy
Niche of activities	Biodiversity conservation. Environmental restoration & rehabilitation	Works at the interface between state and global civil society.
Perception toward state	States, particularly developing countries, have weak capability and resources to prevent environmental degradation	States are either the cause of environmental degradation or the obstacle to environmental protection
Form of political activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen states’ stewardship role to the environment</li> <li>• Empower local peoples in biodiversity conservation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In non-democratic regimes, FoE corner states into environmentally sound behavior</li> <li>• Force states, from the outside, to undertake environmental protection. <sup>1</sup></li> </ul>
Type of organization <sup>2</sup>	Public interest lobby	Professional protest organization
Organizational management	Centralized organizational structure	Decentralized and democratic structure

<sup>1</sup> Wapner (1996)

<sup>2</sup> Based on the typology of non-partisan political organizations developed by Diani and Donati (2002)

## B. Indonesian Environmental NGOs

The environmental movement is a new phenomenon in Indonesia. The term “environment” was brought to the public sphere and public policy concern when the State Ministry for Environment and Development Supervision was established in 1978. In developed countries, the environment became part of the public policy framework as a result of pressure from the public, in particular the common people, who were alarmed by increasing cases of industrial pollution and environmental degradation. In Indonesia, the Ministry for Environment was the brainchild of a small group of academics and enlightened bureaucrats. At the time, State Ministry for Environment was a newcomer to the world of public policy, having unclear defined authority, as well as being under funded and understaffed. Nevertheless, it opened windows for increasingly influential and vocal environmental non-government organizations (NGOs), as well as influencing the press, centers of learning and opinion leaders (Kusumaatmadja, 2000).

As a response to the government’s opening up these windows for various societal groups that were non-governmental in nature, the *Kelompok Sepuluh* (Group of 10) emerged as a cooperative working group of nature lovers and NGOs with a focus on environmental issues. *Kelompok Sepuluh* formed the embryo for the environmental movement in Indonesia and established itself as a partner to the Ministry for Environment. In 1980, upon the initiative and encouragement of *Kelompok Sepuluh*, 79 NGOs from Java and Sumatra agreed to form an environmental NGO network that was given the name *Wahana Lingkungan Hidup* (The Indonesian NGO Forum for the Environment), which then became known as WALHI.<sup>54</sup>

Before 1989, WALHI’s activities remained focused on the problem of increasing the public’s awareness of the need to preserve the environment. According to Emmy Hafild, the Executive Director of WALHI 1999-2002, “During that period, WALHI could be said to have been ‘a well-behaved child’ (in the eyes of the government)” (Yulianto 2003: 528). Up to that point in time, WALHI was not yet classified in the list of NGOs disliked by the government, in fact to the contrary, WALHI was considered a partner, in particular by the Ministry for Environment (Ibid).<sup>55</sup>

When WALHI joined FoE International and took on the predicate FoE Indonesia in 1989, the character of the environmental movement powered by WALHI began to change. For the first time, in 1989, WALHI came into confrontation with the government. WALHI filed a lawsuit against the government for providing an operational permit to PT Inti Indorayon Utama in Porsea, North Sumatra, which had then caused environmental damage in the forests around Lake Toba. Even though this suit failed in the state court, the case changed the image of WALHI from that of a “well behaved” NGO to that of an advocacy NGO that was willing to take risks. The pro-democracy movement, which was primarily driven by the activists of the Legal Aid Institute (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum*, LBH), began to view WALHI as part of their movement. As many as 14 LBH offices located in 14 different regions of Indonesia registered themselves as members of WALHI. Starting at that moment, the government classified WALHI as an NGO that needed to be watched (Yulianto 2003: 528-529).

From 1992, after the fourth National Meeting on the Environment (*Pertemuan Nasional Lingkungan Hidup - PNLH*).<sup>56</sup> WALHI further established itself as a decidedly political environmental movement. Within WALHI circles an awareness emerged that the environmental movement would never achieve its goals without a political shift in the direction of democracy. This awareness drove WALHI to widen the scope of its strategies. WALHI’s advocacy activities were no longer limited to policy issues or the resolution of environmental problems with specific causes, but expanded to involve more basic advocacy on the grassroots level as a part of efforts to strengthen the social control capabilities of various groups existing in society. With democracy becoming the goal, and environmental issues functioning as the wedge for opening doors in that direction, democratization became the main focus of attention for WALHI. This shift was integrally linked to the domination of WALHI membership by various pro-democracy groups (Yulianto 2003: 529).<sup>57</sup>

This shift in WALHI’s orientation was also fueled by both the global and local (Indonesia) political situation of that time. The Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 had strongly influenced the environmental movement in Indonesia. As has been set out in Chapter III. C. (The Politics over Access and Control of Protected Areas),

Suharto had used that forum to improve his image in international circles. In Indonesia at that time, a plurality of conflicting and changing power centers occurred as the question of succession began to surface in the run-up to the 1992 elections (Eccleston and Potter 1996, McGlynn et al. 2005). Prior to 1992 elections, intellectuals, students and other members of the public desired change and wanted somebody other than Suharto. The political space for the public started to open up -- even though it remained narrow -- as the government, the military, the courts and corporations were no longer completely at one (Eccleston and Potter 1996).

More specifically, the shift in the character of the environmental movement forged by WALHI indicated that WALHI had grown toward a crossroads at which the interests of global actors (FoE International) and those of local actors (the pro-democracy movement) coincided. Thus, it could be said that the expanding environmental movement of the 1990s in Indonesia was not simply a response to the various problems emerging in relation to the environment, but that it was also a manifestation of larger issues, those being improved social justice and a more democratic political life.

Throughout 1998, for example, WALHI actively supported the student movement that brought about the fall of Suharto's government (Yulianto 2003). WALHI had a relatively close relationship with the student movement considering that many of its members had recently been or were currently student activists. This close relationship and the shared political view that the authoritarian Suharto had to be replaced overcame any reluctance that WALHI might have had about providing logistics and other assistance to facilitate the student movement. WALHI's role in the drive toward democratization and its increasing closeness to the student movement were not isolated phenomena linked only to WALHI's National Executive offices in Jakarta, but ranged out to encompass the WALHI Regional Executive branches, including that in Central Sulawesi, which will be discussed in more detail in section IV.C. (Central Sulawesi's Environmental NGOs).

Another characteristic of the environmental movement of the 1990s was the development of networks, collaborations, coalitions, and alliances among environmental NGOs as well as other organizations and groups in order to synergize

and facilitate advocacy. When the chlorine pump at PT Inti Indorayon Utama's pulp and paper plant exploded in 1994, WALHI used its international network to pressure Indorayon into running its operations more responsibly in relation to environmental impact. Indorayon failed to get a \$10 million loan from CS First Boston Corporation after that institution was lobbied by international environmental NGOs (Eccleston and Potter 1996). When the politically authoritarian New Order was still strong, the NGO, SKEPHI, was even able to exploit its strategic international network to protect itself from acts of violence, terror and even the threat of organizational disbandment (Eccleston 1996; Eccleston and Potter 1996).

After Suharto, WALHI continued to expand its strategic working network format. One of the most important aspects of this process worth mentioning here was the establishment of the Anti-Debt Coalition (Koalas Anti-Utang – KAU), which came to be better known by its Indonesian acronym. KAU united approximately 150 NGOs, student movements, labor and fishermen's organizations across various sectors and provinces. KAU, along with the International NGOs Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID) actively advocated action on Indonesia's foreign debt (Yulianto 2003: 536).<sup>58</sup> Domestically, KAU put pressure on the government through a campaign against foreign debt, while internationally, INFID utilized its international lobbying mechanisms to influence the policies of the multi-lateral agencies and countries that were providing loans.

Another effective coalition developed by WALHI was the Koalisi Organisasi Non-Pemerintah (Coalition of Non-Governmental Organizations) and *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat* (AMAN), or the National Alliance of Customary Communities, for the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The Indonesian acronyms of these forums were then merged so that this coalition came to be called KORAN. KORAN, which boasted a membership of 15 NGOs and the AMAN organization, was established to undertake a campaign and lobbying drive for providing input on the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. This resulted in the inclusion of the right of the people to a good living environment among the human rights stated in Section 28 H of the 1945 Constitution (Yulianto 2003: 530).

The third characteristic of environmental NGOs, particularly WALHI, is the tendency to seek to exert political influence through well-published campaigns, most notably through the mass media, that were designed to raise public awareness and fan concern over environmental issues, as well as the matters of social justice and equity. A big part of the success of the environmental NGOs was related to their ability to use the media and local networks to promote various campaigns (Bryant and Bailey 1997). For example, environmental NGOs operating in the heart of the nation's capital, Jakarta, or in Palu, the capital of Central Sulawesi province had a high level of ability to attract media attention on some issues in ways that few other actors could. As Maria Hartiningsih, a *Kompas* newspaper journalist, acknowledged, WALHI was her key reference on environmental issues and matters (Yulianto 2003: 531).

Aside from that, the groups also issued bulletins, magazines, position papers or other publications that could publicize their work on policy advocacy and the struggle for social justice. For example, the National Executive of WALHI still regularly publishes *Tanah Air*, and SKEPHI has *Berita Hutan*, whereas the Central Sulawesi branch of WALHI publishes *Bergerak*. In addition, WALHI members in Central Sulawesi have their own publications as well: the Foundation for Freedom of Land (*Yayasan Tanah Merdeka - YTM*) publishes *Seputar Rakyat*, and the Legal Aid Institute of Bantaya (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Bantaya – LBH Bantaya*) issues *Bantaya*. The existence of the Internet has also strengthened the environmental NGOs in their campaigns and in the articulation of ideas and the consolidation of movements so that collective action can be more readily taken in the field.

What has been clarified through the above description of the three characteristics of environmental NGOs is that WALHI exerts its power through networks, collaborations, coalitions, and/or alliances with a variety of global, national and grassroots actors in order to achieve a wider ranging impact. The circuit of power thus accumulated was due to the discourses and narratives of democratization, social justice and equity, which were ushered in through the gateway of environmental issues. The “ideologies” and strategies of FoE International, which were complemented by the pro-democracy movement in Indonesia, made WALHI a power in itself outside of the state apparatus and the political parties.

After two decades, WALHI became the largest and most influential environmental protection network in Indonesia. When the era of regional autonomy began in 2000, the NGOs affiliated to the WALHI already held fairly strong political positions in their regions. They were frequently asked their opinions and actively involved in policymaking processes. This is the situation that unfolded in Aceh, North Sumatra, South Sumatra, Jambi, DKI Jakarta, West Java, East Java, Central Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, and West Nusa Tenggara (Yulianto 2003: 532).

WALHI activists had developed the capability, along with their international, domestic and grassroots networks, to leverage the discourses of democratization, social justice and equity into power. However, instead of applying this power for the environmental movement and to the process of democratization, the environmental NGOs in Central Sulawesi focused it on confronting each other in the Dongi-dongi conflict. This phenomenon will be discussed further in Chapter (The Conflict).

In concluding this section, the following statement by Hayness concerning the phenomenon of environmental NGOs in developing countries seems highly relevant:

“Third world environmental groups always have political goals, molded in part by a perception that political systems are not geared to deal with such concerns. Few are exclusively interested in the environment; they also tend to have a wide range of concerns, including human rights, employment, and development issues. Such groups often serve to challenge conventional culture and economic models of development to advance their politics. Such groups often serve to challenge ‘conventional cultural’ and economic models of development to advance their politics. The creation of political fact by the environmental movement ... takes place through the generation of spaces wherein new meanings are forged ...” (Hayness 2002:223).

### **C. Central Sulawesi Environmental NGOs**

In the 1980s, the first environmental Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) was initiated in Central Sulawesi under the name of *Yayasan Palu Hijau* (Green Palu Foundation, YPH). Nasir Abas, a lecturer at Agriculture Faculty of Tadulako University, pioneered the development of non-governmental organizations concerned

with environmental protection issues. Many NGO activists in Central Sulawesi are quick to point out that the NGO movement in Central Sulawesi could not have gotten off the ground without the initiation of YPH. The initiation of this organization was inspired by the establishment of WALHI in 1980, when Nasir Abas was actively taking part in WALHI's initial meetings. As was the case with WALHI, the activities of *Palu Hijau* in the 1980s remained focused on efforts to raise public awareness of the conservation of the natural environment (forests, land and water). The environmental NGOs in Palu could be said to have been the most progressive of such organizations existing throughout Sulawesi. Therefore, when WALHI still applied a presidium organizational structure, an NGO from Central Sulawesi would sit as a member of the WALHI Presidium representing organizations from throughout Sulawesi.

In the early 1990s a new generation of NGO activists surfaced. Many of them were alumni or senior students at Tadulako University, who had been actively involved in various student activities and discussions through their college years. A large number of these younger activists started their careers in NGOs through the establishment of the Rosantapura Foundation (*Yayasan Rosantapura*). Later on, due to differences in political stances among its members in regards to the Lore Lindu Dam being developed by government, several of these activists left the Rosantapura Foundation at 1995 and established a new NGO called Foundation for Freedom of Land (*Yayasan Tanah Merdeka*). YTM became a prominent organization among the NGOs in Central Sulawesi, as well as throughout Indonesia, due to their advocacy efforts to stop the development plan of the Lore Lindu Dam. YTM was formerly run by two leaders i.e. Arianto Sangaji and Hedar Laujeng. Later, due to different perceptions about managing the organization, Laujeng left YTM and founded LBH *Bantaya* (Legal Aid Institute of *Bantaya*). Sangaji and Laujeng are figures of the second generation NGOs in Central Sulawesi

The increasing opposition to and the New Order regime in the period of 1992-1997 (McGlynn et al. 2005), as well as the shift in orientation by WALHI toward becoming an advocacy NGO, greatly influenced the political life of Central Sulawesi, particularly among young people and university students. Although political space

was still relatively restricted, there was some leeway for the channeling of discontent over the longstanding denial of political rights – such as the right to express opinions and to protection from arbitrary arrest and incarceration. Also in this timeframe, the environmental movement of Central Sulawesi began to pick up momentum: advocacy actions emerged in which the Lindu community rejected the plan to build the Lore Lindu Dam.<sup>59</sup>

In 1992, when it became known that residential and farming property around Lindu Lake would be cleared for the construction of the Lore Lindu Dam, the people of Lindu rejected the plan and protested. These actions were supported by the conservation-oriented environmental NGO circles, such as YPH and TNC, as well as NGO advocacy circles, such as YTM, WALHI, and the Evergreen Indonesia Foundation (*Yayasan Evergreen Indonesia - YEI*). Besides that, strong support also came from the nature lovers' organizations grouped under the Indonesian Forum for Nature Lovers (*Forum Indonesia Pecinta Alam - FIPAL*) and pro-democracy activists affiliated to Indonesian Student Solidarity for Democracy (*Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi - SMID*), as well as a number of local journalists and intellectuals (Sangaji 2000c).

These resistance activities were carried out individually and collectively, and the rejection of the dam was expressed in many ways, ranging from protests channeled through the mass media; letters of protest sent directly to government agencies; the establishment of the Anti-Lore Lindu Dam Solidarity Committee (*Komite Solidaritas Penolakan Pembangunan PLTA Lore Lindu - KSPPPLL*);<sup>60</sup> the mobilization of mass demonstrations,<sup>61</sup> and the presentation of community stances and aspirations in a variety of dialog forums and seminars to the sending of community representatives to Palu to convey the public's concerns and aspirations to local officials and the provincial legislature, as well as to the House of Representatives and ministerial offices in Jakarta. Besides these actions, the people and organizations opposing the construction of the dam also resorted to “closed resistance” accomplished by refusing to take part in meetings or discussions with any parties that held any stance other than the rejection of the Lore Lindu Dam plan (Sangaji 2000). This Lore Lindu Dam opposition movement then expanded into a

significantly influential power due to the heavy coverage of their activities by the press. Large, nationally circulated publications, such as *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan*, *Republika*, and *The Jakarta Post*, as well as local newspapers like *Surya* and *Mercusuar*<sup>62</sup> provided such wide ranging coverage of the controversy surrounding the construction plans for the Lore Lindu Dam that the matter became a highly popular cause (Ibid). After a long period of advocacy, in 1997 the plan to build the Lore Lindu Dam was finally cancelled.<sup>63</sup>

Becoming an environmental NGO activist was one of the more popular choices of occupation among youths and university students in Palu during the decade of the 1990s. However, not all of the environmental NGOs at that time opted to become a member of the Central Sulawesi WALHI branch. For example, there was Awam Green, which had been established by nature lovers and activists, and also the Jambata Foundation (Yayasan Jambata). Other NGOs also popular among the youths and university students of Central Sulawesi were The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Conservation International (CI), and CARE.

These three international NGOs started operating in Central Sulawesi Tengah in the 1990s.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, whereas at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Central Sulawesi had been known as the “before religion” territory – borrowing a term coined by Aragon (2000) – because it was becoming an arena for competition among various Western missionary groups intent on spreading their religious teachings,<sup>65</sup> by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Central Sulawesi – because of its high level of biodiversity – had become an arena for the interests of international conservation NGOs, such as TNC, CI, CARE and FoE (which, in this case, was represented by FoE Indonesia, WALHI).

An international NGO that provide significant influence on the direction of the management of the Lore Lindu Park was TNC. TNC initiated its first activities in Indonesia in 1991 through a project in cooperation with the Directorate General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation called the Sulawesi Parks and Partnership Program. In 1992, TNC started its initial assessment of the Lore Lindu National Park area by preparing a land use and socio-economic survey (LUSE) survey. Over the nine years that followed, the TNC program in Indonesia expanded in size and scope with the support of a number of grants.

Besides the NGOs, other social institutions that became gathering places for the youths and students of Palu in the 1990s were the *Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Palu* (FKMP), which then became highly involved in the activities of the *Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi* (SMID); nature lovers' groups linked under the Central Sulawesi *Forum Indonesia Pecinta Alam* (FIPAL), and the *Front Pemuda Demokratik* (FPD).<sup>66</sup> FKMP, FIPAL and FPD were extra-university organizations formed by university students from the various institutes of higher learning in Palu.<sup>67</sup> FKMP, which was initially established with the intention of unifying the actions and steps being taken by student groups, in practice developed into an organization of discourse focusing on critical discussions, which led it to be called the "Study Circle for Critical Students". Agus Salim Feisal and Agus Salim Umar were two of the most important activists in FKMP. These two people could be described as the third generation of NGO activists in Central Sulawesi.

The year 1994 was one of local protest actions in Palu. The year opened with a demonstration against the planned construction of the Lore Lindu Dam in January, which was followed by a series of protest over the utilization of land for the UNTAD campus in Tondo; illegal mining in the Pantai Talise green zone; the refusal to accept the appointment of Rully Lamajido as the mayor of Palu,<sup>68</sup> and a demonstration by public transit vehicle drivers at the Tondo campus. This series of protest actions and the frequent holding of critical discussions soon radicalized the youth and student movement in Palu into a protest movement.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the establishment of the Democratic People's Party (*Partai Rakyat Demokratik*, PRD) in the middle of 1996 in Jakarta was greeted warmly by the student and youth activists in Central Sulawesi. Within a relatively short period of time, the Central Sulawesi branch of PRD had become a forum for the gathering youths and students affiliated with various organizations outside of the NGO networks, such as SMID dan FPD.<sup>69</sup> PRD offered idioms, narratives, and discourses that were in line with those advocated and supported by the activists of WALHI, FKMP, FIPAL and FPD. More than that, the presence of PRD also motivated the emergence of increasingly more critical discussions, whose topics

included socialism and communism. This was something deemed as taboo by the New Order government.

Close to the end of 20th century, at least three socio-political configurations found in Central Sulawesi NGOs. First, in terms of narratives and discourse use, three different narratives and discourses exert by the Central Sulawesi NGO i.e. the biodiversity conservation, democratization and local community empowerment, and development discourse. NGOs that use and exert the discourse in questions are as follows.

- a) Biodiversity conservation-based NGO, such as TNC, CI, Nature Lover Coordinating Body Central Sulawesi (*Badan Koordinasi Kelompok Pencinta Alam*, BKKPA), Partnership Forum for Lore Lindu National Park (*Forum Kemitraan Taman Nasional Lore Lindu*, FKTNLL), Friends of Maleo (*Gerakan Sahabat Maleo*, GSM), and Katopassa Indonesia Foundation (*Yayasan Katopassa Indonesia*: YAKIS) are categorized in this group. The biodiversity conservation-based NGOs focusing its activities on campaigns and education programs, as well as survey and research on ecological and conservation issues, such as wildlife protection, water resource preservation, and forest conservation. Many of the NGOs in Central Sulawesi initiate their activities on the basis of general conservation issues, only afterwards developing a specific focus or area of expertise in line with their political views, interests and the orientation of their networks.
- b) The advocacy type of NGO concerned with environmental protection through strengthening democratization, social justice, human rights and equity of the people. This type of NGOs is very much inspired by the environmental movement lead by WALHI and democracy movement lead by the legal aid organizations. NGOs categorized under this classification among others are the Central Sulawesi WALHI and its NGOs member, *Awam Green*, *Yayasan Jambata*, YPR, and legal aid organization such as YBHR (*Yayasan Bantuan Hukum Rakyat*, Legal Aid for People Foundation), and LBH *Bantaya*. The advocacy's NGOs placed themselves in opposition to the government and viewed that all private companies were exploitative capitalists, regime of corruption, collusion and nepotism, not friendly

to the conservation of nature, and marginalize local people as well as the customary community.

- c) The type of NGO focusing on the strengthening of the livelihood of local communities, which works on improving the living standards of the community by disseminating information and/or implementing various developmental projects initiated by local or central government, is known as “developmentalism” NGO. Most of the funding and activities of these NGOs is supported by or closely linked to government programs or projects. Because the government frequently requested local NGOs to implement or facilitate activities related to its programs or projects - such as the social security network program and the under-developed village program - not surprisingly, many new NGOs of this type emerged in Central Sulawesi after 1996. It is also not surprising that many of the leaders of this type of NGO have close relationships with senior government officers as well as members of the Provincial House of Representatives.

However, in Palu, due to the rapid creation of new NGOs and the high level of flux within the memberships of the NGOs, the initially chosen schools of thought or discourse use were often modified or adapted by individuals within smalls group inside a given NGO rather than being adopted intact by the entire institution itself.

Second, basically, the environmental movement, which grew up in Central Sulawesi, cannot be considered separately from the democracy movement that emerged in reaction to the repressive New Order regime. The halting of the plan to build the Lore Lindu Dam indicated that the democratization advocated and struggled for by the Central Sulawesi NGOs through environmental issues was bearing some success. This phenomenon occurring in Central Sulawesi was possible because in the same period, 1993-1997, opposition to Suharto was spreading throughout the Indonesian archipelago, and finally reached its peak in May 1998 (McGlynn et al. 2005). Agus Salim Feisal describes the youth and student movement of that time as follows:

“Among these movements were the environmental NGO movements in Central Sulawesi, which were probably of the most significance from the point of view of the radicalization of village

communities ... ” (interview with Agus Salim Feisal, March 22, 2002)

Third, during the Lindu advocacy and subsequent actions many NGO activists in Palu learned together how to organize campaigns and protests, to build up collaboration and to establish alliances and raise public awareness about their cause. The Lindu advocacy became an important lesson learned among NGO activists, which would determine the future direction of the NGO movement in Central Sulawesi. On the basis of these successful advocacy activities, many new NGOs were initiated by the college student and nature-loving activists involved in the Lindu advocacy.

When the Dongi-dongi affair emerged, the NGOs in Central Sulawesi, which formerly had been eager and able to disseminate information to the public on sensitive issues such as conservation advocacy or conservation development, were split into two opposing groups (see Annex 3). The overall NGO movement, which was initially characterized by mutual supportiveness and cooperation, became fragmented with the various NGOs taking opposing stances and even launching attacks on each other. The Dongi-dongi affair has heavily impacted the balance of power within civil society in Central Sulawesi.

A small leased house and a minimum quantity of office equipment (computers, email, telephone and fax facilities) is sufficient for running a small NGO in Palu. Many NGOs operate on a limited budget and sometimes are unable to provide monthly remuneration for their members on a continuous basis. Therefore, due to their political interests, many of the conservation and human rights NGOs in Palu rely on international funding for their activities from agencies such as USAID, NRM II-USAID, Asia Foundation, Spark-VSO, NRM II-USAID and TNC. Even though these NGOs have limited funds, they have developed good relations and network connections with journalists, as well as with the local communities they assist through facilitation or advocacy. Other political resources possessed by local NGOs are the capability to organize public campaigns and to advocate the interests of local communities.

International based NGOs have easier access to better funding resources as compared to local NGOs. The Central Sulawesi office of CARE, for example, has a staff of 10 people, large office rooms, and good hardware support, such as vehicles, motorbikes, and communication equipment. People who work in this type of NGO also get better remuneration compared to local NGO workers. For example, a local conservation specialist who worked in this type of NGO received \$750 as a monthly salary, while a database operator could get \$100 per month.


## V. THE FARMERS AND THEIR VILLAGES

### A. The Formation of Villages and Its Agrarian Structure: The Case of the Four Resettlement Villages

Palolo Valley is one of the topographically flat valleys that stretch longitudinally toward the East from the downstream area facing on Tomini Bay. This valley is the easternmost segment of the Palu Valley, which is the most densely populated valley in Central Sulawesi at this time. This valley is also often called Sopo Valley because this is the area through which the Sopo-Gumbasa River flows toward Palu. This region is the main watershed for the upstream section of the Sopo River Basin system, while the city of Palu and part of Sigi Biromaru Subdistrict make up the downstream area.

The Palolo area is now classified as a Subdistrict in its own right, after being split off from Sigi Biromaru Subdistrict. Even so, the Palolo Subdistrict, which is dominated by dry soil, is now actually more densely populated than its mother subdistrict. It is now the third most densely populated subdistrict in Donggala District after the Banawa and Parigi subdistrict. The high population density of this area is a contemporary phenomenon. Less than four decades ago, this area was forest. Then migrants, those who came in individually or through government relocation programs, began settling there. This has led to a multi-ethnic population pattern, which is fairly characteristic of the majority of villages in Central Sulawesi.

From the point of view of settlement distribution, there were at least three waves in the history of the development of villages in the Palolo area [Syahyuti 2002: 35-37]. Up to 1960 there were only eight villages that were all considered the original settlements of the local Kaili tribe. All of these villages, Sigimpu, Petimbe, Kapiroe, Bunga, Bakubakulu, Bobo, Lemban Tongoa, and Makmur, were set on the west (see Figure 3). Up until now, the Kaili people are the dominant ethnic group in the population of these villages.



The next wave involved the formation of more villages populated by the Kaili people, either developed on their own or through government resettlement. There were six villages formed in this second wave, Rahmat, Kamarora A and B, Kadidia, Sintuwu, and Ranteleda (see Figure 3). The Kaili tribe dominates in terms of population in these villages up to now.

The third wave and last wave resulted in the establishment of seven villages in the eastern part of this area; Rejeki, Tanah Harapan, Ampera, Berdikari, Bahagia, Tongoa and Uenuni. Different from the earlier settlements, the population of these villages is dominated by newcomers from outside the area, in particular people of Bugis and Toraja ethnic origins, with the last three villages mentioned predominantly populated by transmigrants from Jawa.

In many ways, the socio-agrarian conditions in the above-mentioned villages were created in line with the history of development of the region. There were many factors involved in the development of this area, such as the time at which the migration occurred, ethnic origins of migrants, the way in which agricultural resources were procured, and government policies, among others, which determined the agrarian structure in the villages.

The settlement of the strategically located Palolo valley is a key factor in the rapid population growth in the region. Besides having relatively fertile soil, this area is crossed by the main Palu-Napu axis road, which connects Palu to the surrounding areas. The ease of mobility provided by this transportation infrastructure gives Palolo a high economic value, which attracts many newcomers. Statistical data indicates that the population of Palolo grew 8.8 percent in the 1998-1999 period; a spectacular increase compared to the average rate of growth for Donggala District of only 1.63 percent for the same period. Even though, from a territorial point of view, Palolo Subdistrict has the least land area, only 2.03 percent of the total area of Donggala District (Kabupaten Donggala, 2000).

Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat are villages in Palolo Valley which have been frequently influenced by various state policies since the beginning of their establishment. At least two government policies have had an enormous influence on the establishment of the villages and on the agrarian structure of the four villages: the policy on the Resettlement of Community Tribes (*Pemukiman Kembali*

*Suku Terasing*), and the policy on the status and function of forest areas in Palolo Valley.

### **1. The National Policy on Resettlement of Community Tribes**

This policy was conducted in the 1970s and the 1980s throughout Indonesia. The program included provision of guidance in relation to the livelihood of the community tribes to enable them to change their resettlement forms and patterns, cultivation techniques, cultural expressions, formal education, health care, religion, and interaction within the broad community, etc. The targets were the isolated or backward tribes in various upland areas who in the eyes of the decision makers, bureaucrats and academicians were viewed as stubborn, innocent tribals groupings maintaining distinctive traditional ways of life, subsisting on traditional livelihoods and shifting cultivation, which threatened the sustainability of the forests. This social construction of uplanders as backward people has legitimated harsh measures, such as land expropriation and forced resettlement (Li 1999:xvii).

In Donggala District, the resettlement program was implemented in 1971, and called the *Pemanti Dalika* Project (Saleh, 2001:4–5). At Palolo Valley, the resettlement program was begun in 1974 by establishing Rahmat Village located to the southeast of Makmur Village. The people reallocated to Rahmat Village were from the Morui, Salua, Bolobia, Biromaru, Polele, Wayu, Doda, Onjosua, Beka and Dolo areas (Forum Petani Merdeka, et al., 2001a: 3). Most of the communities resettled by this program were from the Da'a tribe. This community lived scattered in various areas in the upland area of Kamalisi Mountain. Their lives were very much dependent on the forest and dry land ecosystem (Ibid: 6).

Further, in 1979 about 500 households (2,437 people) were resettled at Kamarora Village located at the eastern edge of Rahmat Village. These households came from Morui (70 households); Salua (30); Biromaru (70); Bolobia (70); W. Rolele (60); Wayu (60); Doda (50); Onjosua (50); Beka (20), with 20 households from various other places (Forum Petani Merdeka et al. 2001a). In 1998, Kamarora Village was expanded into two villages namely Kamarora A and Kamarora B due to the huge number of its villagers (Ibid: 3).

In 1983, another resettlement move was carried out through the local transmigration program for 100 heads of households to Kadidia sub-village. At that

time Kadidia was one of the sub-villages of Kamarora Village, Kadidia has since come to be classified as a village. Those reallocated to Kadidia came from Dolo Subdistrict (52 households), Marawola Subdistrict (36 hh), and Kulawi Subdistrict (12 hh) (Ibid: 3).

In Palolo valley, the village of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia, and Rahmat, as the second group in the history of village establishment, were categorized as new villages (Syahyuti, 2002:35-37). Although the majority of people in the four villages are from the Kaili Da'a ethnic community, the populace of the area is comprised of various sub-ethnic groups coming from different places. This situation is quite different from that in "the original villages" which had experienced a long process of co-evolution with the local ecosystem, and which were composed of relatively homogenous populations, such as those found at the villages of Sigimpu, Petimbe, Kapiroe, Bunga, Bakubakulu, Bolo, Lemban Tongoa and Makmur located in the same valley.

The above condition indicates that the villagers of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia, and Rahmat – as is characteristic of frontier settlers – live within a loosely knit type of social relations. A relatively short adaptation period, limitedness of old social ties and institutions in a new environment, and structural pressure are causes of an uneven process in the co-evolution of the four villages. Therefore, the "community" or local livelihood systems in the four villages have not yet been fully established (cf. Syahyuti, 2002). A social system disrupted internally by massive external structural pressures leads to difficulties in establishing a new social organization in those villages.

Within the environs of the four resettlement villages, the natural population growth was relatively high, with the population doubling within a period of 20 years (Suara Pembaruan, September 28, 2001). Reflect the conditions in a wider area, this "population momentum" was accelerated further by the flow of migrants into the villages in Palolo in the wake of the massive increases in the prices of cocoa and coffee after the monetary crisis of 1997. It was this rapid growth, which forced the Donggala administration to divide Kamarora village into three designated villages, Kamarora A, Kamarora B, and Kadidia, in 1998.

The expansion of this administrative area, however, could not hinder the rapid rate of population growth. Data released by YBHR, for example, indicated that at the beginning of 2001 the number of heads of families in those four villages had risen to 1,552.<sup>70</sup> It was not long before this relatively dramatic population growth led to problems, in particular the inability of the land to accommodate the larger number of people living there.

For example, many of the children of the first generation to relocate were forced to continue living with their parents even after forming their own families due to the limited amount of open land available for them. A number of surveys done by the Yayasan Pusaka Alam Nusantara (YPAN), YBHR dan WALHI uncovered the prevalence of this pattern in all of the four resettlement villages. These surveys documented several cases in which one house was resided in by two or three family heads. In this way, the rapid development growth affected the socio-agrarian conditions of these resettlement villages.

One of the most predominant characteristics of the agrarian structure of the four villages, Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat, was the large number of family heads that did not have their own land to cultivate. This can be understood in terms of the amount of land actually available and the burgeoning numbers of area residents.

However, this pattern of agrarian structure has its own cultural and structural dimensions outside of demographic considerations. Even though there is not enough data to support a more specific conclusion concerning the cultural dimension in that area, cultural dimension studies in other areas indicate the significance of this variable. The study done by Syahyuti (2002) in the villages of Sintuwu and Berdikari, for example, indicates that the Kaili and Kulawi tribes have more varieties of rituals held at greater expense than the types and costs of rituals of the Bugis tribe.<sup>71</sup> This sort of “ritual economy” (Hefner 1985) at once hinders and spurs the consumer and production patterns of the tribes concerned, and, in turn, has a larger influence on their socio-economic security.

However that may be, in these four villages the structural dimension is the most predominant factor in determining the socio-agrarian structure. This is because this dimension creates the fairly sharp imbalance in the agrarian structure of these villages, in terms of both vertical and horizontal processes.

The agrarian imbalances caused by vertical processes have occurred since the beginning of the relocation process itself. The resettlement program stipulated that each family head relocated would be provided with two hectares of land in the new location. The government had made this same promise to the various communities being relocated to Palolo. However, when the resettlers arrived at the new location, each family head received only between 0.8 and one hectare of land.

This discrepancy was not initially an issue for the people being relocated into that area, which is understandable because they still had enough leeway in the exploitation of the wide range and number of agrarian resources available. They cleared the forest and began planting hard crops, such as coffee and cocoa. They also exploited forestry resources like rattan, wood and game animals.

Research by Li and Sangaji (2003) in Rahmat village indicates that the villagers living there in the period of 1975-1977, (initially) had permission from the authorities to cultivate land and plant coffee in the forested areas bordering on the their villages. This access to the forests was allowed because not all families had received irrigated rice fields, or their fields had flooded out or been taken over by the local authorities, or even sold because the owners were not skilled at cultivating irrigated fields and preferred to work the land in the forest (Li and Sangaji 2003:20). The residents of Rahmat village did not consider this additional land as ancestral land. They continued to respect the forest borders some three km from the residential area of Rahmat village.

## **2. The Status and Function of Forest Areas in Palolo Valley and Its Changes over time**

The second state policy that changes significantly the agrarian structure of the four resettlement villages was the status and function of forest areas in Palolo Valley. In the 1970s, the Department of Forestry established the Palolo Valley forests – including the areas the villagers were using, as well as the Dongi-dongi area – as a production forest under the auspices of PT Kebun Sari as holder of a Forestry Business License (*Hak Pengusahaan Hutan - HPH*). Under the production forest regime the communities in the nine surrounding villages, Sintuwu, Bobo, Sigimpu, Bakubakulu, Rahmat, Kadidia, Kamarora A, Kamarora B, and Tongoa, still had

access to and were not prohibited from collecting rattan and cultivating coffee, cocoa, maize, rain-fed paddy, and cassava (Syahyuti, 2002: 66; Sondakh, 2002: 73).<sup>72</sup> It could be said that at that time the resettlement village economies were still subsistent and dependent on the agrarian resources in the villages and the natural resources available in the forested areas (this included going to work for permit holder PT Kebun Sari).

However, when the production forest status officially changed to that of a wildlife reserve in 1981, the community no longer had any access or control of the forest.<sup>73</sup> The unrest among villagers in Palolo Valley increased in intensity when the Forestry Department began surveying and setting out boundary markers for the Lore Lindu National Park in the period of 1994-1997. With the placement of the boundary markers, the resettlement villages came face to face with the national park territory, which ran along the southern reaches of the village limits. The problem was that, according to the area residents, the boundary markers were placed in such a way that they took up too much space and defined the boundaries well within the previously established village limits. Besides that, the orchards that the villagers had planted with coffee and cocoa long beforehand now fell within the boundaries of the national park. Also, as a result of the new boundaries, the villagers could no longer exploit the natural resources of the forest because the Forest Rangers refused to allow them access for hunting, cutting wood or cultivating crops within the national park territory. These restrictions were even more strongly enforced after the Department of Forestry formed the Lore Lindu National Park Authority (Balai Taman Nasional Lore Lindu - BTNLL) as part of its technical implementation of the management of the national park.

Thus, the changes in government policies on the status and function of forest areas in Palolo Valley have modified the access to and control of forest resources by the villagers in Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia, Rahmat Villages and other villages adjacent to the Park, such as Sintuwu, Bobo, Sigimpu, Bakubakulu, and Tongoa. The villagers are no longer allowed access to the forest to collect rattan and to cultivate coffee, cocoa, maize, rain-fed paddy and cassava. Those who are still utilizing the forest area are accused of being encroachers (Syahyuti, 2002: 66; Sondakh, 2002: 73; Forum Petani Merdeka et al., 2001a: 2). Although they are allowed to harvest existing cocoa and coffee crops, they are prohibited from

maintaining the plants that yield those crops. As a result, the plants slowly stopped growing. The people arrested for collecting rattan have been put in prison and the collected rattan was destroyed (Forum Petani Merdeka: FPM, et al., 2001a:2). Nevertheless, the villagers have not been discouraged from utilizing the forest area as they had done previously, including utilizing the land in the Dongi-dongi area.

In Rahmat village, not only did the villagers lose access to their crops located in the forest, with the survey the borders of the national park expanded into a corner of the village following the route of PT. Kebun Sari's logging road, which was known locally as "Japanese Road".<sup>74</sup> This new border caused their orchards and other cultivated areas to lie well within the boundaries of the national park, making their huts and orchards the targets of the Forest Rangers who were determined to destroy them (Li and Sangaji 2003:20).

Besides resulting in part from these vertical processes, changes in the agrarian structure of the resettlement villages also occurred as a result of horizontal processes. The migration of Bugis tribal people, the cocoa boom, and the sale of agricultural land were all factors causing the drastic change in the agrarian structure of almost all of the villages in Palolo Valley (Li and Sangaji 2003, Sitorus 2002c). Although the Bugis people had migrated into the area in small numbers since the end of the 1960s, the largest wave of migration took place when cocoa prices skyrocketed during the monetary crisis of 1997 (Ibid).

From 1997 onwards a relatively large area of land had fallen into the hands of the Bugis migrants who cultivated cocoa. A sizable segment of this land was procured from government officials (village heads and village administration staff, as well as other local officials), who had come into possession of them through both legal and illegal methods (Li and Sangaji 2003). The legitimization of land sold by government officials became an issue for the local people. In Rahmat, the land sold to the Bugis migrants was actually part of the land initially allocated for the resettlers, but had been misappropriated by the local officials. In the villages of Watumaeta and Sedoa, the sale of land by local officials was the main motivating factor for the migration of the Bugis into those villages. (Ibid: 19).

In the early of 2000s, the Buginese settlers and the cocoa boom have fundamentally changed the rural socio economic condition of the villages around Lore

Lindu Park. The cocoa boom radically changed the rural social formation from the subsistence mode of production previously practiced by the indigenous people of *Kaili* to the economic production orientation practiced predominantly by the Buginese. Hence, “*Revolusi Cokelat*” (cocoa revolution) upgraded the Buginese from “landless” to “landed”, whereas the *Kaili* were downgraded from “landed” to “landless” (Sitorus 2002c).

According to Li and Sangaji (2003:19), the class, tribal and religious differences between the Bugis migrants and the original residents held major potential to explode into horizontal conflict. The narrative of “us against them” was frequently expressed by the original residents both directly and indirectly toward the Bugis migrants. The local people depicted the Bugis newcomers as “rich people”, while the Bugis migrants described the locals as “people who just sell their land then work as day laborers or collect rattan” (Ibid).

By the end of the 1990s, the number of residents of the four resettlement villages had doubled from the original number of resettlers. Every family that had received from 0.8 to one hectare of land at the time of resettlement had grown into two or three families. These new family units clearly could not be accommodated by such small plots of land.

The increased populations of the resettlement villages, the closure of access to the national park, as well as the transfer of significant amounts of land into the hands of the Bugis migrants resulted in an acute land crisis for the original resettlers and their descendents. The younger generation had to live in cramped quarters at their parents’ homes and work as coolies at cocoa plantations or subsist as landless farmers. Up to now, there is no accurate data on the exact number of local residents who are landless. Government data sets the number at between 400 and 500 family heads without land in those four villages (Suara Pembaruan, October 1, 2001). Data gathered by YBHR indicates a much larger number of 931 family heads as can be seen in Table 9.

Similar information was elucidated by the provincial government of Central Sulawesi, which reported that 200 out of 600 households in Rahmat Village had no land (Central Sulawesi Governor, 2001 *in* Firdaus, 2001). A survey conducted in Rahmat Village by an anthropologist, Tania Li, provides similar information: 80 out of 177 households at Sub-village 1 (Hamlet 1) had no land at all (Sangaji, 2001b: 9).

Table 9. Number and Percentage of Landless Farmers in the Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Rahmat and Kadidia Villages

Village	Total Households	Households owning Housing		Landless Farmers	
		Households	%	Households	%
Kamarora A	479	-	-	220	46
Kamarora B	313	298	95	261	83
Rahmat	600	400	67	325	54
Kadidia	160	100	62	125	78
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,552</b>			<b>931</b>	<b>60</b>

Source: Firdaus (2001), Forum Petani Merdeka, *et al.* (2001a: 4-5)  
 (- : no data)

Meanwhile, government institutions occupy large areas of land for their employees in Rahmat Village. For example, the Local Internal Audit Office (*Kantor Inspektorat Daerah*), Justice Office (*Kantor Pengadilan Negeri*), Palu, and Local Development Bank (*Bank Pembangunan Daerah*), each occupy around 100 ha, while former governors/officials of Central Sulawesi Drs. H. Galib Lasahido (around 175 ha) and H. Abdul Azis Lamajido SH (approximately 30 ha) also have use of large areas of land (WALHI Sulteng, 2001: 8).

However, since the fall of the New Order regime, the villagers have recommenced their agricultural activities in the national park. They have expanded their areas of cultivation and begun replacing coffee with cocoa as can be seen from the results of monitoring done by The Nature Conservancy in Rahmat village (The Nature Conservancy 2002c). The replacement of coffee with cocoa has resulted in large trees being cut to prevent their foliage from blocking the sun. At the beginning of 2001, after several confrontations with the locals, the Forest Rangers finally left the villages of Rahmat, Kamarora, Sintuwu and Tongoa (Li and Sangaji 2003). Without the Forest Rangers, the forest canopy in the area is becoming increasingly open. The forest ecosystem around the human habitat had already changed drastically even before the occupation of Dongi-dongi.

### B. Dongi-dongi – A Contested Terrain

Prior to the determination of the Lore Lindu area as the Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve in 1981, in 1976 the central government through Directorate General of Forestry (under the Ministry of Agriculture) provided a forest concession to PT

Kebun Sari to exploit *Agathis lorantifolia*. This concession, covering 25,000 to 50,000 along the Palolo Subdistrict road in the Donggala District and Napu, Poso District, including the Dongi-dongi area, was effective for 20 years (Sondakh 2002: 72).<sup>75</sup> During the exploitation, PT Kebun Sari used Dongi-dongi as its base camp due to its strategic position to support the activity in the Palolo and Napu areas. The supporting facilities for PT Kebun Sari, including a helicopter paddock, maintenance and workshop facilities, oil and fuel supplies, as well as a non-permanent housing complex for field operators, were located in Dongi-dongi.<sup>76</sup> In addition, PT Kebun Sari built a road to support its forest exploitation. This road, known by the local people as “Japanese Road” was to pass through the villages at Palolo and Dongi-dongi, and Napu. Presently, this road, passing through Dongi-dongi, is vital in connecting Palolo and Napu.

Close to the end of the 1980s, the intensity of forest exploitation by PT Kebun Sari at Palolo was decreasing significantly due to a lower volume of the *Agathis* timber than had been calculated and estimated in the preliminary survey (Ibid: 73). In 1981, the Lore Lindu forest, which overlapped the concession area of PT Kebun Sari, whose permit was still effective despite the decrease in its exploitation activity, was designated by the government as a Wildlife Reserve (Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve).<sup>77</sup> In 1993/1994 the forest concession permit of PT. Kebun Sari in Palolo was terminated, and the area was returned to the government. However, PT Kebun Sari requested a 15-year extension (Ibid: 73) for its operation in the Napu area.

When the production forest was designated as a wildlife reserve (1981), and its status later changed to that of a national park (1993), the change in the forest’s status was not followed by a change in its boundary. The borderline of the concession area of PT Kebun Sari was used as the border of Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve, which later became the Lore Lindu National Park. As a result, the community members who were still doing farming activities in the forest area were accused of being illegal loggers by the government (Sondakh, 2002: 66).

When Dongi-dongi was still functioning as the base camp of PT Kebun Sari, even prior to the establishment of the “Japanese Road”, the people of the surrounding villages cultivated coffee and cocoa and collected rattan in certain areas. However, when Dongi-dongi’s status was altered from that of a production forest to that of the Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve, and then to that of a national park, the local community

was no longer afforded their previous access to and control of the area's natural resources. Forest Rangers now restricted the community's access to the areas where they used to harvest coffee and cocoa from the trees they had planted prior to the designation of the area as a wildlife reserve and later as a national park.

Before 2001, it was recorded four times that the surrounding community opened and occupied Dongi-dongi for farming and settlement. The first occupation conducted in 1981. The people of Bunga Village occupied the base camp left in the wake of the construction of the Japanese Road. The second occupation occurred in 1982. Under the leadership of Guru Yusuf, the people of Kamarora attempted to prepare new settlement of Kadidia Village.

The third occupation happened on 14 May 1998, when approximately 450 heads of households, mostly small-scale entrepreneurs from the Rahmat, Kamarora, Kadidia, Balompea and Dangaran villages, cleared 50 ha in Dongi-dongi to have additional land.<sup>78</sup> This time the villagers sent a letter of request to the Governor of Central Sulawesi to access and use the Dongi-dongi area. On June 16, 1998, the Governor rejected the villager's proposal and ordered them to stop the occupation.<sup>79</sup> The Park Authority, government officials and the police of the Sigi Biromaru and Lore Utara Subdistrict return 450 households to their original villages.

The provincial government then promised to give them alternative land located in the Manggalapi area close to Sausu village in the Parigi Subdistrict, Donggala District. However, the villagers complained that the area offered was too remote from Palolo Subdistrict. In addition, there were no transportation facilities serving that area. Some of the villagers who were moved to this new place, were later found to have gone back to their original villages. Disappointed with the situation, on October 1998, nearly a hundred of people from nine villages (Sintuwu, Bobo, Bunga, Kapiroe, Rahmat, Kadidia, Kamarora A, Kamarora B, and Tongoa) protested to the Provincial Parliament and Park Authority to demand access to forest resources.

The fourth occupation was in 1999. Around 40 people cleared 50 ha of land in Dongi-dongi. All of these efforts were aborted by the Forest Rangers, with a total of 80 people arrested but later freed, except for one person, Mr. Lili, who was held for four months at Maesa Prison, Palu, without any judicial process (Forum Petani

Merdeka, et al., 2001b: 3; Sangaji: 2001b: 8). The rest of the community members involved were sent back to their original villages.

On June 3, 1999, shortly after the fourth occupation, the Head of Donggala District held a coordination meeting to prevent the recurrence of occupation at Dongi-dongi. The meeting was attended by the Donggala government officials, provincial forestry officers, Park Authority, and NGOs, as well as the heads of Rahmat, Kamarora B, Kadidia, and Tongoa villages. The results, among others, were to stop the Dongi-dongi occupation, develop social forestry system for increasing the livelihood of the villagers residing close to the Park, identify the farmers and their cultivation areas in the Park, and mapping degraded forest. All participants agreed that the next meeting should be held on July 1999 facilitated by YPAN.<sup>80</sup>

Throughout September to December 1999, YPAN and members of Partnership Forum for Lore Lindu National Park (*Forum Kemitraan Taman Nasional Lore Lindu, FKTNLL*) facilitated a series of meetings between four resettlement villagers and Sintuwu villagers with Park Authority and local government (Donggala District). YPAN found the problem to be complex, involving claims by the villagers that they received only one hectare of the two hectares promised to them during the resettlement, and the fact that some coffee plantation were already planted before the Park was declared in 1982 (The Nature Conservancy 2000).

One important meeting held during that time was in October 1999 when the Park Authority held a dialog with the resettlement villagers. During the meeting, the following issues were identified.

1. As regards the matter of the national park border markers, the villagers demanded:  
(1) the return of the national park boundaries to the original borders because the villagers felt that they had owned that land before the park was established; (2) that it be recognized that the villagers had not been involved in the process of establishing the boundaries of the Lore Lindu National Park; (3) that the Forest Inventory and Planology Agency of the Department of Forestry register new legal boundaries; (4) and that an open forest area be established, which could be exploited by the people living around the national park.
2. As regards the problem of the Lore Lindu National Park, the villagers demanded that the Park Authority should establish a management agreement with the local

community, while the villagers would agree to guard the integrity of the Lore Lindu National Park.

3. As regards the history and socio-cultural conditions of the area, the villagers asked that the rights of the local community be based on historical, cultural and customary considerations.
4. As regards economic development of the area, the villagers demanded that the government and other concerned parties pay more serious attention to developing the economy of the local populace.
5. As regards the conflicts that had arisen, the villagers demanded: (1) that the conflict between the local community and the Lore Lindu National park be resolved immediately at the location; (2) that the Forest Rangers work with the local people to preserve the Lore Lindu National Park, and (3) that both the officials and the local people seek alternatives income sources in order to improve the economic conditions of the local community.

From January to July of 2000, YPAN facilitated the formulation of village plans and community agreements. After a series of data collection activities and participatory village mapping, on August 10-11, 2000, YPAN organized a workshop for drafting the Village Plan and Community Agreement of the Kamarora A, Kamarora B and Kadidia village.<sup>81</sup> On September 2000, the Village Plan and Community Agreement<sup>82</sup> was presented in a multi-stakeholder dialogue involving the villagers' leaders, CSIADCP, Central Sulawesi Planning Board, District of Donggala Planning Board, all agriculture-based agencies and health agencies under Donggala District, members of the Donggala legislature, and the Park Authority, as well as NGOs. The main objective of the dialogue was to communicate the village plan to the decision makers particularly CSIADCP.

At the end of the meeting, the local government concluded that basically the proposed programs are well accepted, as they were in line with the CSIADCP mission and programs. The CSIADCP was to review the Village Plan and communicate its result to the villagers.<sup>83</sup> Since CSIADCP was designed for protecting the Lore Lindu National Park through increasing the livelihood of the local people surrounding the Park, all involved actors, particularly the villagers, had a high level of optimism that CSIADCP could disentangle the problems. After more than six months of waiting,

including three visits to the CSIADCP office at Palu to check on progress, however, no follow-up action from the CSIADCP management had materialized. The villagers became more frustrated and distrustful. In fact, during the 2000 September dialogue, the leaders from Kadidia and Kamarora A had anticipated this situation as follows.

“I don’t want to hear any more promises ... We have been trained to make proposals, and in March 2000 we submitted a proposal to the Lore Lindu National Park Authority for which we still have not received a response. Are you gentlemen not embarrassed that the Lore Lindu National Park is indeed a fine place, while its people remain ignorant and backward?” (Notes from a Dialogue between Villagers of Kamarora A, Kamarora B and Kadidia with local government officials, September 6, 2000).

The situation that resulted in the land crisis in the four resettlement villages had yet to be resolved. What’s more, the alternative land in Manggalapi that had been offered by the government turned out to have not met the expectations of the residents of the resettlement villages.

### **C. Marginality, Power and Resistance**

The failure of the CSIADCP and the Provincial Government to find a way out of the land crisis in the four resettlement villages eradicated any hope among the local people of gaining access to and control over the surrounding land and forest. Their future looked increasingly uncertain. They now felt as if they were truly a marginal people. Li (1999), in her writing *Transforming the Indonesian Upland*, describes this phenomenon as the result of a long and continuing history of political and economic decisions and social engagement that impinged on the people through (mostly) the process of territorialization. Vandergeest and Peluso (1995 in Li 1999:12) describe the territorialization process as the process through which “all modern states divide their territories into complex and overlapping political and economic zones, rearrange people and resources within these units, and create regulations delineating how and by whom these areas can be used”. In Indonesia, at least four kinds of territorialization interventions were found, i.e. official designation of land as state forest; the development of plantation and transmigration sites; the regularizing of spontaneous land settlement; and the resettlement of isolated or backward tribes (*pemukiman masyarakat terasing*) into properly administered villages (Li 1999:14). Albeit

territorializing interventions in the uplands of Indonesia have historically been less intense than that in the lowlands, the interventions have been of central importance in transforming the uplands, (Li 1999:12).

The marginalization and disempowerment of the residents of these four resettlement villages invited the sympathy of two local NGOs in Palu - YBHR and Central Sulawesi WALHI. On the basis of their success in advocacy relating to the Lore Lindu Dam (see Chapter IV.C. Central Sulawesi Environmental NGOs), these two NGOs decided to support the efforts of the residents of the resettlement villages to overcome the land crisis they were facing. However, the approach of these two NGOs was different from that previously undertaken by YPAN dan FKTNLL. YBHR dan Central Sulawesi WALHI chose the method of advocacy through mediation. The selection of this strategy brought with it an important implication: a change in the power relations between the state and the local people.

A number of meetings held in the villages, as well as in the city of Palu, within a more democratic climate, brought the new critical awareness to the community that the marginalization they had been experiencing as a result of political decisions by the state that were not supportive of their needs must come to an immediate end. These intense dialogues with the two NGOs brought them to the conclusion that the people had to take action to establish their rights to the land after the various efforts at mediation had led to a dead-end. The residents of the four resettlement villages, motivated to unify and organize their activities and encouraged by the support of the two NGOs that were experienced in advocacy and had mass organizational skills, joined together to form the *Forum Petani Merdeka* (FPM, Independence Farmer Forum). However, who would be the appropriate leader for this organization?

The marginalization that had been going on for so long resulting in extreme uncertainty had caused the villagers to take on a hard, overly sensitive and myopic attitude. Therefore, it is not surprising that a large number of seemingly innocuous issues arising in the villages often ended in conflict or violence. This kind of situation must be understood as a product of the coercive power of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority during the New Order. Moreover, since coercive power commonly produces resistance, which eventually leads to alienation (Etzioni 1961 in Pierce and Nestrom 1995), then any individuals, who are courageous enough to stand up against the coercive power will become the focus of hope for the populace or group in

question. This type of social situation will have a great deal of influence upon “who will be the leader” of the resettlement villagers.

“Who will be the leader” is also influenced by the presence or the lack of individuals with the capability to access and control the scarce resources needed by the group to overcome the pressing issues. The backing of the residents of the four resettlement villages by YBHR and Central Sulawesi WALHI carried with it the implication that there would have to be enough resources to support the various advocacy activities directed by the two NGOs. However, these two local NGOs were not affluent organizations. For that reason, the villagers who were able to provide the resources required for the various meetings in the village, as well as the other meetings that had to be held and the lobbying that had to be done in relation to various parties in Palu, including the mobilization of villagers for demonstrations in that city, became the focus of attention of the villagers. Therefore, power would automatically be within the grasp of those individuals who had access and control of critical resources.

The leadership process that takes place within a social situation like this will result in the emergence of leaders who are courageous - including those who are brave enough to stand up against the government – determined, cool-headed, and feared, as well as never lacking in confidence in confrontations with anyone, while also having access to the resources required by the members of the community. These leadership characteristics were all found in the local figure, Papa Gola, who was selected as the first chairman of the FPM. Papa Gola reflects perfectly the description of a leader set out by Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) in *Who Gets Power – and How They Hold on to it*.

“Power derives from activities rather than individuals, and the power possessed by a leader is never absolute. Power in social systems tends to follow to those individuals who possess the resources, especially if those are scarce resources that the groups needs to solve its critical problems. The individual in a group, therefore, who is capable of contributing the scarce resources needed by the group to solve its pressing problems tends to define leadership, the nature of the leader’s power, and the amount of influence that he is capable exercising.” (Salancik and Pfeffer 1977 in Pierce and Newstrom 1995:22)

The social movement set into motion by YBHR and WALHI was basically rooted in the resistance to the coercive power exerted by the state. Therefore, it is not

surprising that the presence of YBHR and Central Sulawesi WALHI – which supported the villagers efforts to bravely face the government - plus FPM, which was led by Papa Gola, succeeded within a short time to escalate in expanding into a resistance power equal to the existing coercive power. Regardless of the source of power accessed by FPM, what was clear was that the unequal power relations between the state and the resettlement villagers had shifted.

There were at least two sources of power exploited by the parties that supported the opening up of the Dongi-dongi forest. The first was the power of discourse. YBHR and Central Sulawesi WALHI succeeded in facilitating the discourse of agrarian justice into a power as strong as that of the power generated by the conservation discourse. Through this agrarian discourse, the NGOs, who were in sympathy with the resettlement villagers, grew in number. The resettlement villagers were no longer alone in their stance against the state. The matter of how the various disputing parties exerted power through is discussed in Chapter VII – The Conflicts.

The second source of power was resources that needed for the advocacy actions. The advocacy actions directed by YBHR and Central Sulawesi WALHI require extensive resources in the eyes of the villagers, who were predominantly poverty stricken. This presented a dilemma that could only be resolved by courageous decisions that only leaders with the type of character possessed by Papa Gola could make: access Dongi-dongi forest and sell the logs. Although access to this resource was illegal, this decision was deliberately made Papa Gola, who had the support of the several villagers and his closest friends and colleagues. The illegal logging done was certainly not an agenda item of the FPM itself. However, with these resources, Papa Gola achieved the power to facilitate all kinds of advocacy activities that were being undertaken by YBHR, WALHI and FPM, while also creating a strong network with the police and government officers who were linked to illegal logging.

These two sources of power functioned within their own channels and were effectively leveraged/exercised by each actor in such a way that the totality resulted in a cumulative strength that rivaled that of the coercive power being flaunted by the state. As a result, the resettlement villagers were able to continue their residence in and farming of the Dongi-dongi area without any serious threat or pressure to leave the area from the authorities.

This condition of equal relations did not mean that there was no sacrifice. It did not take long before the practice of illegal logging and the ensuing environmental damage that occurred in the Dongi-dongi area brought negative criticism to bear on WALHI. The activities of Papa Gola and his followers caused WALHI's support of FPM's struggle to become only half-hearted. A number of FPM members, including leading female figures, also disapproved of the illegal logging practices undertaken by Papa Gola and his followers. However, nobody had the courage to go up against Papa Gola. At the end of 2002, when a number of the Dongi-dongi female leaders displayed banners in the village protesting the ongoing illegal logging, Papa Gola not only threatened them, but also approached female NGO activists in Palu directly and threatened them with sharp weapons. Pak Gola accused these female NGO activists of causing the protests among the Dongi-dongi women.

## VI. THE CONFLICTS

The controversy surrounding the case of the occupation of Dongi-dongi exhibits a typical pattern of conflict, which escalates toward degradation tendencies if seen in the framework of social evolution. This social process, which began with acts of protest directed at the government by local farmers, ended anticlimactically with conflicts among the various components of the civil community itself. In order to understand how this could have happened, it is important to analyze the dynamics of the political process occurring during the period of controversy, the interactions of the people and organizations involved, the different phases of the unfolding controversy, and the forms it took.

### A. The Emergence of Conflict

#### 1. The Occupation

On June 19, 2001, 200 people from the villages of Rahmat, Kadidia and Kamarora A and B demonstrated at the Central Sulawesi Provincial Legislature Building along with the Central Sulawesi branch of WALHI and YBHR.<sup>84</sup> In front of the members of parliament and local journalists, the FPM released a declaration that demanded: (1) Provision of land at the former concession area of PT Kebun Sari (Dongi-dongi) to landless farmers; (2) Provision of the full two ha of land as promised by the Resettlement Project and Local Transmigration Program in 1979 and 1983; (3) The recognition and continuation of the ownership of the plants cultivated in the Lore Lindu National Park by the community; (4) the rejection of disadvantageous loan supported projects, and (5) equal distribution of land to the local people. The FPM also asserted their intention to move into Dongi-dongi if the government did not seriously take into account their demands, particularly those regarding new land for agricultural use for landless farmers and access to the fields they had cultivated and planted in the Lore Lindu National Park. This declaration was immediately printed in local newspapers (*Mercusuar*, *Nuansa Pos*).

Both NGOs supported the demands of the farmers from the outset, although their initial statements of support were predominantly directed toward granting them control of the land rather than unilaterally encouraging the occupation of Dongi-

dongi. In statements of position made while accompanying FPM representatives during the protest rally at the Assembly Building (June 19, 2001), both of these NGOs urged the provincial authorities to “develop a meaningful, effective policy in relation to the control of the land by city dwellers, which has and will only continue to result in a land crisis for the farmers”. In connection with the FPM farmers’ demands, both of the NGOs assisting them stated their stance that the occupation of Dongi-dongi had happened because of: (1) the existence of a land crisis, (2) the reality that resettlement and local transmigration projects implemented in the past were flawed and full of problems, and (3) that the determination of the national park territory was done without public participation.

The occupation of Dongi-dongi in 2001 was different from the previous efforts to settle the area (see Chapter V.B). In the most recent occupation, the villagers were supported and facilitated by YBHR and the Central Sulawesi WALHI. The NGO facilitation and advocacy encouraged the landless farmers of the four villages to fight for their concerns and interests. Various intensive discussions with NGO activists had awakened their awareness about the various structural and political dimensions of the land issues they had encountered. The facilitation process provided by the two NGOs encouraged the villagers to organize themselves into the Independent Farmers’ Forum (*Forum Petani Merdeka*: FPM).

Unlike the local farmers’ previous attempts at settling land, the most recent action of the villagers was well organized and the issues at focus were much more sophisticated. YBHR was specifically involved in providing advocacy in the field, and WALHI managed the campaign. In the community action carried out on June 19, 2001, both NGOs facilitated FPM in conducting a rally at the Provincial Parliament. The NGO’s support and facilitation were an effective political resource for the FPM in the fight to establish their political interests.

Press releases, campaign plans, debates in various forums and seminars, the active discourse covered in various newspapers and through electronic forums, as well as the rallies, were all power exertion, which the local farmers, now grouped under FPM, had not previously used in their efforts to settle in Dongi-dongi. Because of the support and facilitation by the two NGOs, the movement to occupy Dongi-dongi was immediately dispersed across provincial and district boundaries. With this support and the relatively widespread public knowledge of their struggle, the villagers

occupying the Dongi-dongi area mobilized efforts in defense of their settlement and land in case actions were taken by the police or security forces to force them to move to other places.

## **2. From Dialogue to Polarization of Stances**

When the occupation of Dongi-dongi first came to the attention of the public, everyone involved in the case acknowledged that the farmers faced a real problem in the acute shortage of land. In addition, everyone agreed to take a persuasive approach involving an in-depth dialogue in order to find a solution to the problem. As a result, the initial approach to resolving the controversy surrounding this case involved intensive discussions and dialogue among the various interested actors.

For 10 days, from the inception of the Dongi-dongi occupation on June 19, 2001, a number of meetings and dialogues were held by the NGOs in order to bring together the various actors involved. However, by the end of the month, there was no sign of a convergence of thinking, but rather, increased polarization among the actors opposed to and in support of the occupation. Meanwhile, the initiatives of both the provincial government and the Central Sulawesi legislature could be said to have been ignored entirely by the villagers occupying Dongi-dongi. Details of this situation follow.

The Central Sulawesi provincial and the Donggala district administrations stated their stance on the occupation through the formulation of a document titled: “Central Sulawesi Government Executive Concept for the Solution of the Aspirations of the Residents of Kamarora, Kadidia and Rahmat Villages, Donggala District”. This Executive Solution Concept compiled by a Special Committee formed by the Central Sulawesi Governor,<sup>85</sup> essentially emphasized that the Dongi-dongi area could not be used for cultivation or residential purposes. As compensation, the government would seek and provide 580-1,160 ha of land in zones classified as Land for Miscellaneous Uses, which would be appropriate for agricultural activities and the development of residential areas.

The government presented this concept during an Opinion Exchange Forum at the Central Sulawesi Legislature on June 21, 2001. Although this Forum was attended by FPM, YBHR, WALHI and government officials,<sup>86</sup> it failed to arrive at an

agreement. The government could not provide a detailed implementation guide for the Solution Concept they were offering. On the other side, the farmers grouped under FPM stated their desire to remaining Dongi-dongi. This Opinion Exchange Forum was finally closed with the understanding that the executive levels of the government would undertake further internal coordination.

Two days later, the government finalized the “Central Sulawesi Government Executive Concept for the Solution of the Aspirations of the Residents of Kamarora, Kadidia and Rahmat Villages, Donggala District”.<sup>87</sup> In this version of the Concept, the government reiterated that the villagers occupying Dongi-dongi must remove themselves from the area and that they would not be allowed to return. As compensation, the villagers would be relocated to land categorized as a Land for Miscellaneous Uses formerly utilized by PT Citra Sumber Daya. Besides that, a decision had been made to take security measures, such as intensified law enforcement, the rehabilitation of damaged forest and the posting of no trespassing signs in Dongi-dongi, after the relocation.

On the same day, June 23, 2001, perhaps because they were extremely disappointed and not patient with waiting to see what steps the government might take, the residents of the resettlement villages occupied Dongi-dongi (this action was concentrated along km 75–79 of the local road). WALHI and YBHR could not prevent this action, but advised that the villagers not cut down trees, as was done by the Tongoa people along km 66 – 69.

The next day, on June 24, 2001, another coordination meeting was held and continued with a visit to the site by the Provincial Secretary. It was planned that the team formed by this meeting would speak directly with the villagers who had opened up agricultural fields in Dongi-dongi in order to collect detailed data and to get a better picture of the situation there. Unfortunately, this party of executive level government officials stopped at Tongoa village and never went on to the Dongi-dongi area. In Tongoa, they immediately summoned the Palolo Subdistrict Head and the Village Heads of the four problem villages to present pertinent data and provide information. These actions deeply disappointed the farmers who had prepared to meet with the government officials in Dongi-dongi. In their eyes it was becoming increasingly apparent that the government was not serious about solving the problems they were facing.

The results of the Coordination meeting and the field visit were then compiled into the “Executive Solution Concept” and sent to the Central Sulawesi Legislature on June 26, 2001 for further discussion. This concept developed by the authorities refused to convert the function of the land in the Dongi-dongi area to that of agricultural and residential status as demanded by FPM. Instead, as a solution to the problem, the government would provide land in Palolo Subdistrict, specifically in Manggalapi, Uenuni and Lemban Tongoa, which had been classified as Land for Miscellaneous Uses. Meanwhile, a day previously, (June 25, 2001) the Central Sulawesi governor had issued an Instruction Letter to the Head of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority and the Central Sulawesi Forestry Agency that the Lore Lindu National Park be secured, that the existing laws be appropriately enforced, and that action be taken against the disruption and damage being done in coordination with the Central Sulawesi provincial Police.

Simultaneously, the NGOs were holding a series of intense meetings to discuss the developments in the Dongi-dongi case. These meetings focused on the mass actions of the local populace and the suspicion that the continued practice of illegal logging may have been the motivation behind the demonstrations and other actions taken by the farmers. On June 23, 2001, FKTNLL arranged a meeting attended by WALHI, YBHR, YTM, government representatives, and private company associations.<sup>88</sup> The meeting came to an agreement that the Dongi-dongi case should be approached differently than that of the situation in the adjacent area of Tongoa.<sup>89</sup> All participants took the stance that a persuasive, communicative approach should be taken toward the farmers involved in the Dongi-dongi case because their actions had been motivated by a land crisis, whereas a repressive approach was required in response to the Tongoa case because the motive there was illegal logging.

This meeting also agreed on the formation of the Tongoa Dongi-dongi Solution Committee (*Komite Solusi Tongoa Dongi-dongi*) and the issuance of a statement as follows:

First, the government must pay serious attention to and take proactive measures in relation to this case in order to prevent horizontal conflicts. Second, a moratorium must be imposed to allow for research activities in the national park for one month. Third, the increased clearing of forested areas in the national park should be anticipated. Fourth, all NGOs should cooperate and assist each other in bringing an

end to the problem of illegal logging and the clearing of forested areas in the National Park, and facilitate the dialogue between the government and the local people involved in the occupation of Dongi-dongi. This statement was conveyed to the government and other concerned parties in a document titled: “Joint Suggestion “STOP” Forest Exploitation that Disadvantages the Poor People!”

At this stage, the intensive cooperation and dialogues still took place among the various concerned parties. On June 27, 2001, the FKTNLL and WALHI networks held another joint meeting to discuss steps to increase the effectiveness of the Tongoa Dongi-dongi Solution Committee. The meeting also agreed to facilitate the dialogue between the government and the occupiers to the point that an understanding could be reached.

On June 28, 2001, facilitated by WALHI and FKTNLL, a discussion between representatives of the farmers and the Park Authority took place at the Provincial Parliament building. During this meeting, the members of the Assembly agreed to send representatives to meet with the farmers in Dongi-dongi in order to determine the best solution. On the same date, in the evening, the meeting was reconvened in Dongi-dongi, with WALHI and FKTNLL still facilitating and coordinating the event. Attending this meeting were representatives of the farmers belonging to the FPM, members of the Provincial Parliament, the Lore Lindu National Park Authority, the traditional leader (*Ketua Adat*) of the Sedoa/*Pekurehua* people, and several representatives of various NGOs.

It was at this meeting that the process of the polarization of stances among the various parties to the dispute began to become apparent. The farmers involved in the occupation of land demanded the land promised but not provided at the time of the initial resettlement. At the same time, the farmers also rejected the alternative land in Manggalapi, Uenuni and Lembantongoa provided in the recently proposed Government Concept of Solution. The farmers were of the opinion that the land provided was not good for farming because it was located in an area of steep slopes and hillsides where the soil was not fertile. They also complained that the location provided was not served by public transportation and was already fairly heavily populated. For those reasons, the farmers continued to insist on being allowed to settle the land in the Dongi-dongi area.

These demands were strongly rejected by the traditional leader of the Sedoa/*Pekurehua* people. The Sedoa leader indicated that although he could understand the problems faced by the farmers and sincerely supported their demands for provision of land by the government, he was strongly opposed to the occupation of Dongi-dongi that they had undertaken. The rejection was simply because the area in dispute was, historically, a part of the *Pekurehua* forest, the traditional customary land of his people.

The statements by the traditional leader introduced a new problem, that being the claiming of the land in dispute as a “customary area” (*wilayah adat*), into the debate over the occupation of Dongi-dongi. This new issue motivated the scheduling of still another meeting, this time among the people of the traditional Sedoa/*Pekurehua* community in order to reach agreement on any demands they might have in relation to the dispute.

This traditional community meeting was held the next day, June 29, 2001 at the Wisata Hotel. Again this meeting was facilitated in cooperation by WALHI and FKTNLL.<sup>90</sup> During this meeting, the farmers grouped under FPM reiterated their strong refusal to be relocated and their demands to be allowed to remain in Dongi-dongi. This FPM’s stubborn stance sharpened the conflict and intensified the existing tendency toward polarization, and made the traditional Sedoa/*Pekurehua* people begin to feel “increasingly uncomfortable”. This meeting resulted in a deadlock without any decision being made; leaving the parties to the discussion even more widely divided in opinion as to whether to support or to reject the occupation of the disputed area, while at the same time ignoring the more serious case in Tongoa. There was also an apparent shift in the focus of the solution seeking process from discussions between the FPM and the government to an open debate among the various elements within the local community and among NGOs itself.

On the same day, the Central Sulawesi legislature issued a Position Letter on the “Executive Solution Concept”, which was submitted to the Central Sulawesi provincial government on June 26, 2001. This Position Letter basically supported the solution suggested by the Central Sulawesi provincial and Donggala district administrations. On June 29, 2001, the governor of Central Sulawesi received a letter from the Minister of Forestry, which emphasized the seriousness of the illegal logging cases occurring in Central Sulawesi. Three days later, on July 2, 2001, the Minister of

Forestry sent another letter to the governor stating his support for the concept of resolving the problem of the occupation of the Lore Lindu National Park.

Although the provincial government's offers and promises had been approved by the regional legislature, the villagers occupying Dongi-dongi apparently no longer had any interest in it. The public's confidence in the government's commitment and sincerity had reached its nadir. Therefore, the end result of the first stages of this controversial case was the emergence of two distinctly conflicting processes: the continued agitation and mobilization on the part of the farmers demanding that they not be relocated, and the government's continued preparations to move the farmers. It was clearly in this stage that the polarization of stances among the parties to the dispute had reached a definitive and irreversible level.

Even as the farmers occupying Dongi-dongi hardened their refusal to be relocated the government continued to plan and prepare for their removal from the disputed area and relocation elsewhere. On July 1, 2001 Head of the Park Authority (BTNLL), along with officials in the executive level of the provincial government, deliberating the formation of an integrated team to carry out the relocation plan.

### **3. Exertion of Power through Discourse and Verbal Abuse**

With this increased polarization in stances, the controversy over the occupation of Dongi-dongi escalated into a new phase of discourse involving intensified defense of the positions taken and more sophisticated argumentation in support of the stances held by all of the concerned parties. At this stage of the controversy, the NGOs and all of the other parties involved in the debate were forced to define the increasingly polarized positions they were taking.

The increasing momentum in this phase of the conflict was perhaps most apparent in the Public Debate on a National Park Management that was held on July 5, 2001. In this public debate took place at the Dwi Mulya Hotel, Palu, Arianto Sangaji, the Director of YTM, presented "*Moratorium for Lore Lindu National Park*" suggesting a moratorium on national parks on the basis of three points. The first point was, that land designated for use as a national park should be returned to its previous function before it was designated for conservation. Second, once the moratorium was in effect, all exploitation of natural resources in the conservation area must be

stopped, including the activities of plantation companies. Third, the ownership structure and control of the land around the Lore Lindu National Park must be redefined and changed. Only then would it be possible to designate new conservation areas through public discussion and consultation with the concerned communities.

As an influential figure among NGO circles in Palu, Sangaji's moratorium narrative on national parks in relation to the numerous agrarian problems arising in the region was very startling and raised a very controversial issue. In a short time the moratorium narrative expanded into a discourse that pushed the parties in conflict into a zero sum game situation. This moratorium narrative was the peak of the agrarian discourse supported by WALHI of Central Sulawesi (including YTM in its membership) and YBHR. WALHI and YBHR were of the opinion that the Dongi-dongi problem could only be resolved through efforts to reform the existing agrarian structure, i.e. by redistributing land declared as a conservation area.

According to WALHI of Central Sulawesi (including YTM) and YBHR, conservation policies could not be accepted as valid if they were implemented in ways that did not take into consideration the social structure of the original communities, and especially if these policies radically marginalized the existence of these communities. To their understanding, the matter of conservation was not disregarded, it just had to be applied in a way that accommodated the needs of the people and took into consideration the specific conditions and social-agrarian structures of the communities concerned.

Through the agrarian narratives and discourses advocated in the various discussions and meetings, mass media reports, e-mails, letters expressing stances, organizational bulletins, and published position papers, WALHI of Central Sulawesi and YBHR gained the power to support the resettlement villagers. The discourses advocated polarized the conflicting parties, so it is not surprising that the moratorium narrative suggested by Sangaji triggered even more confrontation and hardened the stances of the parties concerned with the case: with more clearly defined support of or opposition to the Dongi-dongi occupation. Thus, it was not long before the NGOs in Palu were split between the two opposing poles as is detailed in Appendix 3.

On the other hand, the Park Authority reiterated its intention to retain Dongi-dongi as a part of the Lore Lindu National Park. This was stated in the Lore Lindu

National Park Authority Statement of Stance on July 2, 2001, which was presented to the Central Sulawesi Legislature, the provincial governor, the district head of Donggala and the Regent of Poso. In this statement, Dongi-dongi was defined as a core zone of the Lore Lindu National Park and that for this reason the Lore Lindu National Park Authority could not acknowledge the People's Conservation Agreement formulated by the residents of Dongi-dongi.

The stipulation of Dongi-dongi as part of the core zone of the Lore Lindu National Park placed emphasis on the conservation discourse advocated by the park Authority to counter the agrarian discourse set forth by WALHI of Central Sulawesi, YBHR and FPM. Through this discourse, the Park Authority garnered the powerful support of the provincial government and legislature, as well as that of the central government.

Another important actor that supported the conservation discourse was the TNC. The TNC, which was in the midst of finishing the Management Plan of the Lore Lindu National Park – with zonation as one of its outputs – played an important role in this matter. Delays in the completion of the Management Plan of the Lore Lindu National Park provided the opportunity for TNC to classify Dongi-dongi as part of the core zone of the Park (details of the zonation issue can be found in Chapter III.F. Park Zonation: the Process and Excess). The Dongi-dongi-as-core-zone narrative acted as a strong magnet to draw together the strengths of the NGOs that did not approve of the occupation of Dongi-dongi. Those taking that position included FKTNLL and a number of nature lover's organizations (see Appendix 3).

This polarization among the local NGOs then escalated into a reiteration of discourses supporting their individual positions so that any hope of a constructive open dialog or self criticism was dashed. In general, the stances taken on the occupation of Dongi-dongi were clearly divided into two clear-cut opposing points of view. This polarization created a win-lose situation in which every party felt driven to fight to the finish.

Apart from the above divergence, it was obvious that the agrarian discourse did not deny the importance of conservation or traditional claim; just as the conservation discourse did not ignore the agrarian problem. The overall stances

differed primarily in the emphasis placed on the main aspects of the two issues, with this emphasis then used in evaluation of other aspects of the problem.

Along with the escalation of the debate, the defining and constructing of this discourse became a part of the campaigns waged by the NGOs supporting the farmers' occupation of Dongi-dongi. For example, following the discourse of the moratorium on national parks, the adherents of this agrarian point of view (YBHR, WALHI, YPR and several other advocating NGOs) brought up other related issues, including what they call the "eco-fascism" approach in the management of national parks. The term "eco-fascism" can be defined conceptually as a totalitarian nature management policy, which emphasized nature conservation as a priority in itself over and above any consideration of social conditions, and in which the handling of problems could only be done through authoritarian and technocratic methods (Dietz 1998).

The choice of the term "eco-fascism" for utilization within the context of this controversy is very interesting because it constituted a counter-discourse directed unequivocally toward the policy of eco-populism, which was introduced by the head of the Park Authority.<sup>91</sup> Although head of the Park Authority did exhibit the courage to recognize a number of customary communities' rights as manifestation of his "eco-populism" approach, the "national park" policy itself still, however, was deemed as the representation of the eco-fascist approach because it was based on the classical paradigm of preservation. This classical paradigm emphasized the solution to the destruction of tropical forests by the establishment of protected areas, to which access would be totally restricted. In the view of agrarian discourse, such policy was perceived as anti-community in nature because the human populace was viewed as a threat to and even an enemy of the national parks. Even though before the establishment of such parks, the local people had lived and interacted closely with the forests surrounding them.

With the emergence of the issue of a moratorium against national parks, and the discourse on eco-fascism, the perception of the problem expanded to include the question of the status of the national parks themselves. Both of these controversial topics became immediately popular, with the terms moratorium, eco-fascism and eco-populism used as a kind of jargon within any number of debates and the process of negotiation itself. In sometimes heated discussions on the Internet - which were

metaphorically dubbed “star wars” - these topics became a source of never-ending criticism and even threats exchanged between and among the various NGOs.

Such a zero sum game situation was clearly a fundamental reversal of the environment conducive to dialogue, which existed at the beginning of the debate over the Dongi-dongi controversy. In such a situation, each and every party concerned was forced to express their position vehemently; so that the structure of polarization became increasingly solid within the existing framework of discourse. In connection with developments of this sort, LBH Bantaya submitted a letter withdrawing itself from the Central Sulawesi WALHI network as of July 7, 2001. LBH Bantaya based its withdrawal on the reason that it could not understand or follow the developments in the environmental advocacy movement that was being developed by the Central Sulawesi branch of WALHI in relation to the Dongi-dongi case.

Besides being spontaneous and voluntary in nature, the pressure brought to bear by the various parties in the efforts to position themselves was applied openly and straight-forwardly. For example, in an email sent in a mail group exchange on July 16, 2001, Arianto Sangaji pressured TNC to “face the Dongi-dongi case openly; TNC must appear openly in the public” and “take a clear stance openly on the matter of Dongi-dongi”. This challenge resulted in a barrage of emails between Duncan Neville and Arianto Sangaji, which reflected their individual ideological positions:

“We need to clarify that TNC is actually not a development institution, but is, rather, a conservation institution. Most of our activities involve conservation efforts, such as ecological research, and the mapping of village territories, as well as the implementation of education and public awareness campaigns.”

As a foreign institution, we work in Indonesia under an MOU in which we are prohibited from becoming involved in political issues. As a third point, we also need to inform you a little bit about the operational characteristics of TNC, that require that we work with the public and the government in a non-confrontational pattern at all locations in the various nations in which we operate.” (Duncan Neville’s email, July 16, 2001)

Arianto Sangaji’s response was as follows:

“... TNC certainly should not involve itself in the selection of village heads, Subdistrict or district heads, or even in the choice of the National Park Authority head. I completely agree up to that point. However, you need to remember that conservation is a political issue. When the Lore Lindu National Park boundary markers were put into place without consulting the local populace, it became a political matter. When the authorities confiscate the local people’s logs and rattan, this is a political matter. When the *Katu* people were forced to move out of the Park, that was a political issue. Mr.

Banjar Y. Laban (note: the name of the Park Authority head) has even acknowledged that the Katu people were a political matter. When you prepared the zonation of the Park, that was also political. Even the presence of TNC in Lore Lindu, is also a political matter (international). What I am trying to convey is that you should not try to hide behind the issue of “POLITICS” in relation to the matter of Dongi-dongi, and Lore Lindu in general ” (Arianto Sangaji’s email, July 16, 2001)

As can be seen from the above quotations, the NGOs that leaned toward emphasis on conservation were left far behind in the production of issues and opinions. They supported the more normative view of the problem, which clearly emphasized the ecological function of the Dongi-dongi area. According to them, the location of Dongi-dongi toward the top of the upper reaches of a valley made it a vital water catchments area. Based on this normative viewpoint, they voiced a number of its derivative issues, in particular on the clearing of protected forests and illegal logging. This group of NGOs said that it would be impossible within the framework of massive forest clearing such as was taking place in Dongi-dongi for illegal logging to not occur. They also expressed doubts that the farmers occupying Dongi-dongi were only cutting the smaller trees to erect plantation huts (*sabua*). In fact, based on what they had seen in the field, they suspected that there was a syndicate of financial backers who supported and exploited the occupation of the forested areas in order to gain access to the timber there. They viewed the support of several NGOs of the occupation of the land by farmers as little more than smoothing the way for the financial backers’ exploitation of the Lore Lindu National Park.

Some other NGOs rejecting the occupation of Dongi-dongi also voiced the issue of the sovereignty of customary lands (“*tanah adat*”). According to these NGOs, FPM’s claim to the Dongi-dongi area was entirely without basis. This was because this area was the sovereign region of other Customary Communities, those being the Sedoa/*Pekurehua* people. Although the four resettlement villages from whence the farmers who were members of the FPM had originated were disadvantaged by the unilateral designation of National Park borders, this type of “flawed process” should not be used to validate the occupation of Dongi-dongi because there was no solid connection between the four resettlement villages and Dongi-dongi. This was especially true in relation to discussions about reclaiming the land because the original owners had more right to it than the members of FPM which had been formed as recently as the middle of 2001. Therefore, there was no good reason for FPM to

have occupied the land at all. In fact, the farmers' actions were an infraction against the sovereign rights of customary communities.

The advocacy of this last issue was truly risky because it involved two local communities with the real potential for a horizontal conflict developing between them. It was this concern that led to limited exploitation of this issue. As well, this issue actually could not be developed adequately and sophisticatedly, nor could it be widely used to influence opinion by this circle of NGOs, as was the case with the previously issue of conservation.

Because of this, the group of NGOs opposing the Dongi-dongi occupation was extremely defensive in the face of the discourse and opinions being put forth by the proponent group of NGOs. Failing to find and to creatively develop issues and tools for leverage in the debate, the opponent NGOs became trapped in reactive responses to the discourse set forth by the other parties to the dispute. These reactive responses often came to take the form of insults. For example, in an email message dated July 12, 2001, Shadiq of FKTNLL accused YBHR of having connections with the People's Democratic Party (*Partai Rakyat Demokratik*), a party accused as being adherent of communist ideas. He retracted this email statement the next day after receiving several protests and reprimands from a number of sources. Another example is an email sent on July 20, 2001 from among the same circle accusing WALHI of betraying the environment for their issuing of the National Park Moratorium.

Among the more important phenomena relating to this discourse warfare on the Internet was the emergence of anonymous emails. The senders of these emails never revealed their true identities even though their messages were labeled "black letters" whose contents should be ignored within the discourse. In relation to the ongoing discourse and debate, these email messages voiced opposition to the occupation of Dongi-dongi, often using harsh wording. Such accusations and insulting statements sent through the anonymous emails were fishing for responses of a similar ilk from the targeted NGOs. As a result, for almost three months, from June through August 2001, the correspondence occurring in a number of mail groups in Indonesia was colored by this email war among the NGOs in Central Sulawesi.

In the meantime, the local people involved in the occupation exhibited their determination to remain in Dongi-dongi. This "do or die" stance was expressed in a

statement made by the villagers to the District head of Donggala and representatives of the Donggala legislative council, who visited Palolo on July 7, 2001. In response to the Executive Solution conveyed by the regent, the farmers firmly rejected the offered solution and reiterated that they would remain in Dongi-dongi either alive or dead. The farmers conveyed similar sentiments to the Central Sulawesi provincial legislature, as well as the provincial and Donggala district administrations, on July 9, 2001. During this meeting, the farmers even went so far as to state their rejection of TNC's presence in the Palolo area because that NGO was considered not to be in touch with the interests of the local community, and, to the contrary, to actually be more concerned about the interests of butterflies.<sup>92</sup>

One month after the occupation, the Dongi-dongi controversy was even further away from resulting in a win-win solution, with the occurrence of pro and con polarization within a zero-sum atmosphere. This situation led to the elimination of the intermediate position that had previously been adhered to by a number of parties making efforts to find a balanced solution that could satisfy everyone involved in the dispute.

## **B. The Escalation of Conflict**

### **1. Mobilization of Masses and Claims of Customary Communities**

As the dispute became increasingly more heated, the concerned parties were forced to make efforts to mobilize the public in order to strengthen their own positions. These efforts took the form of exploiting the jargon of customary communities, the creation of alliances among various organizations, a war of words through issuance of statements, as well as the creation of new counter-organizations.

The first mass action to take place after the occupation of Dongi-dongi was carried out by FPM itself and a number of the NGOs that supported the farmers' stance which were gathered under the umbrella of the *Katuvua* Alliance. On July 19, 2001, this alliance consisted of FPM, YBHR, WALHI, YTM, LMND, YPR, SNTP, STN, FNBI, and AMASUTA, held a demonstration in front of the Governor's office. They set forth two demands during this protest: (1) the release of Dongi-dongi status, and (2) the distribution of the "absentee land" to the people living in the area.

During negotiations with the government, which was represented by the Deputy Governor and the Provincial Secretary, FPM reiterated their firm stance that they refused to leave Dongi-dongi. In addition, FPM asked the government to recognize their existence as an organization and be willing to assist them in managing their settlement of the Dongi-dongi area. FPM also expressed the willingness to make a conservation agreement with the government, even one based on traditional (*adat*) laws regulating the use of forest resources. In response, the government continued to take the stance that the farmers should wait for the results of the working panel/team. FPM refused to wait for the report because even after a period of 10 days, the panel had yet to take any actions because they claimed they were waiting for the completion of Duty Letters and other bureaucratic matters. At the same time, the farmers and the larger community were becoming impatient with the process and with being told to wait a little longer. This meeting ended with a deadlock without any decision being made at all.

After the negotiations fell through, the people gathered for the meeting did not disband immediately, instead they continued to demonstrate and held a protest rally at the Tadulako University Campus. During this rally, FPM reiterated the farmers' intention to settle in Dongi-dongi and their refusal to negotiate any further with the authorities. FPM also emphasized its commitment to clear only enough land for the 1,030 heads of households.<sup>93</sup> This number encompassed the heads of households from the first generation of transmigrants who received less land than promised at the time of the resettlement project, other heads of households within that community and the heads of households whose land was washed away in floods. During the rally, the farmers also announced that they planned to hold a traditional land clearing ceremony on Monday, July 23, 2001 and invited everyone to come to that event.

This unilateral action by the FPM brought an end to the previous efforts at dialogue. At that very moment, the controversy over the occupation of Dongi-dongi became a "ball of fire" spreading sparks of conflict among the local community. Meanwhile, the government, the most competent party within efforts to resolve the conflict, simply disappeared from the unfolding process and took no initiative in seeking a breakthrough by finding a better solution to the problem. This "lack of presence" on the part of the state in the midst of a heated community conflict should

be noted as a factor smoothing the way for the escalation of the conflict among the public.

The action taken by the *Katuvua* Alliance immediately drew both pro and con reactions from a number of sources. On the same day, July 19, 2001, the Kamalisi Traditional Community Alliance (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Kamalisi: AMAK*) issued a statement supporting the actions of FPM and its alliance. AMAK also urged the government to redistribute the land existing under the “absentee” status. Besides this, AMAK also rejected the foreign debt that only sold out the rights of the people and led to the exploitation of the conservation areas.

Speaking out against the statement made by this traditional community alliance, the *Pekurehua* Traditional Community Congress held on July 20, 2001 condemned the occupation of Dongi-dongi. The Congress, which took place in Wuasa Village, in Lore Utara Subdistrict, issued the statement that: “Based on existing laws and the history of the region, Dongi-dongi and its surrounding areas fell under the jurisdiction of the Traditional Law of the *Pekurehua* in effect in Lore Utara Subdistrict, Poso District.” Based on this, the Congress urged the government to “Remove all settlements and residences from Dongi-dongi” and “Find and provide alternative land for settlement outside of the boundaries of the National Forest for those people who have been clearing land in the protected area of Dongi-dongi.” In connection with this, the Congress also “strongly rejects the efforts of the parties who are facilitating and supporting the people who have been settling in Dongi-dongi and its surroundings”.

Following this community congress, email under the name of The *Tolelembunga* Alliance showed up on the Internet forums. In his email message dated July 20, 2001, this alliance stated support of the results of the *Pekurehua* Traditional Community Congress within the efforts to retain Dongi-dongi as a part of the traditional region. In line with the decision of the Congress, the *Tolelembunga* Alliance also rejected FPM’s actions aimed at reclaiming the land. The reason for this stance was that there was no historical reason for the Rahmat, Kadidia or even the Kamarora (both A and B) peoples to have any right to the land there. The *Tolelembunga* Alliance acknowledged only the *Pekurehua* traditional community as having any right to Dongi-dongi. The *Tolelembunga* Alliance, therefore, viewed the efforts to occupy and settle the land in Dongi-dongi as “expansion across traditional

regional borders” and could be interpreted as “an effort to disrupt the sovereignty of a traditional community through a systematic process”.

In the wake of the *Pekurehua* Traditional Community Congress, the rhetoric of tradition continued to echo throughout the entire process of trying to resolve the controversy over the occupation of Dongi-dongi. On July 23, 2001, as promised, the citizens of the four villages who were members of FPM and involved in the occupation of the land in Dongi-dongi held a traditional land clearing ceremony. Around 1,000 people from the four villages attended the festivities, which involved the putting up of 14 tents and the slaughtering of four cattle. Through this ritual, the farmers stated their ties to the land in what they called “the Village of Hope” (*Ngata Katuvua*). With this statement of commitment to the land, and through the ritual procession they performed, the farmers were determined to fight to the death to hold onto the land in Dongi-dongi. “Because,” as one local said, “it is like we have buried our heads here.”

More support for the FPM occupation of Dongi-dongi then emerged, this time with a statement from a group called the Central Sulawesi People’s Youth Movement (*Gerakan Pemuda Kerakyatan Sulawesi Tengah*). In a statement issued on July 24, 2001, this group took the following political stances: (1) Dongi-dongi land is for the people; (2) all anti-democratic and repressive laws, government regulations, rulings and decision letters must be rescinded; (3) the Central Sulawesi government must be pressured to void all permits for business in the national park area; (4) support must be given to the Palolo farmers grouped under the Independent Farmers Movement (*Gerakan Petani Merdeka* [sic]) to confiscate the land held by government officials in Palolo, particularly in Dongi-dongi; (5) elimination of the militarism of the New Order must be done, and (6) creation of an economic structure must be based on the strength of the people and not dependent on foreign economic models.

In the meantime, disagreement with the occupation of Dongi-dongi was heard from a group called Poor Farmers Solidarity Forum (*Forum Solidaritas Petani Miskin*: FSPM). FSPM was local community organization in Berdikari village that has strong affiliation with LBH Bantaya. In a statement dated July 25, 2001, this forum openly urged opposition to the occupation of Dongi-dongi because of the suspicion that a local lumbering syndicate was exploiting the farmers’ movement in relation to the occupation. This forum also stated that there were three groups of people involved

with the occupation, all with distinct motives and purposes. According to the FSPM Forum, the first was indeed a group of farmers with no land to till in their own villages; the second was a group of financial backers who had come to that region mostly due to their interests in the logging industry, and the third was a group of financial backers who were interested in expanding the amount of property under their control.

Coming at the problem from another side, the farmers' forum (FPM) in response to concerns expressed by a number of parties about the potential for ecological degradation of Dongi-dongi area, had announced its intention to issue what they called "The Dongi-dongi Unified Charter for the Management of Natural Resources" (*Piagam Kesepakatan Dongi-dongi untuk Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam*). This Charter, issued on July 26, 2001, as the result of meetings among traditional leaders and members of FPM, constituted a number of regulations on the management of the region and even set out traditional sanctions. Among the matters dealt with under these regulations were the distribution of land and its allocation, the management of water, rivers and forests, as well as the settlement of land and the administration of settlements. Under this Charter, it was also agreed that the land should not be sold, nor should trees any larger than 30 centimeters in circumference be cut down; that nothing should be cultivated along river banks, that rice fields should not be planted in the area, and that only annual crops such as coffee, pepper and candlenuts.<sup>94</sup>

After the announcement of the Charter, on the same date, July 26, 2001, Sidiq of YBHR sent an email encouraging all parties to support the desires of the FPM farmers settling in Dongi-dongi. His reasoning was that since the traditional ceremony held on July 23, 2001, no efforts to move the settlers would be effective and could even give rise to new problems. The only feasible focus at this time should be "how to guarantee that their management of the area in question did not deviate from the principles of conservation." YBHR itself, according to the email, intervened with FPM concerning the layout for the usage of the land in Dongi-dongi; a fact verifiable in the issuance of the conservation charter, which had been agreed to by all members of the FPM. YBHR then encouraged all parties to focus their attention on the implementation of the conservation charter.

YBHR's suggestions got a pessimistic response from the *Tolelembunga* Alliance. In an email dated July 26, 2001, the Alliance stated its doubts about the use of any such Charter on conservation, especially if viewed in the context of the principles of conservation. Because, according to the contents of the email, "If more or less 2,000 hectares of arable land in Dongi-dongi are settled by around 1,000 people [sic], there would not be enough land area left for any kind of social infrastructure, not to mention the further division of the land as families grow and children create their own families - where will there be any more space for the forest: Where is the logic of conservation in any of this?"

The *Tolelembunga* Alliance asked YBHR to consider the possibility of horizontal conflict among the various communities that could occur if FPM continued to insist on having its demands met. This alliance also criticized YBHR's idea of an alternative "community compromise" to overcome the potency for conflict. For this alliance, any discussion of compromise must be a kind of compromise at three levels: at the level of government, at the level of NGOs circle, and at the level of community especially with regard to *Pekurehua* community. The alliance viewed that the actions taken by FPM from the very beginning of the controversy to be extremely unilateral and to have ignored the interests of the other three parties concerned.

However that may be, once the controversy surrounding the case of the Dongi-dongi occupation sharpened to the point that the NGOs themselves began to play a major role in the direction the situation was taking, any effort toward a "community compromise" was almost impossible. Instead of compromise, what happened was the continuous development of tension among the members of the community and among the NGOs themselves. This increasingly tense situation, whether they wanted it or not, forced the NGOs involved in the controversy to take steps to try to calm things down. On July 28, 2001, a meeting of NGOs was held in Palu, which resulted in agreement on the following three points. First, no further community assistance would be given by any NGOs in the Lore Lindu National Park area, meanwhile the full sovereignty to make decision must be returned into the hands of the local people (a moratorium on assistance). Second, the people would be given time to discuss the Dongi-dongi case among themselves. Third, the NGO activists would no longer discuss the Dongi-dongi controversy on the Internet, pending a decision by the people.

The agreement to take a break from assistance in the Dongi-dongi area turned out to be able to reduce the tension for the time being, although it had no impact on the resolution of the conflict itself. According to Nasir Abas, a senior NGO activist in Palu, it was during this break in assistance that the incidence of illegal logging in the Dongi-dongi area increased immensely.<sup>95</sup> However that may be, for the parties to the conflict themselves, this period of cooling down was used to consolidate their own individual positions and strengths, instead of seeking compromise between them. As such, this break became a period of preparation for the next phase of the conflict. In this way a new battle arena was formed for even greater conflict and controversy.

Meanwhile, the government filled this period of time with the matter of coordinating efforts to bring to fruition the unimplemented relocation policy. Experts and government officials were preoccupied with taking steps to anticipate and eradicate illegal logging. However, even in this effort, coordination faltered due to the many interests in play in connection with illegal logging activities that were reaching their peak around that time. As the clearing of land expanded in Dongi-dongi, on July 31, 2001 the Director General of PHKA sent a letter to the Governor of Central Sulawesi requesting that he immediately accelerate the implementation of the CSIADCP, stop the damage to the Lore Lindu National Park through, among other things, the withdrawal of business permits for company's using illegal raw materials from the park, and that the Central Sulawesi police assist the Park Authority in handling the problem. On the same day, the head of the Central Sulawesi Forestry Agency held a Planning Meeting on the Elimination of Illegal Sawmills. This meeting, which was attended by representatives of concerned bodies, including the Lore Lindu National Park Authority, agreed to form an Integrated Team for Elimination of Illegal Sawmills.

## **2. Strike-Counter Strike, Efforts to Repress and to Defeat Opponents**

With developments such as those set out above, the controversy over the occupation of Dongi-dongi eventually reached a level of culmination. This phase was marked by repressive moves on the part of the government and efforts among the various groups within the civil community to negate the existence of others with opposing views. These developments were sparked by the steps taken by the

government toward a repressive approach and by the government's efforts to gain public support for its repressive actions.

Facing a situation in which all attempts at dialog were defeated by the hard stance taken by the farmers grouped in FPM who did not want to vacate the land they had occupied in Dongi-dongi, the government began to feel it had no other option in resolving the problem but to enforce the law strictly and forcefully. Therefore, in follow up on the political support provided by the central government through the Department of Forestry, on August 8, 2001, the provincial governor sent a letter to the Central Sulawesi chief of police instructing him to take firm action in Dongi-dongi because Dongi-dongi was a regional asset and a conservation area that had to be guarded and protected.

After the Governor's letter was received, the Regent of Donggala followed up by issuing an instruction letter to the Palolo Subdistrict head, the Village Heads in the Palolo Subdistrict, and the Palolo Subdistrict Traditional Council. In this letter dated August 16, 2001, the Regent of Donggala instructed the above mentioned parties to: (1) summon the area residents who had occupied Dongi-dongi; (2) clear all squatters out of Dongi-dongi and put an end to the clearing of land there; (3) enforce the status of Dongi-dongi as a water catchments zone; and (4) carry out all of the above orders (points 1 through 3 with no exception) within a period of no more than three days (3 x 24 hours) beginning from August 20, 2001. Up until now, the governor's instruction has not been carried out as expected.

In response to this threat of repressive action, on August 19, 2001, WALHI issued a statement demanding that the Regional Police restrain from imposing a security approach to the situation. In its response to FPM's efforts to settle the land in Dongi-dongi, WALHI asked that the authorities "not view the actions as a criminal case because the land they are occupying is designated as a National Park". Instead, "this case should be viewed as an agrarian conflict, in which an imbalance of land ownership has occurred in the area surrounding the National Park".

This rejection of a repressive security approach was also voiced by YPR, STN, SNTP and AMAK, all of which were affiliated under the Alliance Opposing Violence Against and Oppression of the People. In a statement issued on August 22, 2001, this alliance strongly condemned all forms of violence and intimidation toward the people.

In addition, the Alliance urged the FPM to not back down in the face of the threat of repression. This rejection was also even voiced by *Tolembunga* Alliance and a number of NGOs opposing the Dongi-dongi occupation.

While the regional authorities were preparing to take repressive action, it should be noted that the Lore Lindu National Park Authority (BTNLL) and members of the public were making efforts on the basis of existing laws to submit a formal complaint to the police against the people involved in occupying Dongi-dongi. These legal actions were not just directed at the farmers occupying the land, but were more focused on the NGOs, which were viewed as having stirred up the farmers, and encouraged their occupation of Dongi-dongi. On August 13, 2001, for example, the Head of the National Park Authority sent a letter to the Central Sulawesi Regional Police concerning the case of national park land located in Dongi-dongi. In the fifth point set out in that letter, the National Park Authority requested that the Regional Police “investigate YBHR, in relation to enforcing the law in line with all existing regulations and rulings”.

In response to the legal process initiated by the National Park Authority and the steps toward forceful action being taken by the Government, the NGOs supporting the occupation of Dongi-dongi took counter actions. The NGOs perceived the recent steps taken by the National Park Authority as revealing of the true militaristic and eco-fascist character of that agency. This true character strongly challenged the progressive obsession of the head of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority (BTNLL), Laban, toward the transformation of conservation regulations to become more eco-populist and supportive of the “marginal people” (*wong cilik*). As part of their response to the latest moves by the Bureau Head, Arianto Sangaji, on behalf of the NGOs, suggested that the National Executive for WALHI withdraw the “WALHI Award” it had bestowed upon Laban.<sup>96</sup>

However, it turned out that the demands to continue the legal process did not originate solely from the Government. Similar demands were being made by a number of segments of the local community, such as *Pitu Nggota Ngata Kaili* Council (*Dewan Adat Pitu Nggota Ngata Kaili*). During a traditional ceremony attended by the Governor of Central Sulawesi on August 18, 2001, the Council demanded that the Governor immediately take steps through the legal system to stop the land clearing in

Dongi-dongi. The Council also asked that the government provide alternative land for the people who were settling in Dongi-dongi as soon as possible.

On August 23, 2001, a meeting was held among the Regent of Donggala, the Head of the Lore Lindu National Park Bureau, important figures from the Kulawi and Da'a Customary Communities, the Uenuni Village Head, Gafar of the LBH Bantaya and Alimuddin of the Katopassa Foundation at the residence of the Donggala Regent. This meeting also discussed steps toward resolving the Dongi-dongi conflict through legal channels. At this meeting it was decided that a comprehensive legal approach would be required to resolve the Dongi-dongi problem. In connection with this, the Bantaya office was asked to work with and assist the squatters who had left the Dongi-dongi settlement and returned to their home villages. This assistance was expected to result in a legal product in the form of a formal request that the Regional Police investigate the people facilitating the clearing of the land in Dongi-dongi, with the expectation that this would provide a basis for action against those facilitators to make them pay moral and material damages.

On August 30, 2001, as a result of the assistance provided by the LBH Bantaya, the people of Sintuwu Village sent a letter of complaint about the actions of WALHI and YBHR to the Regional Police. In this letter, the villagers stated: "We cleared land in the Dongi-dongi forest because we had no arable land to till, and we got information from the Central Sulawesi branch of WALHI and YBHR in Palu that the Government had given permission to the public to settle and grow plantation crops in Dongi-dongi."

A similar legal process took place the next day, August 31, 2001, when the people of Rahmat Village sent a letter of complaint to the Regional Police. In this letter, the villagers set out three complaints against YBHR. The first was a demand for financial retribution for the losses incurred by the local populace in relation to the efforts to clear the forest. Second, the villagers wanted the name of their village cleared of any impression of wrongdoing because there were so many people from outside of Dongi-dongi who were claiming to be residents of Rahmat Village. The third demand related to the damage to the reputation of the Da'a tribe because of the negative public image within the community that it was the Da'a tribe that was responsible for the clearing of land in the National Park.

Still another segment of society becoming involved in the legal process was the *Pekurehua* Traditional Community. On the same day, August 31, 2001, in a Workshop on Environmental Investigation and Writing at Palu, this group re-emphasized the need for immediate action: “(We) urge the Central Sulawesi Provincial Government, the authorities of Donggala District and Poso District to immediately take firm steps to put an end to all activity in the Lore Lindu National, in particular in the Dongi-dongi area occupied and settled by the residents of the four villages in Palolo Subdistrict”.

The efforts to take action against the NGOs supporting the occupation of Dongi-dongi increased. Interestingly, these efforts were being made not only by the authorities and the Customary Communities and villagers; action was also being taken by environmental activists, nature lovers and even by other NGOs. In the last two cases mentioned above, the pressure was being brought to bear through demonstrations and demands that the organizations deemed at fault be disbanded.

On August 30, 2001, the Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers (*Komunitas Pecinta Alam Sulawesi Tengah: KPA-ST*) held a protest rally at the local Assembly (DPRD) Building. During this demonstration, this group charged that the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI (YBHR and several NGOs) “are environmental criminals responsible for damage to the forest in Dongi-dongi,” and also “responsible for the emergence of disharmony and tension within the regional community, in particular the trouble between the people in Napu Valley and the squatters.” The Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI was considered to have “disempowered the people, even bringing them to the brink of destruction justifying environmental anarchy”. The Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers also charged that: “community was misled by the elimination of dialogue and discussion from each and every effort made to resolve the conflict caused by the Dongi-dongi case.” The protestors also stated their assumption that the support that the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI gave to the occupation of Dongi-dongi could be “construed as smoothing the way for financial backers with timber and real estate interests to exploit the Lore Lindu National Park”.

Upon consideration of all of the above mentioned circumstances, the Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers came to the conclusion that “The presence of the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI had turned out to not be supportive of the ideal pattern of management for conserving natural resources, but rather that the presence

of WALHI in Central Sulawesi had resulted in a process of destruction of natural resources, the smoothing of the way for illegal logging in Lore Lindu National Park, instigating the insulting of the sovereignty of the local communities, and creating social unrest”. Based on these charges, the Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers (KPA-ST) demanded the disbanding of WALHI in Central Sulawesi, as well as the prosecution of the organization. Also in relation to the Dongi-dongi case, the Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers rejected the use of violence or force within the resolution of the conflict.

On August 29-30, 2001, TNC held a Zonation Workshop to discuss the Lore Lindu National Park Management draft, which had been formulated by TNC. In this draft document, Dongi-dongi was classified as part of the integral zone of the Lore Lindu National Park. In response to this, on September 7, 2001, after dissemination of information to the public on the draft zoning plan undertaken by TNC, The People’s Education Foundation (*Yayasan Pendidikan Rakyat: YPR*) issued a letter addressed to the governor of Central Sulawesi. In this letter YPR stated that: “Dongi-dongi ... in an arbitrary and unilateral manner had been turned into a nucleus regional zone by the Lore Lindu National Park Authority and the TNC.... The people living in the area around the National Park were in no way whatsoever involved in the process of developing the zoning plan for the region”. The YPR stated their suspicion that the reason behind the development of this zoning plan was to “remove the local populace entirely from Dongi-dongi”. Based on this assumption, YPR stated: “(We) firmly reject the zoning plan developed by TNC and Lore Lindu National Park Authority... and we urge all parties to reject this zoning”.

Even though the zoning plan had not yet been implemented, being still in draft form and in the process of socialization of the public with its contents, the YPR Foundation’s charges did not take long to spark a strong attack on TNC as the institution most responsible for the creation of the zoning plan. On September 12, 2001, around 300 farmers, members of FPM, closed down and sealed the doors of the TNC and CARE offices. They took this action because they believed that these two foreign NGOs had frequently made mistakes and detrimentally misled the public. During this action, the farmers also stated their rejection of the Lore Lindu National Park zoning plan developed by TNC because the draft had been made in a secretive and non-transparent manner without involving them.

The demands to disband the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI and YBHR were also set forth during a mass demonstration on September 19, 2001 at the Central Sulawesi Provincial People's Representative Assembly (DPRD). The demonstration organized by the *Kabeloata Singgani Alliance (Persekutuan Kabeloata Singgani)*, which was made up of residents of Rahmat and Sintuwu villages, KPA-ST, FSPM, and the Urban Farmers Community (*Komunitas Petani Kota: Kompak*). There were six demands set forth during this demonstration: (1) the Central Sulawesi Regional Executive of WALHI and YBHR must jointly compensate the community for losses; (2) alternative land must be found and prepared immediately for the landless farmers; (3) no violence or force should be used in the resolution of the Dongi-dongi case; (4) a legal process must be implemented in relation to any parties involved in the destruction of the environment (environmental criminals); (5) the Central Sulawesi branch of WALHI and YBHR must be disbanded, and (6) the Dongi-dongi area must be returned to its original function.

In preparation for defending themselves against the demands for disbandment, the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI and its network began to mobilize supportive members of the community to campaign on a more strategic issue. The focus of this campaign was the rights of the farmers and local traditional peoples who had been repeatedly displaced over the period of 30 years of rule by the New Order government. Besides this militaristic regime, international financial forces, including foreign aid loans, had played a role in the process of marginalization of the local people.

Using the momentum of the commemoration of the nation's 40th Agrarian Day, on September 24, 2001 "Farmer's Day Action" was held and participated in by hundreds of people. This event claimed as the largest action taken in the history of protest demonstrations in Central Sulawesi. A number of NGOs, community and university student organizations, including AMASUTA, AMAK, FNBI, LBHR, LMND, SPRA, SNTP, SORAK, STN Donggala, WALHI, YBHR, YEI, YMP, YPR, and YTM. In the statement about the action taken, the protestors demanded that an end should be put to the human rights abuse and expropriation of land the farmers and local Customary Communities had experienced under the New Order regime. The demonstrators also urged democratization of the management of natural resources and the renewal of agrarian practices in as short as possible period of time. In relation to

the management of the Lore Lindu National Forest, the protestors strongly urged the government to revamp the regulations and rulings on the national park in order to more fully involve the local communities in the decision making processes involved in the management of the land there. In addition, the demonstrators also rejected the policy of accepting foreign loans.

On September 27, 2001, another traditional meeting of the *Pitu Nggota Ngata Kaili* community was held. This meeting once again resulted in demands that the Regional Police immediately resolve the Dongi-dongi case through the appropriate legal channels. The Council also urged the Regional Police to investigate the instigators of the occupation of Dongi-dongi. However, despite pressure from various sources, including the government itself, to process this case further on the basis of existing laws, the strong resistance of the local people and the un-conducive security situation in Poso made the Regional Police very reluctant to take a firm law enforcement stance in Dongi-dongi. Instead, the Regional Police preferred to place this problem back in the hands of the body responsible for the management of the area, that being the Central Sulawesi Forest Service, in order that the Forestry officials could investigate to determine who among the local community were actually farmers and who the illegal loggers were.

Meanwhile, feeling pushed into a corner in relation to the Dongi-dongi case, the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI was finally lured into taking similar action. The difference was that the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI did not target the NGOs in Central Sulawesi that were directly involved in trying to force its disbandment, but rather the foreign NGO, TNC. This action took the form of sending a letter to the Director General for Forest Protection and Nature Conservation at the Indonesian Department of Forestry in Jakarta. In this letter dated September 25, 2001, the Central Sulawesi WALHI demanded the rescinding of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between TNC and the Directorate General for Forest Protection and Nature Conservation on the basis of the three points cited here.

First, the income generating projects carried out by TNC did not provide any economic benefit to the local communities. The approach taken in these projects was not sustainable and did not touch on the basic problems faced by the people living near the Lore Lindu National Park. Second, from the very beginning, TNC had opposed community based conservation management. The activities of TNC were

entirely based on the assumption that the local people were the ones damaging and plundering the conservation area. Because of this attitude, the people of the local communities always under surveillance and severe actions were taken against them. Third, in its process of preparing a management plan for the Lore Lindu National Park, TNC made a fatal mistake in issuing the draft zoning plan without involving the local communities in the areas surrounding Lore Lindu National park in the production of that document. As a result, the draft zoning map developed was very detrimental to the local people because the areas that they had traditionally controlled were classified as “utilization zones” by the draft plan.

Once the Director General for Forest Protection and Nature Conservation had received the letter from the Central Sulawesi WALHI, the conflict among the NGOs had been taken to the national level. This action forced negotiations between the TNC Program in Indonesia based in Jakarta and the National Executive for WALHI. Within these negotiations, it was agreed to assign a mediation team made up of representatives of both organizations to Palu in order to attempt to bridge the gap in communication and to calm any conflicts among the NGOs. In addition, while the negotiations continued, the NGOs agreed to adhere to a respite or cooling off period of two weeks to begin on October 1, 2001.

This respite phase marked the end of the open conflict among the various NGOs in Palu. It also marked an end to the demonstrations mobilized by the NGOs. Even so, this did not bring an end to the efforts to take potshots at the opposition, whether this occurred between the government and the NGOs supporting the Dongi-dongi occupation, or among the NGOs themselves, or even between the NGOs and the public.

On November 26, 2001, the head of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority sent a letter to the Central Sulawesi chief of police that essentially put pressure on to resolve the Tongoa and Dongi-dongi cases immediately through legal channels because the police were already in possession of the names of the people responsible for the clearing of the forest and illegal logging. However, even though the Central Sulawesi Provincial Police had strong support from various parties to take firm action against the perpetrators of the Dongi-dongi occupation and illegal logging, the police never took any concrete action. The reluctance of the Regional Police to take any

risks, placed the Dongi-dongi area under the *de facto* control of the local community, and this has been the situation there since.

Then on December 7, 2001, the head of the Park Authority issued a Stance and Protest Statement that pressured the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation to investigate irregularities in the management of the Community Strengthening Support Program (CSSP) funds from USAID, which had been channeled through the Central Sulawesi chapter of WALHI. The Park Authority was of the opinion that this grant was used not only for the publication of the “*Bergerak*” bulletin (printed by the Central Sulawesi branch of WALHI), but also for stirring up the local people in relation to the Dongi-dongi case. As proof, the head of the Park Authority attached a copy of the front cover of August-September 2001 edition of “*Bergerak*”, which featured a photograph of demonstrators carrying a banner with the writing “Moratorium TNLL”. The Park Authority head asked the director general to take steps to stop the disbursement of the CSSP grant funds. The Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation then sent a letter to USAID urgently requesting that the CSSP grant for the Central Sulawesi chapter of WALHI be withdrawn.

In the meantime, TNC was terrorized by threats. In a report made to the local police, the TNC office complained that TNC had received 6 anonymous letters threatening TNC and demanding that it stops its activities in Central Sulawesi. As a result of these threats, TNC requested protection from the police.

The expertise exhibited by the Central Sulawesi NGOs in influencing public opinion and garnering support through the mass media for the rejection of the Lindu Dam project (1994-1997), came back into play in the Dongi-dongi case. However, this time around, the diametric confrontation that occurred was not only between NGOs and the state, but between the NGOs themselves. The actors in this dispute knew exactly how to exploit the power of the mass media – in particular the print media to both develop public opinion and pressure opponents. As a result, during the period from July through September 2001 – or for a period of three months after the occupation – the Dongi-dongi controversy not only filled local newspapers (*Nuansa Pos, Mercusuar, Surya*), but was also covered in nationwide newspapers and magazines (*Suara Pembaruan, Kompas, Gatra, The Jakarta Post, Tempo*). Throughout that period, as many as 52 articles and news pieces about Dongi-dongi

appeared in local and nationally distributed publications. After September 2001, the Dongi-dongi controversy no longer dominated either local or nationally distributed newspapers (see Table 10), even though the farmers continued to occupy the area.

### 3. Illegal Logging

Before the Dongi-dongi area was occupied, illegal logging was widespread in the Lore Lindu National Park. Monitoring of the illegal logging activities by the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI in Lore Lindu National Park found that from January through December 2000, there were approximately 119 cases of theft of wood and rattan (WALHI, 2001: 2). WALHI identified 3 specific perpetrators (actors) involved in the illegal logging, these were: private enterprises; members of the Indonesian Armed Forces, the Police and Forest Rangers. Furthermore, WALHI has reported indications that in 2001, officials of the Central Sulawesi Forestry Department have also become involved in financing illegal logging activities (Ibid, 2001: 2).

Table 10. Frequency of Articles and News about Dongi-dongi in Local and Nationwide Newspapers and Magazines, January – December 2001

Newspapers and Magazines	Frequency of Articles and News about Dong-dongi in 2001				
	January – March	April– June	July- September	October- December	Total
<i>Local newspapers</i>					
Nuansa Pos	3	1	30	1	35
Mercusuar	1	9	12	1	23
Tabloid Formasi	-	-	1	-	1
Surya	-	-	1	1	2
<i>Nationwide newspapers &amp; magazines</i>					
Suara Pembaruan	-	-	2	2	4
Kompas	-	-	2	-	2
The Jakarta Post	-	-	2	-	2
Gatra	-	-	1	-	1
Tempo (magazine)	-	-	1	-	1
Total	4	10	52	5	71

From June 27 through December 31, 2001, the Lore Lindu National Park Authority, along with Police officers observed and investigated illegal logging in the Lore Lindu National Park area. As a result, as much as 302.1 m<sup>3</sup> of wood and 55

trucks carrying wood were confiscated.<sup>97</sup> The highest incidence of illegal logging within that period took place in the timeframe between June 27 and July 16, 2001, with 92 m<sup>3</sup> of wood and 20 trucks confiscated. In that period of three weeks, the amount of wood and number of trucks confiscated reached approximately 30% of the total amount confiscated in the entire six months of surveillance. There appeared to be a close connection between the commencement of the clearing of the Dongi-dongi area by farmers from the four villages on June 19, 2001 and the intensity of illegal logging.

Two NGOs in Palu, the Katopasa Foundation and the Jambata Foundation, also pointed out proof of the occurrence of illegal logging in Dongi-dongi. Both NGOs reported in press releases that between 60–100 chainsaws with a capacity for cutting 1–3 m<sup>3</sup> of wood per day per chainsaw were being operated in the area. The loads of wood would then be picked up by 2–5 trucks every night. With a capacity of 6–12 m<sup>3</sup> per truck, the two NGOs that carried out this investigation on May 11, 2002, estimated that on that day the illegal logging operations using chainsaws had resulted in the loss of 12–60 m<sup>3</sup> of illegally logged wood from Dongi-dongi. This illegally logged wood can be sold locally for transport to Palu at a price of Rp 400,000 to Rp 450,000 per m<sup>3</sup> (the trucks and the workers transporting the wood are paid for by the buyer as well). And once the shipment reaches Palu it can bring as much as Rp 650,000 to Rp 750,000 per m<sup>3</sup> (with the buyer also paying for the truck, its driver and other workers).

It is somewhat difficult for the authorities to prove that this loading and transporting of logs is illegal because the people transporting these loads of wood have Permits for Transportation of Logs by Landowners (*Ijin Pemungutan Kayu Pada Tanah Milik: IPKTM*) and a Certified Forestry Products Document (*Surat Keterangan Sahnya Hasil Hutan: SKSHH*), which are issued by the Provincial Department of Forestry. The Transportation Permits (IPKTM) issued by the Forestry Department are actually meant for the conveyance of logs from forested areas designated under the “Other Utilization” category, although, in practice, the people holding these Transportation Permits collect log shipments inside the national parks because of the low levels of standing stock existing in the “Other Utilization” areas. Even though this wood originates from shipments being sent out of the national park, it is considered legal if the shipments are covered by a Certified Forestry Products Document

(SKSHH). This is because these certification documents can only be issued if the company or institution shipping the wood already has a Transportation Permit.

Therefore, in a letter to the Governor of Central Sulawesi dated March 27, 2002, the Katopassa Foundation requested that the Governor carefully monitor the parties requesting Transportation Permits in the Talabosa, Maholo, Tamadue and other villages in areas adjacent to the Lore Lindu National Park for the sake of the interests of the general public. Besides this, the Katopassa Foundation also protested to the Governor and the Provincial Forestry Department that issued Transportation Permits in Tuwa Village, which shares a border with the Lore Lindu National Park.<sup>98</sup>

These illegal logging syndicates generally have possession of Transportation Permits and Certified Forestry Products Documents, so the Forest Rangers who check documentation at particular posts – due to limited facilities – usually are not able to effectively investigate the area of origination of log shipments. Therefore, the logs stolen from various locations in the Lore Lindu National Park flow freely into Palu. Even shipments of logs without the proper documentation get into Palu because this shipping of illegally logged wood is often backed by members of the military and even by Forest Rangers.

It could be said that the widespread incidence of illegal logging in Central Sulawesi is probably caused by three factors. First, the high level of demand for wood in the region's sawmills and wood (carpentry) shops most of which are operating illegally in the Palu valley. A survey carried out by the Park Authority, the Central Sulawesi Regional Police, and Lore Lindu National Park Partnership Forum (FKTNLL) on November 5-15, 2001, found that: (a) of the two molding factories investigated, one was operating without a permit; (b) of the 58 sawmills investigated, 40 had no permits; and (c) of the 77 wood shops checked, 65 had no permits. The results of this survey gave credence to the statements made by the Deputy Head of the Central Sulawesi Forestry Department published in the "*Radar Sulteng*" newspaper on December 26, 2001. He reported that 95 of 120 units, or 80% of the sawmills in Palu valley did not have the necessary operations document, that being the Plan for the Establishment of Raw Material Processing Industry (Rencana Pengadaan Bahan Baku Industri: RPBI), issued and legalized by the Provincial Forestry Department (Laban, 2002:3).

Second, the weakness of law enforcement. According to Laban, the legal process for prosecuting cases of log shipments transported without the proper Certified Forestry Products Document (Surat Keterangan Sahnya Hasil Hutan: SKSHH) appeared to be extremely slow, and it was suspected that efforts were being made to hinder or stop the ongoing process. For example, of the 40 cases of illegal shipment of wood monitored from June 27 through December 31, 2001 as of February 2, 2002, only three suspects had been sent for trial by the Police; 5 cases had been turned over to the Donggala Police by the Park Authority, and two of the suspects/cases had been turned over to the Military Police Detachment (Laban, 2002: 7).

Third, the issuance of Transportation Permits (IPKTM) and Certified Forestry Products Documents (SKSHH) by the Provincial Forestry Department was not selective enough; the documents were just too easy to get (Press Release Katopassa Foundation, May 11, 2002). Besides this, Laban indicated that placing the authority for three important support processes (official support/assistance in the exploitation of forestry products, the provision of local licenses and permits, and the implementation of production and monitoring plans) in the hands of the Head of the Provincial Forestry Department resulted in that official developing the “hedonistic” attitude of a celebrity (Laban, 2002: 3).

This dark portrait of illegal logging in Central Sulawesi is just a miniature picture of the overall extent of this problem occurring in all the nooks and crannies of the Indonesian archipelago in the wake of the economic crisis. The imbalance in the supply and demand of raw materials from the forests due to the over capacity of the wood industry, the weakness of law enforcement, as well as the continuance of corrupt practices, collusion and nepotism, are the main causes of illegal logging in Indonesia (Kartodihardjo, 2002). As a result of these factors, the volume of forestry natural resources lost annually reaches 40 million m<sup>3</sup>. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the damage to Indonesia’s forests – between 1985 and 1998- is severe at a rate of 1.7 million ha annually. In fact, in 2000 the rate of destruction had accelerated to 2 million ha annually. (Ibid, 2002:4).

The problem of illegal logging in Dongi-dongi got a great deal of attention from the mass media. While in 2001 the print media heavily covered the controversy surrounding the occupation of Dongi-dongi (Table 10), in the two following years -

2002 and 2003 – the print media took up the issue of the illegal logging happening in Dongi-dongi (see Table 11). The local print media even went so far as to sharply criticize the illegal logging there. And, not wanting to be left behind, private sector radio broadcast several talk shows to discuss the issue of illegal logging in Dongi-dongi.

Table 11. Frequency of News on Illegal Logging in Dongi-dongi, 2001 - 2003

Newspapers and Magazines	Frequency of News			
	2001 <sup>1</sup>	2002 <sup>2</sup>	2003 <sup>3</sup>	Total
<i>Local newspapers</i>				
Nuansa Pos	2	3	1	6
Mercusuar	4	0	1	5
Radar Sulteng	-	1	9	10
<i>Nationwide newspapers</i>				
Kompas	1	4	1	6
Jakarta Post	2	2	-	4
Tempo	-	1	1	2
Total	9	11	13	33

<sup>1</sup> Eight out of nine news items were published during the period of July - September 2001 (after the occupation of Dongi-dongi on July 2001)

<sup>2</sup> Nine out of 11 news items were published during the period of October-December 2002 (particularly after one Dongi-dongi settler was shot to death due to illegal logging, see section IV.B.4)

<sup>3</sup> Nine out of 13 news items were published during the period of November-December 2003 (after flooding at Dongi-dongi, see section IV.B.4)

#### 4. Human Victims and Ecological Damage

In the middle of the night on October 8, 2002, two trucks full of lumber resulting from illegal logging pulled into the outskirts of Palu under escort by four motorcyclists. This wood was being transported by a group of Dongi-dongi residents (among them the coordinator of FPM) for sale at the lumber yard in Kalukubula, Palu. These illegal logs were stopped by Forest Rangers/Police Officers who were on routine Operation Amputation for the Eradication of Illegal Exploitation of Forest Resources patrol along the Palu-Palolo axis road.

This intervention by the Forest Rangers upset the Dongi-dongi residents who were transporting the wood. They threatened the officers with raised machetes. Then, upon witnessing his fellow officers coming under assault with the assailants

attempting to take their weapons, Yustus Ferdinan – a Forest Ranger – fired a shot, which hit Agus – one of the Dongi-dongi residents. Agus fell dead on the spot. One of the Forest Rangers was also injured and hospitalized for treatment of his wounds.

The next day, on October 9, 2002, around 1 p.m. a crowd burned down the Lore Lindu National Park Authority facility in Kamarora village. An information center building, four guest houses, a Motorola radio communications unit, and two office structures used by the Subsection Office for the Kamarora Conservation Territory of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority were burned down by villagers occupying Dongi-dongi. Meanwhile, in Bobo village, a crowd burned an office and destroyed a Motorola communication radio.

Reacting to these incidents, the Central Sulawesi chapter of WALHI issued a press release titled "Don't Use Weapons to Enforce Conservation Approach" on October 14, 2002. The WALHI chapter strongly condemned the violence resorted to by the Lore Lindu National Park Authority and requested that Laban resign from his post. The Central Sulawesi chapter of WALHI was of the opinion that the area residents had run amuck and burned the Park Authority's property in response to the forceful actions of the Forest Rangers (Nuansa Pos, October 14, 2002).

In response to WALHI's press release, the head of the Park Authority issued a scathing press release targeting WALHI and the NGOs that had been supporting the occupation of Dongi-dongi on October 25, 2002. At the end of this press release, Laban reported that the WALHI Award that he had been granted in the previous two years (see endnote number 15) had been torn up. While tearing up the award, Laban was quoted as saying that, "I received this award and other ones from the government in 2000, but now I feel deceived and embarrassed by them because of the rampant illegal logging taking place in the national park." Further, Laban added that "other awards that I had received for allowing local people to resettle in the national park without damaging the environment are hanging in my house in Bogor, West Java, but these will also be torn up because they were no longer relevant." (Jakarta Post, October 26, 2002).

During the press conference Laban said that he appreciated the WALHI Award at the time because of the non-governmental organization's strong commitment to supporting the resettlement of a number of communal groups inside

the national park. But all that had now changed. “I decide to dump the awards as neither the government nor WALHI did anything to prevent the Dongi-dongi communal group from looting the forest.” According to Laban, around 3,800 hectares of the total 228,000 hectares of forest in the park had been badly damaged and another 1,000 hectares had been occupied for resettlement purposes. In addition, Laban stated that “WALHI has supported the occupation of the forest and done nothing to prevent the people from felling trees in the park in its effort to win financial support from its donor agencies” (Ibid). During this press conference, Laban also issued the following important statement that is of pertinence to this discussion.

“... The participation of the FPM in that bloody incident, besides being confirmed by the very involvement of Papa Gola (FPM Coordinator), was also indicated by the fact that the illegal lumber, which was confiscated as evidence in the incident, originated from Dongi-dongi. Due to the proven involvement of FPM in the incident, WALHI and its affiliated NGOs should also be held responsible. This is because they are the midwives that attended at the birth of FPM and the ones that have supported all of FPM’s activities in Dongi-dongi.


The public should be made aware that the group of people, who have occupied a section of the Lore Lindu National Park in Dongi-dongi and who call themselves the FPM, certainly have a brutal nature. The brutality they exhibited in their actions during the bloody incident of October 8, were simply repetitions of similar brutality occurring in previous incidents. Among others, the incident of July 4, 2002, in which they mounted a massive attack, made threats of violence and removed illegal logs that had been confiscated and were being stored in the compound of the Lore Lindu national Park Authority. These threats and the mobilization of large numbers of people forced the Forest Rangers of the Park Authority to surrender the confiscated logs.

This brutality exhibited by the group of people who have occupied Dongi-dongi can also be seen in their own fighting among themselves over the past few months. These skirmishes have resulted in several deaths and numerous injuries. Their brutality has also been apparent in their clearing of the forest, which has triggered the anger of the customary community of Sedoa Village, who feel that their traditional territory in the Dongi-dongi area has been wrongfully cleared without any authority. The most recent evidence of this brutality can be seen in the wanton burning of state building around the Lore Lindu National Park” (Press release from the Head of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority, October 25, 2002)

A year after the shooting incident, the damage to the forest ecosystem at Dongi-dongi was continuing. More and more people were to Dongi-dongi and opening up agricultural land there. Whereas in December 2001, there were only 390 new houses in the Dongi-dongi area, by October 2003, a little less than two years later, there were 1,148 buildings there. In the same timeframe, the number of houses with

zinc roofing, which indicates an increase in the quality of the construction of the homes of the Dongi-dongi residents, had increased (see Figure 4 and Appendix 4). This data was collected through observation and rapid assessment done by Christian Schultz, a researcher for Stability of Rainforest Margins (STORMA) that covered the Dongi-dongi region from December 2001 through September 2004.

Figure 4. Trends in the Development of Structures in the Dongi-dongi Area, September 2001 to October 2004<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Data from survey by Christian Schultz, STORMA researcher

In the two years after the occupation, the physical landscape and ecosystem of Dongi-dongi have changed dramatically as a result of the encroachment and illegal logging. This has severely impacted Dongi-dongi's stability as a water catchments area for the downstream regions. The peak result of these ecological changes thus far was the advent of landslides and massive flooding in Dongi-dongi on December 13, 2003, as reported in Chapter I.B (Research Questions).

This massive flooding not only damaged Dongi-dongi, but also caused damage in the villages of Ranteleda, Tongoa and Berdikari. A seven-km section of the Tongoa – Sedoa access road could no longer be used due to landslides and fallen trees, and three bridges were damaged by flooding (one of them was even carried 150 meters from its original site by the flood water), and a hanging bridge in Pakuli (Biromaru Subdistrict) was also washed away. Electrical power was disrupted in

Tongoa, and no fewer than 40 houses in the Tongoa, Dongi-dongi, and Karava (Pakuli) villages were inundated, while 4 homes were washed away and one severely damaged. Besides that, 50 ha of rice fields and cocoa trees were flooded.

Although history seemed to be repeating itself, the whole disaster was over in a flash. The Tongoa – Dongi-dongi – Sedoa route started functioning again. The Dongi-dongi residents went back to their previous activities of clearing the forest, growing cocoa and coffee, with some among them still taking rattan and logs from the forest. A small number of the Dongi-dongi residents have even found another additional source of income. They are charging people fees from every vehicle crossing the emergency bridge built to replace the main bridge that was washed away by the flood. As if finally exhausted, the NGOs that had been in such heated conflict have settled back into their own routine activities. However, they do have a new agenda item as the Central Sulawesi provincial government has revived the plan to build the Lindu dam and electrical power facility.

## VII. Conclusions

This research reveals how contract-oppression power (or juridical/legal power) and domination-repression power (or knowledge/discourse power) have been reinforcing each other and have formed a united force: “juridical-domination power”. This combining of forms of power effectively controls the diversity of species, communities, and ecosystems, as well as the forestlands, that need to be preserved and protected. Frequently, this power is imposed – often with coercion – on existing tenurial relations and changes those relations fundamentally. Further, as the power itself is the result of the production, accumulation and circulation of a discourse, it also dominates the narratives and discourses existing among the bureaucrats, academicians and NGOs, as well as among local peoples.

As a consequence, there is absolutely no opportunity for the local forest users and customary communities to access, use and control protected areas other than those, which have been set out legally by the state, and which are viewed as correct according to scientific discourse. Juridical/legal power dictates that the public’s access be defined by “forbidden” or “allowed”. While knowledge/discourse power carries the public into the space of the “right-wrong” discourse. Hence, the contemporary politics of protected areas involve not only changes to or modification of property regimes, but have much wider implications; these politics also seek to control acts, narratives, discourses, attitudes, and everyday behaviors, as well as the modes of production of the local people living inside and adjacent to the protected areas.

However, this research has found that the “juridical-domination power” did not fully exist in the Dongi-dongi area. Albeit, the phenomenon of the Dongi-dongi occupation did not replicate itself, nor did it extend throughout the Lore Lindu National Park, the occupation continued into 2005. All of the initiatives and solutions set forth by the NGOs and the local administration (including the operation to eradicate illegal logging), which were meant to bring the occupation of Dongi-dongi to an end by moving the people settling there to other places prepared for them, failed to be achieved.

This situation has occurred because, first, the agrarian justice discourse advocated by the local NGOs placed the people of the four resettlement villages in a position of equal power in relation to the state, which depended on the conservation discourse. In other words, the power of the narrative of “allow” and “right” to access, use and control protected areas, which was produced by the NGOs in the name of agrarian justice, was in a position equal to that of the power narrative of “forbidden” and “wrong” to access, use and control protected areas, which was advocated by the state, as well as by international and local conservationists. This configuration of equal power relations continued even though the agrarian discourse faded into oblivion when, in October 2002, the FPM was proven to be involved in illegal logging, which eventually resulted in the death of a member of FPM. The configuration also remained entrenched even when, in December 2003, heavy flooding that originated in the Dongi-dongi swept through downstream areas. So what was the reason that these two momentous events did nothing to shift the political positions of the actors in the conflict? Don’t environmental changes trigger political ramifications as hypothesized by Bryant and Bailey (1997)?

There are at least two additional factors, besides the first point mentioned above, that have caused the residents of the four resettlement villages to continue their occupation of Dongi-dongi to date. The second factor was that the state had yet to transform adequately in the transition to democracy. A weak legal system, poor law enforcement, lack of commitment, and feeble state bureaucracy and institutional arrangements continued to exist in most governmental institutions. Therefore, the various initiatives put forth by the central government, the provincial administration, and the Central Sulawesi legislature, from even before Dongi-dongi was occupied through to the time this thesis was completed, all ended in failure. Not only that, these repeated failures produced costly results: continuously expanding crises of confidence in relation to the commitments, promises and capabilities of the government.

The third factor was the strong overlapping of economic interests among the residents of Dongi-dongi, the police, the military and government officials in the business of illegal logging. Not long after the flooding occurred in the early part of December 2003, during a talk show broadcast by a private sector radio station in Palu, the Coordinator of FPM firmly stated, without trying to cover anything up, that he was actively involved in illegal logging and was not afraid of arrest by the police.

However, if he were to be arrested, he would disclose the names of the police, military and government officials who were involved in and supporting the illegal logging.

This situation indicated that since the advent and rapid expansion of illegal logging in Dongi-dongi, FPM's actual power base was no longer the support of the NGOs. Papa Gola, the Coordinator of FPM at that time, preferred for FPM to ally itself with the movers and shakers of the illegal logging business, who also wielded economic and political power in Central Sulawesi. This shift in the power base of FPM brought WALHI, YBHR and the other NGOs supportive of the Dongi-dongi occupation face to face with an impossible decision: withdraw support from FPM with the risk that WALHI, as the leading NGO in Indonesia, would "lose face" in the eyes of its constituents, or continue to support FPM with the risk of being labeled as an environmental NGO that was inconsistent with its stated vision and mission.

From this it appears that the first hypotheses set forth in this research – "the Dongi-dongi occupation could continue only if the actors in the conflict were functioning on equal power levels within a framework of inter-locked interests in relation to the perceived discourse of 'forbidden and allowed' and 'right and wrong' in connection to access, use and control of the protected area" – was proven to be only partially accurate. In order to be able to hold their position in Dongi-dongi, the occupiers shrewdly manipulated two types of power for their own interests and survival; the power of the support provided by the NGOs, and the power they gleaned from their relations in the illegal logging business. FPM succeeded in leveraging both types of power becoming a "coercion-struggle of power" as a form of opposition that carried a strength equal to that of the "juridical-dominance of power". This lends further credence to Foucault's statement that – "resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (Foucault 1980:95).

As regards the second hypothesis set forth in this research – "under authoritarian regimes, the stability or instability of protected areas are much determined by the interests, power and governance of the state, as well as international actors, rather than local actors. Whereas, under democratic regimes, this is much determined by the interests, power and governance of local actors rather than those of the state and international actors" – the results of this study indicate that this hypothesis could be accepted if, and only if, the government, within its transition to

democracy can overcome the various basic problems discussed, and if the cost benefit factors inherent in the protected areas can be distributed fairly at the local (village) level. If these two factors cannot be managed properly or overcome, the result will be the instability of the rainforest margins, as well as the core of the protected area.

As compared to the situation existing during the authoritarian period, local actors certainly have a much larger influence now in relation to determining access and control over protected areas. Various community-based natural resource management initiatives in the form of Community Conservation Agreements between the Lore Lindu National Park Authority and the residents of the Sedoa, Wuasa, Kaduwaa, Watutau, Betue, Toro, and Katu traditional villages, populated predominantly by indigenous peoples, have been developed since 1999 as a result of collaboration with NGOs (TNC and YTM). However, this type of collaborative situation did not occur in the Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat resettlement villages, inhabited primarily by local transmigrants and their descendants, because they had been treated unjustly and not received equitable distribution of the cost-benefit resulting the existence of the national park. The CSIADCP, which was appointed to establish the Community Conservation Agreements and improve the welfare of the people living in the 63 villages around the Lore Lindu National Park, was not able to find a way out of the situation resulting from the injustices occurring in the agrarian sector that had impacted the area people for more than two decades.

So what can be done in order to find a solution to the Dongi-dongi dilemma in relation to these two important conclusions deriving from this research? This certainly is not an easy situation to resolve, but some initial steps must be taken and implemented consistently over a period of time. As things stand now, there are two alternative solutions to choose from. The first alternative, Alternative I, would be to change the function of Dongi-dongi from its initial status of Taman Nasional Lore Lindu core zone to that of utilization zone, thus allowing legal access and exploitation by villagers who actually do not have any land of their own. The second would be to enforce Dongi-dongi's initial core zone status and to move the occupants to another area they have approved.

In Alternative I, Dongi-dongi would remain state common property, although the local people would be allowed to access and utilize it and to have some limited

control over the area. The area residents would have only the right to access and exploit the forested areas already cleared for agriculture purposes, but without individual or private property rights, so that the property could never be bought or sold or ownership transferred from one party to another in any way. In Alternative I, Dongi-dongi would eventually become an agro-forestry landscape with spatial planning and utilization determined in a participative manner with the local community. As a consequence of these changes, a strong social contract between the Park Authority and the local community would be required concerning the rights to access, control, withdrawal from, and management of the area, as well as exclusion and alienation from resources. Included in this social contract should be the local community's obligation to replant and cultivate trees in areas agreed upon among all concerned parties. The suggestions set forth by Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) concerning *Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of Forest and Protected Area Management* could be used as a reference in developing and implementing Alternative I.

There is a strong probability that Alternative I would be the best solution to the Dongi-dongi problem in comparison to Alternative II in which the people occupying the area would be moved to another site. Alternative II has already been tried by the local administration, but did not receive a positive response from the occupiers due to the issues of accessibility and soil fertility in the resettlement area, which were considered lacking in comparison to Dongi-dongi. Clearly any attempt to resolve the matter through application of Alternative II would encounter vastly more constraints than would the implementation of Alternative I.

However, no matter which alternative is selected, it is imperative that the government take three important steps vital to ensuring the achievement of a resolution of the conflict that will be adhered to by all concerned parties. First of all, in an initial step toward resolving the dispute, the government would have to make a sincere acknowledgement of and apology for its errors in policymaking and actions taken, while exhibiting a concrete determination to improve the lives of the residents of the resettlement villages. In line with the observations made by Kriesberg (1998) in relation to a variety of conflicts occurring in various places worldwide, this kind of action is vital step in enabling the parties to any dispute to achieve an effective conflict resolution. Second, the government must rebuild the public's trust that has

reached the lowest possible point by consistently, over time, fulfilling its promises and realizing mutually established agreements. Third, the government must develop an intense and continual dialog at the onset of steps toward a solution and maintain this intensity throughout the process toward the effective implementation of concrete steps resulting in a final resolution. These three vital steps may seem extremely difficult for the government to take, but if implemented carefully, in a fully focused manner, with patience, sincerity and honesty, are certain to be effective. These four things are what have been lacking throughout the past three decades.

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## End Note Chapter 1

- <sup>1</sup> The survey aggregated plantations in the “forest” category and thus did not provide an estimate of their extent, but it is clear a large part of this area was planted in the 1950s and 1960s (Booth, 1988). In 1950, teak plantations on Java covered an additional 824,000 ha (Peluso, 1992: Annex C).
- <sup>2</sup> In 2000, the Department of Forestry did digital image analysis of 47.9 million ha of production forest that constituted the working area of 320 logging concessions, 12.5 million ha of protection forest and 17.4 million ha of conservation forest. The results were: only 40% of the primary forest remained in the production forest area, only 54% in the protection forest area, and only 60% in the conservation forest area (Department of Forestry 2000 in Kartodihardjo 2002:7).
- <sup>3</sup> Term introduced by the author as it could embrace and reflect approach used by various scholars that deal with the issues of unequal power relations, power dependency, global/local, first world/third world.
- <sup>4</sup> The effort of Bryant and Bailey (1997) to distinguish Third World political ecology from other selected environmental research fields (e.g. political ecology from environmental politics) is not argued very strongly, and they acknowledged a large degree of overlap (Blaikie, 1999:132).
- <sup>5</sup> Another way to understand environmental problems or change is through what Blaikie (1995) terms ‘a chain of explanation’ surrounding specific environmental problems.
- <sup>6</sup> Kriesberg (1998) in his book of ‘*Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*’ describes that the stage of conflict as consisting of emergence, escalation, de-escalation and settlement of conflict (no prologue stage of conflict).

## Endnote Chapter 2

- <sup>7</sup> The Nature Conservancy (TNC) is US-based conservation NGO.
- <sup>8</sup> International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) or World Conservation Union founded in 1948. The World Conservation Union brings together states, government agencies, and a diverse range of NGOs in a unique world partnership: over 1,000 members in all spread across 140 countries. In some cases, IUCN is recognized as a Big International NGO (BINGO), in others as an “International Quasi Non-Governmental Organization”. IUCN has a prominent role in mobilizing and formulating information and discourses for biodiversity conservation. IUCN has also become the central focal point of the houses of the GEF-NGO network (Young 2002: 261).
- <sup>9</sup> Formerly the acronym of WWF stood for World Wild Life Fund. In the US and Canada the organization is known as World Wild Life Fund. WWF was founded in 1961 as a fundraising subsidiary of IUCN.
- <sup>10</sup> In 1991 *Caring for the Earth: a Strategy for Sustainable Living*, IUCN, UNEP, and WWF defined sustainable development as: the maintenance of essential ecological processes and services, the sustainable use of natural resources, and the maintenance of biodiversity (Kramer and van Schaik 1997). *Caring for the Earth* is a continuation of an idea introduced in 1980 as the *World conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development*, by the same authors.
- <sup>11</sup> World Resource Institute (WRI) is an NGO based research institute or think tank created in 1982. WRI is dedicated to helping governments and private organizations of all types cope with environmental, resource, and development challenges of global significance. WRI is funded almost entirely by corporate sponsorship and donations, including Monsanto, Du Pont, Shell, Phillip Morris and individual Rockefellers (Young 2002: 261).
- <sup>12</sup> Council, S. (2004) *Conservation Funding: Helping or Hurting Indigenous People?* in Chapin (2004)
- <sup>13</sup> GEF was created in 1991 as a pilot facility in the WB to multilaterally finance globally valuable conservation. GEF works in four focal areas: biodiversity, climate changes, international waters and ozone depletion. GEF is treasury driven, US-based, with World Bank style efficiency and designed

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for an age of globalization. At Rio Conference, NGOs as well as G77 governments protested the establishment of GEF calling it a rushed fait accompli created back to front with strategy trailing finance. After long, complex and heated negotiations, the facility was restructured in the name of transparency and accountability before refinancing with US\$ 2 billion in 1994 (Young 2002).

- <sup>14</sup> National Environmental Actions Plans provides a long-term conceptual framework that encompasses various government sectors and links environmental and natural resource management goals into the country's national development program (Kramer and Sharma 1997).
- <sup>15</sup> At the Millennium Summit, held in 2000, in addition to reaffirming their support for the general principles of sustainable development, 147 heads of State signed the Millennium Declaration, which contained a section titled "Protecting Our Common Environment". Participants reaffirmed their commitment to address environmental issues identified in previous conventions and treaties. Ten thematically oriented task forces are working to identify the best strategies for reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Project's ultimate objective is to help ensure that all developing countries meet the MDGs (UN Millennium Project 2003).
- <sup>16</sup> Conservation International (CI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) are the three leading environmental NGOs in the world; they all significantly contribute to the production and formation of biodiversity conservation knowledge and discourse, have extensive field actions for the protection of nature throughout the world, gain enormous revenues, and employ large numbers of human resources. See Chapin (2004).
- <sup>17</sup> According to Colchester (2004), the Yosemite and Yellowstone National Parks were not only established to preserve "wilderness" regions, but were also designed with a profit motive. Both were created largely as a result of pressure from the railway-building lobby, which sought to increase the number of fare-paying passengers by routing their tracks near to scenic sights for what today is described as ecotourism.
- <sup>18</sup> Colchester and Erni compiled the works of several authors in 13 protected areas located in South and Southeast Asia, i.e. Rajaji National Park, Northwest India; the Ayubia National Park, Pakistan; Royal Chitwan National Park, Nepal; the Thung Yai Naresuan Wildlife Sanctuary, and the Chom Thong conflict, Thailand; the Virachey National Park, Cambodia; Yok Don National Park, Vietnam; Tasek Bera Wetland Conservation and Crocker Range National Park, Malaysia; Kayan Mentarang National Park and Morowali Nature Reserve in Sulawesi, Indonesia, and the Barak of Palawan Island, Philippines.
- <sup>19</sup> IUCN (1994) defines protected areas as "an area of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means".
- <sup>20</sup> The study was driven by two key critical questions about the three big NGOs: they had become extremely large and wealthy in a short period of time; and they were promoting global approaches to conservation "that have evoked a number of questions – and complaints – from local communities, national NGOs and human rights activists" (Chapin 2004:17).
- <sup>21</sup> According to Chapin, both of the contracted NGOs, which conducted the Ford study, are run by Ford Foundation board members – Yolanda Kakabadse, IUCN's president, and Kathryn Fuller, WWF's president (Fuller is the board chairperson). It is they who kept the initial Ford studies from public view (Chapin 2004:30). Ford officials initially only received a verbal briefing, and finally saw the full studies. However, the studies were never made public (Chapin 2004:28).
- <sup>22</sup> In Indonesia, since the mid 1990s, USAID has sponsored the Natural Resources Management (NRM)/EPIQ Program's Protected Area Management. NRM/EPIQ has worked with BAPPENAS and the Directorate-General for Nature Protection and Conservation of the Department of Forestry to strengthen the management of protected areas in Indonesia. One of the NRM/EPIQ's working areas was Central Sulawesi Province.
- <sup>23</sup> Some agencies and authors include projects that have more commonly been termed community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) or community wildlife management (CWM) programs, such as, for example, CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe and ADMADE in Zambia (Hughes & Flintan 2001: 5).

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### Endnote Chapter 3

- <sup>24</sup> According to estimates prepared by Dhanani and Islam (2000:11-13), the headcount poverty incidence increased from an estimated 30% in February 1997 to just under 45% in September 1998. Between February 1996 and February 1999, the number of people falling below 65% of the total poverty line (or below the food poverty line) increased by over 70 percent (from 17 to 29 million people), while the number of people falling below 80% of the total poverty line increased by over 60% (from 35 to 57 million people), compared with less than 50% for the population below the total poverty line (up from 65 to 94 million people).
- <sup>25</sup> Sunderlin et al (2000:2).
- <sup>26</sup> Linz and Stepan (2001:28) define consolidated democracy as follows: “*behaviorally*, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, socio-economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or seceding from the state. *Attitudinally*, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for anti-system alternative is quite small or is more or less isolated from pro-democratic forces. *Constitutionally*, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and non-governmental forces alike become subject to, as well as habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures and institutions that are sanctioned by the new democratic process”.
- <sup>27</sup> Although, at this time, Law No. 22/1999 has been replaced by Law No. 32/2004, the commentary/discussion in this Chapter continues to refer to the configuration of Law No. 22/1999 because the Dongi-dongi case occurred in the midst of the euphoric atmosphere of decentralization, which had emerged because of the regulations contained within that law.
- <sup>28</sup> The decentralization of 2001 was not Indonesia’s first attempt to decentralize. Since colonial times there have been numerous attempts to do so, but none achieved much success. See World Bank (2003:2-3), and Hofman and Kaiser (2002:3) for further information.
- <sup>29</sup> One of the implementing regulations of the *Agrarische Wet* (Agrarian Act) was a Decree of the King of the Netherlands, *Agrarisch Besluit*, a provision that became the foundation for the establishment of the administrative land law applied until the advent of the Basic Agrarian Law in 1960. Article 1 of this Decree was considered as *Domeinverklaring* or ‘*domein*’ statement (state domain). The first ‘*domein*’ statement applied only to areas in Madura in 1870. Further, it applied for Sumatra in 1874, Manado in 1877 and South and East Borneo in 1888 (Wallace et al 2000; and the 1960 the Basic Agrarian Law).
- <sup>30</sup> In a letter sent to the Dutch NGO, despite thanks for the role of the NGO, the *Boschwezen* mentioned that the nature reserve was fully under the control and responsibility of the Dutch Netherlands India (Department of Forestry [Departemen Kehutanan] 1986a: 189).
- <sup>31</sup> The nature reserve previously established by the Dutch and later transformed in to a National Park was Gunung Leuser, Kerinci (as Kerinci-Seblat National Park), Way Kambas, Berbak, Sumatera Selatan I (as Bukit Barisan Selatan National Park), Baluran, Gunung Palung, Kutai, Gunung Rinjani and Komodo.
- <sup>32</sup> This happened due to the fact that “the central and regional military commands controlled over a dozen timber companies, and many logging concessionaires (HPH, *Hak Pengusahaan Hutan*) were linked to military organizations. Meanwhile, political and bureaucracy power holders within the central, provincial and local bureaucracy and military apparatus also formed partnerships with private business interests creating networks of social power and interest, supporting illegal logging and other lucrative activities at odds with state forest policy” (McCarthy 2000:105).
- <sup>33</sup> It was perceived as necessary to replace BAPI with IBSAP 2003 for several reasons. First, BAPI was considered to be too focused on biodiversity conservation of protected areas (*in-situ*) and to be paying little attention to other biodiversity sites, such as agricultural biodiversity (*ex-situ*). Second, though some Indonesian NGOs were involved, the formulation of BAPI was regarded as highly exclusive in nature, and involving only a little public participation. Third, the economic and political context within which the BAPI was formulated had been changing. The Indonesian monetary and

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economic crisis and the subsequent emergence of a democratic process had led to a new uncertainty, which further burdened implementation (BAPPENAS 2003).

- <sup>34</sup> In the Basic Forestry Law (UU No. 5/1967) the term “national park” could not be found. The term “national park” was not introduced until the issuance of UU No. 5/1990 on the Conservation of Biological Resources and Related Ecosystems. In 1999, the BFL (UU No. 5/1967) was replaced by the Forestry Law (UU No. 41/1999).
- <sup>35</sup> The 10 national parks were Kerinci-Seblat (Sumatra), Bukit Barisan Selatan (Sumatra), Kepulauan Seribu (marine national park, Jakarta), Kepulauan Karimun Java (marine national park, Central Java), Bromo-Tengger-Semeru (East Java), Meru Betiri (East Java), Tanjung Puting (Central Kalimantan), Dumoga Bone (North Sulawesi), Manusella (Moluccas), and Lore Lindu (Central Sulawesi).
- <sup>36</sup> Within the same period (1990-1992), the government also changed the status of four national parks that had initially been classified as “declared” to the status of “appointed” (see Attachment/Addendum 1).
- <sup>37</sup> This agreed text was then signed by Heads of State or Heads of Government as the Convention on Biodiversity at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. (Explanation of Law No.5 Tahun 1994 on the Ratification of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity).
- <sup>38</sup> As many as 16 national parks were established in the period of 1980-1989, with 13 new national parks established in the period of 1990-1992 (see Table 5 and Addendum 1).
- <sup>39</sup> Indonesia was among the first nations to sign the CBD. The signing of this convention by Heads of State/Heads of Government to place during the conference held from June 3 to June 14, 1992. At the time of the signing by Suharto (June 5, 1992), Indonesia was the eighth nation to have signed the convention (of Law No. 5/1994 concerning the Ratification of UN Convention on Biological Diversity).
- <sup>40</sup> Although the 1941 Ordinance for Nature Protection (*Natuurbeschermings Ordonantie* 1941) was rescinded at the time of the issuance of the BFL 1967, the norms contained in the Ordinance continued to exert a major influence on the BFL, in particular in relation to the management of sanctuary forests (*hutan suaka alam*), which included nature reserves (*cagar alam*) and wildlife sanctuaries (*suaka margasatwa*).
- <sup>41</sup> Part of the Lore Kalamanta Wildlife Reserve, particularly the forest in Palolo Valley and Dongi-dongi, formerly was a production forest under the concession of PT. Kebun Sari. Close to the end of 1970s due to low production of Agathis timber, PT Kebun Sari left its operation in Palolo Valley and Dongi-dongi.
- <sup>42</sup> The first tentative outlines for the zoning of the national park were detailed in the Lore Lindu National Park Management Plans of 1981 and 1995. Zoning was again tried in 1997 (Ministerial Letter No. 135/BKSDA/VI/1997), however, was put on hold due to proposed changes to some of the park’s boundaries. These changes eventually resulted in the exclusion of two enclave areas from the park, and in the inclusion of the northern “Gumbasa” extension. Zoning planning was made possible once again with the issuance of an information letter from the office of the Minister of Forestry and Plantations (*Menteri Kehutanan dan Perkebunan, No. 464/Kpts-II/9*) (The Nature Conservancy, *et al*, 2001b: 95).
- <sup>43</sup> Government Regulation of The Republic of Indonesia established under Decree No. 66 of 1998 concerning Natural Sanctuary and Natural Preservation Areas (Government Regulation No. 66, 1998 concerning Wildlife Sanctuaries and Environmental Conservation Areas).
- <sup>44</sup> According to the Project Administration Memorandum of the CSIADCP (ADB, 1998: 3), USAID/TNC and CSIADCP will collaborate to strengthen the capability of the Park Authority for managing biodiversity conservation and user-friendly service to park visitors, as well as the local community, on matters pertaining to several areas of concern. Those are: (1) developing and implementing a Five Year Park Management Working Plan; (2) training Park guards in relation to establishing Park boundaries and an inventory monitoring system; (3) developing visitor programs and recruiting and training staff and villagers to implement such programs; (4) conducting inventories and ecological studies as a guide for park zoning for the protection and sustainable use

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of the forest; (5) constructing guard posts, staff housing and a visitors' center, rehabilitating existing structures and providing field equipment and vehicles for Park resource monitoring purposes, and (6) constructing new and rehabilitating existing Park trails to improve access to tourist attractions in the Park, as well as to the roads outside the Park. Item components (1), (2) and (3) were funded by USAID/TNC, and item components (4), (5) and (6) were funded by the CSIADCP.

- <sup>45</sup> Sources: Position Statement Rejecting the Zoning of the Lore Lindu National Park issued by Forum Petani Merdeka, September 12, 2001; commentary and views expressed by Arianto Sangaji in a seminar (recording) for the presentation of a paper prepared by Sangaji (2001a, 2001b); letters from the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI to the Director General of Forest Conservation and Nature Conservation and to Duncan Neville at the TNC Lore Lindu Field Office; as well as a letter from the Yayasan Pendidikan Rakyat to the Governor of Central Sulawesi.

## Endnote Chapter 4

- <sup>46</sup> Chapin (2004) classifies WWF, TNC and CI as the three largest environmental NGOs in the world. In this research CI is not examined, as it is weakly related to the topic of the study.
- <sup>47</sup> Ron Arnold and Alan Gottlieb (1994) *Trashing the Economy: How Runaway Environmentalism is Wrecking America*
- <sup>48</sup> On line discussion with Jim Petterson, Director of Communications, the Nature Conservancy, Tuesday, May 6, 2003, arranged by *Washington Post*.
- <sup>49</sup> Earth First! is a UK based NGO founded in 1991, considered a new social movement as it revitalizes radical-confrontational grassroots mobilization on environmental issues and takes into account cultural identity (i.e. youth subcultures) (Rootes 2002; Diani and Donati 2002; Wall 2002).
- <sup>50</sup> WALHI founded in 1980.
- <sup>51</sup> "Interstate interactions are the relations between nation-states conceived of as unitary actors. Transgovernmental interactions refer to relations between different parts of governments across state boundaries. Transnational interactions are the relation across borders where at least one actor is not a state. These distinctions were first made by Keohane and Nye (1977) *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*" (endnote of Chapter 5, Wapner 1996: 195)
- <sup>52</sup> In 2000, Friends of the Earth International publicly confronted World Bank President James Wolfensohn with the tragic impacts of the Bank's ongoing investments in oil, mining and gas where FoE has been working closely with the surrounding community. In response, the World Bank commissioned an independent review of its financing of oil, mining and gas projects. In November 2003, a report was issued recommending that the Bank stop financing all coal and oil projects in developing countries, respect human rights, up its funding for renewable energy projects, and implement "free, prior and informed consent" for the communities and indigenous peoples that will be impacted by Bank projects (FoE International 2004)
- <sup>53</sup> At 1992, FoE joined forces to build a powerful coalition to oppose the Narmada Valley Project dam in India. The coalition consists of local peasant, women's, youth and environmental groups, as well as transnational groups, including Green Peace International and the US-based Environmental Defense Fund. The anti-dam campaign forced the World Bank – because of adverse publicity – to withdraw its funding in 1994 (Haynes 2002)
- <sup>54</sup> At present, WALHI unites more than 450 environmental NGOs throughout Indonesia's vast archipelago, with independent offices and grass-root constituencies located in 24 provinces. WALHI's organizational structure developed in a manner quite similar to that of FoE International. The federation structure of WALHI allows members to work autonomously on genuine local environmental issues. The National Executive of WALHI is responsible for coordinating and mobilizing national campaigns and advocacy, for sharing information and facilitating the activities of WALHI's Provincial Executives, and for maintaining and developing effective relations and coordination with international actors.
- <sup>55</sup> WALHI's close relationship to the government was criticized by SKEPHI (*Sekretariat Kerjasama Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia*, the NGO Network for Indonesian Forest Conservation). In the eyes of SKEPHI, WALHI had been co-opted by the government and was only taking an interest in the

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- environment, not in the human beings living in the environment (Yulianto 2003). Formed by WALHI in 1983, SKEPHI was established with the purpose of unifying and coordinating movements launched by student organizations, NGOs and other organizations to put an end to the damage being done to the forests (Sinaga 1996). As time passed, SKEPHI also became involved in advocacy for the protection of the human rights of indigenous peoples.
- <sup>56</sup> PNLH (*Pertemuan Nasional Lingkungan Hidup*, National Assembly for the Environment) is the highest level decision-making forum in WALHI, which is attended by all of the components that make up WALHI. This forum, which is held every three years, functions to formulate and enforce statutes, to set out program guidelines, and to determine the composition of the organizational bodies within the organization. Besides that, the KNLH (*Konsultasi Nasional Lingkungan Hidup*, National Consultation for the Environment) is held every year to evaluate developments in the mandate held by PNLH and to consult on strategic programs and problems. Meanwhile, National Working Meetings, attended by the National and Regional Executive Bodies of WALHI, are held regularly two times a year in line with the organization's synergy program (Yulianto 2003: 527-528).
- <sup>57</sup> This change in WALHI's orientation did not take place fluently, but could be said to have occurred rather chaotically. Not all members of WALHI – particularly not the nature lovers – supported the shift toward becoming a more political movement. They were more interested in the problem of biodiversity conservation. However, as an increasing number of pro-democracy advocates became members of WALHI, the more politically oriented elements of the organization began to dominate (Yulianto 2003: 529).
- <sup>58</sup> WALHI was also a member of INFID.
- <sup>59</sup> The Lore Lindu Dam was planned for construction in the Lindu Lake area, which is located in the Lore Lindu National Park. This project, which would have produced 76 MW of electrical power, would have raised the surface of the lake to cover the residential and agricultural areas of four villages (Puroo, Langko, Tomado, dan Anca). Besides the dam itself, the plan also included the development of a regulating weir, water tunnel, and a 23.5 km access road across the Lore Lindu National Park, which would have led to the degradation of the tropical forest in the National Park (Sangaji 2000).
- <sup>60</sup> KSPPPLL was formed in 1993 during a workshop in Lindu. This committee led by Agus Salim Feisal constituted an alliance among NGOs, students, nature lovers, and intellectuals.
- <sup>61</sup> For the first time in Sulawesi, on January 6, 1994, the around 500 students, members of NGOs and nature lovers' organizations affiliated under KSPPPLL held a demonstration rally and marched from the UNTAD campus in Bumi Nyiur to the Central Sulawesi Regional House of Representatives Building.
- <sup>62</sup> The KSPPPLL viewed the *Mercusuar* newspaper as a government mouthpiece.
- <sup>63</sup> In the same period, 1992-1994, FoE International and FoE India also succeeded in carrying out an anti-dam campaign for the Narmada Valley Project in India. (See endnote 8 above.)
- <sup>64</sup> The Central Sulawesi office of CARE initially focused on the problem of providing clean air and environmental sanitation in villages, but from 2003, CARE has also become involved in managing community based natural resource management.
- <sup>65</sup> According to Aragon (2000: 320), "the lives of Central Sulawesi people – their image of deity, their celebration of ritual, their priestly institution, their daily work habits, their economic ideals, even their domestic habits – have changed immeasurably through missionization".
- <sup>66</sup> FPD was established around 1997 by FKMP as an extension of its propaganda wing.
- <sup>67</sup> The students mentioned were from Universitas Tadulako (UNTAD), the Institut Agama Islam Negeri/ Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN/STAIN), Universitas Islam Muhammadiyah (UNISMUH), Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi (STIE), Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Akuntansi (STIA), dan Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik (STISIPOL).
- <sup>68</sup> Rully Lamajido was appointed and sworn in as the mayor of Palu by his father who held the post of Governor of Central Sulawesi at the time (Azis Lamadjido).

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- <sup>69</sup> The Democratic People's Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, PRD) was established on July 22, 1996, at the office of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, YLBHI). This party constituted an alliance with the Democratic People's Union, which had been established in May 1994 by students, farmers and artists (McGlynn 2005). Before the PRD emerged in Palu, FKMP activists had been involved in the activities of SMID (Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi). The chairman of the PRD Central Sulawesi branch at that time was Agus Salim Feisal.

## Endnote Chapter 5

- <sup>70</sup> Data set out by Aziz Tompu, the Territorial Secretary of Palolo Subdistrict, in the same period indicated a larger number, that being as many as 1,943 Family Heads or around 7,506 people.
- <sup>71</sup> For example, Syahyuti (2002: 92-93) noted that the Kaili and Kulawi tribes had to spend 6 to 7 million rupiah for a wedding ceremony, while facing very limited "input of resources". This was because the guests would come bearing only 2 liters of uncooked rice each, while they expected to fill their rice containers with food to take home with them. While the people of the Bugis tribe would spend 3 to 7 million rupiah with the support of more adequate "input of resources". Besides that, the Bugis never slaughtered any pigs for their weddings, and guests would usually provides gifts of an average of Rp. 10,000 in cash without expecting to take anything home. However, the ritual requiring the largest sums of money among the Kaili and Kulawi tribes were found to be the funeral ceremonies, which usually required the slaughtering of 2 or 3 pigs and one head of cattle.
- <sup>72</sup> PT Kebun Sari got a permit (*Hak Pengusahaan Hutan*: HPH) to exploit specific forest resources within an area of 74,000 ha in Donggala District on the basis of Forest Agreement No. FA/N/032/III/1977, dated March 28, 1977 (later extended on the basis of Forest Agreement No. FA/N-AD/008/1/1980, dated January 26, 1980), and Decision Letter No. 41/Kpts/Um/1/1978, dated Januar24, 1978 (Dinas Kehutanan Propinsi Sulawesi Tengah, 1986: 132).
- <sup>73</sup> In 1981, the production forest at Palolo Valley and Dongi-dongi that has been left over by the logging company of PT Kebun Sari, was designated as Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve and later change to Lore Lindu National Park.
- <sup>74</sup> The local people call the road mention the "Japanese Road" because it was constructed under the direction of an engineer from Japan.
- <sup>75</sup> PT Kebun Sari got a permit (*Hak Pengusahaan Hutan*: HPH) to exploit specific forest resources within an area of 74,000 ha in Donggala District on the basis of Forest Agreement No. FA/N/032/III/1977, dated March 28, 1977 (later extended on the basis of Forest Agreement No. FA/N-AD/008/1/1980, dated January 26, 1980), and Decision Letter No. 41/Kpts/Um/1/1978, dated Januar24, 1978 (Dinas Kehutanan Propinsi Sulawesi Tengah, 1986: 132).
- <sup>76</sup> The remains of the base camp and helipad structures are located approximately 200 meters from the Palolo-Napu road.
- <sup>77</sup> See also Chapter III.D. Lore Lindu National Park: History of Change and the endnote 41.
- <sup>78</sup> Head of Rahmat Village Letter No. 44/KDR/V/98, dated March 16, 1998, directed to the Governor of Central Sulawesi Province, stating that Dangaran Village is a village in Marawola Subdistrict largely adjacent to Rahmat Village.
- <sup>79</sup> Letter from the Central Sulawesi government No.66/2402/Bappedalda, June 16, 1998.
- <sup>80</sup> YPAN established in 1995 by TNC as an Indonesian sister organisation in Jakarta. In 1997, YPAN established office in Palu
- <sup>81</sup> The workshop was held in Kamarora and attended by the villagers, rattan collectors, Park Authority, CSIADCP, government of District of Donggala, and NGOs.
- <sup>82</sup> The Village Plan and Community Agreement documented comprehensively the socio-economic condition of the villages, identification of problems, community need assessment, rattan collector need assessment, village land use map, and draft of community conservation agreement.

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<sup>83</sup> Even though it was not mentioned in the meeting, however, the villagers were informed that the CSIADCP will distribute the fund according to the proposed programmes outline in the village plan.

## Endnote Chapter 6

<sup>84</sup> This FPM demonstration took place one day after a demonstration by the people who had cleared land in Tongoa on June 18, 2001. Around 60 Tongoa villagers had arrived in 2 trucks at the office of the national Park Authority to demand that their activities in the conservation area not be disrupted by the Forest Rangers. From the beginning of June they had been opening up land in the Tongoa area along km 65-68 of the Palolo-Lore Utara route.

<sup>85</sup> The Special Committee consist of Head of the Provincial Forestry Agency (Leader of the Committee), Head of the Lore Lindu National Park (Secretary), Head of the Provincial Community Service Agency, Head of the Forestry and Estate Agency of the Donggala District, and Head of the Development Planning Board of the Donggala District

<sup>86</sup> The meeting was attended by the Secretary of the Central Sulawesi Province, Provincial Forestry Agency, Provincial Development Planning Board, and Environmental Mitigation Agency of Donggala District.

<sup>87</sup> The meeting was chaired by Secretary of the Central Sulawesi Province and attended by Provincial Forestry Agency, Lore Lindu National Park, Forestry and Estate Agency of the Donggala District, Land Agency of Donggala District, Labor and Transmigration Agency of the Donggala District, Head of Subdistrict Palolo, and Head of Tongoa Village.

<sup>88</sup> Government agencies that attend the meeting were the National Park Authority, Central Sulawesi Bureau for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Forestry and Estate Agency of Donggala District. Also attend the meeting was the representative from the Indonesian Association for Forestry Entrepreneurs (*Asosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia*, APHI).

<sup>89</sup> Tongoa is an area in the lower regions of Dongi-dongi near the residential communities of Lemban Tongoa and Kamarora. This are has seen small-scale encroachment by the residents of several villages in Palolo Valley. The encroachment in this area has been sporadic an unorganized, and seems to be motivated more by illegal logging than by pressures cause by land shortage. However that may be, with the controversy surrounding the Dongi-dongi case, and the minimum amount of attention paid to the Tongoa case, the encroachment in this area could expand more openly and on a much larger scale.

<sup>90</sup> The meeting also attended by Park Authority and Head of Subdistrict (Camat) Lore Utara, District of Poso. *Pekurehua* community is located in Subdistrict of Lore Utara, District of Poso.

<sup>91</sup> The eco-populism concept was first introduced by the head of the Lore Lindu National Park in a coordinating meeting to resolve the problem of encroachment into the National Park held at the Donggala District office on June 3, 1999.

<sup>92</sup> In 2001-2002, TNC introduced the butterfly captive breeding in Kamarora. Formerly, Dongi-dongi forest was known as habitat for rich diversity butterfly species.

<sup>93</sup> The total of 1.030 Heads of households stated by FPM was much higher than the number previously announced. In a meeting at the Assembly building on June 21, 2001, the total of Heads of households was stated as 580.

<sup>94</sup> Before being set out in a written form in a charter, the contents of The Dongi-dongi Unified Charter for the Management of Natural Resources were discussed with the Head of the National Park in relation to seeking a basis of authority for the release of the Dongi-dongi area to FPM. However, in a statement issued in response to the Charter, the National Park authorities rejected this possibility by stating: "The National Park has no technical reason or the support of regulations to acknowledge any agreement on conservation, or anything else, from the people who have settled and cultivated land in Dongi-dongi. Besides that, the National Park had no accurate input concerning historical or regional backgrounds to use as a basis for acknowledging any conservation agreement, or anything else from the people who have settled and cultivated land in Dongi-dongi."

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- <sup>95</sup> Interview with Nasir Abas on March 19, 2002.
- <sup>96</sup> On October 15, 2000, on the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of WALHI, the head of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority, Banjar Y. Laban, received a national WALHI Award for his courage in establishing more populist policies in the conservation management of the National Park. One of the bold steps taken was the acknowledgement of customary territory and systems in management of natural resources in a traditional manner by several local communities in the National park area. Based on this, Laban had decided to set aside plans to move people from Katu village, which was located in the National Park, and which was designated for removal with CSIADCP funding.
- <sup>97</sup> Slide presentation of the head of the Lore Lindu Park Authority on February 2, 2002.
- <sup>98</sup> The protest by the Katopassa Foundation was not solely motivated by ecological considerations, but also by the fact that one of the holders of a Transportation Permit (IPKTM) was a member of YBHR.

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## Glossary

Acronym	Indonesian	English Equivalent
ADB	--	The Asian Development Bank
AMAK	Aliansi Adat Masyarakat Kamalisi	Alliances for <i>Kamalisi</i> Customary Community
AMAN	Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara	National Alliances for Customary Community
AMASUTA	Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Sulawesi Tengah	Central Sulawesi Alliances for Customary Community
BAL	Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria No. 5/1960	The Basic Agrarian Law
BAPI	--	Biodiversity Action Plan for Indonesia
BFL	Undang-Undang Pokok Kehutanan No. 5/1967	The Basic Forestry Law
BKKPA	Badan Koordinasi Kelompok Pencinta Alam Sulawesi Tengah	Nature Lover Coordinating Body Central Sulawesi
BTNLL	Balai Taman Nasional Lore Lindu	Lore Lindu National Park Management Authority
CBD	--	Convention on Biodiversity
CBR	Undang-Undang No 5/1990 tentang Konservasi Sumberdaya Hayati dan Ekosistemnya	Law No 5/1990 concerning The Conservation of Biological Resources and Its Ecosystems
CCA	Kesepakatan Konservasi Masyarakat (KKM)	Community Conservation Agreement
CI	--	Conservation International
CSIADCP	--	Central Sulawesi Integrated Area Development and Conservation Project

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Indonesian</b>	<b>English Equivalent</b>
DPRD Provinsi	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Provinsi	Provincial People's Representative Assembly
FIPAL	Forum Indonesia Pencinta Alam	Indonesian Forum for Nature Lover
FKTNLL	Forum Kemitraan Taman Nasional Lore Lindu	Partnership Forum for Lore Lindu National Park
FKMP	Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Palu	Communication Forum for Palu's Student
FL	Undang-Undang No 41/1999 tentang Kehutanan (UU 41/1999)	Law No 41/1999 concerning Forestry
FNBI	Front Nasional Buruh Indonesia	National Front for Indonesian Labor
FPD	Front Pemuda Demokratik	Democratic Youth Front
FPM	Forum Petani Merdeka	Independence Farmer Forum
GEF	--	Global Environmental Facilities
GOI	--	Government of Indonesia
GSM	Gerakan Sahabat Maleo	Friend of Maleo
IBSAP	--	Indonesia Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
INFID	--	International NGOs Forum on Indonesian Development
IUCN	--	International Union for the Conservation of Nature or World Conservation Union
KAU	Koalisi Anti Utang	Anti Debt Coalition

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Indonesian</b>	<b>English Equivalent</b>
KPA Sulteng	Komunitas Pencinta Alam Sulawesi Tengah	Central Sulawesi Nature-Lover Community
KSPPLL	Komite Solidaritas Penolakan Pembangunan PLTA Lore Lindu	Solidarity Committee for Anti Lore Lindu Hydro Power Plant
LBH Bantaya	Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Bantaya	Legal Aid Institute of <i>Bantaya</i>
LBHR	Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Rakyat	Legal Aid Institute for People
LMND	Liga Mahasiswa Nasional Demokratik	League of National Democratic Student
MAPATALA UNTAD	Mahasiswa Pencinta Alam Universitas Tadulako	Student Nature Lover of University Tadulako
NCP for Indonesia	--	National Conservation Plan for Indonesia
NGO	--	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRM USAID	--	Natural Resource Management (a USAID consortium for natural resource management program)
PP	Peraturan Pemerintah	Government Decree
PPA	Direktorat Perlindungan dan Pengawetan Alam	Directorate for Nature Protection and Preservation
PHKA	Direktorat Jenderal Perlindungan Hutan dan Konservasi Alam	Directorate General for Forest Protection and Nature Conservation
PKA	Direktorat Jenderal Perlindungan dan Konservasi Alam	Directorate General for Nature Protection and Conservation
SKEPHI	Sekretariat Kerjasama Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia	NGOs Networks for Indonesian Forest Conservation
SMID	Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi	Indonesian Student Solidarity for Democracy

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Indonesian</b>	<b>English Equivalent</b>
SNTP	Serikat Nelayan Teluk Palu	Fishermen Union of Palu Bay
SORAK	Solidaritas Rakyat	Solidarity of People
SPRA	Solidaritas Perjuangan Reforma Agraria	The Solidarity Struggle for Agrarian Reform
STN Donggala	Serikat Tani Nasional Donggala	National Farmer Union of Donggala
TNC	--	The Nature Conservancy
UNDP	--	United Nations Development Program
UNTAD	Universitas Tadulako	Tadulako University
USAID	--	United States Agency for International Development
UU	Undang-Undang	Law
WALHI	Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia	The Indonesian Environmental Forum
WALHI CS	Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia Sulawesi Tengah	Central Sulawesi - Indonesian Environmental Forum
WB	--	The World Bank
WCED	--	World Conference on Environment and Development
WWF	--	World Wide Fund for Nature (formerly World Wildlife Fund)
YAKIS	Yayasan Katopassa Indonesia	Katopassa Indonesia Foundation

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Indonesian</b>	<b>English Equivalent</b>
YBHR	Yayasan Bantuan Hukum Rakyat	Legal Aid for People Foundation
YEI	Yayasan Evergreen Indonesia	Evergreen Indonesia Foundation
YMP	Yayasan Merah Putih	The Red White Foundation
YPAN	Yayasan Pusaka Alam Nusantara	National Heritage Foundation
YPR	Yayasan Pendidikan Rakyat	Foundation for the Education of People
YTM	Yayasan Tanah Merdeka	Foundation for Freedom of Land

Appendix 1. List of Indonesian National Parks according to Management Status

NATIONAL PARKS	DECLARED	APPOINTED	ESTABLISHED
Sumatera			
1. Gunung Leuser	Minister of Agriculture, 1980. Area: 792,675 ha	SK MenHut No. 276/Kpts-VI/1997. May 23, 1997. Area: 1,094,692 ha	--
2. Batang Gadis	31 December 2003. Area: 108,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 126/Menhut-II/2004. April 29, 2004. Area: 108,000 ha	--
3. Siberut	SK MenHut No. 1082/Kpts-IV/92. November 21, 1992	SK MenHut No. 407/Kpts-II/1993. October 8, 1993. Area: 190,500 ha	--
4. Kerinci Seblat	Minister of Agriculture, 1982	SK MenHut No. 192/Kpts- II/1996. Area: 1,386,000 ha	SK MenHutBun No. 901/ Kpts-V/1999. Area: 1,375,349.867 ha
5. Berbak	--	SK MenHut No. 285/Kpts- II/1992. February 26, 1992. Area: 162,700 ha	--
6. Bukit Duabelas	--	SK MenHutBun No.258/Kpts-II/2000. August 23, 2000. Area: 60,500 ha	--
7. Bukit Tiga Puluh	--	SK MenHut No. 539/Kpts-II/1995. October 5, 1995. Area: 127,698 ha	SK MenHut No. 6407/Kpts-II/2002. June 21, 2002. Area: 144,223 ha
8. Sembilang	--	SK MenHut No. 76/Kpts-II/2001. Area: 205,750 ha	SK MenHut No. 95/Kpts-II/2003. March 19, 2003. Area: 202,896.31 ha

NATIONAL PARKS	DECLARED	APPOINTED	ESTABLISHED
9. Bukit Barisan Selatan	SK MenTan No. 736/X/1982. October 14, 1982. Area: 365,000 ha	--	--
10. Way Kambas	Minister of Agriculture, 1982	SK MenHut No. 14/Menhut- II/1989. Area: 130,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 670/Kpts-II/1999. Area: 125,621.3 ha
Jawa			
11. Ujung Kulon	Minister of Agriculture, 1980	SK MenHut No. 284/ Kpts-II/92. February 26, 1992. Area: 122,956 ha	--
12. Kepulauan Seribu	Minister of Agriculture 1982	SK MenHut No.162/Kpts-II/95. March 21, 1995. Area: 108,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 6310/Kpts-II/2002. July 13, 2002. Area: 107,489 ha
13. Gunung Ciremai	SK MenHut No 195/Kpts-II/2003. July 4, 2003	SK MenHut, No. 424/Menhut-II/2004. October 19, 2004. Area: 15,500 ha	--
14. Gunung Gede Pangrango	Minister of Agriculture, 1980 March 6, 1980. Area: 15,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 174/Kpts-II/2003. July 10, 2003. Area: 21,975 ha	--
15. Gunung Halimun	--	SK MenHut No. 282/Kpts-II/92. February 26, 1992. Area: 40,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 175/Kpts-II/2003. July 10, 2003. Area: 113,357 ha
16. Kepulauan Karimunjawa	SK MenHut No. 161/Menhut-II/98. February 29, 1988	SK MenHut No. 185/Kpts-II/97. Area: 111,625 ha	SK MenHut No. 74/Kpts-II/2001. Area: 110,117,3 ha
17. Gunung Merbabu	SK MenHut No 435/Kpts-II/1999. June 15, 1999	SK MenHut No. 135/Menhut-II/2004. May 4, 2004. Area: 5,725 ha	--

NATIONAL PARKS	DECLARED	APPOINTED	ESTABLISHED
18. Gunung Merapi	--	SK MenHut No. 134/Menhut-II/2004. Area: 6,410 ha	--
19. Alas Purwo	--	SK MenHut No. 283/Kpts-II/92. February 26, 1992. Area: 43,420 ha	SK MenHut No. 196/Kpts-II/1993. February 26, 1993. Area: 43,420 ha
20. Baluran	Minister of Agriculture, 1980	SK MenHut No. 279/Kpts-II/1997. March 23, 1997. Area: 25,000 ha	--
21. Bromo Tengger Semeru	Minister of Agriculture. 1982	SK MenHut No. 278/Kpts-VI/97. May 23, 1997. Area: 50,276.2 ha	--
22. Meru Betiri	SK MenTan No. 529/Kpts/Um/ 7/1982. June 21, 1982. Area: 58,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 277/Kpts-II/97. May 23, 1997. Area: 58,000 ha	--
Bali and Nusa Tenggara			
23. Bali Barat	--	SK MenHut No. 493/Kpts-II/1995. September 15, 1995. Area: 19,003 ha	--
24. Gunung Rinjani	--	SK MenHut No. 448/Kpts-II/90. Area: 40,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 280/Kpts-VI/1997. June 5, 1997. Area: 41,330 ha
25. Kelimutu	--	SK MenHut No. 279/Kpts-II/92. February 26, 1992. Area: 5,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 675/Kpts-II/97. October 10, 1997. Area: 5,356.5 ha
26. Komodo	--	SK MenHut No. 306/Kpts-II/95. June 26, 1995. Area: 173,300 ha	SK MenHut No. 172/Kpts-II/2000. June 29, 2000. Area: 173,300 ha

NATIONAL PARKS	DECLARED	APPOINTED	ESTABLISHED
27. Laiwangi-Wanggameti	--	SK MenHut No. 576/Kpts-II/98. August 3, 1998. Area: 47,014 ha	--
28. Manupeu – Tanah Daru	--	SK MenHut No. 576/Kpts-II/1998. August 3, 1998. Area: 87,984.09 ha	--
Kalimantan			
29. Betung Kerihun	--	SK MenHut No. 467/Kpts-II/95. September 5, 1995. Area: 800,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 510/Kpts-II/99. June 30, 1999. Area: 800,000 ha
30. Gunung Palung	--	SK MenHut No. 448/Kpts-II/1990. March 24, 1990. Area: 90,000 ha	--
31. Danau Sentarum	--	SK MenHut No. 34/Kpts-II/99. February 4, 1999. Area: 132,000 ha	--
32. Bukit-Baka Raya	--	SK MenHut No. 281/Kpts-II/1992. February 26, 1992. Area: 181,090 ha	--
33. Sebangau		SK MenHut No 423/Menhut-II/2004. October 19, 2004. Area: 568,700 ha	
34. Tanjung Putting	Minister of Agriculture. 1982. Area: 300,040 ha	SK MenHut No. 587/Kpts-II/1996. October 25, 1996. Area: 415,040 ha	--
35. Kayan Mentarang	--	SK MenHut No. 631/Kpts-II/1996. October 7, 1996. Area: 1,360,500 ha	--
36. Kutai	SK MenTan No. 736/Mentan/ X/1982. Area: 200,000 ha	SK MenHut No.325/Kpts-II/1995. June 29, 1995. Area: 198,629 ha	--

NATIONAL PARKS	DECLARED	APPOINTED	ESTABLISHED
Sulawesi			
37. Bunaken Manado Tua	--	SK MenHut No. 730/Kpts-II/1991. October 15, 1991. Area: 89,065 ha	--
38. Bogani Nani Wartabone	Minister of Agriculture. 1982. Area: 300,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 731/Kpts-II/1992. October 15, 1992. Area: 287,115 ha	
39. Lore Lindu	Minister of Forestry. 1982. Area: 231,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 593/Kpts-II/1993. January 26, 1995. Area: 229,000 ha	SK MenHut. No. 646/Kpts-II/1999. June 23, 1999. Area: 217,991.18 ha
40. Kepulauan Togean	SK MenHutBun No 757/Kpts-II/1999. September 23, 1999	SK MenHut No. 418/Menhut-II/2004. October 19, 2004. Area: 362,605 ha	
41. Bantimurung-Bulusaraung	SK MenHutBun No. 890/Kpts-II/1999. October 14, 1999	SK MenHut No.398/Menhut-II/2004. October 18, 2004. Area: 43,750 ha	
42. Taka Bonerate	--	SK MenHut No.280/Kpts-II/1992. February 26, 1992. Area: 530,765 ha	--
43. Rawa Aopa Watumohai	SK MenHut No. 444/Menhut-II/89. Area: 96,804 ha	SK MenHut No. 756/Kpts-II/1990. December 17, 1990. Area: 105,194 ha	--
44. Kepulauan Wakatobi	--	SK MenHut No. 393/Kpts-V/1996. October 30, 1996. Area: 1,390,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 765/Kpts-II/2002. August 19, 2002. Area: 1,390,000 ha
Maluku, Papua			

NATIONAL PARKS	DECLARED	APPOINTED	ESTABLISHED
45. Aketajawe – Lolobata	SK MenHutBun No. 415/Kpts-II/1999. June 15, 1999	SK MenHut No. 397/Menhut-II/ 2004. October 18, 2004. Area: 167,300 ha	
46. Manusela	SK MenTan No. 736/Mentan/X/ 1982. October 14, 1992. Area: 189,000 ha	SK MenHut No. 281/Kpts-VI/1997. May 23, 1997. Area: 189,000 ha	--
47. Teluk Cendrawasih	--	SK MenHut No. 448/ Menhut-VI/90. Area: 1,453,500 ha	SK MenHut No. 8009/Kpts-II/2002. August 29, 2002. Area: 1,453,500 ha
48. Lorentz	--	SK MenHut No. 154/Kpts-II/1997. March 19, 1997. Area: 2,450,000 ha	--
49. Wasur	--	SK MenHut No. 448/Menhut-VI/90. Area: 413,810 ha	SK MenHut No. 282/Kpts-VI/1997. May 23, 1997. Area: 413,810 ha

Source: Soekmadi (2002) and [www.dephut.go.id](http://www.dephut.go.id)

## Annex 2. The Component and Schedule of the CSIADCP

Component	1998		1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004		2005	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
<b>A. Project Management &amp; Institutional Strengthening</b>																
1. Setup PCU/PIUs																
2. Action plan of project																
3. Project planning management																
4. Monitoring & evaluation survey																
5. Institutional strengthening																
6. Buffer Zone Forum																
<b>B. Community Development</b>																
1. Community Development Process:																
a. Training for Planning and Staff																
b. Distribution of facilitator/ coordinator NGO to villages																
2. Community Development Fund																
a. Social Cohesion Grant																
b. Credit Cooperative Matching Fund																
3. Katu Resettlement																
a. Social and environmental study																
b. Preparation of location																
c. Village resettlement																
d. Monitoring																
<b>C. National Park Management &amp; Buffer Zone</b>																
1. Initial preparation (funded by USAID/TNC)																
2. Staff development and training																
3. Development and rehabilitation of National Park facilities																
4. Study on ecology, biodiversity and environment																
5. Border demarcation																
6. Opening and making signs for trails																
7. Ecotourism promotion																
<b>D. Village Supporting Facilities &amp; Infra Structures</b>																
1. Basic service for health																
a. Village sanitation																
b. Health service improvement																
c. Supply of basic medicines																
d. Communication network																
e. Health of birth and baby																
f. Improvement of management and participatory capability																
2. <i>Schistosomiasis</i> Control																
a. Updating data survey																
b. Integration of sectors, seminar & workshop																
c. Early warning system/laboratory rehabilitation																

Annex 2. Continue

Component	1998		1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004		2005	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
3. Agriculture production and marketing																
a. Institutional strengthening																
b. Kulawi farming systems survey																
c. Experimentation and demonstration																
d. Establishment of seedling plot																
4. Village Infra Structure																
a. Fresh water supply																
b. Main road, village road and bridge																
c. Wuasa – Puna street																
d. Village irrigation system																
e. Micro hydropower units																
f. Strengthen river bank																

Source: Project Coordination Unit – Central Sulawesi Integrated Area Development and Conservation Project (2002)

-  Implementation/Construction
- PCU Project Coordinator Unit
- PIU Project Implementation Unit

Annex 3. NGOs, Associations/Alliances & Community Organizations Involved in Dongi-Dongi Controversy

Actors	Supportive of Dongi-Dongi Occupation (Pro-Occupation)	Opposed to Dongi-Dongi Occupation (Con-Occupation)
International Based NGO	--	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Nature Conservancy (TNC)</li> <li>• CARE Indonesia – Central Sulawesi</li> </ul>
Local NGOs and Student Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People’s Legal Aid Foundation (YBHR)</li> <li>• Free Land Foundation (YTM)</li> <li>• People’s Education Foundation (YPR)</li> <li>• Palu Bay Fishermen’s Union (SNTP)</li> <li>• National Farmers Union (STN) Donggala</li> <li>• People’s Legal Aid Institute (LBHR)</li> <li>• League of National Democratic Student (LMND)</li> <li>• FNBI</li> <li>• SORAK</li> <li>• SPRA</li> <li>• YMP</li> <li>• YEI</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LBH Bantaya</li> <li>• Katopassa Foundation</li> <li>• Green Advocates</li> <li>• Jambata Foundation</li> <li>• Tadulako Student Nature Lovers (MAPATALA) University of Tadulako</li> <li>• Member of BKKPA</li> <li>• Member of KPA Central Sulawesi</li> </ul>
Associations/Alliances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WALHI Central Sulawesi</li> <li>• Central Sulawesi Customary Community Alliance (AMASUTA)</li> <li>• Kamalisi Customary Community Alliance (AMAK)</li> <li>• Katuvua Alliance</li> <li>• Student Nature Lovers Regional Information Center – Central Sulawesi</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lore Lindu National Park Partnership Forum (FKTNLL)</li> <li>• Nature Lovers Coordinating Body (BKKPA) Central Sulawesi</li> <li>• Nature Lovers Community (KPA) Central Sulawesi</li> <li>• Kabeloata Singgani Alliance</li> <li>• Tolelebunga Alliance (a mysterious organization)</li> </ul>
Local Communities/ Village Administrations/ Community Organizations/ Customary Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Independent Farmers Forum (FPM)</li> <li>• Farmers from Tuva, Pakuli, Bulili, Panimbo, Vatutela, Pandere, Lindu, Sirenja &amp; Dodolo</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor Farmers Solidarity Forum (FSPM)</li> <li>• Pekurehua Customary Community</li> <li>• Farmers and Leaders of Rahmat Villages (Head &amp; Secretary of Village, Chief of Customary Council, etc.)</li> <li>• Leaders of Sintuwu Village (Head &amp; Secretary of Village, Chief of Customary Council, &amp; other formal &amp; non-formal leaders)</li> <li>• Urban Farmers Community Forum</li> <li>• Pitungga Ngata Kaili Customary Council</li> </ul>

#### Appendix 4. Dongi-Dongi Road Count on Houses

	Obs-01	Obs-02	Obs-03	Obs-04	Obs-05	Obs-06	Obs-07	Obs-08	Obs-09
	12/06/2001	11/12/2001	11/03/2002	29/03/2002	28/04/2002	10/07/2002	10/11/2002	13/12/2002	10/01/2003
comments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2
length of Dongi2 area [km]	?	?	17	17	17	17	18	19	19
houses	0	387	655	697	709	748	795	830	885
houses with metal roof	0	0	5	6	13	25	42	55	62
stone house	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
shops	0	3	3	8	3	20	8	19	12
shops with metal roof	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
shop, stone house	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
small eating place	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
saw mill	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
churches	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
churches with metal roof	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
mosque	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
school	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>total of houses</i>	0	390	664	712	726	794	846	924	964

Source of data: Christian Schultz, STORMA researcher.

Notes:

Obs-1 12/06/2001: could not visit Kamarora because STORMA researchers was banned from this area.

?: not measured

<sup>1</sup> Four additional houses 2 km after Dongi-Dongi already close to logging road to Rore Katimbu; two additional houses 6 km after Dongi-Dongi (1 km after Danau Kalimpaa).

<sup>2</sup> One house with metal roof also has a satellite antenna.

#### Appendix 4. Continued

	Obs-13	Obs-14	Obs-15	Obs-16	Obs-17	Obs-18	Obs-19	Obs-20	Obs-21
	25/01/2003	31/01/2003	20/02/2003	31/03/2003	15/08/2003	01/09/2003	11/10/2003	26/04/2004	27/09/2004
comments	3	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
length of Dongi2 area [km]	19,5	19	?	19	19,5	19,5	?	19	?
houses	889	899	910	936	930	886	932	889	813
houses with metal roof	63	69	88	97	143	182	186	203	243
stone house	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3
shops	15	17	18	16	10	14	14	6	8
shops with metal roof	0	3	7	14	14	7	6	6	6
shop, stone house	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	1
small eating place	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	1
saw mill	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0
churches	2	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	4
churches with metal roof	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
mosque	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
school	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
<i>total of houses</i>	970	994	1029	1069	1104	1097	1148	1115	1079

Source of data: Christian Schultz, STORMA researcher.

Note:

? : Not measured

<sup>3</sup> Very likely this count is not accurate

<sup>4</sup> One shop is a stone house

Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich diese Dissertation selbständig, ohne fremde Hilfe und unter Benutzung der angegebenen Literatur angefertigt habe.

Bogor, August 15, 2005

Soeryo Adiwibowo